Andrew Fairbanks Versus Brooke Beninate

ANDREW FAIRBANKS NO. 20-CA-206

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

BROOKE BENINATE COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 763-069, DIVISION "L"
HONORABLE DONALD A. ROWAN, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

December 23, 2020

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and Hans J. Liljeberg

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED
SJW
JGG
HJL

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
ANDREW FAIRBANKS
Terri M. Miles
Rebecca Huskey

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
BROOKE BENINATE
Richard L. Ducote
Victora McIntyre

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Jeffrey M. Landry
Alicia Edmond Wheeler
David J. Smith, Jr.

WINDHORST, J.

In this custody dispute, defendant/appellant, Brooke Beninate, appeals the

trial court’s judgment denying her motion to declare La. R.S. 46:236.5 C

unconstitutional, awarding plaintiff/appellee, Andrew Fairbanks, sole custody of

their child, and restricting Ms. Beninate to supervised visitation. Ms. Beninate also

appeals the awards of child support, attorney’s fees and costs to Mr. Fairbanks. For

the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, except as to the child

support award. We vacate the child support award and remand for further

proceedings.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case has a protracted history of conflict between the parents of C.B., who

is four years old, related primarily to Mr. Fairbanks’ efforts to obtain visitation and

eventually custody. The parents, Ms. Beninate and Mr. Fairbanks, have never been

married or lived together. Mr. Fairbanks has been identified as the child’s biological

father by scientific testing and has acknowledged the child since birth.

Mr. Fairbanks’ efforts to obtain visitation of the child began on July 21, 2016,

when he filed a petition to establish custody seeking visitation every other weekend

and every other holiday. In that petition, Mr. Fairbanks asserted that Ms. Beninate

had prevented him from seeing the child, even though he had been paying her child

support.

During the course of these proceedings, Ms. Beninate has filed multiple

petitions for protection from abuse, although none have been proven to have merit.

She filed the first petition for protection from abuse on August 16, 2018, not long

after Mr. Fairbanks filed his first petition seeking visitation. Ms. Beninate alleged

that she suspected that her child had been physically and sexually abused by Mr.

Fairbanks because he came home covered in bruises, had a busted lip, a purple

toenail, was traumatized and was not the same after that. She asserted that Mr.

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Fairbanks had exhibited physical violence in the past and alleged that he slapped

their child in the face, backhanded and shoved him, and told him to “shut up.” On

August 16, 2018, the court issued an order of protection effective through September

5, 2018, in which Mr. Fairbanks was ordered to not go within 300 feet of their child.

On August 30, 2018, approximately two weeks after filing the petition for protection

from abuse, it was dismissed on Ms. Beninate’s motion.

On August 28, 2018, Mr. Fairbanks filed a petition to set child custody,

seeking formal recognition as C.B.’s biological father and joint custody with a

specific custody and visitation plan. In response, Ms. Beninate asserted that it would

be in the child’s best interest to award her sole custody and Mr. Fairbanks supervised

visitation. She again alleged that Mr. Fairbanks physically and sexually abused their

child. After a hearing officer conference on November 20, 2018 relative to the issues

raised in these pleadings, the hearing officer recommended that Mr. Fairbanks have

visitation with his child twice a week for two hours; that the parties’ counsel arrange

a visitation schedule; and that Mr. Fairbanks pay child support and explore obtaining

health insurance. These recommendations were adopted as an interim judgment of

the court, and Ms. Beninate timely objected to them.

Soon after the interim judgment granting Mr. Fairbanks visitation was signed,

on December 4, 2018, Ms. Beninate filed a second petition for protection from abuse

based on the same previously-asserted allegations that Mr. Fairbanks emotionally,

physically, and sexually abused their child. After a hearing, at which testimony was

presented, the Commissioner found the petition unwarranted and dismissed it due to

Ms. Beninate’s failure to prove the allegations.

Pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, Dr. Karen Van Beyer conducted a

custody evaluation on April 9, 2019. Mr. Fairbanks subsequently moved to

implement Dr. Van Beyer’s recommendations regarding custody, domicile,

activities, vacations, holidays, and therapy.

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On May 10, 2019, Mr. Fairbanks filed a first rule for contempt, stating that

despite the interim judgment granting him visitation, Ms. Beninate had refused to

allow him to see his child since August 2018 without her present. He asserted that

he had only been permitted to see his child ten times in her presence, and that after

these short visits with her and their child, she repeatedly texted and harassed him.

In addition, he alleged that after he filed a motion to implement the custody

evaluation, Ms. Beninate threatened to kill herself and their child if Mr. Fairbanks

did not forego his pursuit of custody and visitation. Although Mr. Fairbanks stated

that he did not believe Ms. Beninate would actually harm herself or their child, he

requested that the court address her behavior and threats. The hearing officer

considered this first rule for contempt at a May 28, 2019 hearing officer conference.

After the May 28, 2019 conference, the hearing officer recommended that Dr.

Van Beyer’s recommendations be made the judgment of the court and implemented.

These recommendations were made an interim judgment of the court. The interim

judgment provided that beginning on May 29, 2019, Mr. Fairbanks was entitled to

visitation with his child twice a week for four hours, and after four weeks, an

overnight visit. Ms. Beninate objected to Dr. Van Beyer’s recommendations and the

hearing officer’s recommendations.

After the May 28, 2019 interim judgment, on June 6, 2019, Mr. Fairbanks

filed a second rule for contempt, stating that Ms. Beninate continued to refuse to

allow him visitation. He stated that she met him at the designated meeting place for

visitation on May 29, 2019, but refused to allow him to take their child. He also

alleged that while he was holding their child, Ms. Beninate physically pried him out

of his arms causing their child distress. To document this incident, Mr. Fairbanks

called the police and a complaint report was issued. In this rule for contempt, Mr.

