Lauren Randazza Versus Pietro M. Giacona

LAUREN RANDAZZA NO. 20-CA-439

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

PIETRO M. GIACONA COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 792-773, DIVISION "C"
HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG, JUDGE PRESIDING

March 24, 2021

JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Jude G. Gravois, and Hans J. Liljeberg

AFFIRMED
JGG
FHW
HJL

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
LAUREN RANDAZZA
Keith R. Credo

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
PIETRO M. GIACONA
Christy M. Howley
M. Elizabeth Bowman

GRAVOIS, J.

Pietro M. Giacona, appellant, and Lauren Randazza, appellee, could not

agree on a school of choice for their three-year-old daughter Mila to attend. After

unsuccessfully attempting to mediate the issue with their parent coordinator, the

matter was brought before a domestic hearing officer on July 16, 2020, who

recommended the school selected by Ms. Randazza. This recommendation was

made an Interim Judgment of the Court on July 20, 2020. Mr. Giacona timely

objected, and the matter was tried de novo before the district court on August 5,

2020. On that date, the district court issued a judgment holding that the minor

child shall attend St. Anthony of Padua School in New Orleans, Louisiana, the

same school recommended by the hearing officer and selected by Ms. Randazza.

Mr. Giacona’s timely appeal followed. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Randazza and Mr. Giacona had a romantic relationship but never

married. Their daughter Mila was born on June 2, 2017. The relationship ended in

September of 2018. While the parties were a couple, they lived on the east bank of

Jefferson Parish in Old Jefferson, with Ms. Randazza being employed as a teacher

in Kenner and Mr. Giacona being employed with a governmental contractor on the

naval base in Belle Chasse.1 Following their break up, Mr. Giacona moved his

home to the naval base, while Ms. Randazza’s home remained on the east bank of

Jefferson Parish.

Ms. Randazza filed a Petition for Custody and Support on March 6, 2019, to

which Mr. Giacona reconvened. After a custody evaluation with Dr. Karen Van

Beyer, the matter came for a hearing before the domestic commissioner on August

6, 2019 and August 23, 2019. On August 23, 2019, pursuant to the hearing, the

1
Belle Chasse is located in Plaquemines Parish on the west bank of the Mississippi River,
immediately adjacent to the west bank of Jefferson Parish.

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parties entered into a Consent Judgment. While not awarding “domiciliary

custody” to either parent, as per Dr. Van Beyer’s evaluation and report, the

Consent Judgment stated that “the parties, Lauren Randazza and Pietro M.

Giacona, should be awarded joint custody with equal shared physical time of the

minor child, Mila Giacona. Lauren Randazza shall be in charge of religious and

educational decisions for the child, in consultation with Pietro M. Giacona.”

(Emphasis added.) Ms. Randazza is a teacher. Her master’s degree in early

childhood intervention, plus her practice of Catholicism, provided the basis for this

term of the Consent Judgment.2

The Consent Judgment reflected that the parties would share physical

custody of their daughter on a “2/2/3” basis. The Consent Judgment stated that

they agreed to send Mila to Christ the King School in Terrytown, which is located

on the west bank of Jefferson Parish, which she in fact attended for the 2019-20

school year.3 However, Christ the King School closed permanently following the

2019-20 school year, and the parties had to find a new school for their child to

attend. Mr. Giacona recommended several schools on the west bank of Jefferson

Parish, which he narrowed down to two schools, Immaculate Conception School,

located in Marrero, and St. Rosalie School, located in Harvey. Ms. Randazza

recommended St. Anthony of Padua’s preschool, which is located in the Mid-City

neighborhood of New Orleans on Canal Street.4 Unable to come to an agreement,

the parties engaged the services of Terri Campesta, the parenting coordinator with

whom they had previously worked. Ms. Campesta attempted to mediate an

agreement between the parties on a school choice, but was unsuccessful.

2
In addition, Ms. Randazza has a second master’s degree in counseling. It is explained in the
record that Mr. Giacona is not active in any particular faith.
3
The parties selected Christ the King School after considering several other schools on both the
east and west banks.
4
Ms. Randazza explained that she did not include the other schools she had previously
recommended before they chose Christ the King School, because those schools had already been
considered and turned down the year before.

