State of Louisiana Versus Kevin Barker

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 19-KA-223

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

KEVIN BARKER COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 18-6405, DIVISION "B"
HONORABLE CORNELIUS E. REGAN, JUDGE PRESIDING

December 11, 2019

JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Jude G. Gravois, and Hans J. Liljeberg

AFFIRMED
JGG
FHW
HJL

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Terry M. Boudreaux
Andrea F. Long
Meredith Hearn

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
KEVIN BARKER
Davidson S. Ehle, III

GRAVOIS, J.

Defendant, Kevin Barker, appeals his conviction and sentence for possession

with intent to distribute methamphetamine weighing less than twenty-eight grams,

following the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. For the

following reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

On October 23, 2018, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of

information charging defendant, Kevin Barker, with possession with intent to

distribute methamphetamine weighing less than twenty-eight grams, in violation of

La. R.S. 40:967(A). Derrick Jones was charged as a co-defendant in the same bill

of information. Defendant entered a plea in absentia of not guilty at his

arraignment on November 19, 2018.1 On that same date, defendant filed omnibus

motions, including a motion to suppress evidence. On February 11, 2019, the trial

court heard only defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.2 On February 19, 2019,

the trial court denied the motion to suppress.

On March 14, 2019, defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and pled guilty

as charged pursuant to State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976). After informing

defendant of his Boykin3 rights and accepting his Crosby plea, the trial court

sentenced defendant to four years imprisonment at hard labor, suspended the

sentence, and placed him on three years of active probation. On March 20, 2019,

defendant filed a motion for an appeal, which was granted on March 21, 2019.

Defendant’s appeal follows where he challenges the trial court’s denial of his

motion to suppress evidence.

1
On that same date, a Motion, Affidavit and Order to Waive Defendant’s Presence at Arraignment was
filed into the record. Per La. C.Cr.P. art. 832, a defendant may waive his presence at arraignment.
2
The remainder of defendant’s omnibus pretrial motions, such as a motion to suppress a confession and
identification, were not heard. When a defendant fails to object to the trial court’s failure to hear or rule on a pretrial
motion before pleading guilty, the motion is considered waived. See State v. Corzo, 04-791 (La. App. 5 Cir.
2/15/05), 896 So.2d 1101, 1102. Here, because defendant did not object to the trial court’s failure to hear or rule on
his other pre-trial motions, any objection thereto is waived.
3
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

19-KA-223 1

Because defendant pled guilty, the facts of his case were not fully developed

at a trial. The bill of information provides that on or about October 4, 2018,

defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed with intent to distribute

methamphetamine weighing less than twenty-eight grams.

At the February 11, 2019 suppression hearing, Detective Allan Doubleday

with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office testified that on October 4, 2018, at

approximately 11:00 a.m., he went to the Boomtown Casino located on Peters

Road in Jefferson Parish after he received information that morning from a known

confidential informant (“CI”).4 The CI provided that defendant would deliver “a

quantity of methamphetamine and liquid methamphetamine” to the casino and that

he would arrive at approximately 11:00 a.m. in an Uber accompanied by a black

male. The CI did not know the name of the black male, but he or she provided

screenshots of both individuals.5

With this information and due to time constraints, Detective Doubleday went

to the casino and established surveillance. As he waited for the suspects to arrive,

Detective Doubleday was able to monitor their Uber on the Uber app, and the CI

also sent Detective Doubleday a text message indicating that the suspects would be

arriving at the casino soon. Detective Doubleday then observed defendant and the

black male from the previously provided screenshots arrive in an Uber. Both

defendant and the black male carried backpacks, and as predicted by the CI,

walked to the lobby of the casino near the elevator “where the meet was supposed

to happen.” At that point, the suspects were detained and brought outside of the

casino to the parking lot.6 Based on the CI’s information and his corroboration of

that information, Detective Doubleday believed that defendant was about to

4
Detective Doubleday testified that he had worked with this CI before and the CI was paid after the
investigation.
5
Detective Doubleday could not recall whether the photographs of the suspects came from “Grinder” or
another social media application.
6
Detective Doubleday denied that the suspects appeared nervous or attempted to discard their backpacks.

19-KA-223 2

commit a crime. Detective Doubleday Mirandized7 both defendant and the black

male, who was identified as Derrick Jones (the co-defendant).

