Gaubert Oil Company, Inc. Versus Bayou Fuel Marine and Hardware Supplies, Inc., C&M Contractors Inc., Lafitte Real Estate, L.L.C., Jacquelyn R. Daigle, Jared Daigle, Chad Daigle, Gulf Coast Bank and Trust Company, New Orleans Regional Business Development Loan Corporation, Jhl Enterprises, L.L.C., Jean Lafitte Harbor, L.L.C., Jean Lafitte Marine, L.L.C.

GAUBERT OIL COMPANY, INC. NO. 19-CA-120

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

BAYOU FUEL MARINE AND HARDWARE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPPLIES, INC., C&M CONTRACTORS
INC., LAFITTE REAL ESTATE, L.L.C., STATE OF LOUISIANA
JACQUELYN R. DAIGLE, JARED DAIGLE,
CHAD DAIGLE, GULF COAST BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, NEW ORLEANS
REGIONAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
LOAN CORPORATION, JLH ENTERPRISES,
L.L.C., JEAN LAFITTE HARBOR, L.L.C.,
JEAN LAFITTE MARINE, L.L.C.

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 759-820, DIVISION "N"
HONORABLE STEPHEN D. ENRIGHT, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

October 23, 2019

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

AFFIRMED
JJM
MEJ
SJW

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
GAUBERT OIL COMPANY, INC.
Daniel A. Ranson
Ryan C. Higgins

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
GULF COAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT LOAN CORPORATION
Wayne A. Maiorana, Jr.
Robert A. Mathis

MOLAISON, J.

This is an appeal from the grant of a partial summary judgment in favor of

two defendants, Gulf Coast Bank and Trust Company (Gulf Coast) and New

Orleans Regional Business Development Loan Corporation (RLC) in a revocatory

action filed by Gaubert Oil Company, Inc. (Gaubert). The revocatory action is one

of several claims asserted in a petition filed by Gaubert against numerous

defendants as a result of a default on a promissory note held by Gaubert. Gulf

Coast and RLC (collectively known as “the lenders”) are lenders and hold

mortgages and other security interests in certain immovable and movable property

that Gaubert asserts was owned by Bayou Fuel Marine and Hardware Supplies,

Inc. (Bayou Fuel), the maker of the promissory note which forms the basis of the

revocatory action. Gaubert asserts that the property was sold to a third party,

increasing or causing the insolvency of the debtor. For the following reasons, we

affirm the judgment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 12, 2016, Gaubert filed a petition naming defendants, Bayou Fuel,

C&M Contractors, Inc. (C&M), Lafitte Real Estate, LLC (Lafitte Real Estate),

Gulf Coast, RLC, Jean Lafitte Harbor, LLC, Jean Lafitte Marine, LLC, JLH

Enterprises, LLC, (JLH), Jacquelyn Daigle, Chad Daigle, and Jared Daigle as

solidary obligors. The petition states a claim for indebtedness on a promissory note

made by Bayou Fuel, a revocatory action, enforcement of a security interest and

purchaser liability.

The petition claims that on March 3, 2016, Bayou Fuel, C&M and Lafitte

Real Estate sold movable and immovable property to JLH, adversely affecting

Gaubert’s security interest in the property. The petition prays for a judgment

against all defendants, who Gaubert asserts are solidary obligors, that includes the

annulment of the sale and transfer of any property, the liquidation of the property,

19-CA-120 1

and the annulment of any and all security interests held by the lenders resulting

from the sale.

Gaubert filed a motion for summary judgment against defendants Bayou

Fuel, Jacquelyn Daigle, Jared Daigle and Chad Daigle as to a promissory note

made by Bayou Fuel in Gaubert’s favor. The trial court granted that motion in a

judgment rendered on December 17, 2017. In that judgment, the trial court found

that Bayou Fuel and the Daigles defaulted on a promissory note and were solidarily

liable for payment to Gaubert in the amount of $609,726.35. That judgment was

appealed to this Court. However, before the appeal was considered, the parties

reached a compromise to satisfy the judgment, and ultimately filed a joint motion

to dismiss the appeal. This Court granted that motion on October 8, 2018.

