Rhonda Jackson Versus Shondrell Perrilloux and Eliana Defrancesch in Her Official Capacity as Clerk of Court for St. John the Baptist Parish

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
RHONDA JACKSON
Kevin P. Klibert

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
SHONDRELL PERRILLOUX
In Proper Person

WINDHORST, J.

Appellant, Shondrell Perrilloux, appeals the trial court’s August 4, 2020

judgment disqualifying her as a candidate for Justice of the Peace District 6 in the

Parish of St. John the Baptist. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant qualified for the office of Justice of the Peace District 6 by filing a

sworn notice of candidacy dated July 23, 2020.1 On July 31, 2020, appellee, Rhonda

Jackson, a qualified elector, filed an Objection to Candidacy and Petition to

Disqualify Candidate, pursuant to La. R.S. 18:1402 A and pursuant to Article l,

Section 10.l of the Constitution of Louisiana.2 Appellee stated that appellant’s notice

of candidacy contained a certification that appellant “is not prohibited from

qualifying as a candidate for the conviction of a felony” pursuant to Article I, Section

10.1 of the Constitution of Louisiana. Appellee contended that the records obtained

from the St. John the Baptist Parish Clerk of Court, showed that appellant was

convicted of three counts of issuing worthless checks on October 17, 2012, and was

sentenced to “24 months with D.O.C., 22 months suspended” on January 9, 2012.3

Appellee stated that appellant was resentenced on December 18, 2013, and that after

exhausting her appeal rights, appellant’s conviction became final on or about

December 28, 2016.4 Appellee claimed that since fewer than five years had passed

since appellant’s conviction became final, appellant was constitutionally prohibited

1 We note that the clerk’s date is July 23, 2020 and appellant’s signature is dated July 24, 2020, which we
assume is an unintentional error.
2 La. Const. Art. 1 Sec. 10.13633 provides that a person who has been convicted within this state of a
felony and who has exhausted all legal remedies shall not be permitted to qualify as a candidate for elective
public office. Section (B) provides that this “shall not prohibit a person convicted of a felony from qualifying
as a candidate for elective public office or holding such elective public office or appointment of honor, trust,
or profit if more than five years have elapsed since the completion of his original sentence for the
conviction.”
3 Appellant was actually convicted of one count of issuing worthless checks listing three separate checks
issued on different dates within the one count. State v. Campbell, 13-130 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/13), 128
So.3d 1137, 1138.
4 Appellee cited State v. Campbell, 16-341 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/16), 210 So.3d 508.

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from running for office. Alternatively, appellee argued that the records from

appellant’s criminal case show that appellant was still making restitution payments

as of September 2019, and said payments are a part of appellant’s sentence.

Appellant filed a motion to dismiss appellee’s Objection to Candidacy and

Petition to Disqualify Candidate, asserting that more than five years have elapsed

since her conviction was final. She contended that she was convicted on November

30, 2011 of issuing worthless checks in the amount of $9,100.00 and was originally

sentenced on October 17, 2012. In her first appeal, this Court affirmed her

conviction but on error patent review, vacated her sentence and remanded the case

for resentencing. She was resentenced on December 18, 2013. She contended that

her probation expired on October 17, 2014, more than the five years to be eligible to

qualify for office pursuant to Article I, Section 10.1 B of the Louisiana Constitution.

She additionally argued that the trial court should consider La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1,

which provides that restitution is considered a civil matter not criminal.

On August 4, 2020, after a trial on the merits, the trial court granted appellee’s

objection to candidacy and disqualified appellant as a candidate. The trial court

found that (1) appellant was convicted of a felony more than five years ago; (2)

appellant was placed on probation and her sentence is complete with the exception

of restitution; (3) appellant’s probation has not been extended; (4) appellant was

ordered to make restitution; and (5) appellant admitted that she has not completed

payment of restitution ordered. The trial court found that appellant’s failure to

complete the imposed sentence, which included restitution, precluded appellant from

qualifying for the position of Justice of the Peace District 6.

Appellant filed the instant appeal.

