Karen Cohen Kinnett Versus Jarred Brandon Kinnett

KAREN COHEN KINNETT NO. 17-CA-625

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

JARRED BRANDON KINNETT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 768-195, DIVISION "E"
HONORABLE JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

August 06, 2020

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Jude G. Gravois, and Robert A. Chaisson

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FHW
JGG
RAC

WICKER, J.; CONCURS WITH REASONS
FHW

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
KAREN COHEN KINNETT
Allison K. Nestor
Leonard L. Levenson

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
JARRED BRANDON KINNETT
Jacqueline F. Maloney
Tracy G. Sheppard

COUNSEL FOR INTERVENOR/APPELLANT,
KEITH EDWARD ANDREWS
Thomas A. Robichaux
Stephanie A. Fratello
Sharon L. Andrews
Desiree M. Valenti

COUNSEL FOR MINOR/APPELLEE,
G. J. K., MINOR CHILD
Ramona G. Fernandez, Supervising Attorney
Loyola University New Orleans, College of Law
Lindsay Dean, Student Practitioner
Ashley Fisher, Student Practitioner
Elizabeth Fox, Student Practitioner

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Honorable Jeffrey M. Landry
David J. Smith, Jr.
Jeffrey M. Wale

WICKER, J.

DNA evidence establishes a 99.99% probability that Appellant, Keith

Andrews, is the biological father of the minor child G.J.K. Mr. Andrews

intervened in divorce proceedings between Appellee, Karen Cohen Kinnett, the

child’s mother, and her husband, Appellee Jared Brandon Kinnett, to file an

avowal action to establish the paternity of G.J.K. on February 10, 2017. At the

time, G.J.K. was eighteen months old. Mr. Andrews appeals the judgment of the

trial court sustaining Mr. Kinnett’s exception of prescription or peremption,

resulting in a dismissal of Mr. Andrews’ petition to establish paternity.

On March 23, 2018, this Court stayed this appeal and remanded the matter to

the trial court to afford the parties the opportunity to properly address the

constitutionality of Louisiana Civil Code art. 198 as raised by both Mr. Andrews

and the Stuart H. Smith Law Clinic at Loyola Law School (“Law Clinic”),

representing the child’s interests. On remand, the trial court found that Mr.

Andrews failed to meet his burden of proving the statute unconstitutional.

Therefore, Mr. Andrews also appeals the trial court’s January 10, 2019 judgment

excluding his evidence on constitutionality and finding Louisiana Civil Code art.

198 to be constitutional.

For the reasons elucidated below, we find that the trial judge erred in his

June 2, 2017 judgment finding that the avowal action was perempted. Therefore,

we reverse the June 2, 2017 judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to

the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As we have

resolved this case based upon our interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code art. 198,

we decline to address the statute’s constitutionality.

17-CA-625 1

FACTS1

Karen and Brandon Kinnett were married on January 24, 2009. On August

29, 2011, their daughter, B.A.K., was born. Thereafter, beginning in the late

summer or fall of 2013, Ms. Kinnett engaged in an extramarital affair with Mr.

Andrews. Mr. Andrews testified that the relationship consisted mostly of

infrequent sexual encounters for several reasons. First, although Ms. Kinnett

expressed unhappiness with her marriage, telling Mr. Andrews that she slept in her

daughter’s bedroom instead of with her husband, she was reluctant to leave the

marriage.2 Second, Mr. Andrews was preoccupied with opening a restaurant while

simultaneously maintaining his solo law practice at the time the affair began.

Finally, the necessity of keeping the relationship a secret combined with both

parties’ busy schedules made meeting on a regular basis difficult.

Furthermore, soon after the affair with Ms. Kinnett began, Mr. Andrews

started dating another woman and suggested to Ms. Kinnett that they end their

affair. According to Mr. Andrews’ testimony, Ms. Kinnett did not want to end

their relationship, but the already infrequent encounters became even more

sporadic, occurring only once every two or three months.

The last intimate encounter between Mr. Andrews and Ms. Kinnett occurred

on November 15, 2014. Mr. Andrews testified that the NuvaRing® birth control

device Ms. Kinnett used throughout their relationship was present during the

encounter. Ms. Kinnett testified to having ten years’ experience using that birth

control method.

With the exception of two text messages between Ms. Kinnett and Mr.

Andrews five days later, the parties did not communicate thereafter for over five

1
These facts are based upon the testimony given at the June 2, 2017 hearing before the district court. Mr.
Kinnett called Mr. Andrews, and thereafter, Mr. Andrews called Ms. Kinnett to give testimony.
2
According to Mr. Andrews’ testimony, Ms. Kinnett was waiting for a more stable job situation before
taking steps to end her marriage.

17-CA-625 2

months, until May 7, 2015. Ms. Kinnett was pregnant in May and testified that she

knew then that Mr. Andrews was possibly her child’s father. She did not,

however, tell Mr. Andrews then that she was pregnant or that he might be the

father. G.J.K. was born on August 5, 2015. Mr. Andrews testified that he made

several attempts to contact Ms. Kinnett via text message in the months between

November 2014 and September 1, 2015, without response.

On September 1, 2015, Mr. Andrews tried texting Ms. Kinnett again, and

she responded. He testified that she apologized for not answering his texts and

explained that she had had sexual relations with her husband one night, had gotten

pregnant, and had had a baby “with” her husband. She further explained that she

was staying in her marriage for the sake of the children. Mr. Andrews testified

that, during the September 1st conversation, it crossed his mind that he could be

the child’s father, but he testified further that, at that point, he did not recall the

date of his last sexual encounter with Ms. Kinnett. During that communication,

Ms. Kinnett did not tell Mr. Andrews when G.J.K. had been born or how old he

was then. Ms. Kinnett, while initially testifying, “I told him it was my husband’s

child,” eventually restated, “I think the message was that I had had a baby and that

I was trying to work on my marriage.”3 She also testified that she believed her

husband was her child’s father, and that her belief was confirmed when the baby

was born looking exactly like Mr. Kinnett.

After the September 1, 2015 text exchange, communication between Mr.

Andrews and Ms. Kinnett was limited to occasional texts as friends.4 Fifteen

months later, on December 9, 2016, Ms. Kinnett called Mr. Andrews by phone.

3
Mr. Andrews’ attorney confronted Ms. Kinnett with her prior testimony before the Domestic
Commissioner on April 12, 2017, wherein she initially testified that she told Mr. Andrews that her
husband was the child’s father, but on further questioning declared, “[a]ctually, I don’t even recall if I—I
think the message was that I had had a child and that I was trying to work on my marriage.”
4
Mr. Andrews testified that the only time he saw Ms. Kinnett in person between the date of their last
sexual encounter and December 10, 2016, was about three weeks before she called to tell him he was
G.J.K.’s father. He ran into Ms. Kinnett with her mother and two children at the Starbucks near his home
and exchanged a brief greeting.

17-CA-625 3

During that conversation, she informed him that she had performed a sibling DNA

test on her two children and learned that Mr. Kinnett was not G.J.K.’s biological

father.

After hanging up, Ms. Kinnett immediately texted Mr. Andrews photographs

of G.J.K. and wished him “Happy Father’s Day.” The two texted throughout that

evening and into early the next morning. In one text Ms. Kinnett stated, “I’ll never

be able to ask your forgiveness enough. He’s a precious guy. He’s lucked out

with you.”

Ms. Kinnett testified that she conducted the sibling paternity test to “prove to

Brandon that it was his child” after he remarked that he did not think G.J.K. looked

like him.5 She also alleged that when she informed Mr. Andrews of his paternity,

he told her that he had suspected that the child was his since first learning of the

birth.

On December 10, 2016, Mr. Andrews met Ms. Kinnett and G.J.K. at a

testing facility for a DNA paternity test. She called him thereafter on December

14th, to inform him that the test confirmed his biological paternity of G.J.K. On

January 12, 2017, she informed Mr. Kinnett that he was not G.J.K.’s biological

father, and on January 14, 2017, she filed for divorce. On January 30, 2017, Mr.

Andrews, Ms. Kinnett, and G.J.K. all submitted for an additional DNA test. The

February 2, 2017 results confirmed that Mr. Andrews is the child’s biological

father to a scientific certainty of 99.999999998%. Mr. Andrews attached a copy of

the January 30th test results to his avowal petition filed eight days later on

February 10, 2017.

5
Mr. Kinnett gave no indication to the court that he harbored suspicions about G.J.K.’s paternity prior to
January of 2017.

17-CA-625 4

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Kinnett commenced the instant litigation by filing for divorce on

January 14, 2017. She sought joint custody with Mr. Kinnett of their daughter,

B.A.K., but sole custody of her son, G.J.K. On January 27, 2017, Mr. Kinnett filed

his Answer and Reconventional Demand disputing Ms. Kinnett’s contention that

awarding her sole custody of G.J.K. would be in the child’s best interest, urging

instead that joint custody be granted.

On February 10, 2017, Mr. Andrews filed a Petition in Intervention to

Establish Paternity and to Obtain Custody of G.J.K. In his petition, Mr. Andrews

alleged that Ms. Kinnett had concealed his possible paternity until December 9,

2016, and sought an order establishing paternity and an action to obtain custody.

On February 21, 2017, Mr. Kinnett answered Mr. Andrews’ intervention

with Exceptions of No Cause and/or No Right of Action, Prescription, and

Peremption, arguing that Mr. Andrews’ avowal action was perempted under

Louisiana Civil Code art. 198 because he failed to file an action within one year of

G.J.K.’s birth. On February 24, 2017, the court appointed the Loyola Law Clinic

to represent the interests of the minor child. Ms. Kinnett first filed a memorandum

opposing the exceptions on April 10, 2017, however, on May 31, 2017, she filed a

second memorandum supporting the exceptions. On appeal, Ms. Kinnett adopted

the arguments in Mr. Kinnett’s appellee briefs.

At the initial April 12, 2017 hearing, the Domestic Commissioner denied the

exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action as to paternity, and granted

the exception of no cause of action as to custody. He also granted the exception of

peremption, finding that Mr. Andrews should have known G.J.K. was his child

given that he had “intimate contact” with Ms. Kinnett nine months prior to the

child's birth. Mr. Andrews objected to the Commissioner's ruling, contending in

17-CA-625 5

pertinent part that the “time limitations in Civil Code article 198 are

constitutionally invalid.”

The parties tried the exceptions de novo before the district court on June 2,

2017. The district court judge ruled from the bench denying the exceptions of no

cause of action and no right of action as to paternity, but granting the exceptions of

no cause of action and no right of action as to custody and visitation. The judge

further held that Mr. Andrews’ avowal action was perempted under Article 198

based on his finding that (a) Mr. Andrews had not proven “that the mother was

actually in bad faith and intended to deceive,” and (b) he had filed his avowal

action more than a year from the time the judge determined he knew or should

have known that he was G.J.K.’s father. The trial court declined to rule on the

constitutionality of the statute and denied Mr. Andrews’ motion for additional time

to notify the attorney general and further plead the constitutionality issue. Mr.

Andrews appealed the June 2, 2017 judgment to this Court.

On March 23, 2018, this Court stayed this appeal and remanded the case to

the trial court to allow Mr. Andrews the opportunity to amend his petition and

appropriately challenge the constitutionality of Article 198. Kinnett v. Kinnett, 17-

CA-625, per curiam, p. 4. On April 6, 2018, Mr. Andrews filed his First

Supplemental and Amending Petition, formally challenging Article 198’s

constitutionality, thereafter notifying the Louisiana Attorney General as required

by law. The Law Clinic filed a memorandum in support of Mr. Andrews’

Supplemental and Amending Petition on June 4, 2018.

The hearing on the constitutional challenge was initially set for June 13,

2018. However, a volley of motions prompted a continuance to address the issues

raised by the parties. On May 12, 2018, Mr. Kinnett moved to strike the portions

of Mr. Andrews’ petition in which he alleged that he had provided financial

support and started spending time with G.J.K. after December 9, 2016, on the

17-CA-625 6

grounds that whether the biological father had established a relationship with the

child was not relevant to the question of constitutionality. Ms. Kinnett filed a

motion in limine to prevent Mr. Andrews from testifying or presenting evidence of

the same at the constitutionality hearing. Mr. Kinnett also filed a motion in limine

to prevent Mr. Andrews from presenting expert testimony and evidence, arguing

that only briefs and arguments were appropriate.6

On October 16, 2018, the court granted both motions in limine. While the

trial court recognized the possibility that “constitutional scholars, legislators, or

those who possess highly specialized knowledge of the legislative history of the

law in question” might serve as witnesses, the court found that neither the opinion

of Dr. Sonnier nor the testimony of Mr. Andrews was related to “whether the

statute serves a legitimate government purpose of protecting the status of a child

vis-á-vis his mother and father, his family, his classmates, and the world.”7

On November 5, and December 18, 2018, the district court heard arguments

on the constitutionality of Article 198. The Hon. William C. Credo, III, presided

as judge pro tempore.8 On January 10, 2019, the court issued its written judgment,

holding “that La. Civ. Code art. 198 is constitutional… Keith Edward Andrews

failed to submit evidence that Article 198 violates either substantive or procedural

rights to due process or that it fails to protect a fundamental liberty interest, as

alleged in his First Supplemental and Amending Petition.” On June 12, 2019, this

Court lifted the stay on the appeal and set deadlines for the parties to file

supplemental briefs solely on the issue of Article 198’s constitutionality.

6
Mr. Andrews’ expert witness, Dr. Loretta Sonnier, is a board-certified forensic child and adolescent
psychiatrist. In her expert report, Dr. Sonnier expressed the opinion that “the application of Article 198 in
GJK’s case is more likely to cause him harm than prevent harm.”
7
Although Mr. Andrews asserted that Dr. Sonnier’s expertise in the science of child development would
“aid the court in determining whether the law works to protect children,” the court denied the need for
such testimony stating, “the issue is not whether the statute works or is drawn with child development
science in mind.”
8
In August of 2018, Judge John Molaison was elected to this Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court
thereafter appointed Mr. William C. Credo, III to the district court bench until the election of Judge
Molaison’s successor.

17-CA-625 7

On appeal, Mr. Andrews argues (1) that the trial court erred in its

interpretation and application of Article 198, and (2) that the statute itself is

unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. It is well settled that courts should

avoid addressing constitutional questions when a case can be disposed of on non-

constitutional grounds. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &

Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L.Ed.2d 645

(1988); M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d

16, 25, amended on reh'g (9/19/08); Crown Beverage Co. v. Dixie Brewing Co.,

Inc., 96-2103 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/28/97), 695 So.2d 1090, 1093, writ denied, 97-

1711 (La. 10/13/97), 703 So.2d 615; Bize v. Larvadain, 18-394 (La. App. 3 Cir.

12/28/18), 263 So.3d 584, 592 (citing State v. Lanclos, 07-0082 (La. 4/8/08), 980

So.2d 643, 647-48), reh'g denied (2/13/19), writ denied, 19-0419 (La. 5/6/19), 270

So.3d 577. Likewise, statutes are presumed constitutional, and when the

interpretation of a statute is at issue, this Court “must construe a statute so as to

preserve its constitutionality when it is reasonable to do so.” Carver v. Louisiana

Dep't of Pub. Safety, 17-1340 (La. 1/30/18), 239 So.3d 226, 230.

Therefore, we first address Mr. Andrews’ claims that the trial court erred in

interpreting and applying Article 198. We begin with a discussion of the statutory

language and the relevant legislative history.

