Nucor Steel Louisiana, LLC Versus St. James Parish School Board and Neshelle Nogess in Her Capacity as Tax Administrator of St. James Parish Tax Agency

NUCOR STEEL LOUISIANA, LLC NO. 20-CA-247

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

ST. JAMES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD AND COURT OF APPEAL
NESHELLE NOGESS IN HER CAPACITY AS
TAX ADMINISTRATOR OF ST. JAMES STATE OF LOUISIANA
PARISH TAX AGENCY

ON APPEAL FROM THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. L00560

November 05, 2021

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

REVERSED AND REMANDED
SJW
SMC
JJM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
NUCOR STEEL LOUISIANA, LLC
Jesse R. Adams, III
Camanda J. Fergus

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
ST. JAMES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD AND NESHELLE NOGESS IN HER
CAPACITY AS TAX ADMINISTRATOR OF ST. JAMES PARISH TAX
AGENCY
Drew M. Talbot

WINDHORST, J.

Plaintiff/appellant, Nucor Steel Louisiana, LLC (“Nucor” or “appellant”),

appeals the judgment from the Louisiana Board of Tax Appeals (the “BTA”),

granting the exception of prescription filed by defendants/appellees, St. James Parish

School Board and Neshelle Nogess in her capacity as Tax Administrator of St. James

Parish Tax Agency (collectively the “Collector”). For the reasons stated below, we

reverse the BTA’s judgment granting the exception of prescription, deny that

exception, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal involves a substantial tax refund claim by Nucor, a direct-reduced

iron (“DRI”) manufacturing facility in St. James Parish. In the course of

constructing its manufacturing facility, Nucor contracted with HYL Technology

S.A. de C.V., Tenova S.P.A., and Tenova Core (collectively, “HYL”) for the design,

engineering and manufacture of a major component of its facility. Soon after

operations began, Nucor experienced production issues with part of the equipment

purchased from HYL, specifically the “Process Gas Heater” (the “PGH”), and, in

November 2014, a portion of the PGH failed. After an investigation, the PGH’s

design was found to be inadequate. As a result, HYL agreed to rebate certain “back

charges” related to the repair and reengineering of the PGH and other components

of the DRI system to Nucor.1 Given the rebate, Nucor paid HYL a total amount of

$183,338,125.05 as opposed to the “contract price” of $197,360,000.00 for the

equipment.

Pursuant to a “direct pay permit” with the Collector, Nucor had accrued and

remitted sales and use tax to the Collector based upon the full contract price with

HYL.2 Because the total payments actually made by Nucor to HYL were less than

1 This agreement was memorialized in a Settlement and Release Agreement on May 29, 2015.

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the contract price, Nucor submitted a refund claim for $821,091.61 on January 26,

2016, asserting (1) an overpayment due to Nucor’s calculation of the tax due for the

HYL purchases; (2) a refund based upon the allowance for defective equipment

agreed to by HYL in its reduction of the purchase price rebated to Nucor (“HYL

Claim”); and (3) Nucor’s purchase of hydrated lime used as a material for further

processing in Nucor’s manufacturing facility.

On April 13, 2016, the Collector acknowledged receipt of the refund claim by

letter and requested additional documentation from Nucor. In May 2016, the

Collector refunded the portion of the refund claim related to hydrated lime. Over

the next several months, Nucor provided additional data to the Collector regarding

the refund claim and the ongoing audit. The refund claim sought the refund of sales

tax paid on the June 2012 through October 2013 sales and use tax returns. The

Collector reviewed the invoices for this period as part of its audit. Throughout the

period of the review, Nucor and the Collector entered into several “Agreement to

Suspend Prescription of Taxes” that applied through October 15, 2017.3

The Collector prepared timelines dated September 14, 2016 and November

17, 2016 regarding the audit, which reflect that the Collector was diligently working

with Nucor in reviewing the refund claim. This included requesting data, hiring

outside counsel, reviewing invoices and contracts, touring the Nucor Facility,

issuing a refund determination letter (wherein she outlined all of the actions she had

taken, her legal basis for denying the claim and outlining Nucor’s appeals rights),

holding a redetermination hearing, and ultimately confirming her decision to deny

the refund claim.