20-CA-439 2

Ultimately, after considering the schools each party chose, Ms. Campesta issued a

report finding that the most “feasible” schools were either Immaculate Conception

School or St. Rosalie School on the west bank, but she declined to formally

recommend either school as she believed such a recommendation would impact

Mr. Giacona’s child support obligation, which was beyond the scope of her

authority. Among other things affecting her endorsement, Ms. Campesta

considered the distances Mila would have to commute while in each parent’s care,

the availability of Mila’s speech therapy at the different campuses, a comparison of

the cost of tuitions, and the availability of before-care and after-care at each school.

On June 18, 2020, Ms. Randazza filed a Rule to Determine School Choice,

citing the parties’ unsuccessful attempt at mediation with Ms. Campesta, and

alleging that Mr. Giacona’s objections to St. Anthony of Padua School were based

on his convenience and financial concerns, rather than on Mila’s best interest. On

July 7, 2020, Mr. Giacona filed a Motion to Designate School, for Incidental

Matters, and for Attorney Fees and Court Costs. The parties went before the

hearing officer on July 16, 2020, who recommended that the minor child attend the

school selected by Ms. Randazza, St. Anthony of Padua’s preschool. This

recommendation was made an Interim Judgment of the Court on July 20, 2020.

Mr. Giacona timely objected to the Interim Judgment.

The matter was then heard in a trial de novo by the district court judge on

August 5, 2020, who received the parties’ testimonies, as well as the testimony of

Ms. Campesta, the parenting coordinator. The witnesses testified regarding the

virtues and drawbacks of the different schools, including the distances and

commute times between the schools and the parties’ residences/work places. The

trial court also received the report of Ms. Campesta, a letter from Mila’s speech

therapist, documentary evidence showing the tuition rates of the schools, as well as

the hearing officer’s recommendations and stipulations of August 6, 2019, the

20-CA-439 3

Consent Judgment of August 23, 2019, the hearing officer’s recommendation of

July 16, 2020, and the July 20, 2020 Interim Order of the Court. At the close of

trial, the court ruled from the bench, citing the provisions of the August 23, 2019

Consent Judgment that placed Ms. Randazza in charge of educational and religious

decisions, and affirmed the hearing officer’s Interim Judgment that Mila should

attend St. Anthony of Padua School, the school selected by Ms. Randazza. A

written judgment was signed that same day.5 Mr. Giacona filed this timely appeal.

On appeal, Mr. Giacona argues first that the trial court erred in giving

unilateral educational decision-making power to Ms. Randazza, when she is not the

domiciliary parent. Second, he argues that the trial court erred in placing a

rebuttable presumption burden of proof on Mr. Giacona, when no domiciliary

parent was designated. Third, he argues that Ms. Randazza failed to meet her

burden of proof that her “unilateral” selection of St. Anthony of Padua School was

in Mila’s best interest. Fourth, he argues that the trial court’s alleged ex parte

communication with Dr. Van Beyer, the custody evaluator, was improper.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s determination in a child custody case will not be disturbed

unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 02-885 (La. App. 5

Cir. 1/14/03), 839 So.2d 150, 152. An appellate court is required to extend great

weight to the factual conclusions of trial courts which are based on reasonable

evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact. Id., citing Rosell v.

ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989).

FIRST AND SECOND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Mr. Giacona argues first that the trial court erred in giving “unilateral”

educational decision making power to Ms. Randazza, when she is not the

5
This Judgment incorrectly refers to the hearing officer’s recommendation as having been made
on July 18, 2020, rather than on July 16, 2020.

20-CA-439 4

domiciliary parent. Second, he argues that the trial court erred in placing a

rebuttable presumption burden of proof on Mr. Giacona, when no domiciliary

parent was designated. Because these assignments of error relate to the issue of

what it means to be a domiciliary parent, they are considered together.

La. R.S. 9:335 is entitled in part “Joint custody decree and implementation

order.” It provides among other things that “[t]he implementation order shall

allocate the legal authority and responsibility of the parents,” and that “[i]n a

decree of joint custody, the court shall designate a domiciliary parent except when

there is an implementation order to the contrary or for other good cause shown.”

See La. R.S. 9:335(A)(3) and (B)(1). Further, paragraph (B)(3) of the statute states

that “[t]he domiciliary parent shall have authority to make all decisions affecting

the child unless an implementation order provides otherwise. All major decisions

made by the domiciliary parent concerning the child shall be subject to review by

the court upon motion of the other parent. It shall be presumed that all major

decisions made by the domiciliary parent are in the best interest of the child.”

