In Re: Medical Review Panel Proceedings of Don Singleton

IN RE: MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL NO. 19-CA-578
PROCEEDINGS OF DON SINGLETON
FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 793-446, DIVISION "N"
HONORABLE STEPHEN D. ENRIGHT, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

September 02, 2020

ROBERT A. CHAISSON
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson,
Robert A. Chaisson, and Stephen J. Windhorst

JUDGMENT AMENDED; AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; AND
REMANDED
RAC
MEJ
SJW

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
DON SINGLETON
Veleka Eskinde
Ann M. Johnson-Griffin

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
WARREN R. BOURGEOIS III, M.D.
C. William Bradley, Jr.
Benjamin J. Biller

CHAISSON, J.

In this medical malpractice case, Don Singleton appeals a June 12, 2019

judgment of the trial court that sustained an exception of prescription and

dismissed his case against Dr. Warren R. Bourgeois, III, with prejudice. For the

following reasons, we amend the judgment of the trial court, affirm as amended,

and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 6, 2019, Mr. Don Singleton filed a request for a medical review

panel against Dr. Warren R. Bourgeois, III, with the Louisiana Division of

Administration. In his request, Mr. Singleton alleged that in or around May 2017,

Dr. Bourgeois negligently performed a cervical procedure on him whereby he

removed degenerative disc and implanted prosthetic devices, resulting in injury to

Mr. Singleton. Mr. Singleton also alleged in his request that on February 10, 2018,

he was “walking home from a Mardi Gras function at his local church when

suddenly and without warning he began to experience excruciating pain.”

In response to Mr. Singleton’s request, Dr. Bourgeois filed a Petition to

Institute Discovery Docket in the 24th Judicial District Court and later filed a

Peremptory Exception of Prescription alleging that Mr. Singleton’s action was

untimely filed and thus prescribed. In support of his exception, Dr. Bourgeois filed

an affidavit in which he attested that he did not perform a cervical procedure on

Mr. Singleton in May 2017 and that the only cervical surgery or cervical procedure

of any kind that he performed on Mr. Singleton was on October 22, 2013. Dr.

Bourgeois attached his two-page dictated operative report from that procedure to

his affidavit.

Thus, Dr. Bourgeois argued that Mr. Singleton’s February 6, 2019 medical

review panel request, filed more than five years after the date of the cervical

procedure that he performed on Mr. Singleton, was prescribed pursuant to both the

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one-year and three-year prescriptive periods for medical malpractice provided in

La. R.S. 9:5628. Additionally, Dr. Bourgeois argued in the alternative, that even if

May 2017 was the correct date of the procedure for which malpractice was alleged,

Mr. Singleton “has no evidence to carry his burden of showing that his February 6,

2019 panel request was timely,” it having been filed more than one year after the

date of the alleged malpractice.

In response to Dr. Bourgeois’ exception of prescription, Mr. Singleton filed

with the trial court a Motion and Order for Leave of Court to File First Amended

and Supplemental Petition for Medical Malpractice, in which Mr. Singleton

clarified that the May 2017 procedure for which he was alleging malpractice, was a

back procedure rather than a cervical procedure. The trial court granted Mr.

Singleton’s motion and allowed the purported First Amended and Supplemental

Petition to be filed into the trial court record prior to the hearing on Dr. Bourgeois’

exception. Thereafter, Mr. Singleton filed a memorandum in opposition to Dr.

Bourgeois’ exception of prescription in which he argued that his Amended and

Supplemental Petition, which corrected the “typographical error” in his original

request for a medical review panel that described the procedure performed by Dr.

Bourgeois as a cervical procedure rather than a back procedure, rendered Dr.

Bourgeois’ exception of prescription moot.

At the hearing on the exception, Dr. Bourgeois introduced as evidence Mr.

