Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC Versus Olethia Davis

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, LLC NO. 20-CA-271

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

OLETHIA DAVIS COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE FORTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 71,928, DIVISION "B"
HONORABLE KIRK A. VAUGHN, JUDGE PRO TEMPORE

March 17, 2021

PER CURIAM

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Fredericka Homberg Wicker, Jude G. Gravois, Marc E. Johnson, Robert A. Chaisson,
Stephen J. Windhorst, Hans J. Liljeberg, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
MEJ
FHW
JGG
RAC
HJL

CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART
SMC
SJW

CONCURS WITH REASONS
JJM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, LLC
Scott C. Barney

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
OLETHIA DAVIS
Olethia Davis

INTERIM PER CURIAM

Defendant, Olethia Davis, appeals the trial court’s September 16, 2019

judgment granting the exception of prescription and motion for summary judgment

filed by plaintiff, Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC (hereinafter FMCC). Before

reaching the merits of this appeal, we find that this matter presents a preliminary

jurisdictional issue: whether a judgment that is otherwise final on the merits but

awards attorney fees—not determinable from the face of the judgment—is a final,

appealable judgment. After en banc consideration of this issue, we find that a

judgment that awards an unspecified amount of attorney fees is not a final,

appealable judgment. Accordingly, for the reasons provided below, we exercise

our supervisory jurisdiction to remand this matter to the trial court to either (1)

amend the judgment to designate it as a final and appealable under La. C.C.P. art.

1915(B), or (2) rule on the attorney fees issue so that all outstanding claims are

resolved and a final judgment may be issued pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A).

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 9, 2018, FMCC filed suit against Ms. Davis in the 40th Judicial

District Court for the Parish of St. John the Baptist, alleging that Ms. Davis

defaulted on a “retail installment contract,” which granted a security interest on a

2012 Ford Focus automobile. In its petition, FMCC sought to collect the

remaining contract balance of $6,425.74 in addition to interest, costs, and

contractual attorney fees. On March 20, 2018, Ms. Davis reconvened against

FMCC, contending that her vehicle had been declared a “lemon” pursuant to the

“Ford Powershift Transmission” litigation and further alleging that FMCC

improperly repossessed and sold her vehicle in violation of the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act.

20-CA-271 1

FMCC subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on its principal

demand and an exception of prescription on Ms. Davis’ reconventional demand.

On September 16, 2019, the trial court issued a written judgment granting FMCC’s

exception of prescription and dismissing Ms. Davis’s reconventional demand

against it with prejudice. The September 16, 2019 judgment further granted

FMCC’s motion for summary judgment on its principal demand as follows:

Olethia Davis is hereby liable unto Ford Motor Credit Company LLC
in the amount of $6,425.74, plus interest on that sum at the rate of 9.0
percent per annum from April 19, 2017 until paid in full, plus all costs,
including attorneys’ fees, incurred by Ford Credit in prosecuting this
claim and collecting the amounts due it.

Ms. Davis has appealed the September 16, 2019 judgment. In connection

with her appeal, Ms. Davis filed a motion for a “limited remand” of this matter to

the trial court for certification of the judgment as final under La. C.C.P. art.

1915(B), asserting that because the judgment on appeal does not set forth a specific

amount of attorney fees awarded, it is not a final, appealable judgment.

DISCUSSION

We have determined that this jurisdictional issue should be reviewed en

banc because any determination by this Court that the judgment at issue is not a

final, appealable judgment could be construed as being in conflict with this Court’s

prior practice as demonstrated in our opinion in Brandner v. Staf-Rath, L.L.C., 10-

778 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/26/11), 64 So.3d 812, 826, writ denied, 11-1085 (La.

9/2/11), 68 So.3d 523, wherein this Court reviewed a similar judgment in a similar

procedural posture pursuant to its appellate jurisdiction.