Fairbanks further asserted that Ms. Beninate did not allow him visitation on June 3,

2019, and that she continued to falsely accuse him of sexual abuse in the presence

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of their child. At a July 11, 2019 hearing officer conference on the second rule for

contempt, the hearing officer recommended that Mr. Fairbanks receive

compensatory visitation with his child and that Ms. Beninate be found in contempt

for violating the previous visitation order of the court and be ordered to pay Mr.

Fairbanks $500.00 for attorney’s fees and $270.00 in court costs. These

recommendations were made an interim judgment of the court, and Ms. Beninate

objected to them.

Ms. Beninate continued to refuse to comply with the interim court orders. As

a result, on August 15, 2019, Mr. Fairbanks filed an emergency rule for sole custody,

asserting the following: (1) since November 20, 2018, the hearing officer and

custody evaluator have repeatedly recommended that Mr. Fairbanks be permitted to

exercise visitation with the child but Ms. Beninate has prevented visitation from

occurring; (2) Mr. Fairbanks believes the child is in danger with Ms. Beninate

because she has threatened to kill the child and herself before following any court-

ordered visitation; (3) Ms. Beninate has made disturbing allegations against Mr.

Fairbanks, including that he is in a cult, a devil-worshipper, satanic demon, craves

the blood of the child as human sacrifice, and performs black magic spells and

curses; (4) Ms. Beninate abuses prescription narcotics; and (5) Ms. Beninate refuses

to answer the door when he arrives at her house and that law enforcement can no

longer assist him in attempting to facilitate the court-ordered visitation because there

is a problem for every visit. Based on Ms. Beninate’s refusal to abide by the court-

ordered visitation and his belief that their child is in imminent danger of bodily harm,

Mr. Fairbanks sought sole custody of their child.

After a hearing before the trial court on August 15, 2019, the trial court

“denied” all of Ms. Beninate’s objections to hearing officer recommendations and

interim orders including those dated November 20, 2018, December 27, 2018, May

28, 2019 and July 11, 2019. The trial court referred the matter to the duty

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commissioner and ordered Ms. Beninate to undergo a psychological evaluation with

a court-appointed mental health professional to address why custody should not be

updated.

On August 22, 2019, Mr. Fairbanks filed his third rule for contempt because

Ms. Beninate had continued to deny him any visitation. Mr. Fairbanks outlined

several dates for scheduled visitation with which Ms. Beninate refused to comply

and asserted that she sends him a barrage of text messages bordering on harassment

and making false allegations. Mr. Fairbanks further alleged that Ms. Beninate is in

contempt of court for failing to pay him the attorney’s fees and court costs awarded

to him in the August 15, 2019 judgment. Mr. Fairbanks sought a judgment holding

Ms. Beninate in contempt of court for refusing to comply with the July 11, 2019

judgment, refusing to allow court-ordered visitation, refusing to co-parent, and

failing to pay him the previously court-awarded attorney’s fees and court costs. He

also sought additional attorney’s fees and court costs for this rule for contempt.

After a hearing officer conference on September 11, 2019, the hearing officer

recommended that (a) Mr. Fairbanks have sole custody of the parties’ child; (b) Ms.

Beninate have supervised visitation for two hours every Saturday, at her expense, at

Council NOLA; (c) Dr. Van Beyer conduct an updated evaluation; (d) Dr. Raphael

Salcedo conduct a mental health evaluation of Ms. Beninate; and (e) Ms. Beninate

be found in contempt and pay court costs and attorney’s fees to Mr. Fairbanks. These

recommendations were made an interim order of the court, and Ms. Beninate

objected timely. On this same day, Ms. Beninate filed a third petition for protection

from abuse based on the same allegations as those asserted in her previous two

petitions for protection from abuse. A judgment of dismissal of this petition was

signed on September 30, 3019, again on Ms. Beninate’s motion.

Once Mr. Fairbanks obtained custody of the child, he filed a motion to modify

child support and sought child support from Ms. Beninate. After a hearing officer

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conference on November 20, 2019 on this motion, the hearing officer recommended

that Ms. Beninate pay $469.41 in child support based on imputed income. She

objected timely.

Because Mr. Fairbanks temporarily obtained custody based on the interim

judgment, Ms. Beninate filed a motion to declare La. R.S. 46:236.5 C

unconstitutional, asserting that this statute establishes arbitrary procedures whereby

a parent can lose custody of their child without the due process right to a meaningful

hearing. In light of this, she argued that La. R.S. 46:236.5 C was unconstitutional,

and that, as result, the interim judgment granting Mr. Fairbanks sole custody was

void.

The trial court heard this matter on January 30, 2020 to address Ms. Beninate’s

motion to declare La. R.S. 46:236.5 C unconstitutional and her objections to the

hearing officer’s recommendations. After hearing argument from the parties, the

trial court denied the motion to declare La. R.S. 46:236.5 C unconstitutional, stating

that “none of what the hearing officer does is a final judgment.” The trial court also

indicated that the hearing officer makes recommendations, and as the trial judge, “I

either adopt the recommendation of the hearing officer or I reject it and I institute

my own judgment.”

With regard to the custody and visitation issues, the following individuals

testified at the trial court hearing: Dr. Allan Klein; Brandi Beninate; Shonell Dillon;

Karen Campos; Zack Campos; Ms. Beninate; Dr. Rafael Salcedo; and Mr.

Fairbanks.

Dr. Klein, a clinical psychologist, testified as an expert in the field of clinical

psychology. He met with Ms. Beninate at her attorney’s request to generate a report

regarding her concerns about her child. In evaluating the situation, he met with Ms.

Beninate for two sessions and reviewed a number of documents, including medical

records, reports from Ms. Dillon, a clinical social worker, and a video of the child

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sucking the trunk of an elephant. Dr. Klein testified that he found Ms. Beninate to

be intact and noted nothing in her mental status that was concerning. He testified

that she was very upset over how her child was removed from her home, that it was

reasonable for her to be concerned about her child possibly being sexually abused,

and noted that it was probably the most traumatic separation that he has ever

observed. Dr. Klein did not meet with Mr. Fairbanks, the child or anyone other than

Ms. Beninate regarding this matter.