FACTS

The following facts concerning the completion date of appellant’s felony

conviction and sentence are based on the limited record before this Court and are

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relevant to this Court’s analysis in determining whether appellant is prohibited from

qualifying for office pursuant to Article I, Section 10.1 of the Louisiana Constitution.

First Appeal: State of Louisiana v. Shondrell P. Campbell, case no. 10-348,

40th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”

On November 30, 2011, appellant was convicted of one count of issuing

worthless checks.5 On October 18, 2012, the trial court sentenced appellant to the

Department of Corrections for a term of 24 months, suspended all but two months,

placed appellant on active probation for a term of 22 months, ordered appellant to

serve 60 days confinement on weekends, imposed a $500.00 fine, ordered appellant

to pay restitution in the amount of $9,100.00 less credit of $864.00, and ordered

appellant to complete a three-credit-hour course in basic accounting.6 On November

12, 2012, the trial court resentenced appellant to the Department of Corrections for

a term of 24 months, suspended, placed appellant on active probation for a term of

two (2) years with a special condition that appellant serve 60 days confinement on

weekends with credit for time served, and ordered that all other sentencing

provisions remain the same.7 Appellant appealed. In her first appeal, this Court

affirmed appellant’s conviction, vacated her sentence and remanded the case to the

trial court to comply with the requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1 and La. R.S.

14:71 G.8

5 The bill of information charged appellant with one count of worthless checks but listed three separate
checks issued on different dates within the one count. Campbell, 128 So.3d at 1138.
6 Campbell, 128 So.3d at 1138-1139; See also official minute entry dated “10/18/2012” in State of Louisiana
v. Shondrell Campbell, case number 10-348, 40th Judicial District Court, Div. “C.”
7 Campbell, 128 So.3d at 1139.

8 This Court found two errors patent requiring appellant’s sentence to be vacated and remanded for
resentencing. In the first error patent, this Court found that the trial court failed to determine the amount of
restitution owed or manner in which restitution would be paid pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1, which
required appellant’s sentence to be vacated and remanded for resentencing. In the second error patent,
this Court found that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence pursuant to La. R.S. 14:71 G, in which
appellant’s sentence was required to be vacated and remanded for resentencing. Campbell, 128 So.3d at
1142-1143.

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Second Appeal: State of Louisiana v. Shondrell Campbell, case no. 10-348,

40th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”

On remand, on December 18, 2013, the trial court resentenced appellant to the

Department of Corrections for a term of 24 months, suspended, placed appellant on

active probation for two (2) years and 480 hours of community service to begin

March 24, 2014, ordered appellant to pay a $500.00 fine and $314.50 in court costs,

ordered appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $9,100.00 with a credit given

for payment of $864.00, and order appellant to pay a $15.00 fee for the per check

charge for a total fee of $45.00.9 Appellant filed a writ application with this Court.10

On October 28, 2014, this Court granted appellant’s writ application, finding that on

remand the trial court failed to comply with this Court’s order that appellant must be

resentenced pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1, and granted appellant’s writ

application for the sole purpose of vacating her sentence and remanding the case for

resentencing.11 On remand, on November 10, 2014, the trial court resentenced

appellant to the Department of Corrections for a term of 24 months, suspended,

placed appellant on active probation for two (2) years and ordered appellant to

complete 480 hours of community service beginning on March 24, 2014, ordered

appellant to enroll and complete a three-hour course in accounting, and ordered the

previous conditions of probation to remain in full force and effect.12 On November

10, 2014, the trial court also held a restitution hearing wherein the judge ordered

appellant to pay $100.00 per month until paid, ordered appellant to pay a $500.00

fine, $314.50 in court costs, $9,100.00 in restitution with a credit of $864.00 as of

that date, and the trial court stated he would “let the District Attorney’s Victims’

9 State v. Campbell, 15-98 (La. App. 5 Cir. 09/15/15), 173 So.3d 1256, 1258; See also the official court
minute entry for resentencing hearing dated “12/18/2013” in State of Louisiana v. Shondrell Campbell, case
no. 10-348, 40th Judicial District Court, Div. “C.”
10 Campbell, 173 So.3d at 1258.