Gaubert Oil Company, Inc., v. Bayou Marine and Hardware Supplies, Inc., 18-225

(La. App. 5th Cir.).

In the instant appeal, Gulf Coast and RLC filed a motion for summary

judgment, primarily arguing that a revocatory action cannot cancel a lender’s

mortgage. The trial court granted the summary judgment finding in part that, a

revocatory action only lies to revoke contracts between third parties and the

obligor. The trial court reasoned that at the time of the sale, Lafitte Real Estate and

C&M, two of the sellers, were not Gaubert’s obligors. Finally, the trial court

found that Gaubert had no recorded lien interests in the assets of Lafitte Real

Estate and C&M at the time of the sale.

Gaubert filed a motion for new trial which the trial court granted in part to

clarify the original judgment. The trial court found that there is no genuine issue

of material fact, and the lenders are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with

regard to Gaubert’s assertion of a revocatory action seeking to directly annul the

lenders’ mortgages and security interests, and dismissed those claims with

prejudice. The judgment clarified that the summary judgment was granted as to

19-CA-120 2

Gaubert’s assertion that the lenders’ mortgages may be invalid based on a theory

that Bayou Fuel, C&M and Lafitte Real Estate operated as a single business

enterprise. The judgment makes it clear that nothing in the original judgment

affects Gaubert’s claim that Bayou Fuel, C&M, and Lafitte Real Estate operated as

a single business enterprise and that each is a solidary obligor on the promissory

note, and that nothing in the original judgment is meant to affect the ranking of any

security interest. Gaubert appeals.

In a separate, but related appeal pending before this Court, defendants, JLH,

Jean Lafitte Harbor, LLC and Jean Lafitte Marine, LLC, filed a motion for

summary judgment in the revocatory action. The trial court granted that motion

and dismissed Gaubert’s revocatory action against JLH, noting that the other two

defendants were previously dismissed with prejudice from this case by a judgment

dated November 27, 2018. Gaubert Oil Company, Inc. v. Bayou Fuel Marine and

Hardware Supplies, Inc., 19-252 (La. App. 5th Cir.) ____ So.3d ___.

FACTS

Bayou Fuel, C&M and Lafitte Real Estate are businesses started by Kenneth

Daigle and Al Gross in the 1970’s in Lafitte, Louisiana. Bayou Fuel operated as a

marina and supply business selling fuel, groceries, marine and hardware supplies.

C&M provided crane and dock services for the oil field industry with equipment to

load and unload barges. C&M also rented boats and cabins, and operated a trailer

park. Lafitte Real Estate owned the immovable property, located at 4932 Kenal

Drive, which it leased to the other two entities.

In 2006, Kenneth Daigle’s sons, Chad and Jared, purchased Mr. Gross’ 50%

shares in the businesses for $2.6 million through financing and a mortgage with

Whitney Bank. That mortgage was subsequently assigned to NCC Financial, LLC

(NCC). After that transaction, all three businesses were owned by Jacquelyn

19-CA-120 3

Daigle (Nicholas Daigle’s wife) (50%), Chad Daigle (26%) and Jared Daigle

(24%) respectively.

Gaubert, a supplier of commercial fuel including gasoline and diesel fuel,

sold fuel to C&M and Bayou Fuel on an open account for many years, and the

parties agreed that a good business relationship existed among them. In 2014,

when the amount unpaid on the open accounts grew to about $900,000.00, Gaubert

put deliveries on a cash on delivery basis. Shortly thereafter, Gaubert and Bayou

Fuel agreed to convert the accounts payable to a promissory note in favor of

Gaubert. Gaubert agreed to waive the finance charges on the amount due, and

Bayou Fuel executed a promissory note to Gaubert in the amount of $774,670.14.