Detective Doubleday testified that Mr. Jones waived his Miranda rights and

elected to speak with him while defendant remained silent. Mr. Jones proceeded to

inform Detective Doubleday that he had arrived in Louisiana from Oklahoma a

few weeks earlier and was living with defendant in an apartment. During that

time, he learned that defendant was distributing methamphetamine from that

location. He further provided that defendant had asked him that morning to travel

with him to deliver a quantity of methamphetamine, and when they went to leave

their apartment, defendant asked Mr. Jones to hold the methamphetamine while

they traveled to the casino. Mr. Jones stated that he had placed the

methamphetamine in a candy box inside of his backpack. Detective Doubleday

testified that after Mr. Jones said that the methamphetamine was in a candy box

inside of the backpack, the backpack was searched.8 Detective Doubleday

subsequently discovered a bag of crystal methamphetamine and also liquid

methamphetamine.9 Defendant did not have any contraband in his backpack or on

his person.

After Detective Doubleday’s testimony concluded, defendant argued that

there was not any corroboration of the information provided by the CI. He averred

that defendant was arrested without any probable cause when he was stopped at the

elevator in the casino lobby before any true corroboration of the tip occurred. He

urged that the arrest was illegal and that the evidence seized thereafter should be

7
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
8
Detective Doubleday provided contradicting information as to whether Mr. Jones consented to a search of
his backpack. He was asked: “Mr. Jones on the other hand at that point in the parking lot after he was detained gave
you consent; is that right?” Detective Doubleday responded: “Correct.” However, he thereafter denied that Mr.
Jones was asked for consent to search his bag or executed a written consent form but rather, “[h]e told us it was in
his bag.”
9
During cross-examination, Detective Doubleday denied knowing that the liquid methamphetamine “came
back negative” after it was tested. The Arrest Report and Probable Cause Affidavit indicates that sixteen grams of
“a crystal like substance that tested positive for methamphetamine” was discovered, as well as “a clear liquid, that
tested positive for methamphetamine with an approximate weigh of 10 milliliters.”

19-KA-223 3

suppressed. The State responded that the CI’s specific information as to the drug

deal provided Detective Doubleday with probable cause to arrest defendant and

that Mr. Jones did not need to consent to a search of his backpack as the backpack

was searched incident to Mr. Jones’ arrest.

The trial court took the matter under advisement. On February 19, 2019, the

trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence, noting that it had listened to the

testimony of Detective Doubleday. Defendant objected to the ruling, but stated no

particular grounds for his objection.

In his only assignment of error on appeal, defendant argues that the trial

court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Defendant argues that

Detective Doubleday did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him, nor did he

have probable cause to effectuate an arrest. More specifically, defendant argues

that the tip provided by the CI did not establish reasonable suspicion to detain

defendant, nor was there probable cause for his arrest. Defendant alleges that

although some predicative information was correct, none of his behavior was

suspicious, there was no corroborating behavior, and the CI’s veracity and

reliability are unknown. Defendant additionally argues that the searches of his and

Mr. Jones’ backpacks were illegal and therefore the evidence seized from Mr.

Jones’ backpack should be suppressed.

The State responds that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress

evidence, as the suppression hearing testimony shows that the CI’s tip accurately

predicted defendant’s future conduct in sufficient detail to justify an investigatory

stop. The State avers that Detective Doubleday’s reasonable suspicion ripened into

probable cause to arrest upon a statement made by Mr. Jones. Lastly, the State

asserts that the searches of the backpacks were lawfully conducted incident to an

arrest, and that the methamphetamine would inevitably have been discovered

during an inventory search of the backpacks.

19-KA-223 4

LAW AND ANALYSIS

In the instant case, defendant entered a guilty plea pursuant to Crosby,

supra. While a plea of guilty normally waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the

proceedings prior to the plea, a plea under Crosby allows appellate review if, at the

time the plea is entered, the defendant expressly reserves his right to appeal a

specific adverse ruling in the case. State v. Overstreet, 18-380 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/27/18), 263 So.3d 1241, 1246, writ denied, 19-0235 (La. 4/29/19), 268 So.3d

1033; State v. Turner, 10-995 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/27/11), 75 So.3d 491, 492, writ

denied, 11-2379 (La. 4/27/12), 86 So.3d 625.

