19-CA-545 Nonprecedential Reversed and Remanded Processed

Succession of John L. Carter, Sr.

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit · Filed May 28, 2020

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Opinion text

SUCCESSION OF JOHN L. CARTER, SR. NO. 19-CA-545

FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 791-261, DIVISION "P"
HONORABLE LEE V. FAULKNER, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

May 28, 2020

HANS J. LILJEBERG
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
Robert A. Chaisson, and Hans J. Liljeberg

REVERSED AND REMANDED
HJL
JGG
RAC

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
JOHN L. CARTER, JR.; WAYNE CARTER, SR.; LINTRELL M. CARTER,
REGINALD CARTER, SR., CARLISIA A. WILLIAMS, JOHN A. DOWNS,
LORAINE CARTER AND CYNTHIA C. LEJEUNE
Wayne Carter, I.P.P.
Leon E. Roy, IV

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
DEANDRIA YOUNG CARTER, THE SURVIVING SPOUSE OF THE
DECEDENT, AND SHERRI HUTTON, EXECUTRIX FOR THE SUCCESSION
OF JOHN L. CARTER
Timon V. Webre

LILJEBERG, J.

In this succession proceeding, the decedent’s children and grandchildren

challenge the trial court’s judgments denying their Petition to Annul Probated

Testament and their Motion for New Trial. Finding the testament to be absolutely

null for lack of proper form, we reverse the trial court’s judgments and remand for

further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

John Carter, Sr. was born on August 20, 1936, and he died on December 26,

2018. He was survived by six of his seven children, all of whom were born of his

first marriage, and also by his second wife, Deandria Young Carter. On January

15, 2019, attorney Sherri Hutton filed a “Petition for Probate of Notarial Testament

and Confirmation of Independent Executrix” seeking an order probating a notarial

testament purportedly executed by the decedent on October 4, 2018 and appointing

Ms. Hutton as the independent executrix of the succession, in accordance with the

terms of the testament. In an order dated January 16, 2019, the trial court probated

the October 4, 2018 testament and appointed Ms. Hutton as the independent

executrix of the succession.

On February 21, 2019, six of the decedent’s children and two of his

grandchildren (collectively “petitioners”)1 filed a “Petition to Annul Probated

Testament,” asserting that the testament was defective because it did not comply

with the formal requirements for a notarial testament as set forth in La. C.C. art.

1577. Specifically, petitioners asserted that the decedent did not sign his name on

each page of the testament, as required by La. C.C. art. 1577; rather, he signed his

name at the end of the testament and only initialed the other three pages.

1
One of the decedent’s seven children, Catricia Carter, predeceased him. She is survived by two children
who are named as petitioners along with the decedent’s six surviving children.

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Ms. Hutton and Deandria Carter filed an answer and memoranda in

opposition to the Petition to Annul, arguing that the testament was in substantial

compliance with the requirements for a notarial testament pursuant to La. C.C. art.

1577 and that minor deviations from the formal requirements are insufficient to

invalidate a notarial testament.

On April 22, 2019, this matter came for hearing before the trial court. After

considering the arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the Petition to Annul

Probated Testament in open court. On May 9, 2019, the trial court signed a written

judgment denying the Petition to Annul Probated Testament and dismissing it with

prejudice at petitioners’ cost. Petitioners filed a Motion for New Trial on May 15,

2019, which was denied after a hearing on July 29, 2019. Petitioners now appeal.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

On appeal, petitioners assert that the trial court erred by concluding that the

notarial testament at issue is valid and denying their Petition to Annul Probated

Testament. They contend that the testament is absolutely null because some pages

were merely initialed, which does not comply with the requirement in La. C.C. art.

1577 that a notarial will shall be signed with the testator’s name at the end of the

will and on each separate page. Petitioners assert that the Louisiana Supreme

Court recently addressed this issue in Successions of Toney, 16-1534 (La. 5/3/17),

226 So.3d 397, where it found that a notarial testament was invalid since it was

initialed on the first two pages, not signed with the testator’s name. They argue

that pursuant to Toney, this Court must reverse the trial court and find the notarial

testament invalid for lack of proper testamentary form.

