Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, 45 So. 2d 541.

15 citing documents.

Burnell v. Sportran Transit System Co. 421 So. 2d 1199 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1982
Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., (La.
Goudeau v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. 225 So. 2d 679 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
Hinegardner v. Dickey’s Potato Chip Co., (1st Cir., 1967); (Orl.App., 1950).” Appellants further argue that “But for the fact that plaintiff and Mr. LeDoux were stationed where they were and acted as they did, injury would not have resulted to plaintiff.” They submit that plaintiff’s injury was not'within the realm of reasonable foreseeability.
Schenker v. Randle 209 So. 2d 327 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1968
Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, La.App., .
Hunter v. American Employers Insurance 153 So. 2d 588 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
The following language appears in Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., La.App., : “The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, without which the result would not have occurred.
Perera v. Johnson 125 So. 2d 493 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
2 Cir., ; Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., La.App.Orl., ; Williams v. Pelican Creamery, Inc., La.App.
Adams v. Great American Indemnity Company 116 So. 2d 307 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1959
Likewise the Orleans Circuit Court of Appeal commented in Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., La.App.1950, , 543: "If the injury to the plaintiff was not likely to result from the accident, and was not one which the defendant could have reasonably foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances, then the accident was not the proximate cause * * *."
Tryon v. Roy 116 So. 2d 327 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1959
881 , Frazier v. Ayres, La.App.1945, ; Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, La.App.1950, .” Unfortunately for plaintiffs the testimony does not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Roy made such an abrupt and sudden stop as to constitute “an entirely independent cause” which could be said to stand as the sole cause of the collision.
Deason v. Greyhound Corporation 106 So. 2d 348 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1958
App.], ; Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., La.App., ; and the standard of care required of a carrier is qualified by the reciprocal duty of the passenger not to contribute to such injury by any want of ordinary care.
Llorens v. City of Alexandria 106 So. 2d 342 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1958
Co., La.App., ; Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., La.App., ; Hopper v. Shreveport Rys.
Kern v. Bumpas 102 So. 2d 263 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1958
1945, ; Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, La.App.1950, .
Pero v. Shreveport Railways Co. 78 So. 2d 66 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
Co., Inc., La.App.1948, ; Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., La.App.1950, ; Johnson v. Shreveport Rys.
Edelman v. Refrigeration Equipment Co. 72 So. 2d 627 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
This break was never traced to Defendant nor could it be traced to Defendant, but rather appears to have been caused by either the Negro porters hired by the Edel-mans or by Wilson who was hired by the Edelmans.” Counsel for defendant relies upon the fqllowing cases: Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, La.App., ; Petrich v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n., La.App., 188 So.
Baker v. Shreveport Rys. Co. 68 So. 2d 228 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953
Co., Inc., La.App.1948, ; Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., La.App.1950, ; Johnson v. Shreveport Rys.
Bishop v. Shreveport Rys. Co. 63 So. 2d 181 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953
Among the almost innumerable authorities which have established and maintained these propositions are Jakubec v. Southern Bus Lines, La.App., ; Brott v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., La.App., ; Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, La.App., ; Brown v. Homer-Doyline Bus Lines, La.
Jackson v. Jones 61 So. 2d 557 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1952
emote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though the injury would not have occurred but for such condition or occasion.’ “In Kendall v. New Orleans Public Service, La.App., , a short circuit and fire broke out on a street car.