I. LOUISIANA’S FILIATION LAW

Louisiana Civil Code art. 198 addresses actions to avow paternity of a child

and provides,

A man may institute an action to establish his paternity of a child
at any time except as provided in this Article. The action is strictly
personal.
If the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the action
shall be instituted within one year from the day of the birth of the child.
Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith deceived the father of the child
regarding his paternity, the action shall be instituted within one year
from the day the father knew or should have known of his paternity, or

17-CA-625 8

within ten years from the day of the birth of the child, whichever first
occurs.
In all cases, the action shall be instituted no later than one year
from the day of the death of the child.
The time periods in this Article are peremptive.

The general rule is that a man may bring an action to establish his paternity of a

child at any time. However, the Louisiana legislature has established time

limitations on the right to avow in two distinct instances—when the child is

presumed to be the child of another man, and when the child has died. See La.

C.C. art. 198, Revision Comment (d). A child born during a marriage or within

300 days of its termination is presumed to be the child of the mother’s husband.

La. C.C. art. 185. Therefore, because Ms. Kinnett was married at the time G.J.K.

was born, Mr. Andrews’ paternity action was subject to the one-year peremptive

period that began on the day G.J.K. was born.

A. Peremption

Peremption, by definition, designates a period of time for which a right

exists and cannot be renounced, interrupted, or suspended. La. C.C. arts. 3458 &

3461; Succession of Pizzillo, 65 So.2d 783, 786 (La. 1953). However, as to Article

198, the legislature saw fit to include an exception to the default rule. See infra

Section I.B. In the event the mother in bad faith deceives the father as to his

paternity, the peremptory period does not begin to run until the moment in time at

which the father knows or should know of his paternity. La. C.C. art. 198. If the

exception applies, the father has one year from that time to file an avowal action,

provided that the action is filed within ten years of the child’s birth; otherwise a

further peremptory period of ten years precludes bringing the action.9

9
The legislature expressly defined the Article 198 time limitations as peremptive. As a matter of law,
nothing may interfere with the running of a peremptive period, including contra non valentem exceptions,
but Article 198 explicitly includes such an exception that suspends the running of the peremptory period.
See In re Medical Review Panel of Gerard Lindquist, 18-444 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/23/19), 274 So.3d 750,
755–56, writ denied, 19-01034 (La. 10/1/19) (doctrine of contra non valentem prevents the running of a
prescriptive period when (1) “there is some legal cause which prevented the court or its officers from
taking cognizance of and acting on the plaintiff's actions;” (2) “there is some condition coupled with the

17-CA-625 9

B. Legislative History

Because the ultimate goal when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the

intent of the legislature, we review the legislative history of Civil Code arts. 191

and 198. Fontenot v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 95-1425 (La. 7/2/96), 676 So.2d 557,

562. In 1991, the Louisiana State Law Institute began meeting with the House

Marriage/Persons Committee to draft legislation that would eventually result in

Act of the Louisiana Legislature No. 192 of 2005. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Who’s

Your Momma, Who are Your Daddies? Louisiana’s New Law of Filiation, 67 LA.

L. REV. 307, 307-08 (2007). The detailed legislative history of Act 192 reflects the

legislature’s attempt to balance the biological father’s interest in an opportunity to

parent against the explicit state policy of preserving the intact marriage and the

best interests of the child.

House Bill 368 was filed during the 2004 regular session—on the

recommendation of the Louisiana Law Institute—and testified to by Katherine

Spaht, chairperson of the Louisiana Marriage/Persons Committee. H.R. 368, 30th

Reg. Sess. (La. 2004) (failed House final passage); Louisiana House of

Representatives, Civil Law Committee (4/5/2004), H.B. 368 available at

https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/VideoArchivePlayer?v=house/2004/apr/0405

_04_CL# (48:13:00). The legislation’s purpose was to provide for the filiation of

children, and the bill included provisions aimed at updating the law to more closely

align biological and legal paternity and address questions raised by evolving

societal norms and scientific and technological advances.10 Spaht, supra, at 314.

contract or coupled with the proceedings which prevented the plaintiff from suing or acting;” (3) “the
defendant has done some act effectually to prevent the plaintiff from availing himself of his cause of
action;” or (4) “the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though his
ignorance is not induced by the defendant”) (emphasis added). However, the Article 198 exception,
requiring the mother’s bad faith deceit, is consistent with the legislature’s practice of including a fraud
exception even when the time for filing suit is distinctly peremptive. See La. R.S. 9:5604(E) (actions for
professional accounting liability), 9:5605(E) (actions for legal malpractice), and 9:5606(E) (actions for
professional insurance agent liability).
10
For example, questions raised by scientific developments permitting pregnancy by surrogacy and
assisted conception prompted the Law Institute to include, for the first time, a provision in the law
identifying the mother for purposes of filiation. La. C.C. art. 184; see Spaht, supra, at 309.

17-CA-625 10

By far the most controversial articles the Law Institute proposed dealt with the

issue of “dual paternity,” which was “considered by the Law Institute Council on

six separate occasions.” Spaht, supra, at 308.

House Bill 368’s answer to the question “whether the law should permit a

child to have two legally recognized fathers” was proposed Article 197, allowing

for an action by the child to establish paternity, and Article 198, recognizing a

biological father’s action to avow his child. See Spaht, supra, at 321-22. While

the Law Institute concluded, based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision

in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,11 that “denying the biological father of a child the right

to establish his filiation when another man was presumed to be the father was not

unconstitutional,” the Institute opted to retain the jurisprudentially created concept

of “dual paternity” granting the second father, if recognized, “all the legal rights

and obligations of a legal father.” Spaht, supra, at 321-22 & nn. 94-96. Yet, due to

concern for the child’s best interest, the proposed legislation placed far stricter

limitations on the biological father’s ability to establish paternity than those

imposed on the child. Id. at 322-23.

House Bill 842, a stand-alone dual paternity statute with the same language

as House Bill 368’s proposed Article 198, was introduced in the House during the

same session as a precaution in the event that House Bill 368 was held up in

committee. H.B. 842, 30th Reg. Sess. (La. 2004) (Original) (enacted as 2004 La.

Acts, No. 530 § 1, eff. June 25, 2004) repealed by 2005 La. Acts, No. 192 § 1, eff.

June 29, 2005; Louisiana House of Representatives, Civil Law Committee

(4/5/2004), H.B. 842 (statement of Rep. Johns), available at

https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/VideoArchivePlayer?v=house/2004/apr/0405

_04_CL# (2:47:00-2:47:30).12

11
491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1989).
12
Both bills went through virtually identical amendments, and eventually House Bill 842 became Act of
the Legislature 530 of 2005, which created Louisiana Civil Code Article 191. 2004 La. Acts, No. 530.

17-CA-625 11

As originally drafted, both bills allowed the biological father to institute an

avowal action only if the marriage between the child’s mother and her husband (the

presumed father) had terminated. However, if that condition was satisfied, House

Bill 368 placed no time restriction on filing the action as long as the child was

living. Upon the death of the child, the father’s action was subject to a one-year

peremptory period. See H.B. 368, 30th Reg. Sess. (La. 2004) (Original), Art. 198

Revision Comments 2004 (c), (f), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/

ViewDocument.aspx?d=272841. Almost immediately, however, House Bill 368

was amended to require the biological father to institute his avowal action within a

peremptory period of two years from the date of the child’s birth. See H.B. 368

(Engrossed), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d

=272843; La. H.R. JOURNAL, 30th Reg. Sess., April 6, 2004, at 9. H.B. 842, 30th

Reg. Sess. (La. 2004) (Original).

The house then voted to strike the language that denied the biological father

the right to avow his paternity if the child’s mother was married, providing instead

a two-year period from the date of the child’s birth to institute the action,

regardless of the mother’s marital status. See Louisiana House Floor Debate, May

11, 2004, H.B. 368, available at https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/

VideoArchivePlayer?v=house/2004/may/0511_04_Day26_2004RS (1:37:50-

1:40:06); H.R. JOURNAL, 30th Reg. Sess., May 11, 2004, at 30. Concern that the

law based a man’s right to claim his child on the mother’s marital status, especially

when DNA evidence renders the father certain of his paternity, prompted the

revision. See Louisiana House Floor Debate, April 7, 2004, H.B. 368 (statements

by Rep. Robbie Carter), available at https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/

VideoArchivePlayer?v=house/2004/apr/0407_04_Day07_2004RS (1:13:58-

17-CA-625 12

1:18:45).13 The amendment’s author was vehemently opposed to denying a

biological father access to the courts and, therefore, the right to be recognized as

the father of his child based on a condition that was out of his control. Id.

As is evident from the comments to Article 198’s originally proposed

language, the Law Institute and some opponents of the amendment believed that

denying the biological father the right to avow his child was necessary when the

mother was still married to the presumed father. See Louisiana House Floor

Debate, May 11, 2004, H.B. 368 (statements by Rep. Bowler), available at

https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/ VideoArchivePlayer?v=house/2004/may/

0511_04_Day26_2004RS (1:44:15- 1:45:14). Although jurisprudence “recognized

the right of a father to institute an avowal action as a predicate to, or simultaneous

with the exercising of parental rights,” the comments stated that denying the

biological father the right to establish his paternity when the mother was still

married “serve[d] to protect a currently intact family unit to which the child

belong[ed].” See H.B. 368 (Engrossed), Art. 198 cmts (a)-(c) available at

http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ ViewDocument.aspx?d=272843.

Other opponents of the amendment and the law as originally drafted opined

that even the two-year peremptory period was too restrictive if the biological father

did not become aware of his paternity until after the two years had passed. See

Louisiana House Floor Debate, May 11, 2004, H.B. 368, available at

13
The debates in the House emphasized a choice between upholding the presumption that the husband of
the mother is the father of the child—by depriving the biological father of the right to avow and have a
relationship with his child—and having the law recognize biological fact, which protects the rights of the
biological father, but also, arguably, potentially harms the child.
The Law Institute and the House Committee chose to give the presumption absolute deference
when the mother remained married to the father for two years after the child’s birth, defending this
decision by asserting the best interests of the child were better served by preserving the intact family. The
drafters of the statute acknowledged that the statute’s purpose was to encourage marriage and children
born in wedlock. They also tacitly admitted that losing the right to be filiated to the child was the father’s
punishment for sleeping with and conceiving a child with a married woman. See H.B. 368 (Engrossed),
Art 198 cmt (b). The importance of the child’s interest in having a stable home environment, see La. C.C.
art. 198 cmt (e), and a settled parentage, Spaht, supra, at 313, 316, 323, outweighed any interests the
child and the biological father may have in a relationship with each other and any interest the child has in
knowing the truth.

17-CA-625 13

https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/VideoArchivePlayer?v=house/2004/may/051

1_04_Day26_2004RS (1:40:06-1:42:36). In response to these latter concerns,

another amendment was proposed providing that “if the mother in bad faith

deceived the father of the child regarding his paternity, the action shall be

instituted within one year from the date the father knew or should have known of

his paternity, but no more than ten years from the date of birth of the child.” Id. at

(1:47:31-1:58:35); H.R. JOURNAL, 30th Reg. Sess., May 11, 2004, at 30. The bad

faith amendment prompted two major questions.

First, when asked whether the biological father had any recourse if the

mother “in good faith believe[d]” that her husband was her child’s father, the

amendment author replied that the exception would apply only if the mother was in

bad faith, but continued with an example of bad faith that had been discussed in

committee hearings. See Louisiana House Floor Debate, May 11, 2004, H.B. 368,

available at https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/VideoArchivePlayer?v=house/

2004/may/0511_04_Day26_2004RS (1:48:48-1:50:02). In the case referenced, a

child was born during a marriage, and, upon divorce, the wife informed the

husband that the child was the biological child of another man she had been having

an affair with. Id. No details were given about statements the mother made to the

husband during the marriage or how long the mother had known that the husband

was not the child’s biological father, but the amendment author stated that the wife

had deceived the husband for a number of years, so, in essence, she was in bad

faith.

The author’s hypothetical prompted another question: in the case of bad faith

deception, why limit the biological father’s right to file an avowal action to ten

years from the birth of the child? See id. at (1:50:02-1:51:07). The amendment’s

author responded that the exception was an attempt to balance the biological

father’s interests with the best interests of the child. Id. If a child had been living

17-CA-625 14

in a stable home for more than ten years and had built a strong relationship with

the man presumed to be his father, even if the mother was in bad faith, the Law

Institute did not believe the biological father should have a right to disrupt that

child’s life. Id. at (1:48:15-1:48:37); see Louisiana Civil Code art. 198 cmt. (e).

The amendment incorporating the bad faith exception was adopted by a vote

of 78 to 17. H.R. JOURNAL, 30th Reg. Sess., May 11, 2004, at 30. Thereafter,

House Bill 368 failed to pass in its entirety. Id. at 31. However, the stand-alone

dual paternity statute (H.B. 842), as amended to mirror the proposed Article 198,

passed the House by a vote of 91 to 6. H.R. JOURNAL, 30th Reg. Sess., May 12,

2004, at 40.

Act of the Legislature No. 530 (H.B. 842) was signed into law on June 25,

2004, creating Louisiana Civil Code art. 191, which provided,

A man may establish his paternity of a child presumed to be the child
of another man even though the presumption has not been rebutted.
This action shall be instituted within two years from the date of birth of
the child, except as may otherwise be provided by law. Nonetheless, if
the mother in bad faith deceives the father of the child regarding his
paternity, the action shall be instituted within one year from the date the
father knew or should have known of his paternity, but no more than
ten years from the date of birth of the child.

During the 2005 Regular Session, the Law Institute recommended House

Bill 91, again proposing changes to the law of filiation after House Bill 368 failed

to pass. H.B. 91, 31st Reg. Sess. (La. 2005); S. GREENSHEET DIGEST, H.B. 91, p.2,

31st Reg. Sess. (La. 2005). The proposed Article 198 replaced Civil Code art. 191

as enacted in 2004 with one substantive change that shortened the peremptory

period to one year from the date of the birth of the child unless the mother in bad

faith deceived the father as to his paternity. See La. C.C. art. 198 cmt. (a); S.

GREENSHEET DIGEST, H.B. 91, p.2, 31st Reg. Sess. (La. 2005); 2005 La. Acts No.

192.

17-CA-625 15

II. WHETHER TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AVOWAL
ACTION WAS PEREMPTED

Mr. Andrews raises several assignments of error relating to the trial court’s

application of Article 198 to the facts of this case, which resulted in a ruling that

Mr. Andrews’ avowal action was untimely filed and, therefore, perempted. First,

Mr. Andrews argues that the trial court incorrectly placed the burden of proof on

him to prove that Ms. Kinnett “in bad faith deceive[d]” him as to his paternity

instead of requiring Mr. Kinnett, as the exceptor, to prove that Mr. Andrews’

claim was perempted. Second, Mr. Andrews argues that the trial court erred in

interpreting the phrases “in bad faith deceived” and “knew or should have known.”

Finally, he argues that the trial court erred in finding that there was no evidence of

bad faith deception on Ms. Kinnett’s part.

For the reasons clearly delineated below, we find that the trial court erred in

placing the burden of proof upon Mr. Andrews to prove Ms. Kinnett’s bad faith

deceit. However, even if the burden of proof was properly upon Mr. Andrews, the

evidence establishes that the trial court’s finding on the issue of bad faith deceit

was manifestly erroneous. Further, upon de novo review, we find that the evidence

establishes that Mr. Andrews’ avowal action was timely filed less than one year

after he knew or should have known of his paternity.

A. Standard of Review

An exception of peremption is a peremptory exception. La. C.C.P. art.

927(A)(2). As peremption has been characterized as a form of prescription, the

rules governing the burden of proof and standard of review for prescription apply.

See, e.g., Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 08-1163 (La. 5/22/09), 16 So.3d 1065,

1082. Peremptive statutes are strictly construed against peremption and in favor of

the claim. Rando, 16 So.3d at 1083.