In Staf-Rath, this Court found the trial court judgment defective for lack of

decretal language because the judgment did not identify the name of the party cast

in judgment. This Court amended the trial court judgment on appeal and corrected

the decretal language deficiency—but did not address that the judgment, even as

20-CA-271 2

amended by this Court, awarded “reasonable attorney’s fees, in an amount to be set

by this Court [the trial court] following a hearing on that issue.” The judgment in

Staf-Rath, after this Court affirmed the trial court judgment as amended, provided:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment
is rendered in favor of defendant, Staf–Rath, LLC, on its reconventional
demand against the plaintiffs, Michael Brandner and Cynthia Brandner,
in the amount of $56,500, plus judicial interest from January 26, 2007,
plus costs including expert fees in the amount of $6937.50, as well as
reasonable attorney’s fees, in an amount to be set by this Court
following a hearing on that issue. Judgment is also rendered in favor of
the defendant, Staf–Rath, LLC as to the plaintiffs', Michael Brandner
and Cynthia Brandner’s case-in-chief, which is dismissed with
prejudice.
Id. (emphasis added).

One year later, in the subsequent appeal of the judgment quantifying the

attorney fees, this Court, in Brandner v. Staf-Rath, 12-62 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/12),

102 So.3d 186, 189, writ denied, 12-2196 (La. 11/21/12), 102 So.3d 62, and writ

denied, 12-2210 (La. 11/21/12), 102 So.3d 62, pointed out that, “[w]hile the appeal

was pending in this Court, the trial court held a three-day hearing on the issue of

reasonable attorneys’ fees due Staf-Rath as per the terms of the purchase

agreement” and referenced that “[t]his Court granted a writ application in Staf-

Rath’s favor, ruling that the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear the attorneys’

fees matter during the pendency of the appeal.” Brandner v. Staf-Rath, L.L.C., No.

10-C-543 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/19/10) (unpublished writ disposition).1

Therefore, this Court has previously determined that, after the granting of an

appeal of an underlying judgment on the merits that also awards an indeterminate

amount of attorney fees, a trial court retains jurisdiction to conduct a hearing to

1
In that unpublished writ disposition (10-C-543), this Court specifically addressed the issue and found:
The issue presented by this writ application is whether the trial court retains jurisdiction to set
the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in a judgment after the order of appeal has been signed.
We conclude that it does, and we therefore grant the writ application and reverse the decision
of the trial court.

20-CA-271 3

quantify the amount of those attorney fees awarded.2 In so holding, this Court has

exercised its appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal of an

underlying judgment that also awards an indeterminable amount of attorney fees.

Other Louisiana circuit courts of appeal, however, have held that a judgment

on the merits which reserves for a later date the determination of an award of

attorney fees is an interlocutory judgment and is not a final, appealable judgment

reviewable under the court’s appellate jurisdiction.3 See Andrew Paul Gerber

Testamentary Tr. v. Flettrich, 16-0065 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/2/16), 204 So.3d 634,

638; Conrad v. McGowan Working Partners, Inc., 08-1251 (La. App. 3 Cir.

11/12/08), 997 So.2d 872 (holding that a judgment awarding attorney’s fees but

not setting the amount of those fees is a partial judgment that must be designated as

final under Art. 1915(B)).

The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, recently faced with a similar

jurisdictional issue, considered the issue en banc to prevent conflicting decisions

within its Circuit. In Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. The Lathan

Company, Inc., 17-1250 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/20/18), 268 So.3d 1044, the First

Circuit ultimately determined that the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction to

consider the merits of an appeal wherein the issue of the quantification of attorney

fees awarded had not yet been decided and was not included in the judgment on

appeal. In a concurring opinion, Judge Holdridge pointed out that under La. C.C.P.

art. 1915(B)(2), such a partial judgment, which awards but does not quantify

2
This Court has found that the enumerated list in La. C.C.P. art. 2088, which provides that the trial court
is divested of jurisdiction over matters reviewable on appeal upon the granting of an order of appeal but
continues to exercise jurisdiction over matters not reviewable under the appeal, is not exclusive. Dufrene
v. Gautreau Family, LLC, 07-467 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/22/08), 980 So. 2d 68, 84, writ denied, 08-0629 (La.
5/9/08), 980 So. 2d 694, and writ denied, 08-0628 (La. 5/9/08), 980 So.2d 698; Law Offices of Fred L.
Herman, APLC v. Helmer, 13-235 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/9/13), 128 So.3d 310, 312.
3
The First Circuit has distinguished a judgment reserving for later the issue of “reasonable attorney fees”
from an otherwise final judgment that awards taxable costs but does not quantify or tax those costs, citing
La. C.C.P. art. 2088. See In re Interdiction of Metzler, 15-0982 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/22/16), 189 So.3d 467,
469. We do not opine on that issue at this time.

