Jose Araujo Versus Gwendolyn Troxler and Larry Troxler, Jr and Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company

JOSE ARAUJO NO. 20-CA-328

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

GWENDOLYN TROXLER AND LARRY COURT OF APPEAL
TROXLER, JR AND LOUISIANA FARM
BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE STATE OF LOUISIANA
COMPANY

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 786-850, DIVISION "F"
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ, JUDGE PRESIDING

February 24, 2021

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
Robert A. Chaisson, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

AFFIRMED
JJM
JGG
RAC

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
JOSE ARAUJO
Hilary G. Gaudin
Elizabeth M. Gaudin

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
GWENDOLYN TROXLER AND LARRY TROXLER, JR AND LOUISIANA
FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
Nicholas C. Gristina
Gordon P. Guthrie, III
Leandro R. Area
Andrew G. West

MOLAISON, J.

In this personal injury case, the appellant seeks review of the trial court’s

granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 21, 2018, the plaintiff/appellant, Jose Araujo, filed a petition for

damages in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for alleged injuries that he

sustained on September 18, 2017, when he fell from the bottom step of apartment

stairs on property owned by the defendants/appellees, Gwendolyn and Larry

Troxler, Jr. After discovery, the appellees filed a motion for summary judgment,

which was granted on June 15, 2020, following a hearing on June 4, 2020. The

instant appeal follows.

A review of the record before us shows that the following facts are not in

dispute. Mr. Araujo was a tenant in an upstairs apartment located at 1710

O’Connor St., in Gretna, which was owned by the appellees. He had resided in the

apartment for over four years with his companion, Marilyn Morange.1 In his

deposition testimony, taken on August 14, 2019, Mr. Araujo indicated that when

he first moved into the apartment, Mr. Troxler advised him to exercise caution

when using the stairs to the apartment. Mr. Araujo indicated that “early on” he

was aware that something was wrong with the stairs. Specifically, he noted that all

the bottom stairs were too “short” or “small.” Mr. Araujo described other stairs as

being “too high,” and further indicated that a portion of the staircase did not have a

functional handrail. He stated that to traverse the smaller steps at the bottom of the

staircase, he turned his feet sideward so that the heel of his foot would not hit a

rung that Mr. Troxler had installed on the back of the staircase. Mr. Araujo

1
The record shows that, prior to Mr. Araujo’s alleged accident, Ms. Morange filed two separate
lawsuits against the appellees after she allegedly sustained injuries by falling on the same staircase at
issue in the instant case.

20-CA-328 1

estimated that in the years he lived in the Troxlers’ apartment, he used the staircase

approximately 10 to 15 times a day on average. Mr. Araujo stated in his deposition

testimony that, on the date that he claimed to have fallen on the stairs, he had taken

pain medication before descending the steps, and also, he did not believe that he

descended the steps in his usual manner.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to

material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.

C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). Factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence

must be construed in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment,

and all doubt must be resolved in the opponent's favor. Willis v. Medders, 00-2507

(La. 12/8/00), 775 So.2d 1049, 1050 (per curiam). In determining whether

summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under

the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary

judgment is appropriate. Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880.

In a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof is on the mover.

Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that

is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the

motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's

claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual

support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or

defense. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). The burden is on the adverse party to produce

factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of a material

fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art.

966(D)(1).

20-CA-328 2

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to

evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter but

instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. A “genuine

issue” is one upon which reasonable persons could disagree. Smith v. Our Lady of

the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751. If based on the

evidence, reasonable persons could only reach one conclusion, the issue is not

genuine. In determining whether an issue is genuine, the courts cannot make

credibility determinations, consider the merits, evaluate testimony, or weigh the

evidence. Id. Further, a fact is “material” when it would matter on the trial on the

merits; i.e., it could insure or preclude recovery, affect the litigant's ultimate

success, or determine the outcome of the legal dispute. Id.

Open and obvious

To establish liability for damages in a negligence case, the plaintiff is

required to prove: (1) that the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a

specific standard; (2) that the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the

appropriate standard; (3) that the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-

fact of the plaintiff's injuries; (4) that the defendant's substandard conduct was a

legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and (5) proof of actual damages. Detraz v.

Lee, 05-1263 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 557, 565.

The second factor of the risk-utility test2 focuses on whether the allegedly

dangerous or defective condition was obvious and apparent. A defendant generally

2
As explained by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Bufkin v. Felipe's Louisiana, LLC, 14-0288 (La.
10/15/14), 171 So. 3d 851, 856:

This court has synthesized the risk-utility balancing test to a consideration of four
pertinent factors: (1) the utility of the complained-of condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude
of harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of preventing
the harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiff's activities in terms of social utility or whether the
activities were dangerous by nature. Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Buildings, 12-1238
(La. 4/5/13), 113 So.3d 175, 184; Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging, Inc., 08-0528 (La. 12/2/08),
995 So.2d 1184, 1186–87 (per curiam); Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council No. 5747,
03-1533 (La. 2/20/04), 866 So.2d 228, 235; Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University, 95-1466 (La.
5/10/96), 673 So.2d 585, 591–93.

20-CA-328 3

does not have a duty to protect against that which is obvious and apparent. Bufkin

v. Felipe's La., LLC, 14-0288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So.3d 851, 856. For an alleged

hazard to be considered obvious and apparent, the hazard should be one that is

open and obvious to everyone who may potentially encounter it. Id.; Broussard v.

