Marolyn Morange Versus Gwendolyn Troxler and Larry Troxler, Jr and Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company

MAROLYN MORANGE NO. 20-CA-386

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

GWENDOLYN TROXLER AND LARRY COURT OF APPEAL
TROXLER, JR AND LOUISIANA FARM
BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE STATE OF LOUISIANA
COMPANY

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 786-755, DIVISION "B"
HONORABLE CORNELIUS E. REGAN, JUDGE PRESIDING

October 27, 2021

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Marc E. Johnson, and Stephen J. Windhorst

AFFIRMED
SJW
SMC
MEJ

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
MAROLYN MORANGE
Hilary G. Gaudin
Elizabeth M. Gaudin

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
GWENDOLYN TROXLER, LARRY TROXLER, JR. AND LOUISIANA FARM
BUREAU CASUALTY COMPANY
Nicholas C. Gristina
Gordon P. Guthrie, III
Andrew G. West

WINDHORST, J.

Appellant, Marolyn Morange, appeals the trial court’s July 25, 2020 judgment

granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, Gwendolyn and Larry Troxler, Jr.,

and Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, and dismissing

appellant’s claims with prejudice.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 17, 2018, appellant filed a petition for damages alleging that she

sustained injuries on August 17, 2017 when she fell down her apartment staircase

on property owned by the Troxlers.2 Appellant alleged that the staircase was

defective and unreasonably dangerous.

On March 3, 2020, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment contending

that no duty was owed to appellant because the condition of the staircase was open

and obvious to all, and appellant was further aware of the staircase’s condition

because she had traversed it successfully for over four years prior to this accident.3

In support of their motion for summary judgment, appellees submitted evidence,

including Ms. Morange’s deposition, that the condition of the staircase was open and

obvious. In her deposition, Ms. Morange testified that she lived in the upstairs

apartment for over four years; that she was aware of the varying heights of the steps;

that the condition of the staircase was open and obvious to all; that she was aware of

1 The trial court issued written reasons for judgment on September 30, 2020.

2 This is appellant’s second lawsuit against the appellees involving the same staircase. In the first suit
(Marolyn Morange v. Gwendolyn Troxler, et al, Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, case No. 782-131, Div.
“J”), appellant contended that on April 21, 2017, she sustained injuries falling down the same staircase.
The trial court in that case granted the same appellees’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing
appellant’s claims with prejudice on finding that the condition of the staircase was open and obvious. Ms.
Morange did not appeal the trial court’s judgment in the first suit.
Appellant’s live-in boyfriend, Jose Araujo, also filed a separate lawsuit (Jose Araujo v. Gwendolyn Troxler,
et al, Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court, case No. 786-850, Div. “F”) against the same appellees alleging
injuries from falling down the same staircase. The trial court likewise granted the same appellees’ motion
for summary judgment, dismissing Mr. Araujo’s claims with prejudice, finding that the condition of the
staircase was open and obvious. This Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on appeal. Araujo v. Troxler,
20-328 (La. App. 5 Cir. 02/24/21), 315 So.3d 385.
3 In support of their motion, appellees attached the following exhibits: (1) Ms. Morange’s January 16, 2020
deposition; (2) the September 10, 2019 judgment dismissing Ms. Morange’s claims against appellees with
prejudice in her first suit; and (3) the August 30, 2019 transcript of the appellees’ motion for summary
judgment in the first suit.

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the condition of the staircase soon after she moved into the apartment; and that she

successfully traversed the staircase without incident for over four years prior to this

incident. She further testified that at the time of this accident, she was descending

the staircase, lost her balance, and fell.