Ms. Carter responds that the notarial testament substantially complies with

the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577, which is all that is required for it to be

valid. She contends that signatures come in all shapes and sizes and that the

decedent’s cursive initials on the first three pages of his testament are sufficient to

19-CA-545 2

constitute his signature. In support of her position, Ms. Carter cites In re

Succession of Hebert, 12-281 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/3/12), 101 So.3d 131, in which

the Third Circuit found a testament to be valid where the decedent did not sign her

name on the first page, but she signed her initials in large, cursive letters next to

each dispositive provision on the first page of the testament and signed her name

on the second and final page. Ms. Carter further argues that the petitioners

mistakenly rely on Successions of Toney, supra, for the proposition that signing

initials instead of a full name on each page invalidates a testament. She asserts that

in Toney, even though the pages of the testament were initialed rather than signed

with the testator’s name, the reason the Court found the testament invalid was

because it had a deficient attestation clause. She also notes that the initials in

Toney were printed, not in cursive as in this case.

In the present case, we must determine whether the decedent’s signing of his

initials, rather than his full name, on the first three pages of the testament is

sufficient to substantially comply with the formal requirements for a notarial

testament, as set forth in La. C.C. art. 1577.

The purpose of prescribing formalities for the execution of wills is to guard

against mistake, imposition, undue influence, fraud or deception, to afford a means

of determining the will’s authenticity, and to prevent substitution of some other

writing in its place. In re Hendricks, 08-1914 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/23/09), 28 So.3d

1057, 1060, writ not considered, 10-480 (La. 3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1256, citing

Succession of Roussel, 373 So.2d 155 (La. 1979). La. C.C. art. 1573 provides that

“[t]he formalities prescribed for the execution of a testament must be observed or

the testament is absolutely null.” The language of La. C.C. art. 1573 does not

provide for any exceptions. Succession of Harlan, 17-1132 (La. 5/1/18), 250 So.3d

220, 226. The fact that there is no fraud, or even suggestion of it, will not justify

19-CA-545 3

the courts in departing from the formal requirements for a notarial testament.

Hendricks, 28 So.3d at 1060; Roussel, supra.

La. C.C. art. 1576 provides that “[a] notarial testament is one that is

executed in accordance with the formalities of Articles 1577 through 1580.1.” The

formalities set forth in La. C.C. art. 1577 include, in pertinent part:

1) In the presence of a notary and two competent witnesses, the
testator shall declare or signify to them that the instrument is his
testament and shall sign his name at the end of the testament
and on each other separate page. (Emphasis added.)

La. C.C. art. 1577 provides that a testator “shall sign his name” on each page

of a notarial testament, and the word “shall” is mandatory. La. R.S. 1:3; In re

Succession of Holbrook, 13-1181 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d 845, 849. When a law

is clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the

pretext of pursuing its spirit. La. R.S. 1:4; Holbrook, 144 So.3d at 849. It is

presumed that every word, sentence, or provision in a law was intended to serve

some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and

that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed. Toney, 226 So.3d at 406;

Sultana Corp. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 03-360 (La. 12/3/03), 860 So.2d 1112,

1119.

The testament at issue herein does not strictly comply with the formal

requirements for a notarial testament, as per La. C.C. art. 1577, because the

decedent signed his initials, not his name, on the first three pages of the testament.

However, the jurisprudence provides that courts need not strictly adhere to the

formal requirements for a notarial testament to the extent of elevating form over

function. Holbrook, 13-1181 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d at 851; Harlan, 250 So.3d at

226. It provides that there is a presumption in favor of the validity of testaments in

general and proof of the nonobservance of formalities must be exceptionally

compelling to rebut the presumption. Id.; Toney, 226 So.3d at 401. Courts should

19-CA-545 4

maintain the validity of a notarial testament, as long as it is in substantial

compliance with the codal requirements. Holbrook, 144 So.3d at 851, citing

Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So.2d 366 (La. 1987).

In order to determine whether the testament in the present case substantially

complies with the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577 and thus, is a valid notarial

testament, we must consider the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in

Successions of Toney, supra. In Toney, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered a

challenge to a notarial testament that did not comply with the requirements of La.