11 Id.

12 See the official court minute entry for resentencing dated “11/10/2014” in State of Louisiana v. Shondrell
Campbell, case no. 10-348, 40th Judicial District Court, Div. “C.”

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Assistance people tell us exactly how much she’s paid.”13 Appellant filed her second

appeal.

In her second appeal, this Court again affirmed appellant’s conviction.14

However, this Court found that while the trial court properly considered appellant’s

earning capacity and assets in determining that restitution be paid at the rate of

$100.00 per month, the trial court failed to set a determinate amount of restitution

due pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1, and erred in leaving those calculations to the

District Attorney’s Office.15 Therefore, this Court again vacated appellant’s

sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.16

Third appeal: State of Louisiana v. Shondrell Campbell, case no. 10-348,

40th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”

On remand from appellant’s second appeal, on December 16, 2015, the trial

court resentenced appellant to the Department of Corrections to a term of 24 months,

suspended, placed appellant on two (2) years active probation with credit for time

served, ordered appellant to do 480 hours of community service, to complete a three-

hour accounting course, to pay a $500.00 fine, $314.50 in court costs, restitution in

the amount of $10,975.00 with a credit of $2,349.00, a $15.00 per check charge for

a total of $45.00 pursuant to La. R.S. 14:71, and $100.00 per month until all

restitution was paid.17 Appellant appealed. On her third appeal, this Court affirmed

appellant’s sentence.18

13 Campbell, 173 So.3d at 1258.

14 This Court found that appellant’s conviction was affirmed in her first appeal, and therefore would not
reconsider her assignment of error as to the sufficiency of the evidence of her conviction. Campbell, 173
So.3d at 1259.
15 Id. at 1260.

16 Id. at 1261.

17 State v. Campbell, 16-341 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/16), 210 So.3d 508, 510.

18 We note that the third appeal opinion affirms appellant’s conviction and sentence, but as observed in
footnote 14, appellant’s conviction was affirmed on her first appeal and the third appeal only concerned
appellant’s sentence. See Campbell, 210 So.3d at 510; See also court minute entry dated “12/16/2015” in
State of Louisiana v. Shondrell Campbell, case no. 10-348, 40th Judicial District Court, Div. “C.”

20-CA-253 5

Trial Court Proceedings before and after the Third Appeal: State of Louisiana

v. Shondrell Campbell, case no. 10-348, 40th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”

Prior to and after the third appeal, the trial court set several proof of payment

hearings for appellant in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 to make payments towards her

restitution.19 In 2016, the trial court held nine proof of payment hearings, which

revealed appellant only made four payments totaling $450.00.20 In 2017, the trial

court held eleven proof of payment hearings, which revealed appellant made eleven

payments totaling $1,100.00. In 2018, the trial court held eleven proof of payment

hearings, which revealed appellant made eleven payments totaling $1,050.00. In

2019, the trial court held eight proof of payment hearings, which revealed appellant

made eight payments totaling $525.00 with the last minute entry dated August 21,

2019. Based on the limited evidence before the trial court and before this Court,

appellant’s restitution payments only total $3,075.00 with appellant’s last payment

being made on August 21, 2019.

Objection to Candidacy and Petition to Disqualify Hearing August 4, 2020

At the hearing, Eliana DeFrancesch, Clerk of Court for St. John the Baptist

Parish testified regarding appellant’s criminal conviction and sentence in State of

Louisiana v. Shondrell Campbell, case number 10-348. To keep this record

manageable, instead of introducing the file into this record, appellee requested that

the trial court take judicial notice of the criminal proceedings in case number 10-

348, to which the trial court agreed. Ms. DeFrancesch testified that appellant is one

in the same as the defendant in case number 10-348. She testified that appellant was

convicted of issuing a worthless check on November 30, 2011, was placed on

probation, and was ordered to pay restitution. After speaking to an employee at the

19 See official court minute entries for State of Louisiana v. Shondrell Campbell, case no. 10-348, 40th
Judicial District Court, Div. “C.”
20 Appellant failed to appear for two of the proof of payment hearings in 2016 and the trial court issued an
attachment and a bench warrant.