17-CA-625 16

When a hearing is held on a peremptory exception prior to trial, evidence

may be introduced to support or controvert the exception. La. C.C.P. art. 931. If

no evidence is presented, the court must decide the exception of peremption on the

facts alleged in the petition accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true. Lomont v.

Bennett, 14-2483 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So.3d 620, 627. When evidence is introduced,

the court will decide the facts based on the evidence presented, and the trial court's

factual conclusions are subject to a manifest error or clearly wrong standard of

review. Id.; La. C.C.P. art. 931; see, e.g., Bijeaux v. Broyles, 11-830 (La. App. 3

Cir. 2/8/12), 88 So.3d 523, 526, writ denied, 12-0970 (La. 6/22/12), 91 So.3d 971.

B. June 2, 2017 Hearing

At the onset of the June 2, 2017 hearing, brief argument was made as to

which party bore the burden of proof on the exception of peremption. Mr.

Kinnett’s counsel admitted to carrying the burden of proof on the exception but

argued that he needed to prove only that the avowal action was filed more than one

year after the child’s birth. Once Mr. Kinnett met that burden, his counsel argued,

the burden shifted to Mr. Andrews to prove that Ms. Kinnett deceived him in bad

faith as to his paternity and that he did not know and should not have known that

fact. Mr. Andrews’ counsel countered that the burden should remain with the

exceptor, as Mr. Andrews had affirmatively pled an exception to peremption in his

avowal petition.

Ultimately, before the judge ruled on the issue, Mr. Kinnett’s counsel

offered to proceed first and called Mr. Andrews to the stand. Thereafter, despite

Mr. Andrews’ request to present first if the judge placed the burden of proof upon

him, the judge permitted Mr. Kinnett’s counsel to proceed.

Still, upon review, it appears the trial court placed the burden of proof for

the peremption exception on Mr. Andrews. The trial court’s oral reasons for

judgment given from the bench reflect that, rather than focusing on Ms. Kinnett’s

17-CA-625 17

behavior and possible motives, the trial judge was most concerned with Mr.

Andrews’ responsibility upon being told that a woman he had been intimate with in

the past year had given birth to a child. After Mr. Andrews testified that Ms.

Kinnett had led him to believe that she knew Mr. Kinnett was the child’s father, the

trial judge referred to Mr. Andrews’ testimony that when Ms. Kinnett first told him

she had given birth to a child in the fall of 2015, “it ran through my mind that there

was a possibility I could be the father of the child.”

Rather than considering whether it was more probable than not that Ms.

Kinnett intentionally insinuated or affirmatively stated that Mr. Kinnett and not

Mr. Andrews was G.J.K.’s father, and whether such an act qualifies as bad faith

deception, the trial court questioned how Mr. Andrews could possibly claim that he

was deceived when it crossed his mind that he could be the father and Mr.

Andrews failed to satisfy what the judge believed was “a moral and a legal

obligation to simply ask, is this my child?”

While an appeal is taken from the judgment, not the trial court’s reasons for

judgment, a trial court’s oral or written reasons may be considered in determining

whether the court committed legal error. See Winfield v. Dih, 01-1357 (La. App. 4

Cir. 4/24/02), 816 So.2d 942, 948; Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571 (La. 4/1/11), 61

So.3d 507, 572. When the trial court commits an error that interdicts the fact-

finding process, it is appropriate for the appellate court to review the record de

novo and render judgment. See Winfield, 816 So.2d at 948; Evans v. Lungrin, 708

So.2d 731, 735 (La. 1998). Therefore, having determined that the burden of proof

was placed on Mr. Andrews, we now determine whether that decision constituted

legal error.

C. Burden of Proof

While the party who raises the exception of peremption generally bears the

burden of proof, when peremption is evident on the face of the pleadings, the

17-CA-625 18

plaintiff will bear the burden of proving that the claim is not perempted. See, e.g.,

Bijeaux, 88 So.3d at 526; Carriere v. Bodenheimer, Jones, Szwak, & Winchell,

L.L.P., 47,186 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/22/12), 120 So.3d 281, 283-84, overruled by

Lomont, 172 So.3d 620.

Mr. Kinnett argues that, as Mr. Andrews’ claim was filed more than one

year after G.J.K.’s birth, it was perempted on its face. Therefore, the trial court

was correct in requiring Mr. Andrews to prove Ms. Kinnett’s bad faith deceit.

However, in Lomont v. Bennett, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that when a

plaintiff’s petition makes a prima facie showing that the claim was timely filed

because a statutory exception rendered the peremptive period inapplicable, the

burden of proof remains with the party who filed the exception. 172 So.3d at 626-

27. See also Gerard Lindquist, 274 So.3d 750; N.G. v. A. C., 19-307 (La. App. 3

Cir. 10/2/19), 281 So.3d 727.

Article 198 contains a statutory exception that will prevent the running of

the peremptory period and states in pertinent part, “if the mother in bad faith

deceived the father of the child regarding his paternity, the action shall be

instituted within one year from the day the father knew or should have known of

his paternity.” Reading the plain language of the statute, the question of when Mr.

Andrews learned of his paternity arises only in the event that Ms. Kinnett deceived

him in bad faith as to his paternity. Therefore, Mr. Andrews was required to plead

both that Ms. Kinnett deceived him in bad faith, and also that he did not know and

should not have known of his paternity for more than one year before filing his

avowal action.

In his paternity petition, Mr. Andrews specifically alleged that, after having

sex with Ms. Kinnett in November of 2014, he had no further contact with her until

fall 2015, at which time, he alleged, Ms. Kinnett told him that she had become

pregnant by her husband and had a son “with him.” The petition further alleged

17-CA-625 19

that Ms. Kinnett concealed that Mr. Andrews was possibly G.J.K.’s father until

December 9, 2016, when she called to inform him that a sibling DNA test had

revealed that her husband was not the child’s father. Furthermore, Mr. Andrews’

petition specifically alleged that, because of the previously delineated facts, the

time period for filing his action was one year from the day he knew or should have

known of his paternity, December 9, 2016. In light of the allegations contained in

Mr. Andrews’ petition, we find that—as Mr. Andrews specifically pled a statutory

exception which would render the peremptive period inapplicable—Mr. Kinnett, as

the party claiming peremption, bore the burden of proving that the bad faith

deception exception provided for in Article 198 was not applicable, and it was

error for the trial court to assign the burden of proving bad faith deception to Mr.

Andrews.

Placing the burden of proof on the wrong party is legal error that will

interdict the fact-finding process by placing a more onerous standard than the law

requires on one of the parties. Barnett v. Barnett, 15-766 (La. App. 5 Cir.

5/26/16), 193 So.3d 460, 466 (citing Leger v. Leger, 03-419 (La. App. 3 Cir.

7/2/03), 854 So.2d 955, 957). Therefore, the trial court’s factual findings—that

Ms. Kinnett was not in bad faith and also that Mr. Andrews knew or should have

known of his paternity on September 1, 2015—are no longer entitled to the

manifest error standard of review. Id. (citing Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La.

2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 735). Since the record is otherwise complete, we will

conduct a de novo review to determine whether Mr. Kinnett satisfied his burden of

proving that Article 198’s bad faith deception exception to peremption did not

apply in Mr. Andrews’ case by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, either

that Ms. Kinnett did not engage in bad faith deception or that Mr. Andrews knew

or should have known of his paternity for more than one year prior to filing his

avowal action. For the reasons elucidated below, we find that Mr. Kinnett failed to

17-CA-625 20

meet his burden of establishing that the bad faith deception exception did not

apply.

D. “In Bad Faith Deceives”

The trial court found “no evidence to suggest . . . that Mrs. Kinnett satisfied

the technical wording of the statute in being, quote unquote, in bad faith and being

deceptive.”14 Rather, the trial court found that if Ms. Kinnett believed the child

was Mr. Kinnett’s, and she told Mr. Andrews that the child was her husband’s

based on this belief, “then she wouldn’t be deceptive. She might have been

mistaken[,] but she wasn’t deceptive.”

Reviewing the trial court’s judgment requires us to take up res nova the

interpretation of Article 198’s phrase “in bad faith deceives.” A law that is clear

and unambiguous shall be applied as written when “its application does not lead to

absurd consequences.” La. C.C. art. 9. But, “[w]hen the literal construction of a

statute produces absurd or unreasonable results, ‘the letter must give way to the

spirit of the law and the statute construed so as to produce a reasonable result.’”

Fontenot, 676 So.2d at 562 (quoting Green v. Louisiana Underwriters Insurance

Co., 571 So.2d 610, 613 (La. 1990). While the plain meaning of the words is a

relevant consideration for statutory interpretation, see La. C.C. art. 11,15 as

discussed above, the ultimate goal is to give effect to the intention of the

legislature. See, e.g., Fontenot, 676 So.2d at 562. In determining the generally

prevailing meaning of terms used within a statute, dictionaries may “provide a

useful starting point . . . by suggesting what the legislature could have meant by

using particular terms.” Hopkins v. Howard, 05-0732 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/5/06), 930

So.2d 999, 1005 (quoting 2A Norman Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction

§ 47:28 (6th ed. 2000)).

14
The trial court relied in large part upon two text messages introduced into evidence to reach his factual
findings. See infra note 33.
15
“The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning.”

17-CA-625 21

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “bad faith” as “[d]ishonesty of belief,

purpose, or motive” and lists the following types of bad faith that have been

recognized in judicial decisions: “evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of

diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a

power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other

party's performance.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Bad faith has

also been defined as

the opposite of “good faith,” generally implying or involving actual or
constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a
neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation,
not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by
some interested or sinister motive. Term ‘bad faith’ is not simply bad
judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a
wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different
from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.

Bordelon v. Medical Center of Baton Rouge, 03-0202 (La. 10/21/03), 871 So.2d

1075, 1083 n.7.

Black’s Law Dictionary recognizes “good faith” to include, among other

things, “honesty in belief or purpose” and “the absence of malice and the absence

of design to defraud or seek unconscionable advantage.” Id.; BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Good faith does not include various types of

conduct that are characterized as “bad faith” because “they violated community

standards of decency, fairness[,] or reasonableness.” Good faith, BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

The definition of “deceit,” according to Black’s Law Dictionary includes

both “intentionally leading someone to believe something that is not true; an act

designed to deceive or trick,” and “[a] false statement of fact made by a person

knowingly or recklessly (i.e., not caring whether it is true or false) with the intent

that someone else will act on it.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

17-CA-625 22

First, we address Mr. Kinnett’s16 argument that Ms. Kinnett could not

deceive Mr. Andrews as to his paternity because she did not know who the father

of her child was at the time of her September 1, 2015 conversation with Mr.

Andrews. Ms. Kinnett testified that she contacted Mr. Andrews to inform him of

his paternity within twenty minutes of learning the truth herself on December 9,

2016. Mr. Kinnett argues that before receiving the test results, as evidenced by a

post filing text message she sent to Mr. Andrews in February of 2017, Ms. Kinnett

believed, “I did not deceive you. I had no idea.” Therefore, Mr. Kinnett posits,

there is “no evidence that [Ms. Kinnett] provided fraudulent statements that created

a false belief in [Mr. Andrews’] mind.”

This argument has two distinct parts. First, Mr. Kinnett argues that Ms.

Kinnett could not have the intent to deceive if she relayed information she believed

to be true or that she had no way of knowing was false. As will be further

discussed below, being unsure of who the father was is not the same as having no

idea who the father might be. Ms. Kinnett did not allege that she informed Mr.

Andrews of the fact that he was possibly the father of the child she bore, although

she admitted on the witness stand that she was aware of that possibility during her

pregnancy and when the child was born.

Conversely, Mr. Andrews testified that during the September, 2015

conversation, Ms. Kinnett informed him that she had sexual relations with her

husband, got pregnant, had a son, and was staying in her marriage for the sake of

her children. That brings us to the second part of Mr. Kinnett’s argument, that

“deceit” requires a false statement. Therefore, if Ms. Kinnett’s version of the

conversation accurately reflects what she said, she relayed only the truth. She

16
By the June 2, 2017 hearing, Ms. Kinnett had aligned herself with Mr. Kinnett, arguing in favor of
peremption. Mr. Kinnett’s arguments on the issue of whether Ms. Kinnett deceived Mr. Andrews in bad
faith as to his paternity have since been fully adopted by Ms. Kinnett in briefs to this Court.

17-CA-625 23

admits to saying that she “had a baby, and that [she] was trying to work on [her]

marriage.”

Article 198’s legislative history, discussed in detail above, reveals the

legislature’s original purpose in adding the bad faith exception was to provide a

route to avowal for men who do not become aware of their paternity until after

the peremptory period has lapsed. See discussion supra, Section I.B. In

particular, the legislature’s discussion regarding the hypothetical woman who

“holds an honest belief” that her husband is the father and the author’s response

to his own hypothetical— that a woman who first informs her husband that

another man is her child’s father upon divorce is guilty of deceiving her husband

for a number of years—along with the exception’s wording, disclose the

legislature’s intended meaning of the terms “bad faith” and “deceit” and a

concomitant inability to contemplate a scenario wherein a man could be truly

unaware of his paternity without bad faith deceit on the part of the mother. Id.

This exchange also emphasizes the fact that the words “bad faith” and “deceit,” as

intended by the legislature, have specific definitions in the law.17

Very little case law has interpreted the bad faith deception exception since

Article 198’s passage. However, the Third Circuit briefly addressed the same

exception contained in Article 191, Article 198’s predecessor. See Mouret v.

Godeaux, 04-496 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/10/04), 886 So.2d 1217, 1221, 1222 n. 2. In

Mouret, the biological father received DNA proof of his paternity within three

months of the child’s birth, but failed to file an avowal action for more than two

years thereafter. Id. at 1219. However, the Mouret court pointed out that there

was no evidence in that case that the mother “concealed information about [the

17
A concept of law bearing upon questions of bad faith, deceit, and fraud provides that a person is liable
for remaining silent only when there is a duty to speak. See e.g., McCarthy v. Evolution Petroleum Corp.,
14-2607 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So.3d 252, 258. The bad faith amendment’s legislative history indicates that
body’s belief that the mother has a duty to speak.

17-CA-625 24

child] from Mr. Mouret,” or “actively or passively created a misimpression about

the child’s paternity.” Id. at 1222 n.2.

The question is, then, does a mother, who has singular knowledge of the

men with whom she has been intimate, the dates on which she has had sexual

encounters with each, the effectiveness of her birth control method if any, her

menstrual cycle, and the approximate date of conception, have a duty to inform

both the legal and the potential biological father(s) of the possible paternity of the

biological father(s)? To interpret Article 198 to permit a mother to prevaricate,

dissimulate, and engage in perfidious silence as to a man’s potential paternity and

yet be found innocent of deceiving the putative father in bad faith—because she

lies by omission rather than by commission of a false statement—flies in the face

of the common definition of both “bad faith” and “deceit,” belies Article 198’s

legislative history, and leads to unjust results.

Further, such an interpretation calls into question the statute’s

constitutionality.18 Another well-settled principle of law requires that when a

statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which would render it

unconstitutional or raise grave constitutional questions, this Court must adopt the

interpretation of the statute which, without doing violence to its language, will

maintain its constitutionality.” M.J. Farms, Ltd., 998 So.2d at 31-32 (citing

Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So.2d 398, 416-417 (La. 1988)); Metro Riverboat

18
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that a biological father’s right to the opportunity to
develop a relationship with his child is a constitutionally protected interest deserving of Due Process
protection. In re A.J.F., 00-0948 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 47, 57. Imposing a duty on the mother to
inform the biological father of the possibility of his paternity would serve the state’s explicit policy
interest in protecting the child and settling his paternity early. While it would not serve the state’s goal of
preserving the intact family, because an avowal action would disrupt the marriage, once a spouse engages
in an extra-marital affair, it is questionable whether the State’s interest in preserving that union is
legitimate, much less compelling. Also, short of imposing an affirmative duty on the mother to inform all
possible fathers of their potential paternity, extending the biological father’s right to avow the child in the
face of the mother’s silence incentivizes her to come forward early. A mother’s choice to conceal that a
man is the possible father of her child from all interested parties, thereby preserving her intact family with
a falsehood, should not serve to terminate the biological father’s right to an opportunity to establish a
relationship with his child.