Singleton’s February 6, 2019 medical review panel request, the Division of

Administration’s February 18, 2019 acknowledgment of that request, his own

April 4, 2019 affidavit regarding the date of the cervical procedure that he

performed on Mr. Singleton, and his October 22, 2013 two-page dictated operative

report for that procedure. Mr. Singleton did not introduce any evidence at the

hearing on the exception, but rather relied upon his purported First Amended and

Supplemental Petition to establish that the procedure for which he was requesting a

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medical review panel was in fact a back procedure, rather than a cervical

procedure, and that the May 2017 date alleged was the correct date of that

procedure. Neither party called any witnesses to testify at the hearing.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sustained Dr. Bourgeois’

Exception of Prescription and dismissed Mr. Singleton’s case with prejudice. Mr.

Singleton subsequently filed a Motion for New Trial, which the trial court denied.

Mr. Singleton now appeals, contending that the trial court erred in sustaining Dr.

Bourgeois’ Exception of Prescription and in denying Mr. Singleton’s Motion for

New Trial.

DISCUSSION

The prescriptive period for medical malpractice actions is set forth in La.

R.S. 9:5628, which states in pertinent part:

A. No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, …
arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one
year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or
within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act,
omission, or neglect; however, even as to claims filed within one
year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims
shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the
date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.

Thus, La. R.S. 9:5628 establishes the general rule that a victim of medical

malpractice has one year from the date of the alleged malpractice to bring his claim

for damages. However, La. R.S. 9:5628 also recognizes an exception to this

general rule in cases where the claimant contends that he was initially not aware of

the malpractice and that there has been a delay in his discovery of the malpractice.1

The language of La. R.S. 9:5628 makes clear, however, that this contra non

valentem type exception to the general one-year prescriptive period is expressly

1
This exception is a codification of the jurisprudentially created fourth category of contra non valentem,
also known as the “discovery rule.” See In Re: Medical Review Panel of Gerald Lindquist, 18-444 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 5/23/19), 274 So.3d 750, writ denied, 19-1034 (La. 10/1/19), 280 So.3d 165.

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made inapplicable after three years from the act, omission, or neglect. Borel v.

Young, 07-0419 (La. 11/27/07), 989 So.2d 42, 63, reh'g granted (La. 7/1/08).

Because Dr. Bourgeois’ Exception of Prescription sought to establish that

the date of malpractice alleged in Mr. Singleton’s medical review panel request

was incorrect, and that the correct date of the act, omission or neglect for which

Mr. Singleton sought review was more than five years prior to his filing of his

medical review panel request, he argued that Mr. Singleton’s claim was prescribed

under both the one-year and three-year prescriptive periods. In the alternative, Dr.

Bourgeois argued that even if the alleged May 2017 date was the correct date of

the act, omission or neglect for which Mr. Singleton sought review, because Mr.

Singleton’s medical review panel request was filed more than one year after that

date, it was prescribed on its face and Mr. Singleton “has no evidence to carry his

burden of showing that his February 6, 2019 panel request was timely.” Thus, Dr.

Bourgeois has advanced two separate and distinct grounds upon which he contends

that Mr. Singleton’s action is prescribed: 1) that the date of the alleged act,

omission or neglect alleged by Mr. Singleton in his medical review panel request is

incorrect (the correct date being more than five years prior to Mr. Singleton’s

filing); and 2) that even if the date as alleged is correct, the action is still prescribed

because it was filed more than a year after the alleged act, omission or neglect.

Despite the fact that Dr. Bourgeois has clearly alleged two separate and

distinct grounds for his exception of prescription, he generally argues, without any

differentiation between the two grounds, that because Mr. Singleton’s medical

review panel request is allegedly prescribed on its face, Mr. Singleton shoulders

the burden of proof that his claim is not prescribed. Additionally, again without

any differentiation between the two grounds for prescription, Dr. Bourgeois argues

that because evidence was introduced at the hearing on his exception, the standard

of appellate review is manifest error. We find that a proper analysis of Dr.

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Bourgeois’ exception requires us to separately examine the two distinct grounds

for the exception, each of which, as will be discussed infra, require different

burdens of proof and different standards of appellate review.

Correct Date of Alleged Act, Omission or Neglect

Ordinarily, the exceptor bears the burden of proof at trial of the peremptory

exception, including prescription. Woods v. Cousins, 12-100 (La. App. 5 Cir.

10/16/12), 102 So.3d 977, 979, writ denied, 12-2452 (La. 1/11/13), 107 So.3d 617.