Finally, paragraph (C) of the statute states that “[i]f a domiciliary parent is not

designated in the joint custody decree and an implementation order does not

provide otherwise, joint custody confers upon the parents the same rights and

responsibilities as are conferred on them by the provisions of Title VII of Book I of

the Civil Code.”

The parties entered into a Consent Judgment on August 23, 2019 that placed

Ms. Randazza “in charge of” educational and religious decisions for the minor

child, “in consultation with” Mr. Giacona.6 In Rousset v. Rousset, 14-663 (La.

6
Though Mr. Giacona appeals the judgment of the court which determined that the minor child
should attend the school selected by Ms. Randazza, it is important to point out that nowhere in the
pleadings does Mr. Giacona seek to modify or nullify this term of the Consent Judgment itself that placed
Ms. Randazza “in charge of religious and educational decisions for the child.”

20-CA-439 5

App. 5 Cir. 4/15/15), 170 So.3d 253, 256, this Court summarized the law

applicable to consent judgments as follows:

A consent judgment is a bilateral contract wherein the parties
adjust their differences by mutual consent and thereby put an end to a
lawsuit with each party balancing the hope of gain against the fear of
loss. [La.] C.C. art. 3071. As such, it should be governed by the same
rules of construction that apply to contracts. Nelson v. Nelson, 08-85
(La. App. 5 Cir. 6/19/08), 985 So.2d 1285, 1290.

A compromise agreement which forms the basis for a consent
judgment gets its binding force and effect from the consent of the
parties. The interpretation of the consent judgment is the
determination of the common intent of the parties. [La.] C.C. art.
2045; Nungesser v. Nungesser, 95-2298 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/28/96), 694
So.2d 312, 314. The meaning and intent of the parties is ordinarily
determined from the four corners of the instrument. Millet v. Millet,
04-406 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/26/04), 888 So.2d 291, 293. Each
provision in the contract is interpreted in light of the other provisions
so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract a whole.
When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no
absurd consequences, the intent of the parties is to be determined by
the words of the contract. [La.] C.C. art. 2046; Sutherlin v. Sutherlin,
05-535 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/3/06), 930 So.2d 51, 53.

In light of this jurisprudence, it is apparent that the Consent Judgment

controls the rights and responsibilities of the parties in this case, notwithstanding

any reports or custody evaluations that took place prior to the confection and entry

of the Consent Judgment and on which the Consent Judgment may have been

based in whole or in part. Further, the term of the Consent Judgment stating that

“Lauren Randazza shall be in charge of religious and educational decisions for the

child, in consultation with Pietro M. Giacona” is clear and explicit.

In this particular case, the Consent Judgment does not name either parent as

the domiciliary parent. As per La. R.S. 9:335, this is permissible based upon Dr.

Van Beyer’s recommendation, in her report, that neither parent should be so

designated.7 Thus, although neither party was designated as domiciliary parent, the

Consent Judgment’s term placing Ms. Randazza “in charge of” religious and

7
Dr. Van Beyer’s report was not introduced into evidence in whole at the trial de novo conducted
on August 5, 2019. A two-page excerpt of what appears to be Dr. Van Beyer’s report is found in exhibit
P-8, which contains the Hearing Officer’s recommendations and stipulations from August 6, 2019.

20-CA-439 6

educational decisions for the minor child gave her the same rights, by analogy, as a

domiciliary parent for those particular issues. Accordingly, the law on the scope of

a domiciliary parent’s decision making power is instructive to our analysis.

Contrary to Mr. Giacona’s arguments both in the trial court and in brief, the

domiciliary parent’s decision making authority is not unilateral, nor absolute. As

previously stated, all major decisions made by the domiciliary parent, which would

include the choice of schools, are subject to judicial review upon motion by the

non-domiciliary parent. La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3); Shaw v. Shaw, 30,613 (La. App. 2

Cir. 6/24/98), 714 So.2d 906, 910, writ denied, 98-2414 (La. 11/20/98), 729 So.2d

556, and writ denied, 98-2426 (La. 11/20/98), 729 So.2d 558. See also Duhe v.