17-CA-625 25

Associates, Inc. v. Louisiana Gaming Control Bd., 01-0185 (La. 10/16/01), 797

So.2d 656, 662; Crown Beverage Co., 695 So.2d at 1093.

Finally, as we explain below, there is no set of circumstances wherein a

woman—who has had sexual relations with more than one man during the period

of possible conception—may have an “honest belief” that one man, and not the

other, is the father. Thus, based upon the foregoing, we find that a mother’s act

of withholding pertinent information or creating a misimpression through

statements, actions, or inactions satisfies the definition of “deceives” within the

context of Article 198.

Mr. Kinnett additionally asserts that there is “no evidence that [Ms. Kinnett]

made a false statement knowingly or recklessly, with or without the intent that [Mr.

Andrews] would act on it” because “[w]hen Karen and [Mr. Andrews]

communicated on September 1, 2015, she did not doubt that her husband was the

father of G.J.K.” Mr. Kinnett argues, as the trial court found, “She might have

been mistaken, but she wasn’t deceptive.” He argues that Mr. Andrews presented

insufficient evidence to refute Ms. Kinnett’s statement that she “had no idea” who

the actual father of her child was prior to the December 9, 2016 sibling DNA test

results. However, we find that Ms. Kinnett may not escape being found deceitful

and in bad faith based upon her claim that she believed Mr. Kinnett fathered her

child.

As discussed above, Ms. Kinnett had singular knowledge of the date on

which she had intimate relations with both men,19 her attentiveness to her chosen

birth control method on each occasion,20 and the date on which the baby was due

19
In spite of telling Mr. Andrews that she did not sleep with her husband, by necessity, Ms. Kinnett
would have had to have been intimate with both men within a relatively short period of time for her to
harbor a hope that her husband was the biological father and to conceal from her husband both her
infidelity and the possibility that he was not the father of her child.
20
Testimony from the various hearings suggests that Ms. Kinnett’s choice of birth control depended on
Ms. Kinnett’s application of the device at a certain time for it to be effective. Mr. Andrews testified that,
after the fact of his paternity became known, Ms. Kinnett admitted to inserting the device a week late.

17-CA-625 26

as given to her by her treating physician. Moreover, Ms. Kinnett admitted to

knowing that Mr. Andrews could be her child’s father throughout her pregnancy

and after G.J.K.’s birth. When asked “[a]t any time, while you were pregnant . . .

were you aware that he [Mr. Andrews] could be the father,” Ms. Kinnett

responded, “I was aware that he could be, but I believed that my husband was the

father.” She testified, “He was in a relationship and he ended things with me, so

why would I tell him I was pregnant?”

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “good-faith mistake” as “[a]n honest error

that involves neither cynical sabotage nor subconscious bias against accomplishing

something.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Moreover, “[a] party

alleging good faith can not (sic) close her ears to information or her eyes to

suspicious circumstances. She must not act blindly or without reasonable

precautions.” Succession of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 320, 29 So.2d 860, 863 (La.

1947).

Either Ms. Kinnett had not been intimate with her husband during the period

G.J.K. was conceived—and therefore knew that Mr. Andrews was the child’s

father and failed to disclose his paternity to him—or she had been intimate with

both her husband and Mr. Andrews—and therefore did not know for certain who

the child’s father was—yet failed to tell Mr. Andrews that he could possibly be her

child’s father. If, however, Ms. Kinnett had been intimate with both her husband

and Mr. Andrews during the period of conception, it was impossible for Ms.

Kinnett to truthfully assert or insinuate to anyone that she was sure that Mr. Kinnett

was the father of her child. It was also impossible for her to have an honest belief

that Mr. Kinnett was definitely G.J.K.’s father. Minimally, Ms. Kinnett engaged in

self-deception, and her dishonesty of belief cast her in bad faith.

Mr. Andrews’ counsel desisted from questioning Ms. Kinnett about her use of the NuvaRing® birth
control device around the time G.J.K. was conceived after the trial judge stated that the information was
irrelevant because no birth control method, aside from abstinence, is 100% effective.

17-CA-625 27

As to whether Ms. Kinnett engaged in more than self-deception, intending

in September, 2015 to deceive Mr. Andrews in bad faith, there is no evidence to

suggest that Ms. Kinnett did not intend for Mr. Andrews to believe that her

husband was G.J.K.’s father until she revealed the DNA results on December 9,

2016. Ms. Kinnett’s act of keeping her pregnancy a secret, her testimony

regarding her beliefs about G.J.K.’s parentage, her recollections of the September

1, 2015 conversation with Mr. Andrews, and the actions of both Mr. Andrews and

Ms. Kinnett in the sixteen months between September 1, 2015 and December 9,

2016, fail to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Kinnett did

not deceive Mr. Andrews in bad faith regarding his paternity.

The substance of the September 1, 2015 exchange between Mr. Andrews

and Ms. Kinnett is the subject of multiple versions. Mr. Andrews testified that

Ms. Kinnett told him that she “had gotten together with her husband one random

night” and that her husband was the father of the child she had given birth to

some weeks earlier.21

Ms. Kinnett’s testimony regarding the information she relayed to Mr.

Andrews during their September 1, 2015 conversation is inconsistent. In

response to requests for admission, she admitted that “in the fall of 2015 . . . when

you (Ms. Kinnett) informed Keith Andrews . . . that you had given birth to a

child, you informed Keith Andrews that Jarred Brandon Kinnett was the child’s

father.”22 Later, at the hearing on the exceptions before the Domestic

Commissioner, after Ms. Kinnett reversed her litigation position from supporting

Mr. Andrews’ petition to opposing it, Ms. Kinnett responded “yes” when asked if

21
Mr. Andrews testified that he was told only that Ms. Kinnett had a “newborn,” not the child’s age or the
date of birth.
22
Ms. Kinnett was cross-examined at the June 12, 2017 hearing on her responses to requests for
admission. Thereafter, Mr. Andrews offered the responses into evidence without objection. The clerk of
court, however, failed to properly record that the exhibit had been “received.” When the transcript and
the clerk’s record are inconsistent, the transcript prevails. See, e.g., State v. Galle, 11-0930 (La. App. 4
Cir. 2/13/13), 107 So.3d 916, 934.

17-CA-625 28

she informed Mr. Andrews that “Mr. Jared Brandon Kinnett was the child’s

father.” However, when subsequently asked, “[y]ou specifically told Mr.

Andrews that,” she responded, “I told him that I had a child and that I was trying

to work on my marriage.” Confused by the exchange, the Commissioner asked

her to clarify whether she told Mr. Andrews that the child was her husband’s; she

initially responded, “yeah, I told him it was my husband’s child.” However, she

then continued, “[a]ctually, I don’t even recall if I—I think the message was that I

had had a baby and that I was trying to work on my marriage.”

Regardless of the exact language she used on September 1, 2015, Ms.

Kinnett was clear about her intentions during that conversation. Both during the

April 12, 2017 hearing before the Domestic Commissioner and the June 2, 2017

hearing before the district court, she explained that she informed Mr. Andrews of

her intentions to stay in her marriage and work it out with her husband because

she “did not want to talk to [Mr. Andrews]” or “be bothered by him anymore.”

She further testified that she had no doubts that Mr. Kinnett was the father of her

child.

In keeping with our duty to interpret the statute in a manner that preserves

its constitutionality, we find as a matter of law that a married woman—whose

husband is presumed to be the father of her child—who knows that it is possible

that another man is the child’s biological father has a duty to inform that man of

his possible paternity. Failure to so inform the possible biological father is bad

faith deceit as contemplated in Civil Code art. 198. Therefore, for the

aforementioned reasons, we find that Mr. Kinnett did not satisfy his burden of

proving that Ms. Kinnett did not deceive Mr. Andrews in bad faith regarding his

paternity of G.J.K. However, even if the trial judge correctly placed the burden

of proof upon Mr. Andrews, we find that there was no factual basis for the trial

court’s finding that Ms. Kinnett did not engage in bad faith deceit.

17-CA-625 29

In the absence of legal error, we would review the trial court’s findings of

fact on the issue of bad faith deception for manifest error. See Wooley, 61 So.3d at

554. When reviewing factual findings for error, the relevant question is not

whether the finding was right or wrong, but whether the conclusion reached by the

finder of fact was reasonable. Id. at 555 (citing Stobart v. State through Dept. of

Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993)). However, a reviewing

court does not simply search the record for some evidence that supports the trial

court’s finding; the record when viewed in its entirety must establish a reasonable

basis for the trial court’s conclusion. Id. at 554-55. Under the manifest error

standard, the appellate court may reverse a finding of fact when the appellate court

reviews the record in its entirety and determines (1) that a reasonable factual basis

does not exist for the finding, and (2) that the record establishes that the fact finder

was clearly wrong. Lomont, 172 So.3d at 633 (citing Bonin v. Ferrellgas, 03-3024

(La. 7/2/04), 877 So.2d 89, 94-95).

The trial court accepted Ms. Kinnett’s testimony that she believed her

husband was G.J.K.’s father, both during her pregnancy and after the baby was

born, as well as her contention that she was completely unaware of the fact that

Mr. Andrews was G.J.K.’s biological father until she received the results of the

sibling DNA test on December 9, 2016. Prior to that date, the trial court opined,

if Ms. Kinnett told Mr. Andrews that she thought her husband was G.J.K.’s

father, she might have been mistaken but not deceptive.

When findings of fact are based on judgments regarding the credibility of

witnesses, the trial court’s determinations are entitled to great deference. Id.;

Wooley, 61 So.3d at 554. However,

[w]here documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's
story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on
its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's
story, the court of appeal may well find manifest error or clear

17-CA-625 30

wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility
determination.

Id. at 554 (quoting Rossell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844-45 (La.1989)).

Our review of the entire record, as discussed above, leads us to conclude that

there was no factual basis upon which the trial court could reasonably conclude

that Ms. Kinnett did not deceive Mr. Andrews in bad faith regarding his paternity

of G.J.K., and that finding was manifestly erroneous.

Ms. Kinnett’s version of events, as discussed in detail above, was

inconsistent, ever evolving, and implausible such that it was clear error for the

trial court to credit her story. Her testimony changed regarding whether she told

Mr. Andrews her husband was her child’s father. As discussed above, the finding

that Ms. Kinnett was honest in her testimony that she believed her husband, and

not Mr. Andrews, was her child’s father is not supported by the evidence.

Furthermore, if Ms. Kinnett believed her husband was the child’s father, the

likelihood that she told Mr. Andrews that the child was her husband’s increases,

which would mean that she made a speculative statement as fact, having no

justification for believing that it was anything more than speculation.

The evidence and testimony presented establish that Ms. Kinnett, knowing

that Mr. Andrews was at least fifty percent likely to be the child’s father,

concealed the pregnancy then informed or implied to Mr. Andrews that her

husband was the father. The timing of both the DNA test and admission to Mr.

Andrews of his paternity just before she filed for divorce supports Mr. Andrews’

testimony that Ms. Kinnett claimed the child was the child of her marriage until

December, 2016. Based upon the evidence Mr. Andrews presented, it is more

probable than not that Ms. Kinnett deceived him as to the child’s paternity until

she was ready for a divorce in December, 2016.

17-CA-625 31

Further, the trial court’s finding that Ms. Kinnett was not in bad faith was

an error of material fact as this finding limited the peremptory period within

which Mr. Andrews was required to file an avowal action to one year from his

child’s birth.23 As we find the trial court here committed both a reversible error

of law and a manifest error of material fact and the appellate record is sufficient,

it is incumbent upon us to re-determine the facts de novo from the entire record

and render a judgment in this case on the merits. Wooley, 61 So.3d at 555 (citing

Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 94-1252 (La. 2/20/95), 650 So.2d 742, 745).

Therefore, we now examine the trial court’s finding that Mr. Andrews did not file

his avowal action within one year of the date that he knew or should have known

of his paternity.

E. “Knew or Should Have Known”

After Ms. Kinnett informed Mr. Andrews of G.J.K’s birth and that she

intended to attempt to make her marriage work in September of 2015, he did not

insert himself into her marriage by filing a paternity action or attempting to see the

child.24 However, he submitted to a DNA paternity test the day after her December

9, 2016 phone call. His avowal action was filed within three months of the date

Ms. Kinnett alleged she first discovered Mr. Andrews’ paternity and informed him

of it.

As he expressed in his oral reasons for judgment, the trial court granted the

exception of peremption, in part, because it found that Mr. Andrews failed to file

his avowal action within one year from the day he knew or should have known of

23
Unless Ms. Kinnett is found to have in bad faith deceived Mr. Andrews as to his paternity, the court
does not appropriately consider the issue of when Mr. Andrews knew or should have known of his
paternity.
24
To interpret the statute to require a possible biological father to interject himself into an intact marriage
in a manner that would, in all probability, cause intense marital strife based upon a thought that “crossed
[his] mind” when the mother said she was trying to make the marriage work would flout the Louisiana
Legislature’s stated public policy of protecting both the intact marriage and the child “from the upheaval
of such litigation and its consequences in circumstances where the child may actually live in an existing
intact family with his mother and presumed father.” La. C.C. art. 198 cmt. (e).

17-CA-625 32

his paternity—September 1, 2015. In other words, the judge applied the

peremptory period provided for if Article 198’s bad faith exception is triggered.

That date being also outside the one-year period from the day of the child’s birth—

the default peremptory period for filing an avowal action pursuant to Article 198—

the trial court granted the exception of peremption without an in-depth analysis of

whether the mother in bad faith deceived Mr. Andrews as to his paternity.25

We find that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Article 198’s “knew

or should have known” language, and therefore, manifestly erred in finding that

Mr. Andrews knew or should have known that he was G.J.K.’s father after his

September 1, 2015 conversation with Ms. Kinnett, that finding being unsupported

by the record.

As discussed above, we begin our interpretation of “knew or should have

known” by looking first to the language of the statute itself, giving words their

ordinary meaning. La. C.C. art. 11; In re Succession of Boyter, 99-0761 (La.

1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122, 1128-29. We do not question whether the trial court was

aware of the generally prevailing meaning of the phrase “knew or should have

known” itself, but rather, whether the trial court committed an error of law when it

found that Mr. Andrews was required to file his avowal action one year from the

date he knew or should have known that a possibility existed that he was G.J.K.’s

father.

The definition of "knowledge,” according to Black’s Law Dictionary, is

“[a]n awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in

which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact.” BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Knowledge may be attributed to an individual

25
After explaining the case law and evidence that led to his conclusion that Mr. Andrews “certainly knew
or should have known” of his paternity more than one year prior to February 10, 2017, the trial court
found “there’s been no evidence to suggest to me that Mrs. Kinnett satisfied the technical wording of the
statute in being, quote unquote, in bad faith and being deceptive. But the statute is clear that he shall
institute within one year of the day he knew or should have known of his paternity.”

17-CA-625 33

when there is “[d]irect and clear knowledge” and also when a person has

“[k]nowledge of information that would lead a reasonable person to inquire

further.” Id.

“Constructive knowledge,” refers to the “knowledge that one using

reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to

a given person.” Id. In the context of determining whether a person had

knowledge sufficient to trigger the running of a prescriptive period, “constructive

knowledge” denotes “whatever notice is enough to excite attention and put the

injured party on guard and call for inquiry.” See, e.g., Campo v. Correa, 01-2707

(La. 6/21/02), 828 So.2d 502, 510-11 (medical malpractice); Thompson v.