However, if prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings, the burden shifts to

the plaintiff to show that the action has not prescribed. Id.

Resolution of a contention that prescription is evident on the face of the

pleading, by its very nature, is limited solely to a review of the facts as alleged in

the pleading itself, without consideration of any extrinsic evidence. To the

contrary, resolution of a contention that the date of malpractice as alleged in the

pleading is incorrect, necessarily requires consideration of relevant extrinsic

evidence, not merely consideration of the allegations of the pleading. Therefore,

for the purpose of establishing which party has the burden of proof as to the ground

of the exception asserting that the date of malpractice as alleged in the petition is

incorrect, the resolution of which necessarily requires consideration of relevant

extrinsic evidence outside the allegations of the petition, we find that the petition is

not prescribed on its face and the initial burden of proof must remain with the

mover on this ground of the exception.

Apparently recognizing that he would have the initial burden of proof as to

this ground of his exception, Dr. Bourgeois introduced at the hearing of his

exception, without any prior introduction of evidence by Mr. Singleton, his own

April 4, 2019 affidavit regarding the date of the cervical procedure that he

performed on Mr. Singleton, and his October 22, 2013 two-page dictated operative

report for that procedure. Dr. Bourgeois contends that this evidence establishes

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that the correct date of the procedure for which Mr. Singleton seeks review is

October 22, 2013, which is more than five years prior to the filing of Mr.

Singleton’s request for review on February 6, 2019. He further contends that since

he introduced evidence on the exception, and Mr. Singleton produced no contrary

evidence, that the trial court’s finding of fact as to the correct date of the act of

alleged malpractice is not manifestly erroneous. Lastly, as to this ground of his

exception, he contends that since the correct date of the procedure is October 22,

2013, which is more than five years prior to the filing of Mr. Singleton’s request

for review on February 6, 2019, Mr. Singleton’s request is prescribed pursuant to

both the one-year and three-year prescriptive periods for medical malpractice

provided in La. R.S. 9:5628.

“On the trial of the peremptory exception pleaded at or prior to the trial of

the case, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert any of the objections

pleaded, when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition.” La. C.C.P. art.

931. The standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a peremptory exception of

prescription turns on whether evidence is introduced. Wells Fargo Financial

Louisiana, Inc. v. Galloway, 17-413 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/15/17), 231 So.3d 793,

800. When no evidence is introduced, appellate courts review judgments

sustaining an exception of prescription de novo, accepting the facts alleged in the

petition as true. DeFelice v. Federated Nat'l Ins. Co., 18-374 (La. App. 5 Cir.

7/9/19), 279 So.3d 422, 426. However, when evidence is introduced at a trial on

an exception of prescription, the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under the

manifest error standard. Id. “The standard of review of a trial court’s finding of

facts supporting prescription is that the appellate court should not disturb the

finding of the trial court unless it is clearly wrong.” Felix v. Safeway Ins. Co., 15-

701 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/15), 183 So.3d 627, 631 (citations omitted).

19-CA-578 6

Because Dr. Bourgeois introduced evidence as to this ground of his

exception, we agree with his contention that the appellate standard of review as to

this ground of his exception is manifest error. However, we first note that it is not

entirely clear to this Court that the trial court made a factual finding as to the date

of the procedure being October 22, 2013, or that it decided the exception of

prescription on this ground of the exception.

The trial court did not provide reasons for its judgment, but did state at the

conclusion of the hearing that “my ruling this morning was just simply based on

what evidence I have before me in the record as it relates to your [Mr. Singleton’s]

opposition to the exception of prescription.” The trial court made no statement

regarding a finding as to the correct date of the procedure and did not indicate upon

which ground it was deciding the exception. Because Mr. Singleton introduced no

evidence on the exception, and the only evidence introduced by Dr. Bourgeois

related to the cervical procedure being on October 22, 2013, our analysis will

initially proceed on the assumption that the trial court made a factual finding that

the correct date of the procedure was October 22, 2013.

A review of Dr. Bourgeois’ affidavit reveals that he attested that he did not

perform a cervical procedure on Mr. Singleton in May 2017 and that the only

cervical surgery or cervical procedure of any kind that he performed on Mr.