2 A “direct pay permit” allows the Louisiana Department of Revenue to authorize certain sales tax dealers
to pay directly to the Department. Qualifying entities will be issued a direct pay permit to provide to their
suppliers instead of paying sales tax on authorized purchases or leases.
3 The last “Agreement to Suspend Prescription of Taxes” suspended the running of the period of
prescription against the assessment and collection of any sales or use taxes, interest and/or penalties due
and owing, and any claim for refund by Taxpayer against Collector for the year(s) January l, 2011 through
December 31, 2013 until October 15, 2017.

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Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-15, contains a complete detailed factual chronology

of the interaction between Nucor and the Collector related to the claim and the

evaluation process from the beginning through the appeal and decision of the BTA.

Its accuracy is supported by the record. We also take note of Ms. Nogess’ estimable

qualifications, and that at all times pertinent, she had legal counsel.

On July 26, 2017, the Collector toured Nucor’s facility, and in an email dated

the next day, the Collector stated that the tour provided perspective on critically

important facts relevant to the legal issues that will help them make determinations

on Nucor’s refund claim. In August, the parties negotiated a confidentiality

agreement related to Nucor providing the Collector with the Settlement Agreement

with HYL and other confidential data. That month, Nucor provided the Collector

with warranty information, a detailed breakdown of the rebate, and other information

regarding the HYL claim.

In September 2017, Nucor provided the Collector with a full copy of the

Settlement Agreement with HYL, as HYL finally agreed to a full disclosure of the

Agreement. The Collector also issued a “preliminary report” which indicated that

two portions of the refund claim were still in progress. Following this report, Nucor

and the Collector continued to exchange information. In October 2017, Nucor

resubmitted its refund claim. The Collector continued to correspond with Nucor

through February 2018 regarding different aspects of the refund claim and finally

made a determination. The record contains correspondence between the parties

during this period discussing issues related to the refund claim, indicating the

Collector was meeting with outside counsel to assist in her consideration of the

refund claim, and requesting additional information.

The Collector finally sent Nucor a refund claim determination letter, denying

Nucor’s refund claim on February 23, 2018. In the letter, the Collector set forth the

various actions the Collector took in considering the refund claim. The Collector

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also informed Nucor of its right to seek reconsideration or redetermination, and/or

to appeal the denial of the refund claim. Specifically, the Collector stated the

following:

Should Nucor disagree with or dispute the Collector’s final
determination, pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.81, Nucor has ninety
(90) calendar days from the date of the certified mailing of
this notice of refund claim determination letter to appeal to
the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”). [Emphasis added.]

Under La. R.S. 47:337.81A, Nucor may within thirty (30) days
of this notice request a hearing with the Collector for
redetermination. Any request for additional consideration,
reconsideration, redetermination, or other action by the Collector
with respect to this refund claim determination letter shall not
operate to extend the ninety (90) day period within which an
appeal to the BTA must be taken by Nucor.

Nucor timely requested an informal hearing with the Collector for

redetermination of its refund claim. On May 14, 2018, the Collector sent Nucor a

refund claim redetermination hearing letter, in which the Collector informed Nucor

that it was confirming in part and revising in part its original refund claim

determinations. After the Collector denied Nucor’s refund claim, Nucor followed

the Collector’s instructions regarding filing an appeal with the BTA.

On May 24, 2018, Nucor filed a petition for redetermination of the denial of

a claim for refund with the BTA. In response to Nucor’s petition, the Collector

asserted for the first time that Nucor had failed to timely file its appeal of the

Collector’s alleged “failure to act” as provided for in La. R.S. 47:337.81 (A)(2). The

Collector contended that, on July 26. 2017, the 180 day time period for Nucor to

appeal the Collector’s “failure to act” lapsed. Thus, based on the Collector’s

position, because it had failed to render a decision within 180 days of the one year

anniversary of Nucor filing the refund claim, Nucor was obligated to file its appeal

with the BTA by July 26, 2017 and that Nucor had failed to file within this time

frame.

