Bernhard McC, LLC Versus Kurt M. Zeringue; Robert G. Mayfield, Sr.; Robert G. Mayfield, Jr.; Cecil Passman; James Brian Carlisle; And Nicholas Zazulak

BERNHARD MCC, LLC NO. 19-CA-529

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

KURT M. ZERINGUE; ROBERT G. COURT OF APPEAL
MAYFIELD, SR.; ROBERT G. MAYFIELD, JR.;
CECIL PASSMAN; JAMES BRIAN CARLISLE; STATE OF LOUISIANA
AND NICHOLAS ZAZULAK

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 774-865, DIVISION "G"
HONORABLE E. ADRIAN ADAMS, JUDGE PRESIDING

September 09, 2020

MARC E. JOHNSON
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and Marc E. Johnson

REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED
MEJ
SMC
FHW

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
BERNHARD MCC, LLC
Mark R. Beebe
Timothy M. Brinks
William D. Shea
Kellen J. Mathews

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
KURT M. ZERINGUE; ROBERT G. MAYFIELD, SR.; ROBERT G.
MAYFIELD, JR.; CECIL PASSMAN; JAMES BRIAN CARLISLE; AND
NICHOLAS ZAZULAK
Robert E. Couhig, Jr.
Jason A. Cavignac
Jack M. Capella

JOHNSON, J.

Bernhard MCC, LLC brought an action against several of its former

employees, alleging violations of the Louisiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act

(“LUTSA”) and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”). The

former employees, Defendants, appeal the trial court’s September 16, 2019

judgment granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Bernhard MCC, LLC. For

the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment granting the injunction, in part,

and remand the matter for further proceedings.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 9, 2017, Bernhard MMC, LLC (“Bernhard”) filed a petition for

preliminary and permanent injunctions against six of its former employees: Kurt

Zeringue, Robert Mayfield, Sr., Robert Mayfield Jr., Cecil Passman, James

Carlisle, and Nicholas Zazulak (collectively “Defendants”). Bernhard alleged that

Defendants were long-time employees of MMC entities of which Bernhard

acquired membership interests in October 2015.1 Bernhard asserted that after the

acquisition, Defendants became employees of Bernhard and continued in their

same duties. Bernhard contended that, as employees, each defendant had access to

confidential company materials, including employee wage rates, pricing structure

information, bid information, estimates, proposals, amongst other information

pertaining to its business operations.2

In May 2017, Defendants resigned and began working with Regional

Mechanical Services, LLC (“RMS”).3 Bernhard alleged Defendants failed to

return its confidential and proprietary information upon their termination and used

1
Bernhard is a mechanical, electrical, and plumbing contracting business.
2
MCC was a mechanical contracting company in New Orleans. After the acquisition, the newly formed
entity became Bernhard MCC, LCC.
3
RMS is not a party to this injunction proceeding; however, it has been named as a defendant in a related
suit, which also named the six defendants who are parties to the instant litigation.

19-CA-529 1

the misappropriated information to solicit and bid commercial construction

projects on behalf of RMS in direct competition with Bernhard. It asserted

Defendants’ use of the confidential and proprietary information violates both the

Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”), in that Defendants’ use of the

information is an unfair method of competition and constitutes unfair or deceptive

acts, and the Louisiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“LUTSA”), in that the

information used by Defendants constitutes a trade secret. Bernhard alleged

Defendants’ use of the confidential and proprietary business information resulted

in lost revenues, loss of customers, loss of business goodwill, loss of business

opportunities, loss of skilled labor, and loss of market share. As such, Bernhard

sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against Defendants to prohibit their

continued use of its confidential business information. Defendants opposed the

petition for injunctive relief, arguing the damages alleged by Bernhard were

monetarily compensable and, thus, Bernhard would not suffer irreparable injury. A

hearing on the preliminary injunction was held on August 23, 2017.

During the hearing, Bernhard presented the testimony of its president, Philip

Catanzaro, and submitted various exhibits, including confidentiality agreements,

the Bernhard Employee Handbook, and various emails. Bernhard averred that no

remedy at law would compensate it for lost customers, employees, and business

goodwill. As such, Bernhard sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against

Defendants to prohibit their continued use of its confidential business information.