Singleton was on October 22, 2013. Significantly, Dr. Bourgeois did not attest that

he never performed any medical procedure on Mr. Singleton in May 2017.2

Therefore, Dr. Bourgeois’ affidavit tended to establish one of two possibilities;

either: 1) Mr. Singleton’s description of the May 2017 procedure as a cervical

2
We note that at the hearing on the exception, when the trial court twice pointedly asked counsel for Dr.
Bourgeois whether Dr. Bourgeois performed a back surgery on Mr. Singleton in May 2017, as alleged in
Mr. Singleton’s purported First Amended and Supplemental Petition, counsel twice demurred and
declined to answer the question.

19-CA-578 7

procedure was incorrect; or 2) as urged by Dr. Bourgeois, the correct date of the

procedure for which Mr. Singleton seeks review is October 22, 2013.

In response to Dr. Bourgeois’ exception of prescription, Mr. Singleton,

apparently recognizing that his request for review either incorrectly described the

procedure for which he sought review or incorrectly stated the date of the

procedure, filed with the trial court a Motion and Order for Leave of Court to File

First Amended and Supplemental Petition for Medical Malpractice. In that

amended petition, Mr. Singleton sought to clarify that the error in his initial request

for review was in the description of the procedure, not the date of the procedure,

and that the May 2017 procedure was in fact a back procedure rather than a

cervical procedure. The trial court, apparently believing Mr. Singleton’s motion to

be procedurally proper, granted Mr. Singleton’s motion and allowed the purported

First Amended and Supplemental Petition to be filed into the trial court record

prior to the hearing on Dr. Bourgeois’ exception.

Mr. Singleton argued to the trial court that his amended petition removed the

ground for the exception by clarifying that the procedure for which he sought

review is a back procedure and that it occurred in May 2017 as alleged in his initial

request. Dr. Bourgeois countered that the amended petition filed in the trial court

was procedurally improper, in that there was no original petition to amend, and that

the proper procedure would be to amend the medical review panel request with the

Division of Administration. He further argues that the amended petition filed in

the trial court is of no effect to remove the grounds for the exception. We agree.

Furthermore, Mr. Singleton’s procedurally improper amended petition,

because it was not verified by him, could not be considered as countervailing

evidence to Dr. Bourgeois’ affidavit, in order to establish that the procedure for

which he seeks review was a back procedure which was performed in May 2017.

Consequently, the only pertinent pleading before the trial court at the time that it

19-CA-578 8

decided Dr. Bourgeois’ exception was Mr. Singleton’s initial request for a medical

review panel, which seeks review for a cervical procedure, and the only evidence

before the trial court at that time was Dr. Bourgeois’ affidavit, which established

that the only cervical procedure he performed on Mr. Singleton was on October 22,

2013. Therefore, to the extent that the trial court found the correct date of the

procedure for which Mr. Singleton seeks review to be October 22, 2013, we are

unable to conclude that the trial court, based upon the evidence before it at the time

of deciding the exception, was manifestly erroneous.

However, La. C.C.P. art. 934 provides that “[w]hen the grounds of the

objections pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of

the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment

within the delay allowed by the court” (emphasis added). The trial court, having

before it in the record Mr. Singleton’s procedurally improper amended petition,

was clearly aware of Mr. Singleton’s position that he could remove the grounds of

this particular basis for Dr. Bourgeois’ exception by amendment.3

We conclude that since Mr. Singleton’s amended petition filed in the district

court is procedurally improper and, as argued by Dr. Bourgeois, of no effect, Mr.

Singleton has not been given the opportunity pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 934 to

properly amend his medical review panel request with the Division of

Administration to remove the grounds of this particular basis for Dr. Bourgeois’

exception. Accordingly, we amend the judgment of the trial court and order Mr.

