Barbara Campbell Versus Seaside Behavioral Healthcare, LLC, Seaside Healthcare, LLC, Seaside Health System, LLC, Jane Doe and Markel Insurance

BARBARA CAMPBELL NO. 21-CA-29
C/W
VERSUS 20-C-341

SEASIDE BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE, LLC, FIFTH CIRCUIT
SEASIDE HEALTHCARE, LLC, SEASIDE
HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC, JANE DOE, AND COURT OF APPEAL
MARKEL INSURANCE COMPANY
STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 799-110, DIVISION "O"
HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR, JUDGE PRESIDING

June 09, 2021

ROBERT A. CHAISSON
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Robert A. Chaisson, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

AFFIRMED
RAC
FHW
JJM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
BARBARA CAMPBELL
Roderick Alvendia
John B. Kelly, III
Jeanne K. Demarest
Kurt A. Offner

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
SEASIDE BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE, LLC, SEASIDE HEALTHCARE,
LLC, SEASIDE HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC AND MARKEL INSURANCE
COMPANY
Lisa A. McLachlan

CHAISSON, J.

In this personal injury case arising from Barbara Campbell’s purported fall

and subsequent injuries while boarding a van to be transported from her home to

the Seaside Behavioral Healthcare facility, defendants appeal the trial court’s

September 2, 2020 judgment denying their exception of prematurity.1 For the

following reasons, we find that Ms. Campbell’s claims, as alleged in her petition,

do not sound in medical malpractice as defined in the Louisiana Medical

Malpractice Act, and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the

exception of prematurity.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

According to her Petition for Damages, on or about September 5, 2018, Ms.

Campbell entered a transportation van owned by Seaside Behavioral Healthcare,

LLC, Seaside Healthcare, LLC, and Seaside Health System, LLC (collectively

“Seaside”), and operated by one of their employees. Her petition alleges that

“suddenly and without warning due to the negligence of [defendants’ employee],

[Ms. Campbell] was severely injured to include a fracture of her right leg.” Her

petition also alleges that the employee failed to use due diligence by not assisting

Ms. Campbell to safely enter onto the transportation van. Ms. Campbell makes

additional allegations against Seaside for negligent hiring and supervision of, and

negligent entrustment of the van to, their driver. She alleges no other facts in the

petition detailing the location or circumstances of the incident.

In response to the petition, defendants filed a dilatory exception of

prematurity wherein they argue that, as qualified healthcare providers, they are

entitled to the protections of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“LMMA”),

La. R.S. 40:1231.1, et seq., including review of Ms. Campbell’s claim by a medical

1
Defendants also sought supervisory review of this same judgment in a writ application filed with this
Court. Upon motion of defendants, Writ Application No. 21-C-341 has been consolidated with this
appeal for resolution.

21-CA-29 1

review panel. In support of their exception of prematurity, defendants attached to

their memoranda exhibits which included: certified copies of Certificates of

Enrollment of defendants with the Louisiana Patient Compensation Fund, an

affidavit of Crystal Foley, the Seaside employee assisting Ms. Campbell, and a

contemporaneous Incident Report Log prepared by Ms. Foley on the date of the

incident. Following a hearing on defendants’ exception of prematurity, the trial

court rendered judgment denying the exception.

On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying the

exception of prematurity because Ms. Campbell “was a mental health care patient

of Seaside Behavioral Health/Psychiatric facility on the date of the incident …

which incident occurred while [Ms. Campbell] was assisted by a Mental Health

Tech to transfer from her home health caregiving agency at her apartment to

Seaside, when Ms. Campbell engaged with an imaginary friend Ernie as Ms. Foley

was assisting [Ms. Campbell] into a facility van.”

DISCUSSION

The burden of proving prematurity is on the exceptors to show that they are

entitled to a medical review panel. Bonilla v. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Serv. Dist. #2,

16-0234 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/16), 210 So.3d 540, 545, writ denied, 17-0187 (La.

4/7/17), 215 So.3d 235; Perry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16-418 (La. App.

5 Cir. 12/14/16), 209 So.3d 308, 311. The LMMA and its limitations on tort

liability for a qualified health care provider apply strictly to claims arising from

medical malpractice, and all other tort liability on the part of the qualified health

care provider is governed by general tort law. Williamson v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No.

1 of Jefferson, 04-0451 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So.2d 782, 786. Coverage under the

LMMA must be strictly construed because the limitations on the liability of a

health care provider are special legislation in derogation of the rights of tort

victims. Id. (citing Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So.2d 577, 578 (La. 1992)). The

21-CA-29 2

issue of whether a claim sounds in medical malpractice is a question of law

conducted under a de novo standard of review. Bonilla, supra.

In Coleman v. Deno, 01-1517 (La. 1/25/02), 813 So.2d 303, 315-316, the

Louisiana Supreme Court identified the following factors to be considered when

determining whether the conduct of a qualified health care provider constitutes

“malpractice” as defined under the LMMA:

[1] whether the particular wrong is ‘treatment related’ or caused by a
dereliction of professional skill,

[2] whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine
whether the appropriate standard of care was breached,

[3] whether the pertinent act or omission involved assessment of the
patient’s condition.