In conjunction with the promissory note, the parties also executed a commercial

security agreement encumbering the equipment, inventory, accounts receivables,

and proceeds from the sale of any of the assets of Bayou Fuel. The documents

were filed in the Lafourche Parish registry. After a few months, the companies

stopped making payments to Gaubert on the promissory note because of financial

restraints.

In 2015, the Daigles’ decided to sell all of their holdings. Their real estate

agent secured an interested buyer, Nicholas Dinet, who agreed to purchase the real

property and all equipment and inventory for $3.1 million. However, Mr. Dinet

was unable to secure financing to complete the transaction.

Further negotiations involved Maria Couevas, who was only able to secure

financing in the amount of $1.8 million through a combination of loans including

one by Gulf Coast and two by RLC. RLC is a community development entity

which provides financing for commercial projects that banks will not fund.

An agreement to purchase the property for $1.8 million was executed and

the transaction was completed on March 3, 2016 by two acts of sale. In one,

Lafitte Real Estate sold the immovable property located at 4932 Kenal Drive for

19-CA-120 4

$1.8 million to JLH, which was represented by Maria Couevas. In the second,

Lafitte Real Estate, C&M and Bayou Fuel sold all movables and assets of all three

businesses for $1.8 million.1 Primary financing for the purchase was obtained by

an $840,000 loan from Gulf Coast and two $300,000 loans from RLC. An

amendment to the purchase agreement shows an agreement between the Daigles

and Ms. Couevas whereby the sellers would finance $600,000 of the purchase

price in the form of a mortgage on real property located at 3894 Jean Lafitte Road

in Lafitte, Louisiana. Additionally, Gulf Coast extended a $100,000 line of credit

to Jean Lafitte Harbor, LLC, a company related to JLH.

At the time of the sale, a mortgage in favor of Whitney Bank in the amount

of $4,080,000 was recorded in the Jefferson Parish records. The mortgage, which

had been assigned to NCC, had a balance due of $1,926,269.77. Because Gulf

Coast and RLC could not obtain first and second mortgages on the property until

the Whitney/NCC mortgage was paid in full and cancelled, the Whitney/NCC debt

was paid at the time of the act of sale. The settlement statement shows

disbursement of the funds for this purpose.

JLH executed promissory notes for each loan. The Gulf Coast and RLC

notes are secured by multiple indebtedness mortgages encumbering the Kenal

Drive property, multiple indebtedness mortgages encumbering two parcels of

immovable property owned by the buyer, and security agreements encumbering the

movable property transferred in the March 3, 2016 sale.2 All debt documents

related to the sale and loans by Gulf Coast and RLC were duly recorded in the

Jefferson Parish records.

Gaubert instituted this litigation to collect on the promissory note and to

revoke the sale of the property and assets. In the course of the litigation, Gaubert

1
This second act of sale makes it clear that the sale price included the immovable property.
2
It does not appear that the $600,000 promissory note in favor of the seller was secured by a mortgage.

19-CA-120 5

secured a judgment against Bayou Fuel and the Daigles on the promissory note in

the amount of $609,726.35. As noted above, the parties reached an agreement to

settle that portion of the litigation, and on September 28, 2018, Gaubert, Bayou

Fuel and the Daigles executed a partial dation en paiement3 acknowledging the

total indebtedness of $1,020,120.33, and transferring certain immovable property

owned by the Daigles. $291,320.73 remains as a deficiency after the dation en

paiement.

This protracted litigation continued and brings two summary judgments in

two separate appeals before this Court. On review in this appeal is the trial court’s

grant of a partial summary judgment concerning certain claims against Gulf Coast

and RLC.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In brief to this Court Gaubert assigns four errors:

1.) The trial court erred in finding that the public records doctrine is an
exception to the revocatory action and, therefore, prevents Gaubert from
invalidating lenders’ mortgages and security interests on the property
transferred by Gaubert’s obligors to JLH.

2.) The trial court erred in finding that the result of Gaubert’s revocatory action,
if successful, will not affect the lenders’ mortgages and security interests in
the property transferred by the Daigle Enterprise to JLH.