Thompson, 14-963 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/4/15), 159 So.3d 1121, 1125 (citing In re

Succession of Bernat, 13-277 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/9/13), 123 So.3d 1277, writ

denied, 13-2640 (La. 2/7/14), 131 So.3d 865). Such notice is tantamount to

knowledge or notice of everything to which a reasonable inquiry may lead.

Campo, 828 So.2d at 511.

A mere apprehension does not trigger the running of peremption. Murray v.

Ward, 18-1371 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/10/19), 280 So.3d 625, 630, writ denied sub

nom. Murray v. Samuel C. Ward, Jr. & Associates, LLC, 19-01149 (La. 10/21/19),

280 So.3d 1166. Rather a plaintiff must receive facts from which a reasonable

person would assume the ultimate fact at issue exists. See, e.g., Id. at 630 (“A

plaintiff's mere apprehension that something may be wrong is insufficient to

commence the running of peremption unless the plaintiff knew or should have

known through the exercise of reasonable diligence that his problem may have

been caused by acts of malpractice.”); see also Powell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr.,

Inc., 52,462 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 265 So.3d 1184, 1186. The ultimate issue

in determining whether a person had constructive knowledge sufficient to

commence a peremptive period is the “reasonableness of the plaintiff’s action or

17-CA-625 34

inaction in light of his education, intelligence, and the nature of the defendant’s

conduct.” See, e.g., Wells v. Zadeck, 11-1232 (La. 3/30/12), 89 So.3d 1145, 1151.

There is a difference between what the plaintiff knew or should have known

at the relevant time and what he could have known through further research.

Gerard Lindquist, 274 So.3d at 761; Wells, 89 So.3d at 1152. The inquiry into the

reasonableness of the plaintiff’s action or inaction properly focuses on the

knowledge he actually possessed. See Wells, 89 So.3d at 1152. Furthermore, for

the cause of action to be reasonably knowable to the plaintiff, such that the

peremptive period begins to run, the plaintiff must have “knowledge of facts

strongly suggestive” of the ultimate issue and there must be no effort by the

defendant “to mislead or cover up information [that] is available to plaintiff

through inquiry.” Powell, 265 So.3d at 1187.

When the defendant’s fraud or bad faith prevents the filing of the action

within the statutory peremptive or prescriptive period, this Court has held that, “the

mere availability of information, in and of itself, cannot serve as sufficient

constructive knowledge of a plaintiff's cause of action to start the running of

prescription.” Gerard Lindquist, 274 So.3d at 761 (citing Lennie v. Exxon Mobil

Corp., 17-204 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/27/18), 251 So.3d 637, 646, writ denied, 18-1435

(La. 11/20/18), 256 So.3d 994). When a plaintiff has been “lulled into a course of

inaction in the enforcement of his right by reason of some concealment or

fraudulent conduct on the part of the defendant, or because of the defendant's

failure to perform some legal duty whereby the plaintiff has been kept in ignorance

of his rights,” the plaintiff is excepted from the effects of prescription. Gerard

Lindquist, 274 So.3d at 759 (citing Carter v. Haygood, 04-0646 (La. 1/19/05), 892

So.2d 1261, 1269). See Fontenot v. Houston General Ins. Co., 467 So.2d 77, 80

(La. App. 3 Cir. 1985) (“employer who lulls an injured employee into a false sense

17-CA-625 35

of security is estopped from interposing a plea of prescription to a worker's

untimely suit for compensation benefits”). See also Lomont, 172 So.3d at 634-35.

Since Article 198 was enacted, no court has been called upon to address a

biological father’s delay in filing an avowal action in the face of the mother’s

statements that she had been intimate with her husband and was trying to make her

marriage work. However, prior to the 2005 incorporation of dual paternity into the

Civil Code, courts refused to find that a biological father’s delay in filing an

avowal action was unreasonable in “circumstances which impute[d] much of the

delay to the mother.” T.D. v. M.M.M., 98-0167 (La. 3/2/99), 730 So.2d 873, 876-

77, abrogated by Fishbein v. State ex rel. Louisiana State Univ. Health Scis. Ctr.,

04-2482 (La. 4/12/05), 898 So.2d 1260. See Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So.2d 287,

292 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1985) (When the mother effectively causes the delay in the

biological father’s filing of an avowal action, the delay is not unreasonable so as to

preclude avowal).

In T.D. v. M.M.M., the mother informed the biological father that she

suspected he was the father of the child. 730 So.2d at 874. Since she was not

intimate with her husband at the time of conception, she also advised him of the

child’s paternity. Id. The biological father regularly visited the child and the

mother during the years-long affair, and DNA testing confirmed his paternity to a

99.5% probability. Id. at 875. Once the mother and her husband divorced, the

mother terminated her affair with the biological father and refused to allow him to

see the child. Id. Finding that the father failed to file his avowal action earlier

because he had regularly visited the child while in a relationship with the mother,

the court held that the father’s avowal action, filed six years after the child’s birth,

was not unreasonable.

Prior to 2005, while dual paternity was a jurisprudential rule, inconsistent

applications sometimes stripped the legal father of his parental status when the

17-CA-625 36

biological father’s avowal was successful, likely creating havoc for the child in the

face of losing a parent. See Louisiana House of Representatives, Civil Law

Committee (4/5/2004), H.B. 368 available at https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/

VideoArchivePlayer?v=house/2004/apr /0405_04_CL# (2:46:46-2:56:50)

(referencing Finnerty, 469 So.2d 287). Yet, Louisiana courts were loath to strip

the biological father of his right to parent, and the child of his or her right to know

that parent, in the face of the mother’s contribution to the filing delay. Today,

when the application of Article 198 does not dispossess the legal father of his right

to parent, but merely adds a parent, we are equally loath to find a biological father

unreasonable in his actions under the facts of this case.

The trial court, relying upon two cases, found that Mr. Andrews’ avowal

action was filed more than one year after the day that he “certainly knew or should

have known” of his paternity. In his oral reasons for judgment, the trial court

quoted the following passage from W.R.M. v. H.C.V.:

[t]he record reflects that W.R.M. was aware of the possibility that he
was A.M.V.'s father from the moment that H.C.V. told him that she was
pregnant, because of their ongoing sexual relationship. While there has
been no determinative DNA testing, it is clear from the evidence and
testimony that W.R.M. suspected from the beginning that A.M.V. was
his biological son. . . . Despite these suspicions, W.R.M. did nothing to
hold A.M.V. out as his son until [a later date].26

951 So.2d at 178 (as quoted by the trial court in its oral reasons for judgment on

June 2, 2017). In that case, the biological father had an ongoing continuous

relationship with the mother of over ten years but brought no avowal action until

the child was almost nine years old. Id. The trial court also found Suarez v.

Acosta, 15-750 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/16/16), 194 So.3d 626, to be “right on point” in

its interpretation of the statute. The biological father in that case received

26
W.R.M. v. H.C.V. interpreted Article 191, the predecessor to Article 198. The only substantive
difference in the two statutes is a two-year peremptive period from the birth of the child in Article 191,
which was reduced to one year by the passage of Article 198. 06-0702 (La. 3/9/07), 951 So.2d 172, 174-
75 & nn. 5-6 (Johnson, J., concurring).

17-CA-625 37

knowledge of his paternity before the child was born but filed no avowal action

until after the child’s death, more than nine years later. Id.

Applying the law, the trial judge found that Mr. Andrews testified to an

“ongoing and repetitive sexual relationship” with Ms. Kinnett that was exclusive in

the sense that he believed she was sleeping in her daughter’s room, not with Mr.

Kinnett. The trial court further found that the timing of Ms. Kinnett’s September

1, 2015 disclosure to Mr. Andrews was “strikingly close to the gestation period,”

and that Mr. Andrews, “in the back of his mind knowing that he could possibly be

the father,” did nothing, admitting that he did not ask Ms. Kinnett if the child was

his. As reflected in the oral reasons for judgment, the trial court found Mr.

Andrews was presented with sufficient facts during that conversation to, at the very

least, excite his attention to the need for further investigation.

Although the trial court found that there was no evidence of bad faith

deception by Ms. Kinnett, the court also opined that Mr. Andrews could not

reasonably rely on Ms. Kinnett’s statement that the baby was the result of her

getting together with her husband one night. The trial judge stated,

You’ve got an ongoing and repetitive sexual relationship with a woman
and yet the testimony is a one-time encounter with her husband and you
just naturally assume, it’s not me, when, in fact, the likely probability
is that one who has continued and repeated in intercourse is more than
likely going to be the father of the child as opposed to [the one time
encounter].

The record, however, does not support this interpretation of the facts.

The sporadic nature of Mr. Andrews’ and Ms. Kinnett’s relationship was

uncontested. Mr. Andrews testified without contradiction that several weeks

passed between intimate encounters at the height of the affair and became even

more infrequent after Mr. Andrews began dating someone else. All parties agree

that Mr. Andrews and Ms. Kinnett had a single sexual encounter during the month

of November 2014, when G.J.K. was conceived. It is also uncontested that Mr.

17-CA-625 38

Andrews did not see Ms. Kinnett in person for over a year thereafter and had only

one communication with her between November, 2014 and September, 2015.

Further, Mr. Andrews’ testimony is also uncontradicted that he first discovered that

Ms. Kinnett had been pregnant nearly a month after she had given birth, and she

did not tell him the birth date.27

Upon the mother’s bad faith deception, Article 198 requires the father to file

his avowal action within one year from the day he knew or should have known of

his paternity. La. C.C. art. 198. Paternity being the ultimate fact that gives rise to

the cause of action for avowal, Mr. Andrews would have to have either “[d]irect

and clear knowledge” of the fact that he was G.J.K.’s biological father or

“[k]nowledge of information that would lead a reasonable person to inquire

further.” Undisputedly, no one clearly and directly informed Mr. Andrews of his

paternity until Ms. Kinnett’s December, 2016 DNA test result revelation.28 The

relevant question, then, is whether Mr. Andrews possessed information on

September 1, 2015 sufficient to give him either reason to assume that he was

27
The trial court’s inference that Mr. Andrews should have assumed he was more likely the father than
Mr. Kinnett is clearly erroneous as the most Mr. Andrews could have assumed was a fifty-fifty
probability of paternity given Ms. Kinnett’s statement that she slept with her husband once to conceive
G.J.K. The uncontradicted evidence was that, it would have been Mr. Kinnett’s one-time encounter
versus Mr. Andrews’ one-time encounter, setting aside other factors exclusively known by Ms. Kinnett,
as discussed above.
28
The trial court relied upon two February 23, 2017 text messages from Mr. Andrews to Ms. Kinnett to
surmise that he might have had actual knowledge. The first message, read, “we do have to say you
deceived me as to my paternity of the child, because if not, I don’t have a claim. . ..” Mr. Andrews
testified that the message was his explanation of the petition’s language to Ms. Kinnett because he was
trying to maintain a romantic relationship with her, and she became upset that the petition cast her in a
bad light. The trial court apparently rejected Mr. Andrews’ explanation of the text stating, “[t]hose words
do not suggest to me the idea of telling the truth,” particularly because Ms. Kinnett’s response was, “I did
not deceive you. I had no idea. You will be lying if you say that.” As addressed in detail above, Ms.
Kinnett’s claim that she “had no idea” was either untrue or simply wishful thinking.
The second text message from Mr. Andrews read, “I’m sorry things didn’t work out differently
between us back then. I feel responsible for the hell you’re going through right now. I wish I would have
whisked you away from a bad situation and we had had [G.J.K.] together. I am very sorry that I did not do
that.” The judge found “[t]hat clearly indicates that in previous time as it’s written, you had knowledge,
you had the ability to intervene and you didn’t.” However, Ms. Kinnett testified that she did not inform
Mr. Andrews that he was G.J.K.’s father until December 9, 2016, because she believed Mr. Kinnett was
the father until then, and because she wanted nothing more to do with Mr. Andrews. Given Ms. Kinnett’s
own testimony, it is difficult to discern how she would have conveyed to Mr. Andrews the probability of
his paternity.

17-CA-625 39

G.J.K.’s father or to excite his attention, put him on guard, and call for further

inquiry.

Whether Mr. Andrews knew or should have known that he was G.J.K.’s

father on September 1, 2015 depends on the facts available to him at that time,

taking into consideration any effort by Ms. Kinnett to mislead him or conceal

information that should be available through inquiry. Mr. Andrews testified that

during their September 1, 2015 conversation she (1) told him the child was her

husband’s, (2) did not tell him the date the child was born or the child’s age, and

that he (3) did not know before then that Ms. Kinnett had been pregnant because he

had not seen her since their last sexual encounter, (4) did not recall the date of that

sexual encounter, and (5) knew that Ms. Kinnett had been using the NuvaRing®

birth control device at the time of intercourse.

Mr. Andrews also testified that he had no reason to believe that Ms. Kinnett

would lie to him about the child’s paternity because he believed she was unhappy

in her marriage and would prefer to be with him. Mr. Andrews would not have

been unreasonable to assume that Ms. Kinnett was aware of the number of times

she had slept with each man, whether or not she had properly used birth control

during all of the relevant encounters, the date of her last menstrual cycle prior to

conception, and the most likely date of ovulation and conception based on

conversations she would have had with her obstetrician about the due date, i.e.,

whether Mr. Andrews was possibly her child’s father.

In fact, while both parties testified to recognizing, at some point, that Mr.

Andrews could be the father, the trial court conferred a “duty,” “obligation,” or

“responsibility” upon Mr. Andrews to specifically ask Ms. Kinnett if the child was

his, simultaneously rejecting the concept that Ms. Kinnett possessed superior

knowledge of the facts—which required her to disclose the possibility of paternity

17-CA-625 40

to Mr. Andrews—stating, “he was aware of that himself. That’s his own testimony

that it could have been his.”

Upon review of the record, we find that the information available to Mr.

Andrews after the September 1, 2015 conversation rendered his failure to file an

avowal action within one year thereafter reasonable. Any apprehension or fleeting

suspicion he may have had about his paternity upon learning that Ms. Kinnett had

had a child was alleviated by her misrepresentations or insinuations that she knew

her husband was the father.

Furthermore, assuming arguendo that Mr. Andrews’ suspicions were

awakened by Ms. Kinnett’s statement that she had given birth, notice sufficient to

trigger inquiry is tantamount to knowledge of everything to which a reasonable

inquiry may lead. The trial court agreed that a reasonable inquiry would have been

to simply ask the mother if she was sure about the paternity. Ms. Kinnett testified

repeatedly that, on September 1, 2015, she had no doubt that her husband was her

child’s father. Therefore, by her own admission, she would merely have conveyed

to Mr. Andrews her husband’s paternity. As Ms. Kinnett, either directly or by

insinuation, answered the question in the back of his mind, the trial court erred in

attributing knowledge to Mr. Andrews beyond what asking that question would

reveal. Mere apprehension of a fact does not trigger the running of the peremptory

period. Murray, 280 So.3d at 630; Powell, 265 So.3d at 1187.

Moreover, the fact that a paternity test would have revealed the truth does

not mean that Mr. Andrews was required to seek one. The fact that the information

was available does not serve as constructive knowledge by itself. See Gerard

Lindquist, 274 So.3d at 761. The paternity test demonstrates what Mr. Andrews

could have known, not what he knew or should have known.29 See Id.; Campo, 828

29
To require the putative biological father to demand a DNA test based upon a mere apprehension of
paternity flouts Louisiana’s explicitly stated policy to preserve the intact family.

