The Parish of Plaquemines v. Rozel Operating Company

THE PARISH OF * NO. 2018-C-0346
PLAQUEMINES
*
VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL
*
ROZEL OPERATING FOURTH CIRCUIT
COMPANY, ET AL. *
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

THE PARISH OF PLAQUEMINES NO. 2018-C-0348

VERSUS

CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY,
ET AL.

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

THE PARISH OF PLAQUEMINES NO. 2018-C-0349

VERSUS

EQUITABLE PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, CHEVRON
U.S.A., INC. EXXON MOBIL
CORPORATION, HELIS OIL &
GAS COMPANY, LLC,
ANADARKO E&P ONSHORE,
LLC, AND CHEVRON PIPELINE
COMPANY

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

THE PARISH OF PLAQUEMINES NO. 2018-C-0350

VERSUS

HELIS OIL & GAS COMPANY,
LLC AND CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
25TH JDC, PARISH OF PLAQUEMINES
NO. 60-996, C/W 60-982, 60-986, 60-990, DIVISION “B”
Honorable Michael D. Clement
******
Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott
******
(Court composed of Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Nakisha
Ervin-Knott)

Donald T. Carmouche
Victor L. Marcello
John H. Carmouche
William R. Coenen, III
Brian T. Carmouche
Todd J. Wimberley
Ross J. Donnes
D. Adele Owen
Leah C. Poole
Christopher D. Martin
Michael L. Heaton
TALBOT, CARMOUCHE & MARCELLO
17405 Perkins Road
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70810

W. Peter Connick
CONNICK AND CONNICK
3421 N. Causeway Boulevard, Suite 408
Metairie, Louisiana 70002

Philip F. Cossich, Jr.
Darren Sumich
David A. Parsiola
Brandon J. Taylor
COSSICH, SUMICH, PARSIOLA & TAYLOR, L.L.C.
8397 Highway 23, Suite 100
Belle Chasse, Louisiana 70037-2648
Bruce D. Burglass, Jr.
Andre’ C. Gaudin
Scott O. Gaspard

BURGLASS & TANKERSLEY, LLC
5213 Airline Drive
Metairie, LA 70001-5602

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF, THE PARISH OF
PLAQUEMINES

Kelly Brechtel Becker
James E. Lapeze, Esq.
Lauren R. Bridges
Mark R. Deethardt
Tiffany D. Davis
Erin E. Bambrick
Cristian M. Soler
Robert B. McNeal
R. Keith Jarrett
Mark L. McNamara
Dana M. Douglas
LISKOW & LEWIS
Hancock Whitney Center
701 Poydras Street, Suite 5000
New Orleans, Louisiana 70139

Jamie D. Rhymes
George Arceneaux III
Brittan J. Bush
John S. Troutman
Randee V. Iles
William J. Heaton
LISKOW & LEWIS
1200 Camellia Blvd., Suite 300
Lafayette, Louisiana 70508

Nancy Milburn (admitted pro hac vice)
ARNOLD & PORTER
250 West 55th Street
New York, New York 10019-9710

Barry W. Ashe
John P. Farnsworth
Daria B. Diaz
Brooke C. Tigchelaar
STONE PIGMAN WALTER WITTMAN, L.L.C.
546 Carondelet Street
New Orleans, LA 70130

Roy C. Cheatwood
Monica A Frois
Matthew A. Woolf

Tyler L. Weidlich
BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL, & BERKOWITZ
201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 3600
New Orleans, LA 70170

COUNSEL FOR RELATORS/DEFENDANTS, SHELL OIL COMPANY,
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, BP AMERICA PRODUCTION
COMPANY, NOBLE ENERGY INC., AND ATLANTIC RICHFIELD
COMPANY

Deborah D. Kuchler
Robert E. Guidry
Michelle Hale DeShazo
Janika D. Polk
Sarah E. Iiams
Mark E. Best
Nicholas S. Wise
KUCHLER POLK WEINER, LLC
1615 Poydras Street, Suite 1300
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

COUNSEL FOR RELATORS/DEFENDANTS, CONOCOPHILLIPS
COMPANY, AND THE LOUISIANA LAND AND EXPLORATION
COMPANY LLC

Michael P. Cash
LISKOW & LEWIS
First City Tower, 1001 Fannin Street
Houston, Texas 77002-6756

Martin A. Stern
Glen M. Pilie
David M. Stein
Jeffrey E. Richardson
ADAMS AND REESE LLP
701 Poydras Street, Suite 4500
New Orleans, Louisiana 70139

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR/DEFENDANT, EXXON MOBIL
CORPORATION

Kathryn Z. Gonski
LISKOW & LEWIS
Hancock Whitney Center

701 Poydras Street, Suite 5000
New Orleans, Louisiana 70139-5099

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR/DEFENDANT, XH, LLC

John Michael Parker
Edward D. Hughes
TAYLOR, PORTER, BROOKS & PHILLIPS L.L.P.
450 Laurel Street, 8th Floor (70801)
P.O. Box 2471
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-2371

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR/DEFENDANT, HELIS OIL & GAS
COMPANY, LLC

J. Blake Canfield
Executive Counsel
Donald W. Price
Special Counsel
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
Post Office Box 94396
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804