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District Attorney’s Office, Ms. DeFrancesch calculated that appellant still owed

$5,011.00 in restitution. On cross-examination, she admitted that she did not have

any written documentation with her to show the amount of restitution still due and

owing, if any, she only had her testimony. She testified that, according to the trial

court minute entries, appellant last appeared on August 21, 2019 to make a

restitution payment. On cross-examination, appellant attempted to have Ms.

DeFrancesch verify a Department of Public Safety and Corrections document,

arguing that it showed that appellant’s probation expiration date was October 17,

2014. Although not authenticated, the trial court allowed the document to be

admitted into evidence, noting that the document did not state appellant’s probation

expiration date as alleged by appellant and that Ms. DeFrancesch was not the proper

party to verify the document. In response to questions as to whether a probation

revocation was ever filed in appellant’s criminal case, Ms. DeFrancesch replied that

she did not see one in the file, not that one was not filed.

At the trial, appellant testified that she was convicted of one count of issuing

worthless checks, conceded that she was ordered to pay restitution as a part of her

sentence, and admitted that the restitution has not been paid in full. Appellant was

shown her notice of candidacy form and her certification regarding felony

convictions, which was admitted into evidence. Appellant requested the trial court

take judicial notice of the three appeals involving her criminal felony conviction in

case number 10-348, to which the trial court agreed.21 Appellant argued that the

purpose of her appeals was for the trial court to make correct calculations concerning

restitution. Appellant argued that this fact is significant in calculating the

completion of her sentence in her felony case. She submitted into evidence her

conditions of probation to show that the “execution of the two-year sentence was

21 We note that this record does not contain appellant’s criminal case number 10-348 nor does this Court
have access to the criminal proceedings at issue in this proceeding.

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originally sentenced on October the 17th of 2012.” She testified that because her

probation was “sustained,” the expiration of her probation would be “October 17th

of 2014.” Appellant further testified that there is no evidence to show that probation

was extended or that a rule to revoke her probation was filed. In support of her

position, appellant also requested the trial court take judicial notice of the transcripts

in her criminal case, to which the court agreed.22

In closing, appellee argued that December 28, 2016 is the date appellant’s

conviction and sentence became final and should be the date used to calculate

whether five years have elapsed to allow appellant to qualify. Appellee also argued

that the payment of restitution was a part of appellant’s sentence, and that the

uncontested testimony of Ms. DeFrancesch and appellant herself establish the

restitution has not been paid in full. Appellee further argued that because the

testimony showed appellant’s last payment was made in August 2019, five years has

not elapsed since the completion of appellant’s sentence, and that her sentence is

still not complete.

Appellant, in closing, argued that completion of the original sentence, not the

conviction is the issue, and because she completed her original sentence (the

probation), she should not be disqualified from running for office. As to the court-

ordered restitution, she asserted that this was a civil matter under La. C.Cr.P. art.

895.1 and thus, also does not disqualify her from running for office. Appellant

further argued that “the two-year probation and the time frame is when these actual

appeals was [sic] filed was actually after the expiration of the time served on

probation” and that the trial court should “consider that there is no vacating of any

sentence.”

22 While the trial court took judicial notice of other transcripts, those transcripts are not in this record and
this Court does not have access to them.

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At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the case under

advisement. The same day, the trial court issued a judgment granting appellee’s

objection to candidacy and disqualified appellant from qualifying. In written reasons

for judgment, the trial court held:

The Court finds as a result of the failure to make the
ordered restitution the original sentence five years have
not elapsed and in fact the sentence has not been
completed.

The Court has rejected the other arguments raised by both
parties. First the conviction is more than 5 years in the
past. Barring a reversal of the trial court on the sentence
(here the Court of Appeal only took issue with the amount
of restitution) the time computation does not start when
the Appeal Court renders a decision, but rather when the
sentence was imposed. Ms. Perrilloux’s argument that
restitution is a civil matter is correct in that a victim may
seek to address restitution issues in civil proceedings. But
here the restitution was ordered in the sentence imposed
and said sentence cannot be said to be complete until the
restitution is paid or somehow the requirement is
extinguished. Ms. Perrilloux has paid on the restitution
owed as recently as August, 2019. Based on that payment
one cannot argue that the obligation has been extinguished
by operation of law or any delay by the State in attempting
to enforce further payment.