17-CA-625 41

So.2d at 511-512. Unless there was enough information available to Mr. Andrews

to strongly suggest to him that he was in fact the father of Ms. Kinnett’s child, it

would not have been reasonable for Mr. Andrews to interject himself into her

marriage and seek a paternity test.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons thoroughly discussed herein, we find that the trial court

committed an error of law in placing the burden of proof on the exception of

peremption upon Mr. Andrews rather than Mr. Kinnett, said error interdicting the

fact finding process. Upon de novo review, we find that Mr. Kinnett failed to carry

his burden of proving that Ms. Kinnett did not deceive Mr. Andrews in bad faith as

to his possible paternity of G.J.K. We further find that, even if the trial court

properly placed the burden upon Mr. Andrews, the trial court was manifestly

erroneous in its finding that Ms. Kinnett did not deceive Mr. Andrews in bad faith

as to his paternity of G.J.K., there being no factual basis for that finding. Further,

the trial court committed an error of law in its interpretation of Civil Code art.

198’s exception to the peremptory period when the trial court failed to recognize

the mother’s duty to inform the potential biological father of his possible paternity

of her child. Finally, we find that the trial court legally erred in finding that a

biological father who is aware of a mere possibility, rather than a probability, of

paternity has a duty to investigate his possible fatherhood—especially when any

such investigation would have been fruitless in the face of Ms. Kinnett’s repeated

statements that she believed Mr. Kinnett was the father of her child.

Therefore, for all of the reasons stated herein, on de novo review, we find

that the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Andrews’ avowal action was

perempted. We find that Mr. Andrews’ avowal action was timely filed on

February 10, 2017, that date being less than one year from the date Mr. Andrews

knew or should have known of his paternity on December 9, 2016. We hereby

17-CA-625 42

reverse the trial court’s June 2, 2017 judgment and remand this matter to the trial

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As this action renders it

unnecessary for this Court to address the constitutional challenge to the statute, we

pretermit discussion of Mr. Andrews’ assignments of error regarding the trial

court’s ruling that Article 198 is constitutional.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

17-CA-625 43

KAREN COHEN KINNETT NO. 17-CA-625

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

JARRED BRANDON KINNETT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

WICKER, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS

While we have resolved this case without addressing the constitutionality of

Article 198, I write separately to point out my deep lingering concerns with the

statute’s constitutionality.

The question is whether Louisiana Civil Code art. 198 on its face and as

applied by the trial court in this case violates Mr. Andrews’ and the minor child’s

right to Due Process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution.

As the opinion of this Court explains, when a statute can be interpreted two

ways, one of which calls into question the statute’s constitutionality, the court shall

choose the interpretation that avoids the constitutional question. Edward J.

DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S.

568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988); M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon

Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 25, amended on reh'g (9/19/08);

Crown Beverage Co. v. Dixie Brewing Co., Inc., 96-2103 (La. App. 4 Cir.

5/28/97), 695 So.2d 1090, 1093, writ denied, 97-1711 (La. 10/13/97), 703 So.2d

615; Bize v. Larvadain, 18-394 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/28/18), 263 So.3d 584, 592

(citing State v. Lanclos, 07-0082 (La. 4/8/08), 980 So.2d 643, 647-8), reh'g denied

(2/13/19), writ denied, 19-0419 (La. 5/6/19),270 So.3d 577. Our interpretation of

Article 198 does so by attempting to ensure that a biological father receives notice

of his child’s existence before being deprived of his opportunity to avow his child.

See discussion infra, Section I.b. Thus, in interpreting the statute, we did not

17-CA-625 44

address the argument—asserted by Mr. Kinnett and cited as partial justification for

Article 198’s limitation on an unwed father’s right to avow30—that the biological

father of a child whose mother was married to another man at the time of the

child’s birth has no constitutional rights to consider when assessing the statute’s

validity. I am of the opinion that Article 198 affects the fundamental rights of both

the putative father and the child, and other interpretations of the statute would

violate both the biological father’s and the child’s rights to due process.

Further, in Mr. Andrews’ case, the deprivation has already occurred and

every moment litigation remains pending increases the likelihood that the damage

caused will become irreparable.

I. Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution promises that

States will not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law.” Jurisprudence recognizes two components of due process: substantive and

procedural. Substantive due process has been described as generally protecting

individuals from arbitrary legislation. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502;

85 S.Ct. 1678, 1691; 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (Justice White, concurring); Poe v.

Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1777, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (Justice

Harlan, dissenting); Babineaux v. Judiciary Comm'n, 341 So.2d 396, 400 (La.

1976). While a variety of interests may require due process protection, substantive

due process is usually satisfied if the government action is rationally related to a

legitimate government interest. Morales v. Par. of Jefferson, 13-486 (La. App. 5

Cir. 4/30/14), 140 So.3d 375, 395, writ denied, 14-1293 (La. 10/10/14), 151 So.3d

30
The Law Institute concluded, based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 105 L Ed.2d 91 (1989), that “denying the biological father of a
child the right to establish his filiation when another man was presumed to be the father was not
unconstitutional.” Katherine Shaw Spaht, Who’s Your Momma, Who are Your Daddies? Louisiana’s New
Law of Filiation, 67 La. L. Rev. 307, 321-22 & nn. 94-96 (2007).

17-CA-625 45

582, and writ denied, 14-1296 (La. 10/10/14), 151 So.3d 582, and writ denied, 14-

1299 (La. 10/10/14), 151 So.3d 583.

However, certain interests, namely, those which are “deeply rooted in this

Nation’s history and tradition” and “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’

such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,’” are

ranked fundamental. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21; 117 S.Ct.

2258, 2268; 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997); see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593;

123 S.Ct. 2472, 2491-92; 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (Scalia, Dissenting).

Fundamental interests cannot be infringed upon by the government “at all, no

matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to

serve a compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct.

1439, 1447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (emphasis in original); See Griswold, 381 U.S.

at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring).

Procedural due process focuses on the essential fairness of the procedures a

state has used to deprive someone of life, liberty, or property. See Moore v. City of

E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 542; 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1957; 52 L.Ed.2d 531

(1977) (White, J., dissenting); Babineaux, 341 So.2d at 400. Among the

requirements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard at

a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Babineaux, 341 So.2d at 400. The

United States Supreme Court has recognized that the determination of the

procedure required depends on the nature of the right or interest being threatened

by the government. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256, 103 S.Ct.

2985, 2990, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). See also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct.

2584, 2631-32, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Therefore, the threshold issue in any due process analysis is classifying the

liberty interests at stake.

17-CA-625 46

a. What Liberty Interest is at Stake?

The United States Supreme Court has held that “a parent’s desire for and

right to ‘the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children’

is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful

countervailing interest, protection.’” Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham

Cty., N. C., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2159-60, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981)

(citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed. 551

(1972)). However, while the Court has stressed the “fundamental liberty interest

of natural parents” in the parent-child relationship in the context of state-initiated

proceedings to terminate parental rights, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753,

102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), when discussing the interests of an

unmarried biological father in the parent-child relationship, the Court has reached

different conclusions about whether the interest is protected by the Due Process

Clause based on the particular facts of the case. Compr. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645;

Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978); Caban v.

Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979); Lehr, 463 U.S.

at 258; and Michael H., 491 U.S. at 109.

In Stanley v. Illinois, an unmarried father’s children became wards of the

state upon the death of their mother, even though the father had lived with and

raised the children and wished to retain custody. The Court found that Stanley’s

interest in his relationship with his children deserved protection, despite the fact

that the relationship was not legitimated by marriage. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651-52.

Similarly, in Caban v. Mohammed, an unmarried father’s constitutional

rights were violated by a statute that allowed an unmarried mother to block the

adoption of her biological child by withholding consent, but did not allow an

unmarried father to block the adoption in the same manner, even when his parental

relationship was substantial. 441 U.S. at 385-87.

17-CA-625 47

Quilloin v. Walcott dealt with a Georgia law that required the consent of

each living parent before the adoption of a child who had been born into a

marriage, regardless of the current marital status of the parents, but required only

the consent of the mother for the adoption of a child born out of wedlock. 434

U.S. at 248. The Court held that the biological father’s rights were not violated

when he had never exercised actual or legal custody nor participated substantially

in the daily responsibilities of rearing the children, and the trial court had found

that the adoption of the child by the mother’s husband was in the best interest of

the child. Id. at 256.

In Lehr v. Robertson, the Court emphasized the difference between the

developed parent-child relationship established in Stanley and Caban and the

“inchoate” relationship evidenced in Quilloin. 463 U.S. at 249-50. The Court

found,

[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by “com[ing] forward to participate in
the rearing of his child,” Caban, 441 U.S., at 392, 99 S. Ct., at 1768, his
interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial
protection under the due process clause. . . . But the mere existence of
a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.

Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.

The Kinnetts argue that Michael H. v. Gerald D. is directly on point with the

facts of this case. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Gerald D.’s wife had an affair with

Michael H., and a daughter was born of that relationship. Blood tests confirmed

Michael’s paternity within the first several months after the birth, and for the first

three years of the child’s life, Michael had a relationship with the child. When the

mother kept Michael from seeing his daughter, he filed a paternity action.

However, California law established a conclusive presumption that the husband of

the mother was the father of any children born into the marriage, and Michael was

denied standing to rebut the presumption.

17-CA-625 48

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address Michael’s

due process claims. Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, emphasized the

requirement that the “asserted liberty interest be rooted in history and tradition,”

and found no evidence that an “adulterous natural father’s” right to assert “parental

rights over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another man” had

ever received special protection. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122-25. Instead, he

declared that the “presumption of legitimacy was a fundamental principle of the

common law.” Id. at 125 (citing H. Nicholas, Adulturine Bastardy 1 (1836)). The

historical policy behind the conclusive presumption was predominately “an

aversion to declaring children illegitimate, thereby depriving them of rights of

inheritance and succession, and likely making them wards of the state.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). However, he pointed out that a secondary concern was

promoting the “peace and tranquility of states and families.” Id.

Therefore, although the Court had recognized six years earlier, “[t]he

significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an

opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his

offspring,” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257-58, the plurality in Michael H. held that when the

child is born into a marriage, “the natural father’s unique opportunity conflicts with

the similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the marriage; and it is not

unconstitutional for the State to give categorical preference to the latter.” 491 U.S.

at 128-29.

The plurality conclusion in Michael H. is troubling for a number of reasons.

The short opinion opened with a narrow description of the right Michael H.

actually asserted and then analyzed whether that right, as defined by the author,

found protection in our nation’s history and traditions. Justice Scalia’s rationale

fails to appreciate fully the historical foundation for the Fourteenth Amendment

and this nation’s unfortunate tradition of denying rights to certain categories of

17-CA-625 49

individuals. The Fourteenth Amendment extended rights and protection of the law

to individuals who had previously been categorically denied protection.

Only Chief Justice Rehnquist “endors[ed] Justice Scalia’s view of the

proper method of analyzing questions arising under the Due Process Clause.” See

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices O’Connor,

Kennedy, and Stevens concurred, agreeing with the outcome in this particular case

but not with the analysis, decrying Justice Scalia’s method of analyzing history and

tradition to determine whether Michael H. had a fundamental liberty interest at

stake. Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). Justice Stevens questioned

Justice Scalia’s seeming rejection of “the possibility that a natural father might

ever have a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child whose

mother was married to, and cohabiting with, another man at the time of the child’s

conception and birth.”31 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackman and White, in dissenting, agreed not

only that the natural father has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a

relationship with his child, but also that the California statute unconstitutionally

terminated Michael H.’s protected liberty interest in the parent-child relationship

without “the least bit of process.” See id. at 136, 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Justice White, with Justice Brennan agreeing, opined further that Michael H. was

provided notice but no real opportunity to be heard as the California statute

unconstitutionally refused him the opportunity to rebut the State’s presumption that

the mother’s husband was the father of the child through blood test evidence. Id. at

161 (White, J., dissenting).

31
Justice Stevens agreed with the outcome because the trial judge had the authority to grant Michael H.
reasonable visitation rights as an “other person having an interest in the welfare of the child.” Therefore,
although Justice Stevens was willing to assume that Michael H. had a constitutional right, he believed that
the California statute satisfied due process. Id. at 133-34, 136 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

17-CA-625 50

Rigid focus upon history and tradition is inconsistent with a rich body of

United States Supreme Court jurisprudence that predates the Michael H. decision

and fails to consider that both history and tradition are a side effect of the passage

of time and evolving social mores. Many of the substantive due process rights now

considered to be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” such that to abolish

them violates “a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of

our people as to be ranked fundamental” were once explicitly denied protection

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58

S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,

105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)) (The Fifth Amendment double

jeopardy clause was not a fundamental principle of liberty and due process such

that it was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); But see

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 23 L.Ed.2d 707

(1969) (finding, “[t]he fundamental nature of the guarantee against double

jeopardy can hardly be doubted” and extending the prohibition against double

jeopardy to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment thirty-two years after the

Palko decision).

Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing a plethora of asserted rights affirms

that history and tradition are not the sole arbiters of whether liberty interests are

entitled to protection under the constitution in the face of evolving science and

societal norms. See e.g. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 572. In Lawrence v.

Texas, the Supreme Court relied upon no historical evidence of protection for

individuals engaging in homosexual intercourse to strike down a Texas statute

criminalizing consensual homosexual sex. Id. On the contrary, the Court

acknowledged that homosexual conduct had been condemned as immoral for

centuries. Id. at 571. Instead, the majority looked to the laws and traditions of the

“past half century” to find an “emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial

17-CA-625 51

protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters

pertaining to sex.” Id. at 571-72. Seventeen years earlier, in a five-to-four

decision, the Supreme Court refused to construe the Constitution to confer “a right

of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.

186, 190-92, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2843, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), overruled by,

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 558.

In Obergefell v. Hodges—rather than viewing the right to same-sex marriage

through the lens of history and tradition—the majority looked to the changing

nature of the institution of marriage and American society as well as its own

evolving stare decisis to find that the traditional denial of the right to marry to

same-sex couples violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See 135 S.Ct. at 2602-05. Forty-three years earlier, in

1972, the United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from a decision of the

Minnesota Supreme Court holding that statutes prohibiting same-sex marriages did

not violate the Constitution. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 93 S.Ct. 37 (Mem), 34

L.Ed.2d 65, (1972). The appeal was dismissed “for want of a substantial federal

question.” Id.

Likewise, Justice Scalia’s description of the liberty interest at stake in

Michael H., in terms of whether the child’s mother was married to the biological

father or another man at the time of conception and birth, is not consistent with the

practice of determining whether the interest is implicit in the concept of ordered

liberty or one that has found protection in the history and traditions of our people.

Justice White, dissenting in Michael H. and Lehr, emphasized that relying on the

particular facts of a case to determine whether the father has a protected interest is

untenable. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 157-58 & n.1; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268 (“As

Jessica’s biological father, Lehr either had an interest protected by the Constitution

or he did not.”).

17-CA-625 52

Furthermore, the dissenting Justices seemed to recognize that historical

justifications for failing to protect the biological father’s interest in his child born

to a married woman no longer exist. Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in

Michael H. pointed out that

the original reasons for the conclusive presumption of paternity are out
of place in a world in which blood tests can prove virtually beyond a
shadow of a doubt who sired a particular child and in which the fact of
illegitimacy no longer plays the burdensome and stigmatizing role it
once did.

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140.

Without question, the parent-child relationship is a fundamental right that

has historically been entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400; 43 S.Ct. 625, 627; 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)

(describing the corresponding rights and duties between parents and children);

Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536; 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1111;

86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942) (the right to have offspring is “one of the basic civil rights of

man.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166; 64 S.Ct. 438, 442; 88 L.Ed.

645 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child

reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation

for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”).