In opposition, appellant argued that the open and obvious doctrine does not

apply under the facts of this case wherein Mr. Troxler acknowledged and warned

her of the dangerous condition of the staircase. She further contended that in

addition to the varying heights of the steps on the staircase making it a hazardous

condition, the steps did not meet code requirements and therefore the staircase was

unreasonably dangerous. Citing Broussard v. State ex re. Office of State Buildings,

12-1238 (La. 04/05/13), 113 So.3d 175, appellant contended that the open and

obvious doctrine cannot be applied to undermine Louisiana’s comparative fault

regime.4 She argued that her knowledge or awareness of the risk created by

appellees’ conduct cannot operate as a bar to recovery, and that comparative fault

principles apply, with her awareness of the danger as only one factor when assigning

fault. She also contended that the question of whether a defect presents an

unreasonable risk of harm is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by

the trier of fact. “Whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm is ‘a matter

wed to the facts’ and must be determined in light of facts and circumstances of each

particular case.” Broussard, 113 So.3d at 183.

After a contradictory hearing, the trial court granted appellees’ motion for

summary judgment, dismissing appellant’s claims with prejudice. This appeal

followed.

4 In opposition, appellant attached the following exhibits: (1) Ms. Morange’s January 16, 2020 deposition;
and (2) the affidavit of Kevin Glidewell with attached photographs.

20-CA-386 2

LAW and ANALYSIS

On appeal, plaintiff/appellant argues that the trial court erred in applying the

open and obvious doctrine to this case because Mr. Troxler had warned her of the

hazardous condition of the staircase, and therefore appellant’s potential knowledge

of the hazard is not in question. Appellant argues that given appellee’s warning and

the holding in Broussard, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment without

considering appellees’ fault under comparative fault principles.

A motion for summary judgment must be granted if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to

material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P.

art. 966 A(3). Appellate courts review a judgment granting a motion for summary

judgment de novo using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s determination

of whether summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is any genuine issue of

material fact, and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Faciane v. Golden Key Div. Ltd. P’ship, 17-636 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/23/18), 249

So.3d 230, 233; Phipps v. Schupp, 09-2037 (La. 07/06/10), 45 So.3d 593, 597.

The initial burden is on the mover to show that no genuine issue of material

fact exists. La. C.C.P. art. 966 D(1). If the moving party will not bear the burden of

proof at trial, the moving party must only point out that there is an absence of factual

support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or

defense. Id. The nonmoving party must then produce factual support to establish

that she will be able to satisfy her evidentiary burden of proof at trial. Id. If the

nonmoving party fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and

summary judgment should be granted. Holmes v. Paul, 19-130 (La. App. 5 Cir.

10/02/19), 279 So.3d 1068, 1072.

A landowner owes a duty to a plaintiff to discover any unreasonably

dangerous conditions, and to either correct the condition or warn of its existence.

20-CA-386 3

Eisenhardt v. Snook, 08-1287 (La. 03/17/09), 8 So.3d 541, 544. Nonetheless, a

defendant generally does not have a duty to protect against that which is obvious and

apparent. Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 14-288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So.3d 851,

856. In order for a hazard to be considered obvious and apparent, the hazard should

be one that is open and obvious to everyone who may potentially encounter it. Id.;

Broussard, 113 So.3d at 184; Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council No.

5747, 03-1533 (La. 02/20/04), 866 So.2d 228, 234. If the facts of a particular case

show that the condition complained of should be obvious to all, the condition may

not be unreasonably dangerous, and the defendant may owe no duty to the plaintiff.

Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging Inc., 09-528 (La. 12/02/08), 995 So.2d 1184,

1186 (per curiam).

The degree to which a danger may be observed by a potential victim is one

factor in the determination of whether the condition is unreasonably dangerous. Id.

A landowner is not liable for an injury which results from a condition which should

have been observed by the individual in the exercise of reasonable care, or which

was as obvious to a visitor as it was to the landowner. Hutchinson, 866 So.2d at

234; Handy v. City of Kenner, 12-135 (La. App. 5 Cir. 06/28/12), 97 So.3d 539, 542.

Summary judgment is not precluded in cases where the plaintiff is unable to produce

factual support for his claim that a complained of condition is unreasonably

dangerous. Allen v. Lockwood, 14-1724 (La. 02/13/15), 156 So.3d 650, 652.

Based on the evidence submitted by appellees, it is undisputed that (1) the

Troxlers, as landlords, were the owners/custodians of the staircase leading to Ms.