On appeal, in several overlapping assignments of error, appellant contends

that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s objection to candidacy and

disqualifying her from qualifying for Justice of the Peace District 6. The issue before

this Court is to decide when the calculation date of five years begins for completion

of appellant’s original sentence for her felony conviction for issuing worthless

checks.

LAW

Louisiana Constitution Article 1, Section 10.1 (B) provides, in part, that a

person convicted of a felony is not prohibited from running for elected office “if

more than five years have elapsed since the completion of his original sentence for

the conviction.”

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Standard of Review

The issue for review before this Court is purely a legal one. Appellate review

of questions of law is simply a review of whether the trial court was legally correct

or incorrect. Buford v. Williams, 11-568 (La. App. 5 Cir. 02/14/12), 88 So.3d 540,

545, writ denied, 12-264 (La. 04/27/12), 86 So.3d 630. If a decision is based on a

trial court’s erroneous interpretation of the law, rather than an exercise of its

discretion, it is not entitled to deference. North v. Doucet, 18-437 (La. App. 5 Cir.

08/01/18), 253 So.3d 815, 818, writ denied, 18-1294 (La. 08/03/18), 249 So.3d 829

(citing Nixon v. Hughes, 15-1036 (La. App. 4 Cir. 09/29/15), 176 So.3d 1135, 1137).

Assignments of Error One and Two

In assignments of error one and two, appellant asserts that there was

insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision and to support appellee’s

petition to disqualify candidate because of the lack of authentic and material

evidence on record with supporting testimony. Appellant argues that authentic

evidence was not provided at the hearing, and that appellee failed to provide

documents to support that appellant’s sentence did not expire on October 17, 2014.

Appellant further argues that she established that her sentence expired on October

17, 2014 by introducing a copy of the Department of Correction Condition of

Probation dated October 30, 2012 and her docket information sheet signed by her

probation office supervisor, which confirmed expiration of her probation on October

17, 2014.

A review of the record indicates that appellee provided authentic evidence to

support the trial court’s decision to disqualify appellant. At the hearing, appellee

called Eliana DeFrancesch, the St. John the Baptist Parish Clerk of Court, and

subpoenaed her to bring appellant’s candidacy form and the clerk’s file for case

number 10-348, State of Louisiana v. Shondrell P. Campbell. The trial court took

judicial notice of this criminal proceeding. The St. John the Baptist Parish Clerk of

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Court’s records showed that Ms. Perrilloux was convicted of the felony of issuing

worthless checks and her sentence included probation and restitution.

La. R.S. 15:459 provides that:

Whenever, during the trial of any criminal case, either party may
desire to offer in evidence any record, paper or document belonging to
the files or records of the court in which the trial is proceeding, the
presiding judge shall, at the request of such party, direct the clerk to
produce such record, document or paper, in order that the same may be
used in evidence; and it shall not be necessary for the clerk in any such
case to make a copy of such record, document or paper.

The records on file with the Clerk of Court, which are otherwise admissible in a

judicial proceeding, may be introduced into evidence in the form of originals or

certified copies and it is unnecessary for the Clerk or Deputy Clerk of Court to

personally appear and testify as to the authenticity of such records. State v. Hunter,

551 So. 2d 1381, 1386 (La. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Rowell, 306 So.2d 668 (La.

1975). A judicial record, for the making of which the law provides, makes full proof

of itself. State v. Banks, 106 La. 480, 31 So. 53 (1901).

A court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts, whether requested or

not. State in Interest of C.M., 13-128 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/13), 128 So.3d 1118,

1127, writ denied, 2013-2796 (La. 5/30/14), 140 So.3d 1172. This Court had found

that the court record is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

Id. The trial court specifically took judicial notice of appellant’s criminal record for

her felony conviction of issuing worthless checks. Additionally, the Clerk of Court,

Ms. DeFrancesch, testified regarding the contents of the file. Based on this law, the

trial court properly considered appellant’s criminal record as evidence of her

sentence, which included restitution, as well as that her last payment was in August

2019 (court minute entries and DeFrancesch testimony) and that full restitution has

not been made under her sentence.