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After the trial on the exception, the BTA concluded that, despite the

Collector’s active review of the refund claim, the Collector “failed to act” and, thus,

Nucor was obligated to appeal the refund claim within 180 days of the one-year

anniversary of Nucor’s filing of the refund claim. The BTA held that “the failure to

act” described in La. R.S. 47:337.81(A)(2) means “the failure to render a decision

on a refund claim.” The BTA also concluded that the Collector did not renounce

prescription in its denial letter, in which Nucor was informed that it had ninety days

to appeal the decision. The BTA further concluded that based upon the evidence in

the record the Collector had not undertaken sufficient affirmative action to support

a claim of estoppel with respect to prescription. Finally, as to the agreements to

suspend prescription, because it was the BTA’s understanding that “Nucor is not

claiming the agreements suspend the prescriptive period at issue in this case,” the

BTA did not rule on the application of these agreements to the prescription issue.

The BTA granted the Collector’s exception of prescription and dismissed Nucor’s

petition with prejudice.

LAW and ANALYSIS

In assignments of error 1, 2, and 3, Nucor asserts that the BTA erred in

sustaining the Collector’s exception of prescription regarding Nucor’s refund claim

based upon the conclusion that a collector only “fails to act,” as contemplated by La.

R.S. 47:337.81(A), when the collector fails to grant or deny a refund claim. In

addition, appellant argues that the BTA erred in concluding that the Collector’s

active review and consideration of Nucor’s refund claim did not constitute an “act”

for purposes of La. R.S. 47:337.8 1(A).

In assignment of error 4, Nucor contends that the Collector renounced

prescription by its conduct of the evaluation of the claim, correspondence, and its

letter of disallowance in which notice of Nucor’s right to appeal within 90 days was

expressly given.

20-CA-247 5

In assignment of error 5, Nucor contends that the Collector is estopped from

asserting prescription based on it conduct.

In assignment of error 6, Nucor contends that the agreements to suspend

prescription of taxes extended the prescriptive period for Nucor’s appeal of the

Collector’s denial of the refund claim.

We find that assignments of error 1–3 are interrelated, and discuss them

together. Although related factually, we discuss assignment of error 5 separately.

We conclude that assignments of error 1, 2, 3 and 5 have merit, and pretermit

discussion on assignments of error 4 and 6.

Standard of Review

La. R.S. 47:1435 provides that the courts of appeal have exclusive jurisdiction

to review the decisions or judgments of the BTA. International Paper, Inc. v.

Bridges, 07-1151 (La. 01/16/08), 972 So.2d 1121, 1127; Zelia, LLC v. Robinson,

19-372 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/19), 286 So.3d 1268, 1272, reh’g denied (Jan. 10,

2020), writ denied, 20-253 (La. 4/27/20), 295 So.3d 948. The BTA’s findings of

fact should be accepted where there is substantial evidence in the record to support

them and should not be set aside unless they are manifestly erroneous in view of the

evidence on the entire record. International Paper, Inc., 972 So.2d at 1127-28. For

questions of law, if the BTA has correctly applied the law and adhered to correct

procedural standards, its judgment should be affirmed. Zelia, 286 So.3d at 1272.

When one or more trial court legal errors interdict the fact-finding process, and the

record is otherwise complete, the reviewing court must conduct a de novo review.

W. Jefferson MRI, LLC v. Lopinto, 19-82 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/27/19), 284 So.3d

1272, 1275, writ denied, 20-64 (La. 3/9/20), 294 So.3d 479, and writ denied, 19-

2076 (La. 3/9/20), 294 So.3d 486.

20-CA-247 6

Application of the 90-day filing period

The Collector argues, and the Board held, that prior to the Collector’s issuance

of the February 23, 2018 Refund Claim Determination letter (i.e., the “notice of

disallowance”), the 180-day window provided by La. R.S. 47:337.81 A(2) had

already closed, and that the 90-day period which commences upon notice of

disallowance as provided in La. R.S. 47:337.81 B(1) does not apply. For the reasons

which follow, we disagree.

La. R.S. 47:337.81 A and B provide:

A. (1) If the collector fails to act on a properly filed claim for
refund or credit within one year from the date received by him
or by the Louisiana Uniform Local Sales Tax Board or if the
collector denies the claim in whole or in part, the taxpayer
claiming such refund or credit may within thirty days of the
notice of disallowance of the claim request a hearing with the
collector for redetermination. The collector shall render a
decision within thirty days of the request by the taxpayer.