3.) The trial court erred in failing to recognize that genuine issues of material
fact exist with respect to the ownership of the property transferred by the
Daigle Enterprise to JLH precluding summary judgment in favor of the
lenders.

4.) The trial court erred in finding that Lafitte Real Estate and C&M cannot be
Gaubert’s obligors at the time of the sale as required in a revocatory action
based on an erroneous interpretation of the single business enterprise theory
having only prospective application.

3
Dation en paiement, or giving in payment, is a contract whereby an obligor gives a thing to the obligee,
who accepts it in payment of a debt. La. C.C. art. 2655.

19-CA-120 6

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Appellate courts review the granting of summary judgment de novo using

the same criteria governing the trial court's consideration of whether summary

judgment is appropriate. Gutierrez v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 13-341 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 10/30/13), 128 So.3d 509, 511. A motion for summary judgment is a

procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of

material fact, and is favored and designed to secure the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action. Village Shopping Ctr. P'ship v. Kimble

Dev., LLC, 18-740 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/24/19), 271 So.3d 376, 380. La. C.C.P. art.

966 A (3) provides that, “[a]fter an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion

for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and

supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and

that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

La. C.C.P. art 966 D (1) provides that the burden of proof rests with the

mover, unless the mover does not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that

is before the court. In that case, “the mover's burden on the motion does not

require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or

defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one

or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. The

burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. A fact is material if it potentially insures or

precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome

of the legal dispute. Hines v. Garrett, 2004-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764,

765-66.

A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree.

If reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on

19-CA-120 7

that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. Any decision as to the

propriety of a grant of the motion must be made with reference to the substantive

law applicable to the case. Only in the context of the applicable substantive law

can issues of material fact be ascertained. Johnson v. Folse, 07-1031 (La. App. 5

Cir. 5/27/08), 986 So.2d 110, 114, writ denied, 08-1377 (La. 9/26/08), 992 So.2d

991.

In the judgment on the motion for new trial, the trial court granted the

summary judgment, finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that

the lenders were entitled to summary judgment with regard to the validity of the

lenders’ mortgages and security interests. In its reasons for judgment, the trial

court found that under La. C.C. art. 20364 a revocatory action lies only to revoke

contracts between third parties and the obligor. Further, the court found that

Lafitte Real Estate and C&M were not obligors at the time of the sale, rejecting

Gaubert’s assertion that the single business enterprise theory is applicable. Finally,

the trial court found that Gaubert possessed no lien interests recorded in the public

records regarding assets belonging to Lafitte Real Estate and C&M, thus giving the

lenders protection from any claim as to those entities.

The judgment of the trial court retains Gaubert’s right to assert a revocatory

action seeking the annulment of the sale of assets of the three companies to JLH,

and does not affect the lenders status as parties pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2042.5

4
La. C.C. art. 2036 provides that; An obligee has a right to annul an act of the obligor, or the result of a
failure to act of the obligor, made or effected after the right of the obligee arose, that causes or increases
the obligor's insolvency.
5
La. C.C. art. 2042 provides that; In an action to annul either his obligor's act, or the result of his
obligor's failure to act, the obligee must join the obligor and the third persons involved in that act
or failure to act.
A third person joined in the action may plead discussion of the obligor's assets.

19-CA-120 8

SINGLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE

Two of Gaubert’s assignments of error relate to its assertion that Bayou

Fuel, C&M and Lafitte Real Estate should be considered as a single business

enterprise, making all three businesses liable on the obligation that forms the basis

of the revocatory action. The single business enterprise doctrine is a theory for

imposing liability where two or more business entities act as one.

Khoobehi Properties, LLC v. Baronne Dev. No. 2, L.L.C., 16-506 (La. App. 5 Cir.

3/29/17), 216 So.3d 287, 298, writ denied, 2017-0893 (La. 9/29/17), 227 So.3d

288. Corporations are separate entities; however, the legal fiction of a distinct

corporate entity may be disregarded when a corporation is so organized and

controlled as to make it merely an instrumentality of another corporation. Id.