Singleton, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 934, within twenty days of the date of this

3
To the extent that the trial court decided Dr. Bourgeois’ exception of prescription on this ground of his
exception, the trial court, upon its realization that its prior acquiescence of the filing of the amended
“petition” in the district court was procedurally improper, should have afforded Mr. Singleton the
opportunity to properly file the amended medical review panel “request” with the Division of
Administration, thus removing the grounds for the exception of prescription by establishing the correct
date of the alleged malpractice to be “in or around May 2017,” as originally alleged. “Harsh rules of
pleading are not favored in this state . . . Courts should look through the caption of pleadings in order to
ascertain their substance and to do substantial justice to the parties.” State Dep't of Children & Family
Servs. ex rel. A.L. v. Lowrie, 14-1025 (La. 5/5/15), 167 So.3d 573, 578.

19-CA-578 9

opinion, to amend his request for a medical review panel with the Division of

Administration to remove this ground for Dr. Bourgeois’ exception of

prescription.4

Delayed Discovery of Malpractice

In the alternative, Dr. Bourgeois argues that even if the date of May 2017 as

alleged in Mr. Singleton’s medical review panel request is correct, that his action is

still prescribed because it was filed on February 6, 2019, more than one year after

the date of alleged malpractice. Consequently, in order for Mr. Singleton’s action

to remain viable, he must rely upon the “discovery rule” embodied in La. R.S.

9:5628, which, as previously stated, allows an action to be filed within one year of

delayed discovery of an act of malpractice, as long as it is filed within a three-year

time limit from the date of malpractice.

Dr. Bourgeois, however, additionally argues that because Mr. Singleton’s

request was filed more than a year after the alleged malpractice, his request is

prescribed on its face and the burden of proof is thus shifted to Mr. Singleton to

prove that his action is not prescribed. Regarding Dr. Bourgeois’ contention of an

automatic shifting of the burden of proof to the claimant in actions filed more than

one year after the date of alleged malpractice, he is in error.

In Campo v. Correa, 01-2707 (La. 6/21/02), 828 So.2d 502, one of the

issues to be resolved by the Louisiana Supreme Court, in order to establish which

party bore the burden of proof on the exception of prescription, was the question of

whether a request for a medical review panel filed more than one year after the

date of alleged malpractice, but within a year of the date of alleged discovery, was

4
We further note that, besides removing the grounds for the exception of prescription, Mr. Singleton
would nevertheless be required to amend his medical review panel request with the Division of
Administration in order that the medical review panel will be given the correct description of the
procedure they will be reviewing.

19-CA-578 10

prescribed on its face.5 In resolving that issue, the Court, noting a split among the

State’s circuit courts of appeal, concluded that, “a petition should not be found

prescribed on its face if it is brought within one year of the date of discovery and

facts alleged with particularity in the petition show that the patient was unaware of

malpractice prior to the alleged date of discovery, and the delay in filing suit was

not due to willful, negligent, or unreasonable action of the patient” (emphasis

added) Campo, 828 So.2d at 509.6

Thus, in order to determine which party bore the burden of proof on Dr.

Bourgeois’ alternative ground for his exception of prescription (i.e., that Mr.

Singleton’s action is prescribed because it was filed more than a year after the

alleged act, omission or neglect), we must first determine whether Mr. Singleton’s

request for a medical review panel sufficiently alleged a date of delayed discovery,

prior to which he was unaware of the malpractice, and that his delay in filing was

not due to willful, negligent, or unreasonable action on his part.

Mr. Singleton alleged in his request for a medical review panel that Dr.

Bourgeois committed malpractice during a surgical procedure “in or around May

2017.” Mr. Singleton also alleged in his request that on February 10, 2018, he was

“walking home from a Mardi Gras function at his local church when suddenly and

without warning he began to experience excruciating pain.” (emphasis added)

These are the only two dates alleged in Mr. Singleton’s request for a medical

5
“The initial issue before us is whether the plaintiffs’ petition was prescribed on its face when plaintiffs’
claims are brought within one year from the date of discovery, but not more than three years from the
alleged act of malpractice.” Campo, 828 So.2d at 504.
6
We acknowledge that imprecise language in various circuit court opinions subsequent to Campo, cited
by Dr. Bourgeois in his appellate brief, can potentially be interpreted to suggest that a request for a
medical review panel filed more than one year after the date of alleged malpractice is automatically
prescribed on its face, thus shifting the burden of proof on the exception of prescription to the plaintiff.
We note that any such proposition is directly contrary to the conclusion of the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Campo. The conclusion reached in Campo is the Louisiana Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement on
this issue and we are bound to follow that precedent. We expressly reject any argument, or circuit court
statements subsequent to Campo, that is contrary to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s pronouncement in
Campo.