(2) The taxpayer may appeal a denial of a claim for refund to
the Board of Tax Appeals, as provided by law. No appeal may
be filed before the expiration of one year from the date of filing
such claim unless the collector renders a decision thereon
within that time, nor after the expiration of ninety days from the
date of mailing by certified or registered mail by the collector
to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the
claim to which the appeal relates, nor after the expiration of one
hundred eighty days from the end of the expiration of the one
year in which the collector failed to act.

(3) A taxpayer's proper appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals
filed within ninety days from the date on any notice of
disallowance issued shall also establish that the appeal was filed
within ninety days from the date of the certified or registered
mailing of the notice.

B. (1) A notice of disallowance, if issued, shall inform the taxpayer
that he has ninety days from the date of the certified or registered
mailing of that notice to appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals and
that any consideration, reconsideration, or action by the collector
with respect to the claim following the mailing of a notice by
certified or registered mail of disallowance shall not operate to
extend the period within which an appeal may be taken.

(2) The failure to transmit this notice does not extend the
separate and distinct prescriptive period that runs following one
year of inaction by the collector.

20-CA-247 7

All underlined language in the foregoing was added by Act 210 of 2015. Section 7

provides that the act shall be effective on Governor’s signature, which was on June

23, 2015.4 The boldface emphasis of “any” in subsection A(3) is added. Hereafter,

all references to the provisions of La. R.S. 47:337.81 will be to subsection A or B.

The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the

intent of the Legislature. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La.

7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 26, amended on reh’g (Sept. 19, 2008). The starting point in

the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Id.; Theriot v.

Midland Risk Ins. Co., 95-2895 (La. 5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184, 186. The well-

established rules of interpretation provide that “[w]hen a law is clear and

unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall

be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the

intent of the legislature.” La. C.C. art. 9; M.J. Farms, Ltd., 998 So.2d at 27. “When

the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted

as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.” La. C.C. art.

10; M.J. Farms, Ltd., 998 So.2d at 27.

Legislative language is interpreted on the assumption the Legislature was

aware of existing statutes, well established principles of statutory construction and

with knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in view. Id. The words

used must be interpreted as they are generally understood. La. C.C. art. 11; State v.

Louisiana Land & Expl. Co., 12-0884 (La. 1/30/13), 110 So.3d 1038, 1044. Courts

have a duty in the interpretation of a statute to adopt a construction which

harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions dealing with the same subject

matter. La. C.C. art. 13; City of New Orleans v. Louisiana Assessors’ Retirement

and Relief Fund, 05-2548 (La. 10/1/07), 986 So.2d 1, 15, on reh’g (Jan. 7, 2008).

4 Section 4 of the act makes the amendment to La. R.S. 47:337.81 A(2) effective June 12, 2014. This
amendment inserts only the words, “expiration of the one.” Its only effect is to cause the 180-day window
provided by this paragraph to commence 26 days later. This amendment is inapplicable to this case.

20-CA-247 8

We conclude that Nucor is entitled to application of the 90-day period

commencing upon the date of the Collector’s mailing by certified or registered mail

of the notice of disallowance. Section (A)(2) provides that no appeal may be filed

after expiration of ninety days from the date of the collector’s mailing by certified

or registered mail of the notice of disallowance. Section (A)(3) states that “A

taxpayer’s proper appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals filed within ninety days from

the date on any notice of disallowance issued shall also establish that the appeal was

filed within ninety days from the date of the certified or registered mailing of the

notice.” Finally, Section (B)(1) requires the collector to inform the taxpayer in a

notice of disallowance “that he has ninety days from the date of the certified or

registered mailing of that notice to appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals.” Thus, in

three separate provisions of the same statute, the Legislature has undeniably

expressed its intent for the taxpayer to have ninety days from the date of notice of

disallowance to appeal his or her claim to the BTA. To ignore this directive from

the Legislature would be to ignore the clear intent and purpose of the law.

We draw our conclusion from a plain reading of the law, which provides for

a 90-day appeal delay after notification of disallowance, and further requires that

the tax collector inform the taxpayer of the right to file an appeal within 90 days of

disallowance. The Legislature enacted the requirement that the taxpayer be so

informed of the 90-day limit for appeal because the Legislature intended the taxpayer

to have an appeal if filed within 90 days of notice, and surely intended that the

taxpayer can rely on the notice it has mandated. Any interpretation that the

Legislature enacted this clear mandate for an unambiguous, exception-free notice of

appeal, but did not intend for it to be true, would lead to absurd results.