Brandi Beninate, Ms. Beninate’s sister, testified that she lived with Ms.

Beninate and the child at their parents’ home. She stated that Mr. Fairbanks was

involved in an incident four years ago with her boyfriend, which she considered

violent. She testified that Mr. Fairbanks “out of nowhere” pulled her boyfriend, Mr.

Campo, off the couch and began wrestling with him and that she believed it was

because he was jealous. She also testified that after the child visited with Mr.

Fairbanks, she thought the manner in which he played with his superhero toys as a

two year old was suspect because he would put them on top of each other in

straddling positions. Brandi testified that after returning from a visit with Mr.

Fairbanks, the child was distraught, that he had a burn mark under his toe one time,

and that on one occasion he randomly started sticking a stuffed elephant down his

throat, gagging himself so much that tears were coming out of his eyes, which Ms.

Beninate videoed. Brandi further testified that the child never slept away from Ms.

Beninate until he was removed from her custody.

Ms. Dillon, a clinical therapist, testified as an expert in the field of clinical

social work. Ms. Dillon treated both Ms. Beninate and her child, but never met with

Mr. Fairbanks. She met with the child weekly from approximately February 2019

until September 2019 for an hour with Ms. Beninate present to treat him for post-

traumatic stress disorder. Ms. Dillon testified that the child spoke very little, and

that she used play therapy to encourage him to express his feelings. On a couple of

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occasions, the child took a child-like doll and hid it under the bed or dresser or in the

closet; he would place the face of a doll at the groin of another doll; and he would

also dismember, fight and/or throw certain dolls. Ms. Dillon testified that Ms.

Beninate was very loving and encouraging towards her child, that she appeared to

want the best for her child, and that the child was very attached to her. Ms. Beninate

did not inform Ms. Dillon of her allegations that Mr. Fairbanks or his family was

involved in a cult; that Mr. Fairbanks’ eyes turn orange because of demonic

possession; or that he puts the child in a cage and/or forces him to eat dog food or

feces or places him in the middle of a circle with family members dressed in black.

Ms. Campos, the mother of Brandi’s boyfriend, testified that she knew Ms.

Beninate and her child and that they occasionally attended gatherings at her house

over the years for holidays and other events. On one visit, Ms. Campos testified that

when someone was singing “Jesus Loves You,” the child screamed “No. Hate him.”

repeatedly. Mr. Campos, Brandi’s boyfriend, testified that he knew Ms. Beninate,

Mr. Fairbanks (from dating Ms. Beninate), and their child. He testified regarding

the incident four years ago where Mr. Fairbanks pulled him off the couch and tackled

him because he was jealous.

Ms. Beninate testified the child lived with her, her parents, and her sister

Brandi until September 11, 2019 when he was placed in Mr. Fairbanks’ custody.

After their child’s birth, Mr. Fairbanks would spend time with Ms. Beninate and

their child at her house. In 2017, when Ms. Beninate started working, the child

would spend time with Mr. Fairbanks at his house, but never spent the night. Ms.

Beninate alleged that after the child began spending time at Mr. Fairbanks’ house,

his demeanor changed, that he no longer wanted to play outside, and that he was

scared of baths and diaper changes. She also asserts that on July 25, 2018, upon

return from a visit with Mr. Fairbanks, the child came home with physical injuries,

and that soon after that, his behavior became sexual because he would position his

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superheroes in sexual positions, he randomly asked to see her butt, and would stick

his face in her butt. Ms. Beninate took the video of the child stuffing the elephant

truck in and out of his mouth and testified that she did not prompt him to do that.

The child also began to become visibly upset when it was time to go to Mr.

Fairbanks’ house for a visit. Because of the child’s alleged behaviors and upon

doctors’ recommendation, Ms. Beninate took the child to a therapist, Ms. Dillon.

Ms. Beninate further alleges that two or three times, Mr. Fairbanks allegedly told the

child to shut up when he was babbling, backhanded him in the stomach on one

occasion, and slapped the child in the face after the child had slapped him.

Mr. Fairbanks’ counsel questioned Ms. Beninate regarding her previous

allegations that Mr. Fairbanks’ eyes turned orange because of demonic possession;

that he has exercised MK-Ultra mind control over their child; that he and his family

are members of a cult; that he drinks blood and participates in human sacrifice; and

that he has held the child upside down and near drowned him. She attempted to

explain these allegations by stating she was speaking figuratively and/or repeating

things her child told her and things she found from her research on MK-Ultra mind

control. Ms. Beninate admitted that she told Mr. Fairbanks he was going to have to

kill her and her family before she would give their child to him, and that her goal is

to keep Mr. Fairbanks from their child.

Mr. Fairbanks testified at trial that when the child was born and he went to the

hospital to see him, Ms. Beninate and her mother asked him to leave and he was not

allowed to see the child. Three months after the child’s birth, he was asked to take

a paternity test, which showed that he was the father, and then he was allowed to see

the child. In December 2015, Mr. Fairbanks was allowed to visit the child at Ms.

Beninate’s house a few times a week. They started dating again and the visits

increased, but when they broke up, he was allowed to see the child less often. Mr.

Fairbanks testified that he was allowed to have his child outside of Ms. Beninate’s

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presence fewer than ten times. Even after interim orders were entered granting Mr.

Fairbanks unsupervised visitation, Ms. Beninate continued to refuse to allow Mr.

Fairbanks visitation with his child. As a result, Mr. Fairbanks eventually filed rules

for contempt in an effort to have his visitation. Mr. Fairbanks testified that because

of his efforts to see the child, Ms. Beninate sent him threatening text messages, such

as “I will hit you in the head with a baseball bat. I will kill you.”