19-CA-578 11

review panel with any relevance to resolution of Dr. Bourgeois’ exception of

prescription.

Although Mr. Singleton did not specifically state that this was the first

indication that he had of any injury, the use of the phrase “suddenly and without

warning” and the word “began,” together with the fact that no other date between

May 2017 and February 10, 2018, was referenced in his request, strongly suggest

that was the import of the allegation. Additionally, there simply is no other

significance or relevance that we can assign to this allegation other than that it is

the first date upon which Mr. Singleton had any indication that he was injured.

Thus, Mr. Singleton’s request sufficiently established a specific date of delayed

discovery, i.e., February 10, 2018.

Furthermore, accepting that Mr. Singleton’s allegation sufficiently

establishes that he had no indication prior to February 10, 2018, of any injury or

complication as a result of his surgery, and there being no allegation in his request

that contradicts that proposition, it would be impossible for Mr. Singleton to bring

a cause of action regarding a matter of which he has no knowledge. We therefore

find that his delay in filing was not due to willful, negligent, or unreasonable action

on his part.

We conclude, therefore, applying the test established by the Louisiana

Supreme Court in Campo, that Mr. Singleton’s medical review panel request is not

prescribed on its face. Thus, as the mover on the exception, Dr. Bourgeois had the

initial burden to prove that Mr. Singleton’s action was discovered by him more

than a year prior to the filing of his medical review panel request such that it was

prescribed. Woods, 102 So.3d at 979.

The only evidence submitted by Dr. Bourgeois related to his first ground for

the exception of prescription, i.e., that the correct date of the alleged malpractice

was October 22, 2013, more than five years prior to Mr. Singleton’s medical

19-CA-578 12

review panel request. As to his alternative ground for his exception of

prescription, which accepted the date of alleged malpractice as sometime in May

2017, Dr. Bourgeois presented absolutely no evidence pertinent to the date of Mr.

Singleton’s discovery of the alleged malpractice from which the trial court could

make a factual finding contrary to Mr. Singleton’s alleged date of delayed

discovery. Consequently, because no evidence was admitted as to this ground of

Dr. Bourgeois’ exception of prescription, our standard of appellate review is de

novo, accepting the facts alleged in the petition as true. DeFelice, 279 So.3d at

426.

With no evidence to contradict Mr. Singleton’s allegation of the date of

February 10, 2018, as the first date upon which he had any indication that he was

injured as a result of Dr. Bourgeois’ malpractice, we find upon our de novo review

that Mr. Singleton’s action, having been filed within one year of the date of his

discovery of the alleged malpractice, and within the three-year time limitation from

the date of alleged malpractice, is not prescribed.

CONCLUSION

To the extent that the trial court sustained Dr. Bourgeois’ exception of

prescription as to his first ground for the exception, by making a factual finding

that the correct date of alleged malpractice was October 22, 2013, more than five

years prior to Mr. Singleton’s filing, we are unable to conclude that the trial court

was manifestly erroneous. However, we amend the judgment of the trial court,

order Mr. Singleton, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 934, within twenty days of the date

of this opinion, to amend his request for a medical review panel with the Division

of Administration to remove this ground for Dr. Bourgeois’ exception of

prescription, and affirm the judgment as amended.

As to Dr. Bourgeois’ second ground for his exception of prescription, upon

our de novo review, we find that Dr. Bourgeois failed to carry his burden of

19-CA-578 13

proving that Mr. Singleton failed to file his request for a medical review panel

within one year from his date of discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.

JUDGMENT AMENDED;
AFFIRMED AS AMENDED;
AND REMANDED

19-CA-578 14

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

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19-CA-578
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE STEPHEN D. ENRIGHT, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
ANN M. JOHNSON-GRIFFIN (APPELLANT) VELEKA ESKINDE (APPELLANT) BENJAMIN J. BILLER (APPELLEE)
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