In their defense, Defendants presented the testimony of one defendant, Kurt

Zeringue. Defendants opposed the petition for injunctive relief, arguing the

damages alleged by Bernhard were monetarily compensable and, thus, Bernhard

would not suffer irreparable injury. Defendants also maintained that the

information and documentation Bernhard sought to enjoin was not unique to

19-CA-529 2

Bernhard as the information was readily available from other third-party sources

and, thus, did not constitute trade secrets.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under

advisement and subsequently entered judgment on August 31, 2017, without

reasons, in favor of Bernhard. Thereafter, the trial court amended its original

judgment—once on September 18, 2017, and then on September 27, 2017— again

ruling in favor of Bernhard. On May 30, 2018, this Court, finding that the original

August 31, 2017 judgment was null and void for lack of specificity as required by

La. C.C.P. art. 3605, and the September 18, 2017 and September 27, 2017

judgments were absolute nullities because the trial court had been divested of

jurisdiction at the time the judgments were signed, vacated all three judgments and

remanded the matter for further proceedings. See Bernhard MCC, LLC v.

Zeringue, 18-30 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/18); 250 So.3d 342, 349.

On remand, without a hearing and without assigning reasons, the trial court

issued judgment on July 13, 2018, in favor of Bernhard. Specifically, the judgment

granted Bernhard’s petition for preliminary injunction and prohibited Defendants

from seeking, requesting, soliciting from any person, or utilizing for any purpose,

any confidential and/or proprietary business information of Bernhard. The

judgment further ordered Defendants to return all of Bernhard’s confidential and

proprietary business information and any other material constituting a trade secret

and to comply with their respective obligations to Bernhard regarding the

confidentiality and non-disclosure of confidential and proprietary business

information. Defendants appealed that judgment. On February 27, 2019, this Court,

noting that the decretal language of the July 13, 2018 judgment was identical to

that of the September 27, 2017 amended judgment that was the subject of the first

appeal between the two parties, again found that the judgment was null and void

for lack of specificity as required by La. C.C.P. art. 3605, vacated the judgment

19-CA-529 3

and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Bernhard MCC, LLC v.

Zeringue, 18-553 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/27/19); 266 So.3d 537, 542.

On remand, the trial court held a hearing on September 16, 2019 on the

Motion to Enter Judgment on Preliminary Hearing, filed by Bernhard on July 29,

2019. Counsel for Bernhard requested that the court enter the order they prepared.

Defendants’ counsel countered that Bernhard was not entitled to relief because

there was another remedy available to Bernhard, as evidenced by Bernhard’s suit

for damages filed against Defendants on May 4, 2018.The court found that

Bernhard established a prima facie case that they will “prevail on the merits in

showing that Defendants took Bernhard’s ‘confidential, proprietary and/or trade

secret documents and [. . .] had no apparent, legitimate business reason for doing

so.’” The trial court granted a preliminary injunction and adopted the judgment

submitted by Bernhard. Defendants were prohibited from “seeking, requesting, or

soliciting” those documents, “including, but not limited to” the customer list,

estimating tools data, summaries of projects and bids submitted, company forms,

wage and employee data, and an invitation to bid on a particular project

Defendants sent to themselves via email. Defendants were also prohibited from

“utilizing” the materials “for any purpose” and ordered to return the privileged

materials in their possession to Bernhard. Defendants filed the instant appeal,

seeking review of the September 19, 2019 judgment.

ISSUES

Defendants argue that Bernhard was not entitled to the injunctive relief

granted. First, Defendants contend it is unlikely that Bernhard will prevail on its

claims that Defendants acted in violation of LUTSA and LUTPA. Second,

Defendants assert that injunctive relief was not warranted because Bernhard failed

to prove that it would suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue.