Mr. Fairbanks testified that after the September 11, 2019 hearing at which the

Commissioner awarded him temporary sole custody, he was told to go straight to

Ms. Beninate’s house to pick up the child and that officers would meet him there to

assist. He testified that when he picked the child up from Ms. Beninate, the child

was crying and told him he was crying because he did not have his shoes. Once Mr.

Fairbanks told him they would go get some new shoes, he stopped crying

immediately and did not have any problems with him once they got home.

Dr. Salcedo, a clinical psychologist, testified as an expert in the fields of

clinical and forensic psychology. In 2019, the court appointed Dr. Salcedo to

conduct a mental health evaluation of Ms. Beninate. In September, 2019, he

conducted a clinical interview with Ms. Beninate, including the Minnesota

Multiphasic Personality Inventory, met with her three times, and reviewed

documents provided to him by Ms. Beninate and Mr. Fairbanks. Dr. Salcedo

concluded that Ms. Beninate did not suffer from any major psychiatric disorder. Ms.

Beninate informed him that she suffers from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

and receives Adderall for treatment of that disorder. Dr. Salcedo stated that this is

common and does not result in any impairment relative to reality testing. He found

Ms. Beninate to be in touch with reality and found nothing that would prevent her

from functioning as a custodial parent or to support finding her delusional.

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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Ms. Beninate asserts that the trial court erred in (1) denying her motion to

declare La. R.S. 46.236.5 C unconstitutional; (2) adopting the hearing officer’s

September 11, 2019 recommendations as the court’s judgment, instead of

conducting a de novo trial and, thereafter, independently applying the C.C. art.

134(A) child custody “best interest” factors to the evidence; (3) retaining sole

custody of the parties’ child with his father Mr. Fairbanks; (4) retaining Ms. Beninate

on supervised visitation at her expense; (5) adopting the hearing officer’s

recommendations that Ms. Beninate pay attorney’s fees and court costs; and (6) in

adopting the hearing officer’s recommendations that Ms. Beninate pay child support.

Law and Analysis: The Constitutionality of La. R.S. 46:236.5 C

Ms. Beninate challenges the constitutionality of La. R.S. 46:236.5 C, which

provides that:

C. An expedited process for the establishment of paternity and
the establishment and enforcement of support and other related family
and domestic matters in district courts using hearing officers may be
implemented as follows:

(1) The judge or judges of the appropriate court or courts for the
establishment of paternity or the establishment and enforcement of
support and other domestic and family matters may appoint one or more
hearing officers to hear paternity, support, and other domestic and
family related matters. Domestic and family matters shall include
divorce and all issues ancillary to a divorce proceeding; all child-related
issues such as paternity, filiation, custody, visitation, and support in
non-marital cases; all protective orders filed in accordance with R.S.
46:2131 et seq., R.S. 46:2151 et seq., and the Children's Code and all
injunctions filed in accordance with R.S. 9:361, 371, and 372 and Code
of Civil Procedure Articles 3601 et seq., which involve personal abuse,
terrorizing, stalking, or harassment; and enforcement of orders in any
of these matters, including contempt of court.

(2) The hearing officer shall be a full-time or part-time employee
of the court and shall be an attorney who has been in good standing with
any state bar association for not less than five years and has prior
experience in cases involving child support services.

(3) The hearing officer shall act as a finder of fact and shall make
written recommendations to the court concerning any domestic and

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family matters as set forth by local court rule, including but not limited
to the following matters….

Ms. Beninate argues that this provision is unconstitutional because it

establishes an arbitrary procedure that allows the hearing officer to make “findings

of fact” without administering oaths, taking testimony, or making a record of the

hearing. Ms. Beninate asserts that the provisions allowing the trial judge to “accept,

reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings of the hearing officer” and to receive

additional information if needed or remand to the hearing officer, result in an

arbitrary proceeding for a judge to decide a custody and a contempt of court case

without a meaningful opportunity to be heard, confront witnesses and/or rebut

evidence. Ms. Beninate also asserts that while the law provides for a de novo hearing

before the trial court, these provisions do not coincide with the constitutional right

to a de novo hearing. In light of this, Ms. Beninate asserts that this procedure

deprives a parent of his or her due process rights to have a meaningful opportunity

to be heard. She further argues that the trial judge’s decision to adopt the hearing

officer’s recommendations indicates that he did not engage in his own best interest

of the child analysis under C.C. art. 134 and that she was deprived of a de novo

hearing.

Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and any doubt as to the legislation’s

constitutionality must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Moore v. RLCC

Techs., Inc., 95-2621 (La. 2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1135, 1140; Polk v. Edwards, 626

So.2d 1128, 1132 (La. 1993). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute

bears the burden of proving clearly that the legislation is unconstitutional. In re

American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 588 So.2d 367, 373 (La. 1001). The party

must establish that the legislation is barred by a constitutional provision which

restricts the power of the legislature to enact the particular legislation at issue. Id.

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The Facial Constitutional Challenge to La. R.S. 46:236.5 C

We first address Ms. Beninate’s challenge that La. R.S. 46:236.5 C is

unconstitutional on its face. A facial constitutional challenge seeks more drastic

relief than an as-applied challenge; therefore, the movant in a facial challenge bears

an especially heavy burden. U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095,

2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987); LaPointe v. Vermilion Par. Sch. Bd., 15-432 (La.

6/30/15), 173 So.3d 1152, 1159-60. To meet this burden, Ms. Beninate must prove

that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid, that

is, that the law is unconstitutional in all its applications. Washington State

Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184,

1190, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008); LaPointe, 173 So.3d at 1159-60. In determining

whether a law is facially invalid, the court “must be careful not to go beyond the

statute’s facial requirements and speculate about hypothetical or imaginary cases.”

Id. at 160.