20-CA-271 4

attorney fees, can be amended at any time to be certified as final under La. C.C.P.

art. 1915(B)(1).

After considering this jurisdictional issue en banc, we agree with the First

Circuit’s position in Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions, supra, and hold that

an otherwise final judgment that awards attorney fees but does not specify the

amount of fees awarded is not a final, appealable judgment. Because the

September 16, 2019 judgment at issue in this appeal awards an unspecified amount

of attorney fees, we find that the judgment appealed is not a final, appealable

judgment.

This Court cannot reach the merits of an appeal unless our jurisdiction has

been properly invoked by a valid final judgment. Input/Output Marine Sys. v.

Wilson Greatbatch Techs., Inc., 10-477 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/10), 52 So.3d 909,

915. “No appeal may be taken from a partial final judgment under Article 1915(B)

until the judgment has been designated a final judgment under Article 1915(B).”

La. C.C.P. art. 1911(B). In the absence of such a designation, a judgment shall not

constitute a final judgment for purposes of an immediate appeal. Richardson v.

Capitol One, N.A., 18-240 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/5/18), 258 So.3d 208, 211; La.

C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(2). Nonetheless, a certification order issued after a notice of

appeal may cure jurisdictional defects in the appeal. In re Interdiction of Gambino,

20-312 (La. 6/3/20), 296 So.3d 1046.

DECREE

Because we find that the September 16, 2019 judgment appealed in this

matter is not a final, appealable judgment, we hereby exercise our supervisory

jurisdiction to remand this matter to the trial court. It is ordered that, on remand,

the trial court amend its September 16, 2019 judgment to either (1) designate the

judgment as final and appealable under La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B), OR (2) determine

the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded and render a final appealable judgment

20-CA-271 5

pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A). Either action is to be accomplished within 30

days of the date of this Per Curiam. It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court for

the 40th Judicial District Court supplement the appellate record with the trial

court’s amended or modified judgment within 10 days of the signing of that

judgment.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court for the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeal remove this appeal from the February docket. Upon supplementation of the

appellate record, the Clerk of Court is ordered to reset this case on the next

available docket.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

20-CA-271 6

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, LLC NO. 20-CA-271

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

OLETHIA DAVIS COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

CHEHARDY, C.J., CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART

I concur with the order of remand, but respectfully dissent from the majority

reasoning regarding the need for en banc review of the jurisdictional issue.

20-CA-271 7

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, LLC NO. 20-CA-271

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

OLETHIA DAVIS COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

WINDHORST, J., CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART

I also concur with the order of remand, but respectfully dissent from the

majority reasoning regarding the need for en banc review of the jurisdictional

issue.

20-CA-271 8

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, LLC NO. 20-CA-271

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

OLETHIA DAVIS COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

MOLAISON, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS
While I concur with the order of remand to the trial court to certify the

judgment as final or determine the amount of attorney’s fees, as I agree that the

judgment in this case was not a final judgment, I disagree that this case presented a

conflict with this court’s prior practice. The judgment in the case cited to in the

majority’s opinion was not similar. In Brandner v. Staf-Rath, L.L.C., 10-778 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 4/26/11), 64 So.3d 812, 826, writ denied, 11-1085 (La. 9/2/11), 68

So.3d 523, the court’s judgment reflected that the issue of the attorney’s fees

would be determined at a hearing to be held separately. In this case, there is no

indication of how or when the attorney’s fees would be determined. Therefore, I

concur with the majority’s analysis and conclusion, but do not believe that this

case created the need for an en banc review of this court’s prior practice.

20-CA-271 9

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
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GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
MARCH 17, 2021 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

20-CA-271
E-NOTIFIED
40TH DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE KIRK A. VAUGHN, JUDGE PRO TEMPORE (DISTRICT JUDGE)
HONORABLE NGHANA LEWIS (DISTRICT JUDGE)
SCOTT C. BARNEY (APPELLEE)

MAILED
ROBERT W. MAXWELL (APPELLEE) OLETHIA DAVIS (APPELLANT)
ATTORNEY AT LAW POST OFFICE BOX 2174
130 TERRA BELLA BOULEVARD LAPLACE, LA 70069
COVINGTON, LA 70433