State ex rel. Office of State Bldg., 12-1238 (La. 4/05/13), 113 So.3d 175, 184. If

the facts of a particular case show that the complained-of condition should be

obvious to all, the condition may not be unreasonably dangerous, and the

defendant may owe no duty to the plaintiff. Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging

Inc., 08-0528 (La. 12/02/08), 995 So.2d 1184, 1186 (per curiam). A landowner is

not liable for an injury that results from a condition that should have been observed

by the individual in the exercise of reasonable care, or which was as obvious to a

visitor as it was to the landowner. Id.

In the instant appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in

applying the "open and obvious" doctrine in a case “where a defendant had warned

a plaintiff of a hazardous condition,” and ultimately led “to a weighing of

Appellees' and Appellant's fault, when such weighing is not appropriate on

summary judgment.” Conversely, the appellees argue that the trial court did not

err in granting summary judgment in their favor when the alleged hazard

complained of is open and obvious.

In the relevant part, the trial court stated in its June 15, 2020 Reasons For

Judgment:

In the matter presently before the Court, the evidence is
that the condition of the stairs was open and obvious. There
was testimony that the plaintiff was warned of the condition of
the stairs, the plaintiff resided at the premises for approximately
four years prior to the incident using the stairs several times a
day, and that the condition of the stairs was obvious.
Furthermore, in Marolyn v. Morange v. Gwendolyn Troxler,
Larry Troxler, and Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co.,
Case # 782-131 (24th JDC 8/20/19), the court granted summary
judgment in a factually similar suit filed by plaintiff’s girlfriend

20-CA-328 4

involving a slip and fall on the same stairs at the same property
at issue in this matter holding that the stairs were an open and
obvious hazard known to the plaintiff.

The trial court also indicated that it was granting summary judgment based, in part,

on this Court’s holding in Eskine v. City of Gretna, 17-542 (La. App. 5 Cir.

3/14/18), 240 So.3d 338. In that case, the plaintiff was injured in front of his home

when his walker rolled over the edge of an elevated walkway resulting in a fall into

a ditch below the walkway. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the city of Gretna

as the owner of the walkway, claiming that the walkway was unreasonably

dangerous and had not been properly maintained by the city. The city filed a

motion for summary judgment in which it argued that the walkway was not

unreasonably dangerous because its condition was open and obvious. In opposing

the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff offered evidence that the width of

the walkway did not conform to the city’s building code. The trial court ultimately

granted the city’s motion for summary judgment. In affirming that ruling on

appeal, this Court reasoned:

. . . Mr. Eskine was aware of the location and condition of the
walkway in front of his house, where he had lived all of his life.
Mr. Eskine testified that he was aware of the “deteriorated
condition” of the walkway before the fall, noting “[y]ou can
look at it and see.” According to Mr. Eskine, he would usually
use the driveway to approach the street instead of the walkway,
due to its defective condition, and he had only walked across
this walkway two or three times in 20 years. Although Mr.
Eskine was not aware of the width requirements or the precise
width of the walkway or its flat surface, there was no evidence
that his view of the walkway was obstructed or that there was
any hidden defect. Mr. Eskine, or anyone who encountered the
walkway, could see how wide the walkway was before deciding
whether to cross at that location.
. . .

A prudent person would have exercised whatever caution
was necessary under the circumstances to avoid the risk created
by the alleged hazard.

Eskine v. City of Gretna, supra at 343–44.

20-CA-328 5

In the instant case, the record before us contains little information about the

staircase at issue. There are no photos in evidence showing the section of the

staircase where Mr. Araujo was allegedly injured.3 There is no evidence in the

record that the premises owner advised Mr. Araujo that the stairs were dangerous,

per se, only that those who used the steps were urged to be cautious. There is no

direct evidence that the staircase violated any specific and applicable building

codes. Like the plaintiff in the Eskine case, Mr. Araujo had been aware for several

years that he needed to exercise caution on the stairs for reasons that were apparent

to him. The stairs remained exactly as they had been since the date he moved into

the apartment. However, on the day of the alleged accident, Mr. Araujo admitted

that he did not descend the staircase in his usual manner. Under these facts, we

find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the condition of the staircase was

open and obvious, and granting summary judgment on that basis.

DECREE

Based on the foregoing, after our de novo review of the record, memoranda,

exhibits, and the law, we find no genuine issue of material fact and that the

defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

3
We note that in opposing the appellee’s motion for summary judgment, Mr. Araujo attached a
document from a lawsuit in which his companion, Ms. Morange, was the plaintiff (24th JDC case number
782-131). The affidavit of Kevin Glidewell, a “field investigator of accidents” is dated June 10, 2019,
and purports to make a conclusion based on photographs of two steps reportedly taken on September 24,
2017. The affidavit itself makes no reference to a specific location or address where the steps he
reviewed are located. Although Mr. Glidewell concluded that the stair treads were two inches too short
for code, the affidavit does not specify which code the investigator used to reach his conclusion.
Nevertheless, cases such as Eskine, supra, have held that, even when evidence is presented that the
condition violates an applicable code, this fact is less relevant when the condition is open and obvious to
all.

20-CA-328 6

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
FEBRUARY 24, 2021 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

20-CA-328
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ (DISTRICT JUDGE)
ANDREW G. WEST (APPELLEE) LEANDRO R. AREA (APPELLEE) NICHOLAS C. GRISTINA (APPELLEE)

MAILED
ELIZABETH M. GAUDIN (APPELLANT) GORDON P. GUTHRIE, III (APPELLEE)
HILARY G. GAUDIN (APPELLANT) ATTORNEY AT LAW
PIERRE F. GAUDIN (APPELLANT) 704 CARONDELET STREET
ATTORNEYS AT LAW NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130
1088 FOURTH STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053