Ms. Beninate generally asserts that this procedure at issue deprives a parent

of his or her due process rights to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Due

process generally requires some kind of hearing and notice of that hearing. Paschal

v. Hazlinsky, 35,513 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/19/01), 803 So.2d 413, 417. But, no one

has a vested right in any given mode of procedure. Lott v. State, through Department

of Public Safety and Corrections, 98-1920 (La. 5/18/99), 734 So.2d 617, 621. States

may determine the process by which legal rights are asserted and enforced so long

as a party receives due notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 621-622. It is

well established that due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content

unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Fields v. State, through Department of

Public Safety and Corrections, 98-611 (La. 7/8/98), 714 So.2d 1244, 1251. Due

process is flexible and calls for procedural protections demanded by the particular

situation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484

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(1972). The determination of what procedural safeguards are required in order to

meet due process standards depends on the nature of the proceeding and the nature

of the right or interest affected by the proceeding. State ex rel R.C. v. Clarke, 33,023

(La. App. 2 Cir. 10/27/99), 743 So.2d 843, 849.

The resolution of whether the administrative procedures are constitutionally

sufficient to satisfy due process requires an analysis of the governmental and private

interests that are affected. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S. Ct. 893,

902, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). The United States Supreme Court has set forth three

factors to consider in determining whether due process rights are sufficiently

protected: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,

the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,

and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and

finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement

would entail. Id. at 335.

With respect to the first factor, we recognize that the United States Supreme

Court has declared that a biological parent’s right to “the companionship, care,

custody, and management” of his or her children is a liberty interest far more

important than any property right. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102

S.Ct. 1388, 1397, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re A.J.F., 00-948 (La. 6/30/00), 764

So.2d 47, 55. The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed

essential basic civil rights of man. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct.

1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed. 2d 551 (1972). A parent’s interest in having a relationship

with his or her children is without a doubt a liberty interest protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee. Ferrand v. Ferrand, 16-7 (La. App.

5 Cir. 8/31/16), 221 So.3d 909, 919, writ denied, 16-1903 (La. 12/16/16), 211 So.3d

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1164, citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 84, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2070, 147 L.Ed.2d

49 (2000).

As to the second factor, we find that the procedure afforded parents under La.

R.S. 46:236.5C with both a hearing officer and the trial court makes the risk of

erroneous deprivation of that interest slight. This Court has recognized that the

purpose of La. R.S. 46:236.5 and the local rules pertaining thereto is to expedite the

handling of domestic matters. Ackel v. Ackel, 06-646 (La. 5 Cir. 1/16/07), 951

So.2d 403 (2007). The practice of providing the parties an initial hearing with a

hearing officer in custody cases facilitates resolution of these sensitive matters in a

more expedient manner and provides a temporary resolution to, often times, a very

volatile situation. With this practice, the parties, upon request, have the opportunity

to be heard twice before two different individuals, including the hearing officer and,

when an objection is timely filed, the trial judge. All parties receive notice of the

initial hearing before the hearing officer and, if requested, the hearing before the trial

judge.

In addition, both hearings follow well-established procedures. La. R.S.

46:236.5 authorizes the court-appointed hearing officers to act as finders of fact and

provide written recommendations to the court concerning support, paternity,

domestic violence protective orders, and other matters. The statute mandates that the

hearing officer’s written recommendations include a statement of the pleadings,

findings of fact and law, including the hearing officer’s conclusions thereon, and a

proposed judgment. Yet, while the hearing officer makes findings of fact,

conclusions, and interim recommendations based on the evidence presented before

him, “findings of fact” and “conclusions” by the domestic hearing officer are only

recommendations, and as elaborated hereafter, certainly do not constitute final

judgments.

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This Court has held that where a party timely objected to the hearing officer’s

recommendations, those recommendations did not become a final judgment, and the

objecting party was clearly entitled to a de novo review of the hearing officer’s

findings by the trial court. Dugué v. Dugué, 17-525 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/27/18), 250

So.3d 1174, 1178. The interim judgment is not a final judgment and has been found

to be consistent with statutory directive of the hearing officer process. Ackel, 951

So.2d at 407.

Once a timely written objection is filed, the party objecting is entitled to a de

novo contradictory hearing in the district court before the trial judge to whom the

case is assigned, and the de novo hearing is promptly scheduled upon the filing of

the objection. The trial judge then signs the interim judgment, which also sets the

date for the de novo hearing.

The de novo hearing is of record, and rules of evidence apply. The parties

may present evidence, sworn testimony, and argument before the trial judge, as in

any other trial or contradictory evidentiary hearing.

The trial court must hear the evidence and review the hearing officer’s

recommendations de novo, and it “shall accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part

the findings of the hearing officer.” Dugué, 250 So.3d at 1178. Significantly, the

burden of proof does not shift to the objecting spouse. In keeping with the intent of

a de novo hearing, the burden of proof remains on the moving spouse who originally

had the burden of proof. If after de novo consideration of the evidence presented,

the trial court makes the same findings of fact and law as did the hearing officer, the

court may adopt the hearing officer’s recommendations in whole or in part. If it

does not agree, the trial court may adopt part or none of the hearing officer’s

recommendations, and may fashion its own remedies and judgment. Thus, the trial

court may rule as it deems appropriate on the remaining issues based on the relevant

evidence admitted at the de novo hearing.

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In Ackel, supra, this Court found this statutory scheme to be constitutional

under both the Louisiana and United States Constitutions. This Court also held that

La. R.S. 46:236.5 clearly contemplates that the Louisiana District Court Rules

(hereafter LDCR) and local rules will provide the particulars regarding hearing

officer procedures. Neither the LDCR nor the local rules of the Twenty-Fourth

Judicial District Court exceed or improperly expand the statutory authority of the

hearing officers. LDCR 35.8 and Local Rule Appendix 35.8-I provide that the

hearing officer’s recommendations shall be signed by the District Court Judge or

Commissioner, and shall be deemed an interim order or judgment of the court. We

find this procedure to be consistent with the statute, and, especially considering the

temporary nature of the interim order or judgment, that it is not a violation of due

process.