O’Donnell, 15-683 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/16), 193 So.3d 455, 459, citing Walden v.

Walden, 00-2911 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/14/02), 835 So.2d 513.

Here, Mr. Giacona was afforded judicial review by a hearing de novo in the

district court, as well as appellate review by this Court. Thus, his argument that

Ms. Randazza was afforded unilateral decision making authority, contrary to law,

is without merit.

Mr. Giacona also points out that the Consent Judgment appointed a parent

coordinator (Ms. Campesta) to mediate custody/visitation issues in the event the

parties could not agree on a particular issue. The Consent Judgment did not state,

however, that the parent coordinator would have decision-making power in the

event the parents could not agree. The record shows that Ms. Campesta did indeed

attempt to mediate an agreement on the school choice issue, as per the Consent

Judgment, but was unsuccessful in this regard. In fact, as noted above, Ms.

Campesta acknowledged that she could not formally recommend either

Immaculate Conception School or St. Rosalie School, as she believed such a

recommendation would impact Mr. Giacona’s child support obligation, which was

beyond the scope of her authority.

20-CA-439 7

Next, Mr. Giacona argues that it was error to place a “rebuttable

presumption” burden of proof upon him. However, we find no error in this regard.

In the judicial review of the domiciliary parent’s major decisions, it is presumed

that all major decisions made by the domiciliary parent are in the best interest of

the child and the burden of proving they are in fact not in the best interest of the

child is placed on the non-domiciliary parent who opposes the decision. Shaw v.

Shaw, 714 So.2d at 910. Thus, the law is clear that in this particular case, while

Ms. Randazza is not the domiciliary parent, she enjoys a rebuttable presumption

that her choice of school is in their daughter’s best interest, based upon the terms

of the Consent Judgment and La. R.S. 9:335, which presumption Mr. Giacona was

required to rebut in order to prevail. Accordingly, there is no merit to this

assignment of error that the rebuttable presumption was misplaced.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Mr. Giacona argues that Ms. Randazza failed to meet her burden of proof

that her “unilateral” selection of St. Anthony of Padua School was in Mila’s best

interest. However, as noted above, the burden of proof was on Mr. Giacona to

rebut Ms. Randazza’s choice of school, rather than it being her burden of proof to

justify her choice of school was in Mila’s best interest. For the following reasons,

we find that Mr. Giacona did not rebut the presumption in favor of Ms. Randazza’s

choice of school.

The parties presented evidence in support of their school choices, as

described previously, which outlined the virtues and drawbacks of St. Anthony of

Padua School and the two schools on the west bank selected by Mr. Giacona. Mr.

Giacona testified that he selected possible schools on the basis of first, reducing

Mila’s previous commuting time to and from Christ the King on Ms. Randazza’s

days, and second, the availability of before-care and after-care, speech therapy, as

well as the “religious aspect they want.” The record further shows that Ms.

20-CA-439 8

Randazza’s choice of schools was based first upon the excellence of the curriculum

and educational opportunities, as well as a school that was Catholic and as

equidistant as possible to the parties’ homes. She also expressed that it would be

easier for her to become involved with parish life at St. Anthony than at the two

west bank church parishes.

The record shows that Ms. Randazza willingly provided accommodation for

Mr. Giacona’s concerns, including covering his possible occasional inability to

pick Mila up before after-care ended due to work or traffic, the availability of her

speech therapy on the east bank, and the increased costs associated with St.

Anthony of Padua School.

Mr. Giacona focused on the distance both he and Mila would have to travel

on days he exercised physical custody, because of the necessary commute across

the Mississippi River from his home in Belle Chasse to the Mid-City neighborhood

of New Orleans, where St. Anthony of Padua School is located. While the

commute is an important factor, the trial court noted that the schools on the west

bank would involve similar commuting issues for Mila while in Ms. Randazza’s

custody, and had in fact involved that same issue while Mila attended Christ the

King. At the hearing in the trial court, Ms. Randazza testified that she would be

able to enlist help from her parents and family in picking up Mila from St.

Anthony of Padua on Mr. Giacona’s days if work requirements or bridge traffic

prevented him from collecting her prior to the end of after-care, which closed

earlier than the after-care offered at the two west bank schools. Ms. Randazza

stated that she also made arrangements for Mila’s speech therapy to continue at

another location on the east bank. (Previously, Mila’s speech therapist saw her at

Christ the King.)