The record does not reflect a specific ruling defendant desired to preserve

for review. A defendant’s failure to specify which pretrial ruling he desires to

reserve for appeal as part of a guilty plea entered under Crosby may limit the scope

of appellate review, but does not preclude review altogether. State v. Joseph, 03-

315 (La. 5/16/03), 847 So.2d 1196 (per curiam). Absent a detailed specification of

which adverse pretrial rulings the defendant reserved for appellate review as part

of his guilty plea, an appellate court should presume that the Crosby reservation

preserves review of those evidentiary rulings which “go to the heart of the

prosecution’s case,” such as the denial of a motion to suppress, and not rulings that

may affect the conduct of the trial but do not substantially relate to guilt, such as

the denial of a continuance or a severance. Joseph, 847 So.2d at 1196-97.

Considering the foregoing, we find that the denial of defendant’s motion to

suppress is properly before this Court on appeal. See Overstreet, 263 So.3d at

1246.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 5

of the Louisiana Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and

seizures. If evidence is derived from an unreasonable search or seizure, the proper

remedy is to exclude the evidence from trial. State v. Burton, 11-1023 (La. App. 5

19-KA-223 5

Cir. 5/22/12), 98 So.3d 375, 379, writ denied, 12-1422 (La. 1/11/13), 106 So.3d

547.

In a hearing on a motion to suppress, the State has the burden to establish the

admissibility of evidence seized without a warrant. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D). The

trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is afforded great weight and will not be

set aside unless the preponderance of the evidence clearly favors suppression.

State v. Bellow, 07-824 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/11/08), 982 So.2d 826, 829.

The right of law enforcement officers to stop and interrogate those

reasonably suspected of criminal activity is recognized by La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, as

well as by state and federal jurisprudence. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct.

1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195 (La. 1983), cert.

denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2158, 80 L.Ed.2d 543 (1984). The Terry standard,

as codified in La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, authorizes police officers to stop a person in a

public place whom they reasonably suspect is committing, has committed, or is

about to commit an offense, and demand that the person identify himself and

explain his actions. State v. Molette, 11-384 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/11), 79 So.3d

484, 489.

“Reasonable suspicion” necessary to conduct an investigatory stop is

something less than probable cause and is determined under the facts and

circumstances of each case by whether the officer had sufficient facts within his

knowledge to justify an infringement on the individual’s right to be free from

governmental interference. State v. Triche, 03-149 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/03), 848

So.2d 80, 84, writ denied, 03-1979 (La. 1/16/04), 864 So.2d 625. In making the

determination of whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion, a reviewing

court must take into consideration the totality of the circumstances and give

deference to the inferences and deductions of a trained police officer that might

elude an untrained person. Molette, 79 So.3d at 489.

19-KA-223 6

Whether an informant’s tip establishes reasonable suspicion to conduct an

investigatory stop is considered under the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2320, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v.

Nelson, 02-65 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/26/02), 822 So.2d 796, 801, writ denied, 02-2090

(La. 2/21/03), 837 So.2d 627. The United States Supreme Court has applied a

“totality of the circumstances approach” which considers an informant’s veracity,

reliability and basis of knowledge as highly relevant in determining the value of an

informant’s tip. Id. This Court has held that a tip by an informant can supply

reasonable suspicion if it accurately predicts future conduct in sufficient detail to

support a reasonable belief that the informant had reliable information regarding

the illegal activity. State v. Murphy, 14-437 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/15/14), 181 So.3d

1, 7. The informant’s ability to predict the person’s future behavior goes to the

informant’s reliability because it demonstrates inside information and a special

familiarity with the person’s affairs. In addition, the tip must be corroborated. Id.

“If the tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be

required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if

the tip were more reliable.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412,

2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); State v. Tovar, 03-513 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/15/03),

860 So.2d 51, 54-55.

In State v. Anthony, 07-204 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/27/07), 971 So.2d 1219,

1226, writ denied, 08-0338 (La. 1/16/09), 998 So.2d 98, the CI informed the police

that a black male nicknamed “Twin” would be delivering crack cocaine to the

Oasis Motel located at 70 Westbank Expressway in Gretna. The informant stated

that “Twin” would be driving a newer-model, black Pontiac Grand Prix with

chrome rims. Id. at 1223. The police set up surveillance, and approximately

twenty to thirty minutes after the call, police observed a black Grand Prix with

three occupants enter the Oasis Motel parking lot. Id. The officers converged on

19-KA-223 7

the vehicle, stated that they were the police, ordered the driver to turn off the

vehicle, and ordered the occupants to exit the car. Id. This Court found that the

CI, who had previously provided information that aided in apprehensions and

convictions, provided a specific description of the vehicle, the vehicle’s driver, and

the location of where the delivery of the drugs would take place. Within twenty

minutes of the tip, the police corroborated the reliable CI’s tip with surveillance of

the Westbank Expressway and the motel’s parking lot, which this Court found

gave the police reasonable suspicion to stop the defendants. Id. at 1226.