As noted in Dugué, supra, LDCR Rule 35.7 provides that the trial judge “may

review the hearing officer’s conference report, and shall accept, reject, or modify in

whole or in part the findings of the hearing officer and give them such weight as

deemed appropriate based on the evidence adduced at the hearing.” [Emphasis

added.]1

The basis of our decision in Dugué, supra, was that the trial court committed

reversible error when it required proof of a material change in circumstances before

modification of the interim judgment would be considered. In doing so, the trial

court effectively deemed the interim judgment to be a final judgment, which was a

misapplication of La. R.S. 46:236.5 C and the applicable rules. Due process in

Dugué required adherence to the procedure set by La. R.S. 46:236.5 C and the

applicable rules, which have been properly applied in the case before us. Those

1 LDCR Rules 35.0–35.9 non-domestic violence hearing officer conferences. The Twenty-Fourth Judicial
District Court Local Rules can be found in the LDCR Appendices, App. 35.0–35.8 under “24th JDC.”

20-CA-206 17

statutory provisions and rules clearly make the interim judgment a temporary one

which the trial court may accept or discard in whole or in part at the de novo hearing.

We recognize the possibility that in infrequent cases, an interim order may

impose a temporary obligation, deprivation, or hardship on a spouse which might

later be determined by the trial court to be unnecessary or inappropriate. However,

we believe that there is an equal or greater possibility that an intolerable or

undesirable condition might be unnecessarily prolonged while awaiting discovery

and trial in the absence of an impartial, albeit informal, hearing officer conference.

Further, hearing officer conferences often resolve differences between spouses

permanently, and result in judgments avoiding lengthy, stressful, and very costly

litigation.

With the foregoing procedures in place, all parties have the opportunity to

present their positions, arguments, and evidence, and the hearing officer and the trial

court consider the merits of each case based on a full record as presented by the

parties. Taking this into consideration, as to the third factor, we find that this process

sufficiently balances the governmental interest in expeditiously and efficiently

handling domestic matters and protecting individuals’ right to a fundamentally fair

and meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Considering the foregoing, we find the procedures set forth in La. R.S.

46:236.5 satisfy the due process requirements of the Louisiana and United States

Constitutions, and are facially constitutional. Ms. Beninate’s argument that these

procedures deprived her of due process is without merit.

The Constitutional Challenge As Applied to Ms. Beninate

We also find no support for Ms. Beninate’s argument that she was not afforded

due process in this custody dispute with Mr. Fairbanks. This Court has held that the

local system implemented by the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court in Jefferson

Parish under La. R.S. 46:236.5 is in accord with the authority granted by that statute.

20-CA-206 18

Ackel, 951 So.2d at 407. As required by the statute, Ms. Beninate received notice

of all proceedings, which informed her of the time and place of the hearing and the

issues to be addressed.

Ms. Beninate has been represented by various attorneys throughout most of

these proceedings, and new counsel enrolled to represent her on September 10, 2019

before the September 11, 2019 hearing officer conference. In addition, as asserted

by Ms. Beninate, the hearing officer conference was informal, but all parties were

allowed to state their positions and present evidence to the hearing officer. She

participated fully in the hearing officer conference, and after the hearing officer

made recommendations that she disliked, she exercised her right to object, indicating

that she was seeking a de novo hearing by the district court. Upon her objection to

the September 11, 2019 hearing officer recommendations, the de novo hearing was

promptly set for October 24, 2019. That date was later continued to January 30,

2020 on Ms. Beninate’s motion.

Ms. Beninate was present and represented at the de novo hearing before the

district court. She presented multiple witnesses, including expert testimony,

evidence, and had the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Fairbanks’ witnesses, all of

which the trial court heard and considered in reaching its conclusions. The mere fact

that the trial court adopted the hearing officer’s recommendations does not indicate

that Ms. Beninate’s due process rights were violated, or that the hearing was not

genuinely de novo. In addressing her motion to declare La. R.S. 46:236.5 C

unconstitutional, the trial court stated that nothing the hearing officer does is a final

judgment, and that the court can adopt the recommendations or reject them and

institute its own judgment.

The purpose of the hearing officer procedures is to expedite the handling of

domestic cases, as set forth in La. R.S. 46:236.5 C: “An expedited process for the

establishment of paternity and the establishment and enforcement of support and

20-CA-206 19

other related family and domestic matters in district courts using hearing officers

may be implemented as follows….” This purpose would be defeated if Ms. Beninate

were allowed to achieve her stated intended purpose, which was to prevent visitation

by the child’s father indefinitely, contrary to the recommendation of the hearing

officer and later, the testimony of experts. As previously stated, allowing this

behavior on her part to continue posed a greater injustice than implementing the

temporary interim order after a hearing officer conference.

Additionally, we note that Ms. Beninate’s refusal to comply with the court

orders, which were intended to facilitate Mr. Fairbanks’ right to visitation with his

child, is ultimately an important part of the catalyst that made it necessary for

immediate enforcement of the interim judgment. Thus, Ms. Beninate’s own actions

in depriving Mr. Fairbanks of his rights caused what she now claims is a violation

of her rights. The hearing officer procedures consequently allowed the court to

ensure that the constitutional rights of all the parties were recognized and enforced

and that the fundamental needs of the child were met.

In light of the foregoing, we do not find this statute unconstitutional as applied

to Ms. Beninate.

Custody and Visitation

In her second, third and fourth assignments of error, Ms. Beninate asserts that

the trial court erred in adopting the hearing officer’s recommendations as the court’s

judgment, instead of conducting a de novo trial and independently applying La. C.C.

art. 134(A) child custody “best interest” factors to the evidence; awarding sole

custody of C.B. to Mr. Fairbanks; and restricting Ms. Beninate to supervised

visitation.