Likewise, children have corresponding constitutional rights to the parent-

child relationship. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760-61 (“until the State proves

parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing

erroneous termination of their natural relationship.”). Yet, courts and legislatures

often use the child’s best interest as justification for refusing protection to the

relationship between the biological father and the child. See, e.g., Quilloin, 434

U.S. at 255 (“we cannot say that the State was required . . . to find anything more

than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the ‘best interests of the

child.’”).

17-CA-625 53

The State of course must consider the child’s interest in having basic needs

met as well as the child’s mental, physical, and emotional well-being to control the

outcome of many cases involving children. See, e.g., Tracie F. v. Francisco D.,

15-224 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/21/15), 174 So.3d 781, 794. However, if a child’s

interest in developing and preserving this all-important and unique relationship—

which, according to the State, is usually in the child’s best interest32—is

fundamental, then the foreclosure of that right cannot occur without due process of

law.33 Where fundamental rights are at stake, due process is satisfied only when

the government has a compelling interest that justifies infringing upon the right,

and the law employs the least restrictive means to achieve the government’s

objective. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 760 (La. 1992).

As will be discussed below, some of the state’s originally stated interests

justifying Article 198 are no longer compelling. Also, while the best interest of the

child is a major consideration, this standard does not adequately protect the

fundamental rights of both the biological father and the child when the issue is

whether the father may avow the child. Furthermore, Article 198 eliminates even

the minimal process that a hearing on the best interest of the child would provide,

unduly burdening the right to the parent-child relationship.

1. History of the Marital Presumption

Historically, children needed protection not only from the social stigma of

illegitimacy but also from the harsh legal consequences of being labeled

illegitimate. See Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847, 849 (La. 1989). In an effort to

32
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2061, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (constitutional
law historically recognized that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children.”) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979));
Spaht, supra, at 315 (describing the preference for children being raised by biological parents united in
marriage); Tracie F., 188 So.3d at 242-43 (recognizing a preference for biological parents in custody
determinations).
33
The child also has other interests at stake including an interest in knowing his biological father’s
ancestors, medical history, and genetic traits and an interest in knowing that his father wants to be
involved in his life.

17-CA-625 54

promote marriage, fidelity, and “legitimate family relationships,”34 the Civil Code

developed a complex system to regulate family life, which included classifying

children based on the circumstances of their birth and assigning varying rights and

degrees of protection based on those classifications. See, e.g., id.; Succession of

Robins, 349 So.2d 276, 282 (La. 1977) (Summers, J., dissenting) (“Stability of the

family and certainty of property rights are sought to be protected by the Civil

Code. So interrelated with this purpose is the treatment of illegitimate children

that our courts have declined attacks upon the elaborate plan regulating family life

embodied in the Code.”).

For example, for purposes of inheritance, legitimate children were afforded

greater rights than illegitimate children, and some illegitimate children were

prohibited from receiving property from their natural parents by any means. See

id. at 277. On its face, the law of legitimacy was concerned with biological fact.

The term “legitimate” included only those children who were conceived during the

marriage of their natural parents. Succession of Robins, 349 So.2d at 282. The

category of illegitimate children included both children born to persons who, at the

time of conception, could have legally married, and children born to persons who

could not marry at the time of conception because of some legal impediment. Id.

Both “adulterous bastards”35 and “incestuous bastards” were expressly defined by

the law as members of the latter category of illegitimates. Id. Furthermore, the

law prevented children who were considered illegitimate because they were born

of adultery or incest from becoming legitimate through parental acknowledgment.

See Weber, 406 U.S. at 167 n.3, 171 & n.9.

34
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1405, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972)
(Louisiana asserted interest in protecting “legitimate family relationships” as justification for denying
illegitimate children workmen’s compensation benefits at father’s death).
35
Former Civil Code art. 182 defined “adulterous bastards” as “those produced by an unlawful
connection between two persons, who, at the time when the child was conceived, were, either of them or
both, connected by marriage with some other person.” Id. at 282-83.

17-CA-625 55

The harsh consequences of illegitimacy were designed to promote marriage

and discourage extramarital affairs. See, e.g., Succession of Robins, 349 So.2d at

278 (“valid state purpose said to be served is to help preserve the sanctity of the

marriage by penalizing adulteries”). However, the need to protect innocent

children from those consequences, combined with the difficulty of proving

paternity, resulted in strict application of the marital presumption.36 See, e.g.,

Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 So.2d 619, 623 (La. 1972).

In its first manifestation in Louisiana law, neither the “wife’s adultery nor

the allegation of the husband’s natural or accidental impotency” could rebut the

presumption. T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.2d at 880 (Kimball, J., dissenting),

abrogated by Fishbein v. State ex rel. Louisiana State Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 04-

2482 (La. 4/12/05), 898 So.2d 1260 (citing Title VII, Chapter II, art. 7, Civil Laws

of the Treaty of Orleans (1808). Between 1870 and 1976, the husband of the

mother was prohibited from disavowing the child because of his wife’s infidelity

unless the birth was concealed from him. Id. at 881. In other words, in Louisiana,

just as in the common law referenced by Justice Scalia in Michael H.,37 the

presumption could be rebutted only when it was virtually certain that the husband

of the mother was not the biological father. See T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.2d at 880;

Tannehill, 261 So.2d at 622 (presumption of paternity did not arise when the child

was born before the 180th day of the marriage, when the child was born more than

300 days after dissolution of the marriage or judgment of separation, or when the

husband was so remote from the wife that cohabitation was physically impossible).

36
The marital presumption was also intended to recognize and protect biological fact by placing the
presumption of paternity on the man most likely to be the biological father of a child and eliminating the
need for case-by-case determination of paternity. See Spaht, supra, at 318 (recognizing the same logic
applied to new presumptions of paternity in the 2005 revisions to the law of filiation, i.e. that subsequent
marriage to the mother is evidence of a man’s belief in biological paternity). The marital presumption
relied on a further presumption that a married woman complied with her obligation of fidelity. Id.; see
La. C.C. art. 98 cmt. (b); La. C.C. art. 185.
37
See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122-25.

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In reality, however, the presumption also served to circumvent the law’s

intended consequences for infidelity by shielding children born of a woman’s

extramarital affair from the label and stigma of illegitimacy and forcing some

husbands to support and legitimize their wives’ illegitimate children.38 Smith v.

Cole, 553 So.2d at 850; Rachel L. Kovach, Sorry Daddy—Your Time is Up:

Rebutting the Presumption of Paternity in Louisiana, 56 LOY. L. REV. 651, 653

(2010). While the law defined all children born of extramarital affairs as

“illegitimate,” a child born as a result of a married woman’s affair was protected

by the marital presumption. Succession of Robins, 349 So.2d at 279.

As seen in Smith v. Cole, instead of penalizing extramarital affairs, the

presumption could also insulate biological fathers from the responsibility of having

children. 553 So.2d at 847. Mr. and Ms. Smith physically separated before Ms.

Smith had a child with Mr. Cole but did not divorce until years later. Id. at 848.

Ms. Smith brought a filiation and support action against the biological father, Mr.

Cole. Id. Mr. Cole argued that the child was the legitimate child of Mr. Smith—as

Mr. Smith had not formally disavowed her—and that Ms. Smith should not be

allowed to “bastardize” the child to obtain money. Id. at 849.

As various unintended consequences of the law came to light, what was once

a nearly irrebuttable presumption gave way to actions allowing proof of actual

paternity. In 1976, revisions to the Civil Code granted the husband the ability to

rebut the presumption by proving that the child was not his biologically. Id. at

881. Around the same time, United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the

constitutional rights of illegitimate children prompted the Louisiana Supreme

38
The fact that the presumption served to protect children that the law intended to suffer the consequences
of their parents’ choices is not lamentable. The United States Supreme Court correctly decided that such
discrimination against innocent children cannot be justified by the State’s desire to force adults to
conform to certain social standards. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 1464-65,
52 L.Ed.2d 31 (1977).

17-CA-625 57

Court to recognize dual paternity. Warren v. Richard, 296 So.2d 813, 816-17 (La.

1974).

As it became clear that the State’s interest in promoting and protecting

certain family values could not justify discrimination against illegitimate children,

the need to protect children from the stigma and legal consequences of illegitimacy

was diminished. Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d at 850 & n.4; Levy v. Louisiana, 391

U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968); Weber, 406 U.S. 164. Today,

single-parent homes, stepfamilies, and divorce are commonplace, and neither

divorce nor illegitimacy carries the stigma that it once did. See T.D. v. M.M.M.,

730 So.2d at 878 (Knoll, J., concurring); Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood,

Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 Tul. L. Rev.

585, 641 (1991).

The Louisiana marital presumption’s evolving path illustrates that history

and tradition must sometimes give way to truth gained from experience, science,

and technology. When the social and legal consequences associated with

illegitimacy were dire, and the only actual proof of paternity was long absence, the

State’s interest in providing protection for innocent children was compelling,

whether or not the method of providing protection was wholly effective. Today,

when the evolution of the law and society has rendered the protection of the child

from negative social and legal consequences unnecessary, and scientific advances

make proof of paternity a simple scientific reality, the State’s interest in protecting

children no longer justifies the maintenance of legal fiction in the face of biological

fact.

The marital presumption and its purposes no longer justify denying the

existence of a biological father’s constitutional right to parent.

17-CA-625 58

2. Louisiana Law–Right to Avow

Mr. Kinnett, relying upon the plurality’s reasoning in Michael H., argues

that a biological father has no parental rights unless his petition to avow his child is

successful, and the legal relationship between biological father and child is

recognized. See supra note 30. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has

distinguished between the right that “flows from the [biological] fact of

parenthood,” and the “possibility of a subsequent forfeiture of parental rights

through abandonment or neglect.” See, e.g., Maxwell v. Leblanc, 434 So.2d 375

(La. 1983) (unwed biological father had a natural right to visitation with his child);

Deville v. LaGrange, 388 So.2d 696, 697-98 (La. 1980) (unwed biological father

had a “paramount” right to custody of his child). Thus, to protect his interest in the

parent-child relationship, the biological father may be required to “demonstrate[]

his fitness for parental responsibilities, commitment to those responsibilities,

concrete actions taken to grasp his opportunity to be a father, and the potential for

him to make a valuable contribution to the child’s development.” See Matter of

R.E., 94-2657 (La. 11/9/94), 645 So.2d 205, 207-08 (citing In re Adoption of

B.G.S., 556 So.2d 545 (La. 1990)).39

However, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the concept that only

biological fathers with a “fully developed relationship” with their children possess

a constitutionally protected interest in parenthood. B.G.S., 556 So.2d at 550-51.

See also State in the Matter of R.E., 642 So.2d 889 (concurrence emphasizing that

the father had never had the opportunity to meet his child or develop a substantial

relationship where the mother surrendered the child days after the birth); Lehr, 463

U.S. at 271 (dissent pointing out that the biological father would have developed a

substantial relationship with his child if the mother had not hidden the child’s

39
But see infra note 15 (mothers’ constitutional rights are entitled to protection without such
demonstrations).

17-CA-625 59

whereabouts from him). Relying upon the line of United States Supreme Court

cases discussed supra, pp. 47-50, the Court found that a biological father has

“cognizable constitutional rights to parenthood,” In re A.J.F., 764 So.2d at 57,

when he has “dedicated himself to his paternity when there is yet time for him to

make a valuable contribution to the child’s development.” B.G.S., 556 So.2d at

550, 553 (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62.)40 Therefore, a “fully committed

unwed father of a newborn child has a constitutionally protected interest in his

opportunity to develop a mutually beneficial emotional or psychological bond with

his child” which is “defeasible if not preserved by dedicated, opportune fatherly

action.” Id. at 550.

The “interest of a biological parent in having an opportunity to establish a

relationship with his child is one of those liberties of which no person may be

deprived without due process of law under our state constitution.”41 B.G.S., 556

So.2d at 550, 553 (La. 1990) (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261). The constitutionally

protected interest does not cease to exist when the biological father’s child is

presumed to be the child of another man. Finnerty, 469 So.2d at 292 (The

“biological relationship does entitle a natural father to at least some opportunity to

develop a personal relationship with his child, and thus to assume a responsible

role in the future of his child.”). See Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413 (La. Ct.

App. 1990), writ denied sub nom. Kemph v. Nolan, 569 So.2d 981 (La. 1990)

(denying the biological father the right to avow paternity also denied him of his

opportunity to establish a relationship with his child, which, according to the

40
The Court examined whether a State through private adoption statutes may allow a mother of an
illegitimate child to terminate the parental rights of the unwed father without notice and opportunity to be
heard.
41
Recognizing that the “reciprocal rights and obligations of natural parents and children” are included
among the individual rights discussed in Article 1, section 24 of the Louisiana Constitution, which
provides that the “enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not deny or disparage other rights
retained by the individual citizens of the state.” B.G.S., 556 So.2d at 551.

17-CA-625 60

relevant precedent, he was obliged to take advantage of in order to have his

parental rights protected under the constitution).

The relevant question is whether Article 198’s procedure for terminating the

right of a biological father to avow his child—the peremptory periods—satisfies

the requirements of due process.

b. What Process is Due?

Due process requires that a person whose rights may be affected by state

action must be notified because he is entitled to be heard. B.G.S., 556 So.2d at

554. Once the court determines that the nature of the interest threatened is

constitutionally cognizable, proper evaluation of the state’s process involves

weighing the importance of the private and public interests at stake. Id. Due

process requires “some kind of hearing;” just what kind of hearing must be

determined by balancing the factors set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

321; 96 S.Ct. 893, 901-03; 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Wilson v. City of New Orleans,

479 So.2d 891 (La. 1985).

The factors include (1) the “private interest that will be affected by the

official action;” (2) the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through

the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

procedural safeguards;” and (3), the “Government’s interest, including the function

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S at 334-35.

The private interest affected by the government action in this case is both

constitutionally cognizable and significant.42 Depriving the biological father of the

right to avow his child terminates all of his parental rights, including the most

basic right of parenthood, custody or visitation. Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d at 412

42
The state action in this case is the establishment of peremptory periods that presume one year from the
date of birth of the child is a reasonable amount of time for a man to seize his opportunity to preserve his
parental rights in every situation (except one). La. C.C. art. 198.

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(“If a natural father has no right of action by which he can have the biological

parent-child link legally recognized, then there is no link, in the eyes of the law,

that could serve as a basis for granting visitation.”) (quoting Finnerty, 469 So.2d at

292); See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 148-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (a biological

father who has been prevented from asserting his paternity cannot benefit from the

legal presumption that a parent is entitled to visitation rights unless the visitation

would be detrimental to the best interests of the child).

However, the biological father is not simultaneously relieved of the

responsibilities and obligations of parenthood. See id. at 413-14; T.D. v. M.M.M.,

730 So.2d at 876. It is the fact of biological paternity or maternity that obliges

parents to support and nourish their children. Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d at 854.

Therefore, denial of the biological father’s right to parent does not prevent the

child’s mother or the State from establishing paternity for purposes of child

support. See Id. at 854-55. Conversely, filiation entitles an otherwise deprived

child to wrongful death benefits and inheritance. See Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d at

413.

The biological father’s constitutional rights to parenthood are not unfettered.

The biological father must nurture those rights or risk losing them. Although a

biological father has cognizable constitutional rights to parenthood by virtue of his

biological relationship to the child, “a biological father who knows or has reason to

know of the existence of his biological child and who fails to assert his rights for a

significant period of time[] cannot later come forward and assert paternity.” See,

e.g., Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d at 414. When parental rights are at stake, courts

have been reluctant to terminate those rights for reasons short of abandonment or

unfitness. See, e.g., Deville, 388 So.2d at 698; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. This

implies that a man must first know or have reason to know of the existence of his

17-CA-625 62

child before his right to the opportunity to develop a relationship may be

eliminated by the mere passage of time and operation of law.