[4] whether an incident occurred in the context of a physician-patient
relationship, or was within the scope of activities which a hospital is
licensed to perform,

[5] whether the injury would have occurred if the patient had not
sought treatment, and

[6] whether the tort alleged was intentional.

Before applying the Coleman factors to the pleadings and evidence

contained in the record, we first note the challenge of doing so in this particular

case based upon the extremely limited and vague allegations made in Ms.

Campbell’s petition, as well as the scant evidence supplied in Ms. Foley’s affidavit

and incident report in support of defendants’ exception of prematurity.2 Ms.

Campbell’s petition makes no allegations regarding her medical status, her

relationship or connection to the defendant entities, or the reason that she was

being transported by defendants to their facility or the location from which she was

being transported. Regarding Ms. Foley’s conduct, the petition only alleges that

2
Although counsel for both Ms. Campbell and for defendants take great liberties in elaborating upon the
circumstances under which, and the reason why, Ms. Campbell was being provided transportation to
defendants’ facility, and the conduct of both Ms. Campbell and Ms. Foley at the time of the incident, this
Court is constrained to review only the allegations of Ms. Campbell’s petition and the evidence
introduced on the exception of prematurity, not allegations made by counsel in their briefs and argument
to the trial court not supported by the record.

21-CA-29 3

Ms. Foley failed to assist Ms. Campbell with entering the van, which caused Ms.

Campbell to fall.

On the other hand, although Ms. Foley’s affidavit maintains that Ms.

Campbell was Seaside’s “patient,” it provides no additional information regarding

the nature of Ms. Campbell’s condition or the reason that she was being

transported from the “patient’s [Ms. Campbell’s] home” to Seaside’s facility.

Additionally, Ms. Foley’s affidavit and report alleges that Ms. Campbell was

“engaged with her imaginary friend Ernie” when Ms. Campbell “jumped

backwards from the bottom step of the van,” claiming that Ernie “pushed her

down.” However, as to her own conduct, Ms. Foley merely alleges that she was

generally assisting Ms. Campbell with a footstool to get on the van.3

Consequently, it is these vague allegations and limited evidence to which we

now apply the Coleman factors. Defendants argue under the first Coleman factor

that the alleged negligence of Ms. Foley, a certified mental health technician, is

treatment related. The defendants assert, correctly, that nothing in the plain

language of the LMMA limits its application to direct treatment by a physician.

Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., 15-1754 (La. 3/15/16), 187 So.3d 436, 443. The

LMMA provides the following definition of malpractice:

“Malpractice” means any unintentional tort … based on health care or
professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered,
by a health care provider, to a patient, including failure to render
services timely and the handling of a patient, including loading and
unloading of a patient, and also includes all legal responsibility of a
health care provider arising from acts or omissions … in the training
or supervision of healthcare providers…

La. R.S. § 40:1231.1(A)(13)

The use of the term “health care provider” rather than simply “physician” or

“medical doctor” necessarily includes actions which are treatment related and

3
Her only other allegations regarding her own conduct involve helping Ms. Campbell get up after she had
already fallen.

21-CA-29 4

undertaken by a hospital in its capacity as a health care provider - even if those

actions are not performed directly by a medical professional. Dupuy, 187 So.3d at

443.

However, the Supreme Court has also instructed that an allegation may

involve “handling of a patient” and still not constitute malpractice if the alleged act

or omission does not occur during the patient’s medical care, treatment or

confinement. Richard v. Louisiana Extended Care Centers, Inc., 02-0978 (La.

1/14/03), 835 So.2d 460, 468; Porter v. S. Oaks Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC,

49,807 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/15), 165 So.3d 1197, 1202, writ denied, 15-1228 (La.

9/25/15), 182 So.3d 935. The parties do not dispute that Ms. Campbell was not

receiving medical treatment at the time of the incident. The transportation service

provided by Seaside is not an ambulance service as that term is defined in La. R.S.

40:1231.1 or La. R.S. 40:1237.1, staffed with a paramedic or registered nurse.

Additionally, while defendants characterize Ms. Foley as a trained “mental

health technician” and introduced evidence of her training in crisis prevention,4

there is no dispute that Ms. Foley is not licensed to practice medicine or provide

medical treatment in the State of Louisiana. “Mental health technician” is not one

of the medical professions recognized under La. R.S. 40:1231.1, and as such her

actions or omissions could not be characterized as a dereliction of professional

medical skill. Furthermore, defendants make no allegation, and provide no

evidence, that Ms. Foley made any type of medical assessment of Ms. Campbell or

that she was providing any type of medical treatment to Ms. Campbell at the time

of the incident. Nor do defendants provide any evidence as to the reason that Ms.

Campbell was being transported to their facility. Consequently, we find that this

factor weighs against a finding that Ms. Campbell’s claims sound in malpractice.

4
It’s unclear from the record whether Ms. Foley’s training in crisis prevention included any instruction on
proper procedures for assisting someone into a van or preventing falls.