Upon review, we find that Detective Doubleday had reasonable suspicion to

conduct an investigatory stop of defendant. Detective Doubleday provided that he

has worked with this CI in the past. The CI provided the detective with

defendant’s name, a photograph of defendant, that he would sell

methamphetamine, his mode of transportation, the time and location of his arrival

to the drug transaction, that he would be traveling with a black male, and a

photograph of the black male. The CI was also able to inform Detective

Doubleday that defendant would soon arrive at the casino when he was en route,

which the detective was able to monitor and confirm himself. Upon defendant’s

arrival, in an Uber as described by the CI, Detective Doubleday was able to

confirm defendant and the black male were the previously described suspects, and

the CI had also described that defendant would approach the elevators inside the

casino. The only information contained in the CI tip which was not accurate was

that Mr. Jones, rather than defendant, would carry the methamphetamine.

However, Mr. Jones explained that defendant had asked him to carry the

methamphetamine.

Considering the above, we find that the CI’s tip accurately predicted

defendant’s future conduct with in-depth details sufficient to support a reasonable

belief that the CI had inside information and a special familiarity with defendant’s

19-KA-223 8

affairs. The CI’s information was sufficiently corroborated by the surveillance by

Detective Doubleday. Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, we find

that the CI’s tip was sufficient to justify an investigatory stop of defendant after he

observed defendant’s arrival to the location with Mr. Jones and in an Uber.

Defendant further argues that Detective Doubleday did not have probable

cause to arrest him without a warrant. An arrest occurs when the circumstances

indicate intent to affect an extended restraint on the liberty of the accused, rather

than at the precise time an officer tells an accused he is under arrest. State v.

Bazley, 09-358 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11), 60 So.3d 7, 24, writ denied, 11-0282 (La.

1/17/11), 63 So.3d 1039. A seizure is an arrest, rather than an investigatory stop,

when a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have understood the

situation to be a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree that the law

associates with a formal arrest. State v. Cojoe, 01-2465 (La. 10/25/02), 828 So.2d

1101, 1104. Although a seizure occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes either

when an individual has been subjected to physical restraint or when he submits to

the assertion of official authority, no bright-line rule exists for distinguishing

between investigatory stops, characterized by brief restraint imposed on a lesser

showing of reasonable suspicion, from arrests based on probable cause. Id. at

1103; Bazley, 60 So.3d at 24. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that an

investigatory stop does not turn into an arrest when detainees are read their

constitutional rights. See State v. Thompson, 11-0915 (La. 5/8/12), 93 So.3d 553,

570 (“[W]e cannot fault the officer for providing Thompson with greater protection

that he might otherwise have had in an investigatory stop.”).

An officer may make a warrantless arrest when the officer has probable

cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense. State v.

Gibson, 12-350 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/12), 103 So.3d 641, 650; State v. Davis, 00-

278 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/29/00), 768 So.2d 201, 212, writ denied, 00-2730 (La.

19-KA-223 9

8/31/01), 795 So.2d 1205. Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and

circumstances known to the arresting officer are sufficient to justify a man of

ordinary caution in believing that the person to be arrested has committed a crime

or was committing a crime. State v. Brisban, 00-3437 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d

923, 927. While mere suspicion is insufficient to justify an arrest, a police officer

need not have sufficient proof to convict in order to arrest. State v. Wells, 08-2262

(La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 577, 583.

After defendant and Mr. Jones were stopped inside the casino, they were

relocated and brought outside of the casino to the parking lot, and Detective

Doubleday testified that both defendant and Mr. Jones were detained at that point

and Mirandized as he believed a crime, likely the actual distribution of the drugs,

was about to occur. Detective Doubleday did not provide if the suspects were

handcuffed or restrained, but immediately after their detention, Mr. Jones waived

his Miranda rights and stated that defendant had asked him that morning to travel

with him to the casino to deliver the methamphetamine, which was located in his

backpack. Undoubtedly, at that point in the investigation, Detective Doubleday

had probable cause to arrest both Mr. Jones, as he admitted that he had the drugs,

and defendant, as it was clear that he and Mr. Jones were working together to

distribute the methamphetamine.10 Considering Mr. Jones’ statement coupled with

Detective Doubleday’s observations confirming several aspects of the CI tip, we

find that Detective Doubleday had probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest

of defendant.