Mr. Giacona objected to St. Anthony of Padua School on several other

bases, not only the commute time. He stated that St. Anthony of Padua’s facility

20-CA-439 9

for the pre-school was a small repurposed building, unlike the “beautiful new and

updated” building at Immaculate Conception School.8 He also noted that Mila

would have to apply to Christian Brothers School next year, but would not have to

reapply if accepted at Immaculate Conception School for pre-school, as the school

continued to the elementary grades.9 He noted that the principal at Immaculate

Conception School told him that many students from Christ the King were

enrolling at Immaculate Conception School, which meant that Mila would know

other students, unlike at St. Anthony of Padua. He also noted that the tuition cost

of St. Anthony of Padua/Christian Brothers was considerably more than at

Immaculate Conception School, as well as their before-care and after-care

offerings provided less coverage and were more expensive. In response, Ms.

Randazza agreed that she would bear the difference in tuition costs and after-care

costs that Mr. Giacona would have paid at his choices of schools, so that his

financial obligation would not increase.

Ms. Randazza testified to the excellent curriculum at St. Anthony of Padua,

as well as the excellent curriculum and highly regarded reputation at Christian

Brothers School, the elementary school located adjacent to St. Anthony of Padua

and where many of its students matriculate after attending St. Anthony of Padua.

Ms. Randazza also investigated the curriculum of Immaculate Conception, which

she described as being based on “standards” but not the type of curriculum or

methods offered at St. Anthony, which in her opinion were superior. Without any

denigration of Mr. Giacona’s chosen schools, the trial court concurred with the

evidence provided by Ms. Randazza regarding the superior reputation of Ms.

Randazza’s school choice and its long-term importance in Mila’s education.

8
Though Mr. Giacona recommended two schools, the hearing tended to focus more on
Immaculate Conception School than St. Rosalie School.
9
Ms. Randazza testified that she was told that students at St. Anthony of Padua School were
preferred for enrollment to Christian Brothers School.

20-CA-439 10

Accordingly, after considering the evidence in the record, we find that Mr.

Giacona failed to overcome the presumption of the law that Ms. Randazza’s choice

of school was in the best interest of Mila. While he showed that his choice of

school was more convenient for him, he did not show that Mila’s attendance at St.

Anthony of Padua School was not in her best interest. He also did not show that as

a whole, Immaculate Conception School was a better choice for Mila. The legal

presumption in favor of Ms. Randazza’s choice must prevail in the absence of

evidence showing that attendance at St. Anthony of Padua School is not in Mila’s

best interest. Upon review, per Schmidt v. Schmidt, supra, we find no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s judgment. This assignment of error is without merit.

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Finally, Mr. Giacona argues on appeal that the trial court had an ex parte

communication with Dr. Van Beyer, the author of the custody evaluation, on the

morning of the trial de novo. He argues that the trial court’s reliance on the

custody evaluator’s report that was changed when the parties consented, and which

report was not entered into evidence by either party, constituted an overreach of

the court’s authority.

In brief, Mr. Giacona refers to a “veiled” reference made by the trial court

during the hearing that could possibly be construed that the trial court may have

communicated with Dr. Van Beyer on the morning of the trial de novo regarding

her report. Having thoroughly reviewed the entire transcript, we find that it is not

at all clear from the record as to whether the trial court did in fact have an ex parte

communication with Dr. Van Beyer. In any event, neither party objected and

neither party sought to call Dr. Van Beyer as a witness or to keep the record open

for introduction of her testimony or her complete report. As such, this assignment

of error was not preserved for appellate review.

20-CA-439 11

Further, our thorough review of the record and transcript shows clearly that

the trial court relied upon the Consent Judgment in her ruling, not a report that was

not entered into evidence, or an alleged ex parte communication with the author of

that report. As stated previously, the Consent Judgment controls the rights and

responsibilities of the parties herein and the terms of the Consent Judgment are

clear and explicit. This assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reason, the judgment of the trial court under review is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED

20-CA-439 12

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
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IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
MARCH 24, 2021 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

20-CA-439
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG (DISTRICT JUDGE)
KEITH R. CREDO (APPELLEE) CHRISTY M. HOWLEY (APPELLANT) M. ELIZABETH BOWMAN (APPELLANT)

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