19-KA-63 Nonprecedential Affirmed; Remanded with Instructions Processed

State of Louisiana Versus Thaddeus Johnson

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit · Filed September 4, 2019

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 19-KA-63

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

THADDEUS JOHNSON COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 99-6773, DIVISION "M"
HONORABLE HENRY G. SULLIVAN, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

September 04, 2019

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson,
John J. Molaison, Jr., and Robert M. Murphy, Ad Hoc

SENTENCE AFFIRMED; MATTER REMANDED FOR CORRECTION
OF UCO; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED
JJM
MEJ
RMM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Terry M. Boudreaux

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
THADDEUS JOHNSON
Jane L. Beebe

MOLAISON, J.

Defendant, Thaddeus Johnson, appeals following his re-sentencing as a

third-felony offender. For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant’s sentence,

grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, and remand for correction of the

Uniform Commitment Order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is defendant’s second appeal. In State v. Johnson, 01-0842 (La. App.

5 Cir. 2/13/02), 812 So.2d 106, writ denied, 02-1037 (La. 3/21/03), 840 So.2d 532,

this Court affirmed defendant’s convictions for two counts of armed robbery and

enhanced life sentence as a multiple offender. Thereafter, defendant’s application

for post-conviction relief was denied. State v. Johnson, 04-496 (La. App. 5 Cir.

5/5/04) (unpublished writ disposition), State ex rel Johnson v. State, 04-1491 (La.

4/8/05), 899 So.2d 3. On July 27, 2018, defendant filed a pro se Motion and Order

to Correct Illegal Sentence and Request for Resentencing Hearing in which he

argued that his life sentence without benefits as a third-felony offender was illegal

in light of State ex rel. Esteen v. State, 16-0949 (La. 1/30/18), 239 So.3d 233,

rehearing denied, 16-0949 (La. 3/13/18), 239 So.3d 266, and the more lenient

provisions enacted by Act No. 403 of the 2001 Regular Legislative Session and

Act No. 45 of the 2006 First Extraordinary Legislative Session. On August 9,

2018, the State filed a response to defendant’s motion, conceding that he was

entitled to resentencing under the ameliorative changes in Act No. 403 under the

holding of Esteen and that defendant’s now illegal sentence, imposed pursuant to

the then-existing version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii)—which at the time

mandated a sentence of life imprisonment for a third-felony offender—should be

corrected. The State affirmed that defendant was therefore entitled to resentencing

to a term not less than 66 years of imprisonment and not more than 198 years of

imprisonment.

19-KA-63 1

On October 11, 2018, the trial court vacated defendant’s life sentence and

resentenced him to serve 66 years at hard labor without the benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence. On November 13, 2018, defendant filed a

pro se written motion for appeal that was granted on November 28, 2018. The

instant appeal followed.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Anders Brief

Under the procedure adopted by this Court, appointed appellate counsel has

filed a brief asserting that she has thoroughly reviewed the trial court record and

cannot find any non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal.1 Accordingly, pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and

State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241 (per curiam), appointed

counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of record.

In Anders, supra the United States Supreme Court stated that appointed

appellate counsel may request permission to withdraw if he finds the defendant’s

case to be wholly frivolous after a conscientious examination of it.2 The request

must be accompanied by “a brief referring to anything in the record that might

arguably support the appeal” so as to provide the reviewing court “with a basis for

determining whether appointed counsel have fully performed their duty to support

their clients’ appeals to the best of their ability” and to assist the reviewing court

“in making the critical determination whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that

counsel should be permitted to withdraw.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals of

1
In State v. Bradford, 95-929 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/25/96), 676 So.2d 1108, 1110-11, this Court
adopted the procedures outlined in State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528, 530 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990), which
were sanctioned by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v Mouton, 95-0981, pp. 1-2 (La. 4/28/95), 653
So.2d 1176
, 1177 (per curiam).
2
The United States Supreme Court reiterated Anders in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct.
746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000).

19-KA-63 2

Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 439, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902, 100 L.Ed.2d 440

(1988) (internal citations omitted).

In State v. Jyles, 704 So.2d at 241, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that

an Anders brief need not tediously catalog every meritless pretrial motion or

objection made at trial with a detailed explanation of why the motions or

objections lack merit. The Supreme Court explained that an Anders brief must

demonstrate by full discussion and analysis that appellate counsel “has cast an

advocate’s eye over the trial record and considered whether any ruling made by the

trial court, subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, had a significant,

adverse impact on shaping the evidence presented to the jury for its consideration.”

Id.

When conducting a review for compliance with Anders, an appellate court

must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the appeal

is wholly frivolous. Bradford, 676 So.2d at 1110. If, after an independent review,

the reviewing court determines there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, it may

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the defendant’s conviction and

sentence. However, if the court finds any legal point arguable on the merits, it may

either deny the motion and order the court-appointed attorney to file a brief arguing

the legal point(s) identified by the court, or grant the motion and appoint substitute

counsel for the appellant. Id.

Defendant’s appellate counsel asserts that after a detailed review of the

record, she could find no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. Counsel asserts

that defendant’s pro se motion to correct illegal sentence was correctly granted

based on State ex rel. Esteen v. State, supra, and defendant was resentenced to the

minimum sentence of 66 years of imprisonment as a third-felony offender. Counsel

notes that defendant acknowledged in his pro se motion that the sentencing range

he now faced was 66 to 198 years of imprisonment. She further notes that since

19-KA-63 3

2001, the Louisiana Legislature has “revamped” La. R.S. 15:529.1 to reduce the

penalties for non-violent offenders, and La. R.S. 15:308(B) and Esteen, supra are

reflections of this. She concedes that defendant’s multiple offender sentence is not

subject to any reduction based on the 2017 ameliorative changes to the law.

Appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as attorney of record which states

she has made a conscientious and thorough review of the record and can find no

non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. She stated that she had advised defendant

of his right to file a pro se brief in this appeal. Additionally, this Court sent

defendant a letter by certified mail informing him that an Anders brief had been

filed and that he had until April 18, 2019, to file a pro se supplemental brief.

Defendant did not file a pro se supplemental brief.

The State responds that appellate counsel correctly notes that this case

presents no non-frivolous issues for appellate review, and the motion to withdraw

should be granted. It notes that defendant was resentenced to a term of

imprisonment of sixty-six years, the minimum allowed by law as a third-felony

offender, and the “revamping” of La. R.S. 15:529.1 does not provide defendant any

further remedies.

An independent review of the record supports appellate counsel’s assertion

that there are no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal.

It is first noted that in this second appeal, defendant may only seek review of

issues related to his multiple offender resentencing. See, State v. Torres, 05-260

(La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/05), 919 So.2d 730, 733, writ denied, 06-0697 (La.

10/6/06), 938 So.2d 65.

The record reflects that defendant appeared at his resentencing hearing held

on October 11, 2018. At that time, the trial court determined that defendant was

entitled to be resentenced under Act No. 403 of 2001. It informed defendant that

pursuant to statutory provisions of Act No. 403, he faced a minimum sentence of

19-KA-63 4

66 years and a maximum sentence of 198 years. The trial court advised defendant

that he would be imprisoned without parole. The trial court then vacated

defendant’s “life sentence handed down to him in this matter” and resentenced him

to the minimum sentence of sixty-six years at hard labor without the benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence to run “[a]ll concurrent with each

other.”

Under the version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) in effect in

1999, at the time of the commission of the underlying offense of armed robbery,

defendant faced a sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence due to his underlying conviction of armed

robbery and his predicate conviction of sexual battery, both crimes of violence.

Thus, defendant correctly received a life sentence without benefits at that time.

However, after the 2001 amendment to the statute, defendant’s sentence as a third-

felony offender with his predicate convictions would have been for a determinate

term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence (sixty-six years) and

not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction

(198 years) under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i). Defendant no longer falls under

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) mandating a sentence of life imprisonment without

benefits. Defendant’s predicate conviction for unauthorized entry of an inhabited

dwelling is not punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more and is not

defined as a crime of violence in La. R.S. 14:2(B). Further, defendant committed

his underlying crime, was convicted, and was sentenced on both his original and

enhanced sentences prior to June 15, 2001. Therefore, defendant falls within the

class of persons where retroactive application under La. R.S. 15:308(B) of the

2001 legislative changes ameliorates his circumstances. Accordingly, the trial court

properly resentenced defendant as a third-felony offender to sixty-six years

19-KA-63 5

imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence

under Esteen, supra, and La. R.S. 15:308(B).

Because appellate counsel’s brief adequately demonstrates by full discussion

and analysis that she has reviewed the trial court proceedings and cannot identify

any basis for a non-frivolous appeal and an independent review of the record

supports counsel’s assertion, appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney of

is hereby granted.

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

This is a second appeal. Defendant is not entitled to a second error patent

review of his underlying convictions and sentences. However, he is entitled to a

second error patent review of his multiple offender resentencing. The record was

reviewed for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312

So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).

The following is noted.

The record contains an amended uniform commitment order (UCO)

reflecting defendant’s multiple offender sentence, his original sentence on count

three, and the charges on counts one and four that were dismissed. The record

additionally contains a multiple offender UCO reflecting his multiple offender

sentence only. The sentencing transcript reflects that defendant was resentenced to

serve an enhanced sentence of sixty-six years at hard labor without the benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The transcript prevails. See

State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).

Here, the amended UCO incorrectly reflects that defendant’s enhanced

sentence on count two is to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of

sentence. The multiple offender UCO also incorrectly reflects that the enhanced

sentence on count two was to be served without the benefit of probation or

suspension of sentence. Further, it is noted that the sentencing minute entry does

19-KA-63 6

not reflect any restrictions of benefits regarding defendant’s enhanced sentence.

Additionally, the amended UCO incorrectly reflects the disposition date of counts

one, three, and four as April 4, 2001, which is the date that defendant was

previously adjudicated as a multiple offender. Counts one and four were dismissed

by the State on February 12, 2001. Defendant was convicted on count three on

February 6, 2001. Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial court with

instructions for it to correct the inconsistencies in the sentencing minute entry and

the UCOs to conform with the transcript. We further direct the Clerk of Court for

the 24th Judicial District Court to transmit the original of the UCOs to the

appropriate authorities and the Department of Corrections’ legal department. State

v. Long, 12-184 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/11/12), 106 So.3d 1136, 1142 (citing La.

C.Cr.P. art. 892(B)(2)).

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s sentence is affirmed. We remand this

matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of correcting the Uniform

Commitment Order and for the 24th Judicial District Court Clerk of Court to

transmit the corrected UCO to the appropriate authorities in accordance with La.

C.C.P. art. 892(B)(2) and to the Department of Corrections’ legal department. The

motion to withdraw as counsel for defendant is hereby granted.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED; MATTER
REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF
UCO; MOTION TO WITHDRAW
GRANTED

19-KA-63 7

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY MARY E. LEGNON

CHIEF JUDGE INTERIM CLERK OF COURT

FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

19-KA-63
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE HENRY G. SULLIVAN, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
TERRY M. BOUDREAUX (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)

MAILED
JANE L. BEEBE (APPELLANT) HON. PAUL D. CONNICK, JR. (APPELLEE)
ATTORNEY AT LAW DISTRICT ATTORNEY
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
POST OFFICE BOX 6351 200 DERBIGNY STREET
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70174-6351 GRETNA, LA 70053