As his final argument, defendant asserts that the searches of his and Mr.

Jones’ backpacks were performed illegally following their arrests. Defendant

10
The term “possession” in La. R.S. 40:967 is broad enough to encompass both actual and constructive
possession. Brisban, 809 So.2d at 929. A person may be in constructive possession of a drug even if it is not in his
physical custody, but rather only the subject of his dominion and control. Id. Also, a person may be deemed to be
in joint possession of a drug which is in the physical custody of a companion, if he willfully and knowingly shares
with the other the right to control of it. Id. See also State v. Smith, 250 La. 1109, 1114, 245 So.2d 327, 329 (La.
1971).

19-KA-223 10

suggests that Detective Doubleday did not have a warrant, nor did either of them

consent to a search.

As to the search of Mr. Jones’ backpack,11 we find the search was lawful

pursuant to Mr. Jones’ arrest. A search incident to a lawful arrest is a well-

recognized exception to a warrantless search. State v. Grimes, 09-2 (La. App. 5

Cir. 5/26/09), 16 So.3d 418, 423, writ denied, 09-1517 (La. 3/12/10), 28 So.3d

1023. In a search incident to a lawful arrest, a police officer can search the

suspect’s person and the area within his immediate control in order to remove

weapons and prevent destruction of evidence. State v. Murray, 17-534 (La. App. 5

Cir. 3/14/18), 242 So.3d 821, 830. It is irrelevant that the actual custodial arrest of

defendant may have taken place after the methamphetamine was found in Mr.

Jones’ backpack. See State v. Melton, 412 So.2d 1065, 1068 (La. 1982) (“When

there is probable cause but no formal arrest, a limited search to preserve evidence

is justified.”).

Upon review, we find that the search of Mr. Jones’ backpack, which yielded

the only contraband in this case, was a lawful search incident to arrest performed

by Detective Doubleday in order to prevent the removal or destruction of evidence

from the scene due to Mr. Jones’ statement that the backpack contained drugs.12

The incident happened quickly, and Detective Doubleday testified that both

suspects were wearing backpacks. Further, Mr. Jones’ consent to search was not

required. As discussed, Detective Doubleday had probable cause to arrest Mr.

Jones when he stated that he was carrying the methamphetamine in his backpack,

11
Defendant has standing to challenge the search of Mr. Jones’ backpack, as he was adversely affected by
the search. Under federal law, a person has no standing to challenge an illegal search and seizure of a third party’s
property; conversely, in Louisiana, any person adversely affected by an illegal search or seizure shall have standing
to raise its illegality. State v. Bone, 12-34 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/11/12), 107 So.3d 49, 63 n. 19, writ denied, 12-2229
(La. 4/1/13), 110 So.3d 574.
12
There was no explicit testimony that the methamphetamine was in the candy box inside the backpack,
only that it was inside the backpack. Nonetheless, a search of the candy box would still be valid pursuant to a search
incident to an arrest, as it was within Mr. Jones’ immediate control and would have contained the contraband.

19-KA-223 11

and the record does not show that the search was performed before his statements

were made.13

In conclusion, Detective Doubleday had reasonable suspicion to conduct an

investigatory stop of defendant after conducting surveillance and corroborating the

information contained in the detailed tip from a known CI. Detective Doubleday

further had probable cause to arrest defendant upon Mr. Jones’ voluntary statement

that he had methamphetamine in his backpack and was asked by defendant to carry

the drugs to the casino to be distributed. Finally, Mr. Jones’ backpack was

lawfully searched pursuant to his arrest, and thus, the methamphetamine was

legally seized. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

The record was reviewed for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920,

State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975), and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175

(La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). We find no errors requiring corrective action.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

13
Although defendant challenges the search of his backpack, defendant was not adversely affected by the
search as no evidence was found therein.

19-KA-223 12

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

MARY E. LEGNON
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
DECEMBER 11, 2019 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

19-KA-223
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE CORNELIUS E. REGAN (DISTRICT JUDGE)
DAVIDSON S. EHLE, III (APPELLANT) TERRY M. BOUDREAUX (APPELLEE) ANDREA F. LONG (APPELLEE)
THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)

MAILED
HON. PAUL D. CONNICK, JR. (APPELLEE)
MEREDITH HEARN (APPELLEE)
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053