It is obvious that in enacting Act 210 of 2015, the Legislature was cognizant

of the co-existence of the two potentially conflicting provisions. Subsection B (2)

provides that the failure by the collector to transmit this notice does not extend the

20-CA-247 9

separate and distinct prescriptive period that runs following “one year of inaction by

the collector.” In this case, however, the Collector did not fail to act, but conducted

a thorough and extensive investigation, and did not fail to transmit a letter of disallowance

including the required notice of appeal rights within 90 days. It is significant that the

Legislature here characterizes the year in which a collector “fails to act” as the “one year

of inaction by the collector,” thereby equating failing to act with mere inaction.

Furthermore, to the extent that the provisions requiring notice of the right to

appeal within 90 days of disallowance conflict with the 180-day provision, the

“within 90 days of disallowance” is the more recent expression of legislative will.

In this case, the Collector mailed the initial notice of refund claim

determination to Nucor on February 23, 2018. Nucor had ninety days from the

mailing date of this letter to file its appeal with the BTA. Nucor filed its petition on

May 24, 2018 with the BTA within the ninety-day period, and thus timely filed its

appeal.

Construction of “fails to act” and application of the 180-day period

In construing La. R.S. 47:337.81A(1), the BTA interpreted the phrase “failed

to act” to mean the “failure to render a decision.” This interpretation gives a broad

and general phrase a very specific meaning. If given its ordinary or familiar

meaning, “failed to act” means failed to do something, anything, or failed to take

action. Further, the phrase “fails to act” is used in subsection A(1), but in subsection

A(2), the more specific phrase “unless the collector renders a decision” is used,

having a more restrictive meaning. Use of two different phrases, both in subsection

A, indicates that the legislature intended that the two different phrases have different

meanings. We therefore find that the Legislature would have or should have used

the words “fails to render a decision” instead of “fails to act” had it intended for the

appeal period to commence before a decision has been rendered and while a claim

is still under consideration.

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As noted above, subsection B(2) refers to the 180-day prescriptive period as

the “distinct prescriptive period that runs following one year of inaction by the

collector.” [Emphasis added.] Thus, this statute characterizes the year in which a

collector “fails to act” as a one-year period of inaction, after which the 180-day

prescriptive period commences to run. This paragraph thereby equates a collector’s

failure to act with simple “inaction.” The appeal record clearly shows that the

Collector was continuously and regularly investigating and re-evaluating the refund

claim at the time by which it now contends the appellant should have filed an appeal,

and that there was no “one year of inaction” at any time prior to the notice of

disallowance.

In this case, there are two interpretations of the relevant statutory law. An

interpretation construing “fails to act” to mean “fails to render a decision” leads to

the absurd result that the taxpayer would be forced to appeal a decision which has

not yet been rendered, and while the claim is under evaluation. To adopt and apply

the interpretation which, at least under these circumstances, results in the absurd

requirement that a taxpayer must file an appeal during the course of an ongoing

evaluation but before a ruling on the claim cannot be the intended or proper

application of the law. Forcing an appeal while the claim is under consideration

would be contrary to the goal of resolving a claim without the expense and effort of

litigation. See Joseph v. Huntington Ingalls Incorp., et al., 18-2061 (La. 1/29/20),

2020 WL 499939. It is fundamental that statutory interpretation should not lead to

absurd results. Johnson v. Occidental Life Insurance Company of California, 368

So.2d 1032 (La. 1979), Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners v. Bertucci, 593

So.2d 798, 801 (La. Ct. App. 4 Cir. 1992). When a statute is subject to two

reasonable interpretations, courts may consider legislative aim and design to

determine legislative intent. Louisiana Television Broad. Corp. v. Total C.A.T.V.,

341 So.2d 1183, 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 1976), writ refused, 343 So.2d 1076 (La.

20-CA-247 11

1977). An interpretation requiring that the taxpayer file an action against the

collector during the collector’s evaluation process before knowing the result thereof

and from what to appeal is an absurdity.

Accordingly, we find that the BTA’s conclusion that “the failure to act

described in La. R.S. 47:337.81 (A)(2) necessarily means failure to render a decision

on a refund claim” was in error.