Gaubert argues that there are genuine issues of material fact that exist with

respect to the ownership of the assets transferred in the sale, based on Gaubert’s

assertion that the single business enterprise theory is applicable. In support of

these assignments, Gaubert argues that the treatment of all three entities as “seller”

in the act of sale is evidence that the entities were operated as a single business

enterprise. Gaubert also argues the trial court erred in finding that Lafitte Real

Estate and C&M cannot be Gaubert’s obligors at the time of the sale as required in

a revocatory action based on its erroneous interpretation of the single business

enterprise theory having only prospective application.

Lenders counter that the relationship of the obligee and the obligor must be

established before the sale that formed the basis of the revocatory action, not after.

Lenders point out that, while Bayou Fuel is an obligor pursuant to the promissory

note, C&M and Lafitte Real Estate are not. We find lenders’ argument convincing.

La. C.C. art. 1756 defines obligation as “a legal relationship whereby a

person, called the obligor, is bound to render a performance in favor of another,

called the obligee.” The party asserting an obligation bears the burden of proof. La.

19-CA-120 9

C.C. art. 1831. The record is clear that Bayou Fuel is the only entity bound by the

promissory note used as a basis for the revocatory action. The remaining two

entities are not bound by the note, and therefore are not bound to render a

performance in favor of Gaubert under article 1756. This position is also

supported by the fact that Gaubert successfully sought partial summary judgment

on the note, and ultimately settled only with Bayou Fuel and the Daigles

individually on that obligation.

The revocatory action derives from La. C.C. art. 2036, which provides that

“(a)n obligee has a right to annul an act of the obligor, or the result of a failure to

act of the obligor, made or effected after the right of the obligee arose, that causes

or increases the obligor's insolvency.” In order for an obligee to annul an act of the

obligor, he must show; (1) an act (or failure to act) of the obligor that causes or

increases the obligor's insolvency, and; (2) the act must occur after the obligee's

rights arose. Long Duc Bui v. Mughal, 52,514 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So.3d

494, 498. Article 2036 makes it clear that a revocatory action will not lie before

the obligee’s rights arise. It is axiomatic that the obligee’s right cannot arise before

the obligation exists. The only obligation that existed at the time Gaubert filed this

revocatory action was the obligation on the note made by Bayou Fuel.

Based on the above cited law, we find no error in the trial court’s

determination that Gaubert’s single business enterprise theory has prospective

application. C&M and Lafitte Real Estate were not obligors on the note, nor were

they cast in judgment as obligors to Gaubert in the December 17, 2017 summary

judgment. Neither business entity had an established obligation to Gaubert at the

time of the filing of the revocatory action. After making that finding, it follows

that there is no need for a factual determination relating to the single enterprise

theory which would preclude the grant of the summary judgment as it relates to the

19-CA-120 10

issue of Gaubert’s right to a revocatory action to directly annul the sale or the

lenders’ mortgages.

PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE

The remaining two assignments of error relate to the effect of the public

records doctrine on a revocatory action. Gaubert asserts that the public records

doctrine has no application to a revocatory action. Gaubert argues that the

obligee’s interest in the revocatory action does not need to be recorded to be

effective against third parties. In essence, Gaubert’s general argument is that it is

not required to have a recorded interest in the assets belonging to Lafitte Real

Estate and C&M because the right to annul the sale is based on its interest in the

revocatory action, which is an interest that does not require recordation under the

law to affect third parties. Gaubert argues that, while the public records doctrine

protects third parties against unrecorded acts, it does not protect third parties

against unrecorded interests.

Gaubert further argues that the exceptions to the public records doctrine

recognized in the civil code encompass the protection of unrecorded interests and

creditors’ rights based on the insolvency of the seller. More specifically, Gaubert

argues there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the ownership of the

assets and Gaubert’s rights to those assets since all assets of all three entities were

combined in the sale.