Article 198 risks an erroneous deprivation of the biological father’s interest

because the statute does not consider whether the biological father has received

notice of, not only the upcoming expiration of his parental rights, but first of the

child’s very existence before his time to develop a relationship lapses. Also,

Article 198’s bad faith exception may be too narrow to adequately protect the

biological father’s rights. When constitutionally protected interests are affected by

government action, due process requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford

them an opportunity to present their objections.” B.G.S., 556 So.2d at 554 (citing

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652,

657, 94 L.Ed. 865, 873 (1950)). To protect his rights, Article 198 requires Mr.

Andrews to rely upon Ms. Kinnett’s good will to timely inform him of his possible

paternity, in the face of her conflicting interest.

Mr. Kinnett seeks to distinguish B.G.S. and other cases involving the

biological father’s right to notice and a hearing before termination of parental

rights and subsequent adoption of the child, arguing such notice is constitutionally

required only when the mother seeks to terminate her parental rights. See

generally id.; In re A.J.F., 764 So.2d 47; La. Ch.C. art. 1132-36 (requiring notice

to alleged or adjudicated father when the mother of a child born outside of

marriage surrenders the child for adoption).43

43
The adoption cases are distinguishable to the extent that the adoption process involves state action
whereas the filiation process does not. Article 198 permits the state to assume that Mr. Andrews had no
parental rights, merely the opportunity to seek them. By finding that the unwed biological father has
fewer rights than the mother—the courts have created a situation in which the state did not deprive Mr.
Andrews of his opportunity to develop a meaningful relationship with his son, Ms. Kinnett did.
The legislature has statutorily determined the reasonable time for a biological father to seize his
constitutionally protected opportunity and presumed that a failure to avow within that time period
constitutes a knowing waiver of parental rights, creating a legal fiction.

17-CA-625 63

However, the adoption cases and the dual paternity cases both base their

holdings on the premise that due process requires that the biological father must

have the opportunity to assert his right to parenthood. In cases in which the mother

voluntarily relinquishes her rights to the child, diligent effort must be made to

discover the identity of the biological father if the mother does not reveal it. See In

re A.J.F., 764 So.2d at 56. The mother’s failure to identify a potential biological

father or misattribution of paternity to someone other than the actual father can

result in an annulment of the adoption by fraud. Id.; Thompson v. Cavanaugh, 688

So.2d 1259 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1997).

Article 198, on the other hand, operates to terminate a biological father’s

parental rights whether or not he even knows such rights exist. As discussed

above, the court considers whether the father knew or should have known that his

child existed only when there is proof that the mother in bad faith deceived the

biological father as to his paternity. Article 198, like the statute found to have

deprived the father of due process in B.G.S., allows the child’s mother “to decide

whether the natural father shall be notified or consulted prior to the termination of

his interest.” B.G.S., 556 So.2d at 553.

The B.G.S. court found that the statute, which depended on the child’s

mother to provide notice to the biological father that his parental rights were

subject to termination, also deprived the biological father of a neutral decision

maker, as required for due process. Id. at 555. The court there pointed out that the

mother could hardly be considered neutral, as she and the father potentially had

adverse interests, as in this case. Id. at 555.

Article 198’s requirement that the mother engage in bad faith deceit to

trigger the extended peremptory period and its silence as to the party bearing the

burden of proof on that issue may, in the face of the mother’s mere silence for over

one year from the child’s birth, place the biological father in the impossible

17-CA-625 64

position of proving bad faith with no evidence whatsoever of the mother’s intent.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in B.G.S. stated, “the lack of a hearing, combined

with the placement of decision in the hands of a potentially adverse decision

maker, violates the most basic principles of due process under both our state and

federal constitutions.” Id. at 556.

The third Mathews factor analyzes the government’s interest, including any

additional burdens that would be caused by additional or substitute procedural

requirements. As discussed in this Court’s opinion, the Law Institute had several

objectives when drafting the legislation that eventually incorporated Article 198,

including more closely aligning biological and legal paternity. Spaht, supra, at 314

see Louisiana House of Representatives, Civil Law Committee (4/5/2004), H.B.

842 available at

https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/VideoArchivePlayer?v=house/2004/apr/0405

_04 _CL# (58:00:00- 1:06:20) (discussion of proposed Articles 186, 196, and 197

emphasizing the intention to align filiation and biological paternity).

Acknowledging that the proposed legislation involved the interests of

multiple parties, the drafters attempted to fairly balance and protect the interests of

all parties affected by the law. See, e.g., Spaht, supra, at 311-13.44 However, with

respect to Article 198, the drafters attributed no constitutionally protected interests

to the biological father. See supra note 30. The constitutional rights of the mother

and the presumed father (both the right to marital privacy and parental rights) were

weighed along with the child’s interests, which include constitutionally protected

44
With respect to proposed Article 186—wherein a child born within 300 days from the termination of a
marriage was presumed to be the first husband’s child, but upon disavowal, if the mother had remarried,
the second husband became the child’s presumed father—protection of the interests involved depended
on notice. Id. at 311-12. To ensure that the second husband was given notice of the effect the first
husband’s disavowal action might have on him, the law required that the second husband be made a party
to the first husband’s disavowal action. Id. While Article 186 requires notice to other potential fathers,
Article 198 does not.

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interests such as the right to care, custody, and support. See discussion supra pp.

54-55.

According to Professor Spaht, “the interest of the child demands resolution

of its paternity within a reasonable period of time.” Spaht, supra, at 313.

Furthermore, the requirement that the biological father act quickly to institute an

avowal action “is intended to protect the child from the upheaval of such litigation

and its consequences in circumstances where the child may actually live in an

existing intact family with his mother and presumed father or may have become

attached over many years to the man presumed to be his father.” La. C.C. art. 198

cmt. (e). The stated purpose of the peremptory period includes the State’s interest

in promoting and protecting its preferred definition of family. See supra, note 18.

According to research relied upon by the Law Institute when drafting Article

198, “on average a child who is reared in the home of his or her biological parents

united in marriage prospers in ways unattained by children reared in other family

structures.” Spaht, supra, at 315. However, in the absence of the ideal situation, a

two-parent household is generally preferable (provided the parents are married and

regardless of whether a biological connection exists). See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S.

645. Finally, the State desired, above all, that a child be filiated to someone. See

Spaht, supra, at 315-16 (“The mother may not contest the paternity of her husband

if the biological father is unwilling to marry the mother or if the biological father is

unknown” because the result would be to “bastardize” her child.).

Therefore, no peremptory period exists as to the biological father’s right to

avow when the child has never been filiated to anyone. However, when a child is

born into a marriage, the law creates barriers to acknowledging biological truth.

While the state’s interest in protecting the child is important, Article 198’s

peremptory period is not so sufficiently related to achieving that interest that it

outweighs the risk of erroneous deprivation of the biological father’s

17-CA-625 66

constitutionally protected interest in an opportunity to develop a relationship with

his child.

The fact that a marriage still exists between a child’s mother and presumed

father does not necessarily mean that an intact family exists, at least not in a way

that will nurture the child’s interest in a stable and loving home environment. As

in Smith v. Cole, the presumed father may simply abandon the relationship with the

child without going through the disavowal process. 553 So.2d at 848. Then, while

the presumption remains, the child is not part of an intact family and has, in fact,

lost the parent-child relationship that may have formed over many years.

Furthermore, the “upheaval” contemplated by the legislature depends on

there being either an existing intact family involving both the mother and

presumed father or a relationship with the presumed father that developed over

many years. La. C.C. art. 198 cmt. (e). The upheaval referred to is not just the

avowal litigation itself, but the revelation that the man a child has believed to be

his biological father is not, and the resulting introduction of a new paternal figure

in the child’s life. As a practical matter, the upheaval can occur without an avowal

action. Nothing prevents the biological father from asserting his paternity outside

of court, and nothing limits the time within which he can do so. A phone call may

throw the marriage and the family into disarray, causing further upheaval to the

child’s home in the form of divorce proceedings or marital strife. See Michael H.,

491 U.S. at 155 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Article 198, as it was interpreted and applied by the trial court in this case,

permits the mother—whose interest conflicts with the biological father’s—to

deprive the father of parental rights by silently engaging in wishful thinking that

her husband is the father of her child in the face of evidence that her paramour is

equally likely to be the child’s father. The trial court’s interpretation and

application of Article 198 in this case is more likely to increase the upheaval

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caused by litigation and its consequences by requiring men to file avowal actions at

the earliest suspicion of paternity, in spite of any evidence which tends to refute the

suspicion (including the mother’s statements to the contrary). See supra pp. 41-42

& n. 29. This interpretation may cause unnecessary upheaval of a child’s life.

However, the fact that Article 198 allows for dual paternity potentially decreases

the risk of upheaval if all parties consider the best interests of the child first.

Unlike the California law at issue in Michael H.,45 avowal actions pursuant to

Articles 197 and 198 do not affect the presumed father’s legal status. La. C.C. art.

192 cmt.

In this case, none of the state’s interests were served by denying Mr.

Andrews the right to avow his biological child. When Mr. Andrews filed his

petition to establish paternity, there was little to no risk of upheaval to the child

because there was no intact family46 and, as G.J.K. was under age two, no

relationship of many years existed between G.J.K. and his presumed father. At the

time the avowal action was filed, Mr. Andrews had been introduced to his son and

had begun spending time developing a relationship. At age eighteen months, the

child was young enough to introduce another parental figure into his life without

detrimental upset or confusion. Growing up with two fathers could be less

disruptive to the child’s life than the divorce of his parents and the subsequent

remarriage or cohabitation of one or both of those parents with step-parents. See

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 162 (White, J., dissenting) (“It is hardly rare in this world

of divorce and remarriage for a child to live with the ‘father’ to whom her mother

is married, and still have a relationship with her biological father.”).

45
See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130.
46
The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated, “once the bonds of matrimony are dissolved by divorce, the
State's interest in preserving the marital family disappears.” See Gallo v. Gallo, 03-0794 (La. 12/3/03),
861 So.2d 168, 174 (citing T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.2d at 878 (concurring opinion)).

17-CA-625 68

The trial court in this case also referred to the state’s interest in “protecting

the status of a child vis-á-vis his mother and father, his family, his classmates, and

the world.”47 However, neither denying nor granting Mr. Andrews’ avowal

petition alters the child’s status. If the court had declared Mr. Andrews to be

G.J.K.’s biological father, G.J.K. would legally remain the legitimate child of the

Kinnett marriage. Conversely, denying Mr. Andrews’ avowal of G.J.K. does not

change the fact that G.J.K. is Mr. Andrews’ illegitimate child born to a married

woman. See discussion supra pp. 55-57. Nor does the state’s steadfast refusal to

acknowledge biological fact prevent the child from learning of his biological

paternity in the future, although he may suffer more if deceived for years.

Article 198’s peremptory periods reflect a pre-determination that the best

interest of the child requires terminating the biological father’s parental rights

without a hearing on parental fitness. See Maxwell, 434 So.2d at 379-80

(conclusive evidence that “parent has forfeited his right” by his conduct or that

“exercise of the right would injuriously affect the child’s welfare” was required to

terminate unwed biological father’s right to visitation); Stanley, 405 U.S. 657-58

(state’s interest in caring for children is de minimus if the father is a fit parent).

In B.G.S., the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the opportunity to present

evidence at a hearing to determine the best interest of the child did not satisfy the

requirements of due process because the interest of the biological father and the

deprivation of his rights was not at issue in a best interest hearing. 556 So.2d at

555. Article 198 does not afford the biological father even the minimal process

that a hearing on the best interest of the child would provide.

In the present case, Mr. Andrews has a private interest in bringing an avowal

action that is affected by Article 198’s peremption clause. As the current statute

47
The legislative history of Article 198 and its stated purpose of protecting the “intact family” reveal the
same underlying concern with legitimacy.

17-CA-625 69

can be interpreted to deprive him of his interest after one year, without requiring

that he receive notice of a child’s birth, there is a risk of an erroneous deprivation.

Due process protection of a man’s inchoate right to a relationship with his child

requires, at a minimum, that he be aware of his paternity, and that he be afforded

some meaningful opportunity to exercise his right to develop that relationship.

Article 198 grants sole discretion to the child’s mother to determine whether the

father has the opportunity to develop the relationship or even receive notice of his

child’s existence.

Finally, in my opinion, the State has not shown that it would be substantially

more burdensome on the system to allow a father a hearing on the child’s best

interest, or at least notice of paternity, before foreclosing his right through

peremption. Even if the definition of “bad faith deceives” is as we have

determined in our majority opinion, the time and resources expended in litigating

the mother’s knowledge and motives would have been better spent determining

whether the father acted reasonably, and in a timely fashion, in coming forward to

accept responsibility for his child’s care and seek a relationship with his child.

Before the legislature implemented the peremptory periods, Louisiana courts

afforded a biological father a hearing to determine whether he acted in a timely

manner considering all relevant factors including the best interest of the child.

Putnam v. Mayeaux, 645 So.2d 1223 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1994) (no prescriptive

period; one year and three days was reasonable); Geen v. Geen, 666 So.2d 1192

(La. App. 3 Cir. 1995) (fifteen to nineteen months was reasonable); Demery v.

Housing Auth. Of New Orleans, 689 So.2d 659 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1997), T.D. v.

M.M.M., 730 So.2d 873 (six years was not too long).

As to the claim that G.J.K.’s due process rights were violated, if the

biological father has a constitutional interest in his opportunity to develop an

emotional and psychological connection with his child, then the child has a

17-CA-625 70

concomitant interest in the opportunity to know and develop a relationship with his

biological father. However, at least facially, the child’s rights to both the personal

relationship and the legal benefits that accompany filiation to one’s father are not

affected by Article 198.

Civil Code Article 197 allows the child’s action to establish filiation to his

biological father, despite being filiated to his presumed father, ensuring that the

child would receive all of the legal benefits filiation provides (i.e., support,

inheritance, wrongful death benefits). There is no time limitation on the child’s

ability to file the action unless the biological father has died. La. C.C. art. 197.

But see Louisiana House of Representatives, Civil Law Committee (4/5/2004),

H.B. 368 available at

https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/VideoArchivePlayer?v=house/2004/apr/0405

_04_CL# (1:18:39-1:19:35-1:20:00). However, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure

art. 683 requires that the presumed father must agree to file the avowal action on

behalf of the child until the child reaches the age of majority. As discussed above,

the presumed father’s interest may well be contrary to avowal of the biological

father and inimical to the child’s own interest, causing deprivation to the child of

his due process rights. Therefore, as discussed above, Civil Code art. 198 risks

violating the due process rights of both the biological father and the child.

As is becoming apparent, the most important right parents possess is the

right to due process protection of their fundamental right to parent. Parents are

entitled to a hearing on the issue of fitness before their parental rights may be

terminated. See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. Article 198 risks a biological

father’s right to an opportunity to prove his willingness and fitness to parent in

circumstances in which he may be unaware of his paternity or, for a legitimate

reason, late in filing his action. The statute presumes that the biological father

deserves to have his parental rights terminated one year after the birth of the child

17-CA-625 71

unless he can affirmatively prove that the child’s mother deceived him in bad faith

as to his paternity.

When rights as important as these are at stake, a statutory scheme that

deprives a biological father of all parental rights without a hearing as to his

commitment to parental responsibilities or his fitness minimally places the

biological father’s right to due process at extreme risk. As the United States

Supreme Court found in Stanley,

Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it
explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it
needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of
both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.

405 U.S. at 656-57.

Again, I remain deeply concerned with Louisiana Civil Code Article 198’s

constitutionality.

17-CA-625 72

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

MARY E. LEGNON
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17-CA-625
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