It is well-settled that “prescriptive statutes are strictly construed against

prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished; thus, of two

possible constructions, that which favors maintaining, as opposed to barring, an

action should be adopted.” Carter v. Haygood, 04-646 (La. 1/19/05), 892 So.2d

1261, 1268. The rules of prescription are designed to prevent old and stale claims

from being prosecuted. Prevo v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Div. of

Prob. & Parole, 15-0823 (La. 11/20/15), 187 So.3d 395, 398. In our opinion, a

refund claim that has not yet been granted or denied cannot be an old or stale claim.

A claim that is actively being investigated and for which there is no final decision is

not ripe for litigation.

Considering the foregoing, based on our interpretation of La. R.S. 47:337.81,

we find that “failed to act” means the failure to do anything regarding a claim. Given

that the Collector did not fail to act relative to Nucor’s refund claim, this part of the

statute does not apply. Under La. R.S. 47:337.81, Nucor had ninety days from the

date of mailing by certified or registered mail by the Collector the notice of the

disallowance or denial of the refund claim. In that the Collector mailed the notice

of denial of the refund claim on February 23, 2018 and Nucor filed its petition with

the BTA on May 24, 2018, within the ninety-day period, Nucor timely filed its

appeal. We therefore conclude that the BTA erred in its judgment granting the

Collector’s prescription exception.

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Estoppel

Nucor asserts that the BTA erred in failing to conclude that the Collector was

estopped from asserting prescription in this case. La. C.C. art. 1967 sets forth the

theory of detrimental reliance:

A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should
have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely
on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so
relying. Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the
damages suffered as a result of the promisee’s reliance on the
promise. Reliance on a gratuitous promise made without required
formalities is not reasonable.

The purpose of the detrimental reliance theory is “to prevent injustice by

barring a party from taking a position contrary to his prior acts, admissions,

representations, or silence.” Suire v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459

(La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 58-59. Detrimental reliance requires proof of (1) a

representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in

position to one’s detriment because of the reliance. Id.

In its notice of disallowance of the refund claim, the Collector represented to

Nucor that it had “ninety (90) calendar days from the date of certified mailing of this

Notice of Refund Claim Determination letter to appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals.”

Indeed, La. R.S. 47:337.81(B)(1) states that “A notice of disallowance, if issued,

shall inform the taxpayer that he has ninety days from the date of the certified or

registered mailing of that notice to appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals….”

Considering this statutory directive, we believe the Collector clearly made a

representation to Nucor that it had ninety days from the notice of disallowance to

appeal its refund claim to the BTA and that Nucor reasonably relied on this

representation. Nucor, by law, is granted the right to rely on this representation.

Further, the record shows that Nucor relied on this representation to its detriment

because Nucor waited to file its appeal within the ninety-day time frame.

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Accordingly, given these facts, we find that the Collector is estopped from asserting

prescription.

Furthermore, we recognize that Article VII, Section 3(A), of the Louisiana

Constitution provides that legislature shall “provide a complete and adequate remedy

for the prompt recovery of an illegal tax paid by a taxpayer.” La. R.S. 47:15 sets

forth the taxpayer’s bill of rights, which includes the right to be treated fairly,

courteously, and with respect” and “to receive a refund, in some cases with interest,

for any taxes overpaid so long as the refund claim is timely.” The record reflects

that here the Collector continued to evaluate Nucor’s refund claim, informed Nucor

that it was evaluating its claim and repeatedly requested more information, and met

with Nucor regarding the refund claim. The Collector also informed Nucor that it

would have an opportunity to appeal the Collector’s decision once that decision was

made. To sanction the Collector’s conduct of engaging Nucor in this manner and

then deprive Nucor of its right to appeal would be contrary to the principles of the

taxpayer bill of rights and allow a governmental entity to mislead a law-abiding

taxpayer.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the BTA’s judgment granting the

Collector’s exception of prescription, we overrule the exception of prescription, and

remand this matter for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
NOVEMBER 5, 2021 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

20-CA-247
E-NOTIFIED
BOARD OF TAX APPEALS (CLERK)
ANDRE B. BURVANT (APPELLANT) CAMANDA J. FERGUS (APPELLANT) JESSE R. ADAMS, III (APPELLANT)
DREW M. TALBOT (APPELLEE)

MAILED
LOUISIANA BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
(DISTRICT JUDGE)
POST OFFICE BOX 3217
BATON ROUGE, LA 70821