Under the facts of this case, we find an examination of the relationship

between the public records doctrine and a revocatory action is unnecessary. As

previously explained, we find that Gaubert cannot extend liability to C&M and

Lafitte Real Estate after the sale on a single business enterprise theory. The

obligation must have existed before the sale. Thus, Gaubert’s claim in the

revocatory action will only lie against Bayou Fuel, which had no ownership

interest in the immovable property transferred in the sale. The only interest that

19-CA-120 11

can be legally asserted in this revocatory action is one in the movables owned by

Bayou Fuel.

Gaubert argues that this interest in the movables, owned by Bayou Fuel and

included in the sale, justifies the annulment of the lenders’ mortgage and security

interests in the property. We disagree. The lenders have a mortgage on the

immovable property that was transferred from Lafitte Real Estate to JLH in an act

of sale. Since Lafitte Real Estate is not an obligor, Gaubert has no interest in that

sale and cannot prove the essential elements of its action in a revocatory action

against Lafitte Real Estate, or by extension, the lenders. Therefore, we find that

the lenders’ mortgage on the immovable property cannot be annulled. Summary

judgment as to that issue was correctly granted.

In a separate document, the movables of all three businesses were sold to

JLH. This included the movables owned by Bayou Fuel. Since Bayou Fuel is an

obligor, Gaubert can bring a claim for revocation against Bayou Fuel and “third

persons involved in that act.” La. C.C. art. 2042. We find the term “involved in

that act,” is broad enough to include the lenders as well as the buyer. We note that

the trial court retained the lenders’ status as parties pursuant to article 2042 in the

judgment partially granting the motion for new trial.

One of the essential elements of a revocatory action is a showing that the

sale “causes or increases the obligor’s insolvency.” La. C.C. art. 2036. The

existence of the debt and insolvency of the debtor are the two prerequisites to

revocation of the transaction. Reading & Bates Const. Co. v. Baker Energy Res.

Corp., 96–1276 (La. App. 3d Cir. 5/21/97), 698 So.2d 413, 422, writ denied, 97–

2548 (La. 1/16/98), 706 So.2d 976. An obligor is insolvent when the total of his

liabilities exceeds the total of his fairly appraised assets. La. C.C. art. 2037.

Gaubert asserts that Bayou Fuel was insolvent at the time of the sale. There

is evidence in the record to support that claim. However, if the insolvency existed

19-CA-120 12

at the time of the sale, Gaubert must meet its burden of proof that the sale

increased the insolvency. Gaubert failed to produce any evidence that the sale

negatively affected Bayou Fuel’s financial condition. In fact, the evidence

indicates Bayou Fuel’s financial condition improved after the sale. The undisputed

facts show that Bayou Fuel was an obligor on a $1,926,269.76 mortgage in favor

of NCC that was extinguished with the proceeds of the sale as shown in the

settlement statement from the sale. There is also evidence in the record that Bayou

Fuel has an interest in the $600,000 seller’s loan to the buyer.

We find Gaubert is unable to prove an increase in the insolvency of Bayou

Fuel, an essential element of the action at issue in this matter. Therefore, we find

summary judgment was correctly granted. Accordingly, we find no merit in

Gaubert’s assignments of error, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court on

appeal.

AFFIRMED

19-CA-120 13

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY MARY E. LEGNON

CHIEF JUDGE INTERIM CLERK OF COURT

FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
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GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
OCTOBER 23, 2019 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

19-CA-120
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE STEPHEN D. ENRIGHT, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
RYAN C. HIGGINS (APPELLANT) JAMES L. DONOVAN, JR. (APPELLEE) GUS A. FRITCHIE, III (APPELLEE)
JOEL A. LEVY (APPELLEE) DANIEL A. RANSON (APPELLANT)

MAILED
ROBERT S. REICH (APPELLEE) WAYNE A. MAIORANA, JR. (APPELLEE)
ATTORNEY AT LAW ROBERT A. MATHIS (APPELLEE)
3850 N. CAUSEWAY BOULEVARD ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SUITE 1000 433 METAIRIE ROAD
METAIRIE, LA 70002 SUITE 600
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