Ms. Beninate asserts that the trial court did not conduct a true de novo hearing

on her objections to the hearing officer’s recommendations. The basis for this

argument is primarily that the trial court came to the same conclusions and rendered

20-CA-206 20

the same decision as the hearing officer. Contrary to her assertion, the record clearly

indicates that the trial judge conducted a full trial de novo, as required by La. R.S.

46:236.5 C. On January 30, 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing and addressed

Ms. Beninate’s motion to declare La. R.S. 46.236.5 C unconstitutional, as well as

issues regarding custody and visitation. Several witnesses, including multiple

experts, testified, and the parties formally introduced evidence. Ms. Beninate had

the opportunity to question and cross-examine the witnesses, to present evidence,

and to present arguments to the court supporting why she should have custody, more

visitation and/or unsupervised visitation. The record shows the trial court conducted

a full hearing and ultimately agreed with the hearing officer’s recommendations.

Thus, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Ms. Beninate next challenges the trial court’s custody and visitation rulings.

In resolving custody issues, the primary consideration is whether the custody

arrangement is in the best interest of the child. La. C.C. art. 131, 134. La. C.C. art.

134 sets out fourteen non-exclusive factors for the court to consider in awarding

custody.2 The trial court is not bound to make a mechanical evaluation of all the

factors in La. C.C. art. 134, but should decide each case on its own facts in light of

those factors. Robertson v. Robertson, 10-926 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/26/11), 64 So.3d

354, 363. These factors are not exclusive, but are provided as a guide to the court,

2 The relevant factors included: (1) The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children’s Code

Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration; (2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties
between each party and the child; (3) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love,
affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child; (4) The capacity
and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs;
(5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of
maintaining continuity of that environment; (6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes; (7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child;
(8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any party; (9) The mental and physical
health of each party. Evidence that an abused parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other
parent shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody; (10) The home, school, and community history
of the child; (11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age
to express a preference; (12) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close
and continuing relationship between the child and the other party, except when objectively substantial
evidence of specific abusive, reckless, or illegal conduct has caused one party to have reasonable concerns
for the child's safety or well-being while in the care of the other party; (13) The distance between the
respective residences of the parties; (14) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously
exercised by each party. La. C.C. art. 134.

20-CA-206 21

and the relative weight given to each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court.

Id. Each child custody case must be viewed in light of its own particular set of facts

and circumstances with the paramount goal of reaching a decision that is in the best

interest of the children. Id.; Harvey v. Harvey, 13-81 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/5/13), 133

So.3d 1, 3, writ denied, 13-1600 (La. 7/22/13), 119 So.3d 596. On appellate review,

the trial court’s custody determination is entitled to great weight and will not be

disturbed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Clofer, 18-

119 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/27/18), 251 So.3d 597, 600; Bridges v. Bridges, 09-742 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 2/9/10), 33 So.3d 914, 918.

One of the most relevant factors to this case is the willingness of each party

to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and

the other party. The record clearly indicates that Ms. Beninate has refused to

facilitate or encourage a relationship between the child and Mr. Fairbanks. A

biological parent’s right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management” of

his or her child is not limited to one parent but instead applies fully to both biological

parents. Mr. Fairbanks has exhibited great patience in attempting to forge a true

relationship with his child while he was in Ms. Beninate’s custody. When Ms.

Beninate and Mr. Fairbanks were involved in a relationship, Mr. Fairbanks was

allowed to spend time with the child on an informal basis. When this relationship

ended, however, Ms. Beninate’s willingness to allow Mr. Fairbanks time with his

child deteriorated to the point where she testified that her intent is prevent him from

ever seeing his child.

On multiple occasions, Mr. Fairbanks, by court order, has been granted

visitation with his child only to have Ms. Beninate take extreme measures to frustrate

all his attempts at visitation. Ms. Beninate resorted to nefarious allegations against

Mr. Fairbanks as means to avoid allowing him visitation with his child. These

allegations have proven baseless throughout this litigation as reflected by not only

20-CA-206 22

her own dismissal of multiple petitions for protection from alleged abuse, but also

the complete lack of support for her allegations, and by the increasing

outrageousness of the unsupported allegations. In addition, the record indicates that

Ms. Beninate filed the petitions for protection from abuse either after Mr. Fairbanks

sought or was awarded visitation and/or custody of the child. Because of Ms.

Beninate’s refusal to comply with court orders, Mr. Fairbanks had to resort to filing

three contempt of court proceedings in an effort to enforce his right to visitation.

Ms. Beninate’s actions resulted in Mr. Fairbanks not seeing his child for over a year.

Given the course of these proceedings, we do not find any abuse of discretion

or manifest error on the part of the trial court. In fact, we see no other option but to

award sole custody to Mr. Fairbanks. While this removed the child from his current

environment, consideration of that factor does not outweigh other factors, and is not

a sufficient basis to deprive one parent of any contact with his or her child.

The record shows that Mr. Fairbanks can provide the child with love, affection

and other emotional support, as well as education, food, clothing, medical care and

other material needs. He is employed, paid child support regularly when Ms.

Beninate had custody, and lives in stable home environment with his parents. It is

also clear that Mr. Fairbanks loves and cares for the child. Mr. Fairbanks has also

exhibited a healthy moral fitness, and is mentally and physically capable of caring

for the child. Further, the record indicates that other members of Mr. Fairbanks’

family want to develop a relationship with the child and can assist him with caring

for the child. Thus, considering the record in its entirety and for the reasons stated

above, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of sole custody to

Mr. Fairbanks.

Ms. Beninate also challenges the judgment’s restriction of only granting her

supervised visitation with the child. The trial court has vast discretion in custody

determinations. When considering the safety and best interest of the child, ordering

20-CA-206 23

supervised visitation is within the trial court’s vast discretion. Guidry v. Guidry, 18-

639 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/22/19), 274 So.3d 709, 715.

“Frequent and continuing contact” with each parent is important. La. R.S.