C.C. art. 1577 in two respects: 1) the first two pages of the testament were initialed

in print, with a signature only at the end of the testament; and 2) there was a

defective attestation clause. The Court analyzed each of the two defects and

concluded that the testament, viewed in its entirety, did not substantially comply

with the formal requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577. Toney, 226 So.3d at 404. The

Court found that these deviations from the formal requirements of a notarial

testament were significant and material and, thus, the testament was absolutely

null. Toney, 226 So.3d at 407.

Addressing the requirement that the testator shall sign his name at the end of

the testament and on each separate page, the Toney Court noted that the first two

pages of the testament were not signed but were initialed in print, contrary to the

provisions of La. C.C. art. 1577. The Court stated that although signatures come in

a variety of forms and although a few appellate courts have upheld wills where

some pages were initialed rather than signed, La. C.C. art. 1577 “unambiguously

requires the testator to ‘sign his name at the end of the testament and on each

other separate page,’ and merely initialing undoubtedly falls short of this

requirement.” Toney, 226 So.3d at 404 (Emphasis in original.) The Court further

noted that even though fraud was not alleged, “signing one’s name on each page of

the will undoubtedly offers more heightened protection from surreptitious

19-CA-545 5

replacement of pages than mere initialing, particularly when the initialing is in

print rather than cursive as is found here.” Id. at 404-405.

The Toney Court further emphasized that fraud need not be alleged in order

to find a testament null for failing to comply with the requirements set forth in the

Louisiana Civil Code. It noted that Louisiana courts have held notarial testaments

invalid when they contain “material deviations” from the form requirements, even

in the absence of any indication of fraud, and stated that “[a]ny language in

previous jurisprudence which suggested otherwise is rejected.” Toney, 226 So.3d

at 407. The Court further stated that the legislature has provided a significant

benefit for testaments that comply with the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577, and

that whether it is prudent to reduce the testamentary form requirements “is a

question of policy reserved to the purview of the legislature.” Id.

In the present case, Ms. Carter contends that the Toney case is

distinguishable from the instant case, because the initials in this case are in cursive,

not printed as in Toney. She also argues that initials, in lieu of a signature on each

page, would not have rendered the will invalid in Toney without the defective

attestation clause.

First, while the Toney Court did note that printed initials are easier to imitate

than cursive initials, it did not hold that cursive initials are sufficient to

substantially comply with the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577. It specifically

noted that “merely initialing falls short” of the requirement that the testator sign his

name on each page. Second, while there were two deviations from the required

testamentary form in Toney, not one deviation as in this case, the Toney court

discussed each deviation separately and found that the “deviations” were

significant and material. There is no indication that the result would have been

different if only one deviation was present or if the initials were in cursive.

19-CA-545 6

In the present case, the decedent did not sign his name on each page of the

testament, which is required under the clear and unambiguous language of La. C.C.

art. 1577. Further, after considering the applicable jurisprudence, particularly the

Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Successions of Toney, supra, we find that

this deviation is material and significant and that the testament in this case does not

substantially comply with the requirements for a notarial testament. Because the

notarial testament in this case does not substantially comply with the formal

requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577, we find that the testament is absolutely null

pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1573.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgments denying

and dismissing petitioners’ Petition to Annul Probated Testament and denying their

Motion for New Trial. We find that the testament at issue is absolutely null, and

we remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

19-CA-545 7

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

MARY E. LEGNON
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
JUDE G. GRAVOIS CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
HANS J. LILJEBERG FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY MAY 28, 2020
TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

19-CA-545
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HON. LEE V. FAULKNER, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
LEON E. ROY, IV (APPELLANT) TIMON V. WEBRE (APPELLEE)

MAILED
MICHAEL D. ROCHE (ATTORNEY) SHERRI L. HUTTON (ATTORNEY) WAYNE CARTER (APPELLANT)
ATTORNEY AT LAW ATTORNEY AT LAW IN PROPER PERSON
4601 CHATEAU DRIVE 700 CAMP STREET 5076 WOODCREST DRIVE
METAIRIE, LA 70002 SUITE 112 MARRERO, LA 70072
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130
RONNETTE JOHNSON (APPELLEE)
IN PROPER PERSON
POST OFFICE BOX 10063
BIRMINGHAM, AL 32502