Morange’s apartment; (2) Ms. Morange lived in the apartment for over four years

prior to this incident; (3) Ms. Morange testified that the condition of the staircase

was open and obvious to all; (4) Ms. Morange testified that she was aware of the

condition of the staircase soon after moving into the apartment; and (5) Ms. Morange

testified that when she moved in, Mr. Troxler told her to be careful using the stairs.

20-CA-386 4

Considering these undisputed facts, appellees put forth evidence that the condition

of the staircase was open and obvious, and that they owed no duty to appellant.

Once appellees demonstrated that appellant would be unable to bear her

burden of proving an essential element of her claim, i.e., that the Troxlers owed her

a duty, then the burden shifted to appellant to show that she would be able to meet

her burden at trial. Bufkin, 171 So.3d at 858.

In opposition to appellees’ motion for summary judgment, appellant argued

that the open and obvious doctrine was a “nonissue” because Mr. Troxler warned

her many times about the dangerous condition of the staircase. She testified that

despite her requests to fix the staircase, it was not fixed. Based on this warning,

appellant argued that this case involves a situation of comparative fault, which is not

appropriate for summary judgment. In support, appellant cited Broussard, supra,

contending that the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the open and obvious

doctrine does not take the place of an appropriate proper comparative fault analysis.

Appellant argued that if the steps were hazardous and she had been warned, “perhaps

she was careless going up-and-down the steps. Perhaps she was. That is not a

determination for this arena.”

Contrary to appellant’s argument, the Louisiana Supreme Court clarified its

holding in Broussard in several subsequent opinions stating that absent a material

factual issue, summary judgment is appropriate to determine whether a condition is

open and obvious and thus does not present an unreasonable risk of harm. See

Bufkin, supra; Rodriquez v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 14-1725 (La. 11/14/14), 152 So.3d

871 (per curiam); Allen, supra. In clarifying Broussard, the Court in Allen stated:

Notably, Broussard was a three-day jury trial involving a fact-
intensive determination as to whether the defect posed an
unreasonable risk of harm or constituted an open and obvious defect.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Broussard. The First Circuit
Court of Appeal reversed on grounds of manifest error because it
found the defect was open and obvious. This Court reversed finding
no manifest error in the jury’s determination. We resolved the issue

20-CA-386 5

under the risk-utility balancing test. Our comments under this
discussion clearly pertained to cases that were tried either by judge
or jury. Broussard did not involve summary judgment practice nor
did our discussion infer that issues of this nature must be determined
by a trial. Any reading of Broussard interpreting it as a limit on
summary judgment practice involving issues of unreasonable risk of
harm is a misinterpretation of the Broussard case. [Emphasis added.]

Allen, 156 So.3d at 652-653. The Allen Court further explained:

In Bufkin, we clarified our holding in Broussard, stating
“[Broussard] should not be construed as precluding summary
judgment when no legal duty is owed because the condition
encountered is obvious and apparent to all and not unreasonably
dangerous.” Further we explained that once a defendant points out a
lack of factual support for an essential element in the plaintiff’s case,
the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with evidence
(by affidavit, deposition, discovery response, or other form
sanctioned by La. Code Civ. P. arts. 966 and 967) to demonstrate that
he or she would be able to meet his or her burden at trial. As Bufkin
demonstrated, “our jurisprudence does not preclude the granting of a
motion for summary judgment in cases where the plaintiff is unable
to produce factual support for his or her claim that a complained-of
condition or things is unreasonably dangerous.” Rather, in such a
procedural posture, the court’s obligation is to decide “if there [is] a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the [complained-of
condition or thing] created an unreasonable risk of harm.” (Internal
citations omitted.)

Id. at 653.

Considering the Supreme Court’s clarification that summary judgment is not

precluded when no legal duty is owed due to an open and obvious condition, and the

plaintiff fails to produce evidence that shows she can meet her burden at trial, we

find appellant’s interpretation of and reliance on Broussard to be erroneous.