Appellant also asserts that her probation ended on October 17, 2014, and that

this constitutes the completion of her original sentence. This argument fails for three

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reasons. First, appellant did not present authenticated evidence showing the

completion of her probation. Second, the unauthenticated evidence on which

appellant relies, a document from the Department of Public Safety & Corrections,

does not confirm the date of the expiration of her probation. Third, this fails to

consider the court-ordered restitution, which as discussed in more detail below,

constitutes part of appellant’s sentence.

Assignments of Error Three, Four and Five

In assignments of error three, four and five, appellant asserts that the financial

obligation created by restitution should not create a barrier to the offender’s

successful rehabilitation and re-entry into society, and that offenders who are

consistent in their payments and in good faith try to fulfill their financial obligations

should be rewarded for their efforts. Appellant argues that her disqualification from

candidacy deprives her of the constitutional right to qualify as a candidate.

Appellant relies on La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1, which provides in pertinent part:

A. The purpose of imposing financial obligations on an offender
who is convicted of a criminal offense is to hold the offender
accountable for his action, to compensate victims for any
actual pecuniary loss or costs incurred in connection with a
criminal prosecution, to defray the cost of court operations,
and to provide services to offenders and victims. These
financial obligations should not create a barrier to the
offender’s successful rehabilitation and reentry into society.
Financial obligations in excess of what an offender can
reasonably pay undermine the primary purpose of the justice
system which is to deter criminal behavior and encourage
compliance with the law. Financial obligations that cause
undue hardship on the offender should be waived, modified,
or forgiven. Creating a payment plan for the offender that is
based upon the ability to pay, results in financial obligations
that the offender is able to comply with and often results in
more money collected. Offenders who are consistent in their
payments and in good faith try to fulfill their financial
obligations should be rewarded for their efforts.

***
E. If a defendant is ordered to make monthly payments under
a payment plan established pursuant to the provisions of
Subparagraph (D)(1)(b) of this Article, the defendant's
outstanding financial obligations resulting from his criminal

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conviction are forgiven and considered paid-in-full if the
defendant makes consistent monthly payments for either
twelve consecutive months or consistent monthly payments
for half of the defendant's term of supervision, whichever is
longer.

Appellant appears to be arguing that under this provision her outstanding

financial obligations resulting from her criminal conviction should be forgiven and

considered paid in full because she made consistent monthly payments for either

twelve consecutive months and/or consistent monthly payments for half of her

probation term. She also seems to assert because her term of supervision has ended

and the court-ordered restitution remains outstanding, the balance of the unpaid

restitution should be reduced to a civil money judgment and enforced in the same

manner as provided for the execution of judgments pursuant to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

These issues presented by appellant are not currently before this Court or part

of this appeal. The issue on appeal is whether appellant’s court-ordered restitution

was part of her sentence for the felony conviction of issuing worthless checks, and

whether five years have passed since that sentence was completed. In order for the

court-ordered restitution to be forgiven or reduced to a civil money judgment,

appellant must specifically seek such relief in another proceeding, specifically a

proceeding related to her conviction and sentence. Appellant has not done this. As

a result, the record reflects that restitution remains outstanding for her November 30,

2011 conviction, and that her last restitution payment was in August 2019.

Based on statutory law and jurisprudence, we find that the court-ordered

restitution was part of appellant’s sentence for her November 30, 2011 conviction.

Louisiana law specifically provides that in all cases in which the court finds an actual

pecuniary loss to a victim, the trial court shall order the defendant to provide

restitution to the victim as a part of any sentence that the court shall impose.

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La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1 provides as follows:

When a court places the defendant on probation, it shall, as a condition
of probation, order the payment of restitution in cases where the victim
or his family has suffered any direct loss of actual cash, any monetary
loss pursuant to damage to or loss of property, or medical expense. The
court shall order restitution in a reasonable sum not to exceed the actual
pecuniary loss to the victim in an amount certain. However, any
additional or other damages sought by the victim and available under
the law shall be pursued in an action separate from the establishment of
the restitution order as a civil money judgment provided for in
Subparagraph (2) of this Paragraph. The restitution payment shall be
made, in discretion of the court, either in a lump sum or in monthly
installments based on the earning capacity and assets of the defendant.