Finally, Defendants contend the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court

19-CA-529 4

fails to describe the prohibited acts with reasonable detail and, thus, is fatally

defective.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

First, we briefly address Defendant’s third assignment of error regarding the

form of the judgment. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3605 provides

that an order granting a preliminary injunction “shall describe in reasonable detail,

and not by mere reference to the petition or other documents, the act or acts sought

to be restrained.” In the previous appeal, this Court found that the July 13, 2018

judgment did not itemize what constitutes confidential and proprietary business

information from which Defendants are prohibited from using or soliciting, or

define what obligations Defendants owed Bernhard. The September 16, 2019 is

not identical to the previous judgment; additional references were made to the

alleged trade secrets and proprietary materials, Bernhard MCC’s Employee

Handbook, and “or any Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure agreements” in the

decretal language of the judgment. The decree, alone, states the decision; it must

be delineated in clear, unambiguous language. Wells One Investments, LLC v. City

of New Orleans, 17-415 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/2/17), 231 So.3d 54, 57. However, we

conclude--for this particular case--that the description of the conduct to be enjoined

within the four corners of the third preliminary injunction, in its entirety, is

sufficient to address the merits of the case in the interests of justice and judicial

economy. See La. C.C.P. art 2164.

Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes the distinction between a prohibitory

injunction – an injunction to preserve the status quo – and a mandatory injunction

sought to order specific action(s) – i.e., “the doing of something”, as a matter of

procedure and evidence. Saer v. New Orleans Regional Physician Hosp.

Organization, 14-856 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/25/15); 169 So.3d 617, 620-21 (Internal

citation omitted). A mandatory injunction essentially has the same effect as a

19-CA-529 5

permanent injunction, so a party seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the preliminary

injunction. Id.

The primary purpose of injunctive relief is to prevent the occurrence of

future acts that may result in irreparable injury, loss, or damage to the applicant.

Ryan Gootee Gen. Contractors, LLC v. Plaquemines Par. Sch. Bd. & One Const.,

Inc., 15-325 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/19/15); 180 So.3d 588, 598. Generally, a party

seeking the issuance of a preliminary injunction must show that he will suffer

irreparable injury if the injunction does not issue and must make a prima facie

showing that he will prevail on the merits of the case. Id. Irreparable injury means

the petitioner cannot be adequately compensated in money damages or suffers

injuries that cannot be measured by pecuniary standards. Yur-Mar, LLC v.

Jefferson Par. Council, 11-669 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/12); 90 So.3d 1137, 1140.

The primary purpose of injunctive relief is to prevent the occurrence of future acts

that may result in irreparable injury, loss, or damage to the applicant. Ryan Gootee

Gen. Contractors, LLC, 180 So.3d at 598. However, upon a prima facie showing,

a preliminary injunction that preserves the status quo between the parties pending a

full trial on the merits, may issue.

Although the judgment on a preliminary injunction is
interlocutory, a party aggrieved by a judgment either
granting or denying a preliminary injunction is entitled to
an appeal.
Generally, a party seeking the issuance of a preliminary
injunction must show that he will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction does not issue and must make a
prima facie showing that he will prevail on the merits of
the case. The threat of irreparable injury need not be
shown when the deprivation of a constitutional right is at
issue or when the act sought to be enjoined is unlawful.
Irreparable injury means the petitioner cannot adequately
be compensated in money damages or suffers injuries
which cannot be measured by pecuniary standards.
The primary purpose of injunctive relief is to prevent the
occurrence of future acts that may result in irreparable
injury, loss, or damage to the applicant. The trial court

19-CA-529 6

has great discretion in determining whether a preliminary
injunction is warranted; thus, the trial court’s ruling will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
discretion.

Bernhard MCC, LLC v. Zeringue, 266 So.3d at 540-41 (Internal citations omitted).

The appellate court reviews the granting or denial of a preliminary injunction

under the manifest error standard. Zeringue v. St. James Parish School Bd., 13-

444 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/19/13); 130 So.3d 356, 359.

The law requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case on the merits of

his claim in order to be entitled to the preliminary injunction, but it does not

require conclusive adjudication of the plaintiff’s claim on the merits as a condition

for the preliminary injunction. The trial judge has broad discretion in determining

whether to grant or refuse the injunction. Daigre Engineers, Inc. v. City of

Winnfield, 14154 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/10/1980); 385 So.2d 866, 871. The principal

demand is determined on its merits only after a full trial under ordinary process,

even though the hearing on the summary proceedings to obtain the preliminary

injunction may touch upon or tentatively decide merit-issues.” Smith v. W.

Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 373 So.2d 488, 494 (La. 1979).

To state a claim under LUTSA, “a plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of a

trade secret and (2) misappropriation of the trade secret by another.” Pyramid

Instrumentation & Elec. Corp. v. Hebert, 17-CV-1358, 18 WL 1789325, at *3

(W.D. La. Mar. 14, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2:17-CV-1358,

2018 WL 1788621 (W.D. La. Apr. 13, 2018). Under La. R.S. 51:1431(4), “trade

secret” is defined, in pertinent part, as “information” that:

(a) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by other
persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

19-CA-529 7

We find that Bernhard did not prove that the materials taken by Defendants

were “trade secrets” as contemplated by LUTSA. The estimating tools, customer

list, employee information, company forms, and historical bid summaries

Defendants took from Bernhard were common knowledge for their industry, albeit

conveniently compiled, or easily discoverable. In Pyramid Instr. & Elec. Corp.,

supra, the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana found

that the plaintiff’s “formulaic recitation of the definitions of a trade secret [. . .] and

their repeated use of the term ‘confidential and proprietary’ with respect to the

manuals [were] not enough” to show the independent economic value of the

manuals or the efforts made by Pyramid to maintain their secrecy.” Pyramid Instr.

& Elec. Corp., at *4. Similarly, in the instant case, references to the subject

documents as “confidential information,” trade secrets,” or “intellectual property”

in Bernhard’s Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement and Employee

Handbook are not proof of the documents’ intrinsic financial value, or of

Bernhard’s efforts to maintain their secrecy.

Also, LUTPA, codified in Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:1401 et seq.,

makes “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in

the conduct of any trade or commerce” unlawful. Newton v. Brenan, 14-423 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 12/16/14); 166 So.3d 285, 289. Acts which constitute unfair or

deceptive practices are not specifically defined in the statute and are instead

determined by courts on a case-by-case basis. Id. Under LUTPA, conduct is

considered unlawful when it involves fraud, misrepresentation, deception, breach

of fiduciary duty, or other unethical conduct. Creative Risk Controls, Inc. v.

Brechtel, 01-1150 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/29/03); 847 So.2d 20, 24–25, writ denied, 03-

1769 (La. 10/10/03); 855 So.2d 353. We cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion when it found that Bernhard made a prima facie showing that

Defendants’ actions violated LUPTA, which rendered the question of whether

19-CA-529 8

Bernhard proved irreparable injury moot; thus, a showing of irreparable harm was

not required.

Accordingly, we find that Bernhard did not prove that the materials

Defendants took from Bernhard were trade secrets pursuant to LUTSA. However,

we cannot say that the trial court committed manifest error when it found that

Bernhard established a prima facie case that Defendants engaged in unfair trade

practices sufficient for a preliminary injunction to issue.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse in part the September 16, 2019

judgment purporting to grant injunctive relief to Bernhard MCC, LLC. We find

that Appellee did not make a prima facie showing that Defendants violated

LUTSA, but did make a prima facie showing that Defendants violated LUPTA.

This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED

19-CA-529 9

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

MARY E. LEGNON
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
SEPTEMBER 9, 2020 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

19-CA-529
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE E. ADRIAN ADAMS (DISTRICT JUDGE)
KELLEN J. MATHEWS (APPELLEE) MARK R. BEEBE (APPELLEE) TIMOTHY M. BRINKS (APPELLEE)
WILLIAM D. SHEA (APPELLEE) JASON A. CAVIGNAC (APPELLANT)

MAILED
CORY S. GRANT (APPELLANT) JACK M. CAPELLA (APPELLANT)
ROBERT E. COUHIG, JR. (APPELLANT) ATTORNEY AT LAW
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 3421 N. CAUSEWAY BOULEVARD
1100 POYDRAS STREET SUITE 105
SUITE 3250 METAIRIE, LA 70002
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70163