With regard to appellant’s contention that Mr. Troxler “warned” her that the

staircase was unreasonably dangerous, a thorough review of Ms. Morange’s

deposition shows that Mr. Troxler only told her to “be careful” on the staircase. A

mention by Mr. Troxler to be careful on the staircase is not necessarily a warning.

Appellant has therefore not shown that she can offer any evidence or law to support

her contention that Mr. Troxler’s statement was the equivalent of a warning.

20-CA-386 6

Regardless, even if we would find appellee’s statement to be a “warning,” it

would tend to support appellees’ indisputable claim that the condition of the

staircase was open and obvious to all. Ms. Morange testified in her deposition that

she was aware of and extremely familiar with the condition and varying heights of

the steps on the staircase. She used “caution” when traversing the staircase, and she

successfully did so numerous times over four years without incident.5

Appellant also argued that because the staircase did not meet applicable code

requirements, it was unreasonably dangerous. In support of this contention,

appellant submitted an affidavit from Kevin Glidewell, a “field investigator of

accidents.” Mr. Glidewell stated that the width of the steps on the staircase are 9

inches wide, and the “applicable codes require that the treads must be at least eleven

(11) inches wide.” Upon review, we find this affidavit does not create a genuine

issue of material fact or demonstrate that appellant can meet her burden at trial.

First, although Mr. Glidewell concluded that the treads of the steps were two

inches short per “applicable codes,” the affidavit does not: (1) identify the address

where the staircase is located; (2) specify which code or codes Mr. Glidewell used

to reach his conclusion or whether those codes are applicable to this staircase; nor

(3) conclude that this code violation makes the staircase unreasonably dangerous.

Additionally, we do not find that the photographs attached to the affidavit show that

the staircase is unreasonably dangerous.

Secondly, compliance with building codes is only one factor to be considered

in determining premise liability. Primeaux v. Best Western Plus Houma Inn, 18-841

(La. App. 1 Cir. 02/28/19), 274 So.3d 20, 30; Calcagno v. Kuebel, Fuchs Partnership,

01-691 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/14/01), 802 So.2d 746, 751. Moreover, evidence that a

condition violates an applicable code is less relevant when the condition is open and

5 Ms. Morange also confirmed in her deposition that the condition of the staircase and the location of her
fall in this case were the same as in her first suit which was previously dismissed.

20-CA-386 7

obvious. Primeaux, 274 So.3d at 30; Eskine v. City of Gretna, 17-542 (La. App. 5

Cir. 03/14/18), 240, So.3d 338; Araujo, supra.

Upon de novo review of the memoranda in support of and in opposition to the

motion for summary judgment and the exhibits attached thereto, we find that no

genuine issue of material fact exists, and that appellees are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Based on the undisputed facts, the Troxlers did not owe appellant a

duty because the condition of the staircase was open and obvious. Once the burden

shifted, appellant failed to submit evidence to show that she could meet her burden

at trial. Ms. Morange acknowledged that she was aware of the need to exercise

caution on the staircase, and that she used the staircase for over four years without

incident. She testified that she descended the staircase on this occasion, lost her

balance, and fell. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling granting

appellees’ motion for summary judgment.

DECREE

For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s July 25, 2020 judgment

granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, Gwendolyn and Larry Troxler, Jr.

and Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, dismissing appellant,

Marolyn Morange’s claims against appellees with prejudice. The costs of this appeal

are assessed against appellant.

AFFIRMED

20-CA-386 8

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
OCTOBER 27, 2021 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

20-CA-386
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE CORNELIUS E. REGAN (DISTRICT JUDGE)
HONORABLE R. CHRISTOPHER COX, III (DISTRICT JUDGE)
ANDREW G. WEST (APPELLEE) LEANDRO R. AREA (APPELLEE) NICHOLAS C. GRISTINA (APPELLEE)

MAILED
ELIZABETH M. GAUDIN (APPELLANT) GORDON P. GUTHRIE, III (APPELLEE)
HILARY G. GAUDIN (APPELLANT) MATTHEW R. FEIGLER (APPELLEE)
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