9:335. Ms. Beninate, however, testified that she only exercised her right to

supervised visitation twice, explaining that it was expensive, emotional for both of

them to be together in a strange place, and the child had no reaction to her at the

visits. Although we recognize the distressing nature of supervised visitation

particularly after having sole custody of a child, Ms. Beninate’s failure to exercise

that visitation while also seeking custody and/or unsupervised visitation does not

present well for her case. Instead of continuing her relationship and contact with her

child through supervised visitation and exhibiting to the court a willingness to

cooperate with court orders and a genuine commitment to maintaining her

relationship with her child regardless of the strain some measures may impose on

her, Ms. Beninate forewent any contact with her child for whom the change was

clearly disconcerting and perplexing. In light of this and the unsettling nature of Ms.

Beninate’s behavior relative to Mr. Fairbanks, we do not find the trial court abused

its discretion in ordering supervised visitation for two hours every Saturday at her

expense to Ms. Beninate. There is nothing to prevent Ms. Beninate from seeking to

lift the supervision restriction as she exhibits an ability to cooperate with court orders

and Mr. Fairbanks and restores her relationship with the child through supervised

visitation.

Imposition of Court Costs and Attorney’s Fees for Contempt

Ms. Beninate asserts that the trial court erred in ordering her to comply with

the hearing officer’s recommendation that she pay attorney’s fees and court costs

due to her contempt finding. After the September 11, 2019 hearing officer

conference, the hearing officer found Ms. Beninate in contempt because she

20-CA-206 24

repeatedly failed to comply with court orders granting Mr. Fairbanks visitation with

his child.

La. R.S. 13:4611 provides that courts may punish a person adjudged guilty of

contempt of court for disobeying an order for the right of custody or visitation and

award attorney fees to the prevailing party in a contempt of court proceeding. The

plain reading of this provision indicates that the Legislature has chosen to authorize

awards of attorney fees under this statute to a party who successfully prosecutes a

motion for contempt. Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Jackel Int’l Ltd., 19-749 (La. 1/29/20),

— So.3d —, 2020 WL 499164.

The record is clear that (1) Ms. Beninate had not allowed Mr. Fairbanks to see

the parties’ child since the hearing officer first recommended Mr. Fairbanks have

visitation on November 20, 2018; (2) Ms. Beninate refused to allow Mr. Fairbanks

visitation with the child out of her presence; (3) Ms. Beninate did not deny these

facts and told the hearing officer Mr. Fairbanks was not allowed to see their child;

(4) Mr. Fairbanks verified to the hearing officer that he was denied visitation and

access to his child on each of the dates identified in his third rule for contempt and

that on each of the occasions listed in his third rule for contempt he personally went

to Ms. Beninate’s residence and knocked on the door with no successful result as no

one answered. It was undisputed that Mr. Fairbanks had not been allowed by Ms.

Beninate to exercise his court-ordered visitation when he attempted to retrieve the

child from Ms. Beninate for that purpose.

In similar circumstances, another appellate court affirmed the trial court’s

judgment finding the mother in contempt of court and ordering her to pay the father’s

attorney’s fees due to her failure to enforce the minimum visitation requirement to

which father was entitled under the parties’ consent judgment. The father in this

case was also prevented from having visitation with child for months despite active

20-CA-206 25

efforts for visitation. LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 06-1307 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/7/07), 953

So.2d 115, 123.

Considering the foregoing, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in

ordering Ms. Beninate to pay Mr. Fairbanks’ attorney’s fees and court costs for the

contempt proceedings.

Child Support

On November 20, 2019, the hearing officer recommended that Ms. Beninate

pay $469.41 in child support based on imputed income, and she timely objected.

After the January 30, 2020 hearing, the trial court adopted this recommendation. On

appeal, Ms. Beninate argues that the trial court erred in adopting the hearing officer’s

recommendations regarding child support because no evidence pertinent to child

support was introduced at the hearing, and thus the trial court was unable to conduct

a de novo review of the child support recommendation.

Upon review, we find the record before us does not contain sufficient evidence

to support the judgment regarding child support. A child support award is

determined pursuant to La. R.S. 9:315.2. La. R.S. 9:315.2(A) provides that “Each

party shall provide to the court a verified income statement showing gross income

and adjusted gross income, together with documentation of current and past

earnings.” None of these required documents were introduced at the January 30,

2020 hearing before the trial court judge. Furthermore, La. R.S. 9:315.2(D)

provides: “The court shall determine the basic child support obligation amount from

the schedule in R.S. 9:315.19 by using the combined adjusted gross income of the

parties and the number of children involved in the proceeding, but in no event shall

the amount of child support be less than the amount provided in R.S. 9:315.14.”

Without the required documentation, this Court cannot determine whether the trial

judge erred in calculating the child support award. See, State, Dep’t of Children &

Family Servs. ex rel. L.R. v. Haines, 11-84 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/6/11), 67 So.3d 515,

20-CA-206 26

516; State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services and Jessica Rareshide v.

Lehman, 06-922 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/11/07), 955 So.2d 738.

Appellate courts are courts of record and may not review evidence that is not

in the appellate record. La. C.C.P. art. 2164; Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,

07-2143 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88. Because the parties did not introduce

evidence regarding child support for this Court to review, we vacate the trial court’s

judgment to the extent Ms. Beninate is ordered to pay child support. On remand,

child support should be awarded based on the guidelines in La. R.S. 9:315.2 et seq.

after the parties have submitted the requisite documentation.

DECREE

Considering the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s judgment except as to

the child support award. We vacate the judgment to the extent Ms. Beninate is

ordered to pay child support, and remand this matter to the trial court to determine

child support pursuant to La. R.S. 9:315.2 et seq., after the parties have submitted

the requisite documentation.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED

20-CA-206 27

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
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ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
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DECEMBER 23, 2020 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
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20-CA-206
E-NOTIFIED
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HONORABLE DONALD A. ROWAN, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
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