21-CA-29 5

Defendants’ arguments concerning the second and third Coleman factors are

unsupported and conclusory. Ms. Campbell alleges in her petition that she fell

while boarding the van.5 Boarding a van is not an act that usually requires a

medical assessment. In contending that Ms. Campbell’s claim sounds in medical

malpractice, defendants do not explain how the act of boarding a van required an

assessment of Ms. Campbell’s medical condition, or exactly what expert medical

evidence will be required to establish the appropriate standard of care. Defendants

also disregard a long history of general negligence cases involving passengers

falling while entering vehicles. See Willis v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 95-2350 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 3/27/96), 672 So.2d 1013, 1015; Robin v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,

Inc., 292 So.2d 926, 927 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1974); Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co.,

189 La. 183, 191, 179 So. 75 (1938). We find that these factors weigh against

finding that Ms. Campbell’s claims sound in malpractice.

Regarding the fourth Coleman factor, defendants repeatedly reiterate Ms.

Campbell’s status as a “patient” of Seaside, but fail to discuss or provide evidence

of the other half of that relationship, the physician, or whether the actions being

performed were within the scope of Seaside’s license. See Rivera v. Bolden’s

Transp. Serv., Inc., 11-1669 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/28/12), 97 So.3d 1096, 1102. This

Court cannot assume that merely because the plaintiff is a “patient” that all of the

services rendered by Seaside and its employees are medical services covered by

the LMMA. See Richard, supra.

5
Cf., Encalade v. W. Jefferson Med. Ctr. Ambulance Serv., 09-355 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/24/09), 28 So.3d
1116, 1119, in which case the plaintiffs specifically alleged in their petitions that “the failure of the
emergency medical technicians to hurriedly get to Mr. Encalade, promptly stabilize Mr. Encalade for
transport, and quickly return Mr. Encalade to WJMC contributed to the rapidity of his death.” This Court
found no error in the trial court’s reasoning that “plaintiffs’ allegations fall within the scope of the
Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act because it places squarely at issue the emergency medical
technicians’ assessment of the patient’s medical condition and the nature of the response (flashing lights
and the speed of emergency transport) required by the applicable standard of care.”

21-CA-29 6

Defendants further argue that Ms. Campbell suffered a mental health

incident while entering the van which was the cause of her fall. While this

allegation is relevant to the question of causation, and ultimately who, if anyone,

may be at fault for Ms. Campbell’s injuries, it is not determinative of the question

of whether Seaside or its employees were providing healthcare or rendering

professional medical services at the time of the injury. People trip and fall for

many causes unrelated to the provision of healthcare. We find that this factor

weighs against finding that Ms. Campbell’s claims sound in malpractice.

For the fifth Coleman factor, defendants argue that the incident would not

have occurred absent the necessary transfer from Ms. Campbell’s home care to the

Seaside facility for treatment. As this Court has noted previously, this factor is not

a simple “but for” test, but must be construed in relation to the other Coleman

factors. Bonilla, 210 So.3d at 553. As mentioned above, no evidence has been

introduced to show that professional medical services or treatment were being

rendered to Ms. Campbell at the time of the van incident. Defendants argue that

Ms. Campbell was on her way to the Seaside facility for medical treatment, but

have offered no evidence of this or any other evidence specifying the nature of the

medical services or treatment Seaside provided Ms. Campbell. Furthermore, there

is no evidence that transportation to Seaside via van service was medically

necessary, rather than an amenity or convenience to facilitate provision of medical

services or treatment at the Seaside facility. We find that this factor weighs against

finding that Ms. Campbell’s claims sound in malpractice.

Defendant’s correctly point out that Ms. Campbell has not alleged any

intentionality on the part of the defendants. As this Court has previously stated,

this factor is never irrelevant because intentional torts are clearly outside the scope

of the LMMA. Bonilla, 210 So.3d at 554. We find that this factor weighs in

defendants’ favor.

21-CA-29 7

CONCLUSION

Upon our de novo review of the limited and vague allegations contained in

Ms. Campbell’s petition, and the scant evidence contained in Ms. Foley’s affidavit

and incident report, in light of the Coleman factors, we are unable to conclude that

defendants have carried their burden of proof on their exception of prematurity to

show that Ms. Campbell’s allegations of negligence against Seaside and its

employee sound in medical malpractice as defined in the LMMA. To the contrary,

applying the Coleman factors to these vague allegations and limited evidence as

contained in the record at this time, compels us to conclude that Ms. Campbell’s

allegations of negligence do not sound in medical malpractice as defined in the

LMMA. Accordingly, on the record before us, we affirm the ruling of the trial

court denying defendants’ exception of prematurity.

AFFIRMED

21-CA-29 8

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
JUNE 9, 2021 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

21-CA-29
C/W 20-C-341
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR (DISTRICT JUDGE)
JEANNE K. DEMAREST (APPELLEE) JOHN B. KELLY, III (APPELLEE) KURT A. OFFNER (APPELLEE)
LISA A. MCLACHLAN (APPELLANT)

MAILED
RODERICK ALVENDIA (APPELLEE)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
909 POYDRAS STREET
SUITE 1625
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70112