The above clearly requires restitution and considers it to be part of a defendant’s

sentence. First, the language of C.Cr.P. art. 895.1 indicates that restitution (in an

amount that does exceed the victim’s actual loss) shall be a condition of the

probation. Second, it specifically provides that the victim may seek additional

damages in a separate civil suit and seek a civil money judgment. Given that the

statute expressly provides that any amount in excess of actual damages must be

sought in civil suit, it is clear that the court-ordered restitution for the victim’s actual

loss is statutorily a part of a defendant’s sentence.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 883.2, as well as jurisprudence also supports this conclusion.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 883.2 states as follows:

In all cases in which the court finds an actual pecuniary loss to a victim,
or in any case where the court finds that costs have been incurred by
the victim in connection with a criminal prosecution, the trial court
shall order the defendant to provide restitution to the victim as a part
of any sentence that the court shall impose. (Emphasis added.)

Appellate courts have also held that the imposition of restitution is considered

a part of the defendant’s sentence, for which the defendant must be present. State v.

Granger, 08-1479 (La. App. 3 Cir. 06/03/09), 11 So.3d 666, 673; State v. Fortier,

03–882 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/03), 862 So.2d 170. In State v. Granger, the Louisiana

Third Circuit Court of Appeal relied on State v. Roberts, supra, in which the trial

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court stated at sentencing that it was “‘also grant[ing] Mr. Gary Celestine a judgment

in the amount of $28,556.71 against Mr. Roberts.’” Id. at 1016. The defendant

appealed, arguing that the trial court did not order restitution as part of his sentence

under La. C.Cr.P. art. 883.2. The Third Circuit, relying on La. C.Cr.P. art. 886, held

that instead of “making restitution to the victim a part of the defendant’s sentence,

the trial court ordered restitution in the form of a money judgment.” 11 So.3d at

672-73. The Third Circuit found the judgment was improper, vacated it, and

remanded the matter for the imposition of restitution as part of defendant’s sentence

as contemplated by La. C.Cr.P. art. 883.2. Id.

We further believe that the above is further supported by this Court’s finding

that a trial court’s failure to set a determinate payment schedule for restitution

payments is patent error requiring that the sentence be vacated and the case

remanded for resentencing relative to La. C. Cr. P. arts. 879 and 895.1. State v.

Green, 09-309 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/24/09), 28 So.3d 1105; State v. Echeverria, 03–

898 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/03), 862 So.2d 163; State v. Berkeley, 00-1900 (La. App.

5 Cir. 05/30/01), 788 So.2d 647, writ denied, 01-1659 (La. 04/26/02), 814 So.2d

549. Our finding that restitution is part of appellant’s sentence is consistent with the

law that a defendant’s sentence is indeterminate and illegal and must be vacated if

the amount of restitution is not a specific amount.

Appellant was still making restitution payments as of August 2019.

Considering that the court-ordered restitution is considered by law part of appellant’s

sentence, and that it continued into 2019, the record reflects that five years have not

passed since the completion of her sentence for the November 30, 2011 conviction.

Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s judgment finding appellant is

disqualified as a candidate for Justice of the Peace District 6.

20-CA-253 15

Appellee’s Answer Requesting Sanctions

Having considered appellee’s claim for attorney’s fees, costs, and damages,

as well as all related factors, we find some of the issues raised on appeal to be

arguable enough to preclude sanctions. Accordingly, sanctions are denied.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s August 4, 2020 judgment

granting appellee’s objection to candidacy and disqualifying appellant as a candidate

for Justice of the Peace District 6. We further deny the sanctions.

AFFIRMED

20-CA-253 16

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

MARY E. LEGNON
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
AUGUST 11, 2020 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

20-CA-253
E-NOTIFIED
40TH DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE KIRK A. VAUGHN (DISTRICT JUDGE)
KEVIN P. KLIBERT (APPELLEE)

MAILED
SHONDRELL PERRILLOUX (APPELLANT)
1118 MAIN STREET
LAPLACE, LA 70068