Megan K. Terrell
Legal Advisor
Governor's Office of Coastal Activities
900 North Third Street
Capitol Building, Fourth Floor
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT/INTERVENOR, THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES

JEFF LANDRY
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Ryan M. Seidemann

Michelle M. White
Wilbur L. Stiles, III
Elizabeth B. Murrill
Harry J. Vorhoff
Michael S. Heier
Assistant Attorneys General
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Civil Division
1885 North Third Street
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9005

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT/INTERVENOR, THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA, EX REL. JEFF LANDRY, ATTORNEY GENERAL

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED; AFFIRMED AS AMENDED
MAY 22, 2024

NEK BP America Production Company; Atlantic Richfield Company; Exxon
PAB
Mobil Corporation; ConocoPhillips Company; the Louisiana Land and Exploration
DNA
Company, LLC; XH, LLC; and Helis Oil & Gas Company, LLC (collectively

“Relators”) seek review of the trial court’s March 19, 2018 judgment denying their

motions to change venue and granting the Parish of Plaquemines’ (“Respondent”)

motion in limine to exclude testimony of Tom Goldstein (“Mr. Goldstein”). For the

following reasons, we grant Relators’ writ application and affirm the trial court’s

judgment as amended.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this case have been succinctly outlined in Par. of Plaquemines v.

Rozel Operating Co., et al, No. 18-5189, 2023 WL 3336640, *1 (E.D. La. May 10,

2023). As such, we incorporate a portion of that recitation herein:

This case is one of many brought in Louisiana to determine the role
played by oil and gas companies’ oil production activities in the rapid
loss of Louisiana’s coastal wetlands. In each of the cases, Louisiana
coastal parishes brought suit in state court against a collection of oil and
gas companies, alleging that their oil production activities created
pollution and land loss along Louisiana’s coast. Specifically,
Plaintiffs[1] sue for violation of Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal
1 On November 8, 2013, Respondent filed twenty-one separate petitions for damages on behalf of

itself and the State of Louisiana, ex. rel. Parish of Plaquemines naming various oil and gas

1

Resources Management Act of 1978 (“SLCRMA”). The SLCRMA
regulates conduct within the Coastal Zone of Louisiana via a permitting
system and provides a cause of action against companies that violate or
fail to obtain permits. Each lawsuit alleges violations of the SLCRMA
based on oil production activities that occurred in a specifically defined
area along Louisiana’s coast (“the Operational Area”).

Throughout 2017, the defendant-oil and gas companies – inclusive of Relators

– filed motions to change venue asserting Plaquemines Parish residents have

financial and direct, personal interests in the outcome of this litigation; the Parish’s

small size increases the probable inability to seat an impartial jury; and voir dire is

an inadequate remedy to the constitutional problems.2 Several exhibits were filed in

support of these motions to change venue – the 2017 Louisiana’s Comprehensive

Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast; various local and national news articles reports;

correspondence from Governor John Bel Edwards; and an affidavit from Mr.

Goldstein, a professor of journalism and director of media studies at the University

of California at Berkeley. Respondent and the State filed oppositions to the motions

to change venue, and Respondent filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony of

Mr. Goldstein.

On February 8, 2018, the trial court heard the motions to change venue and

motion in limine and took these matters under advisement. Several weeks later, on

March 19, 2018, the trial court issued a judgment and reasons for judgment denying

the motions for change of venue and granting the motion in limine.3 Relators timely

companies as defendants. Subsequent to the filing of these petitions, the State of Louisiana, ex. rel.
Jeff Landry, Attorney General and the State of Louisiana, through the Louisiana Department of
Natural Resources, Office of Coastal Management and its Secretary, Thomas F. Harris
(collectively “The State”), filed intervention petitions and intervened into this litigation as
plaintiffs. Thus, for purposes of these writ applications before this Court, the Plaintiffs are
Plaquemines Parish and the State.
2 These motions to change venue were filed in five of the twenty-one Plaintiffs’ suits.
3 Upon review of the record, it appears the trial court issued one judgment and reasons for judgment

regarding the motions to change venue and motion in limine that applied to the five separate suits.

2

filed writ applications in April 2018, and soon thereafter, this Court consolidated the

separate writ applications.

Prior to this Court’s resolution of these consolidated writ applications, the

underlying cases were removed to federal court on May 23, 2018. Due to the

removal, on July 18, 2018, this Court ordered a stay in these matters. On March 12,

2024, Relators and Respondent filed a joint motion to lift stay, in part, and for

supplemental briefing, which was granted.4 We now conduct supervisory review of

the trial court’s March 19, 2018 judgment.

DISCUSSION

Relators assert the trial court erred in denying their motions to change venue

and granting Respondent’s motion in limine to exclude testimony of Mr. Goldstein.

Motions to Change Venue

A party may obtain a change of venue “upon proof that he [or she] cannot

obtain a fair and impartial trial because of the undue influence of an adverse party,

prejudice existing in the public mind, or some other sufficient cause.” La. C.C.P. art.

122. “The party seeking a change of venue has the burden of showing sufficient

cause as to why he is unable to obtain an impartial trial in the court of original

venue.” Atkins v. Strayhan, 559 So.2d 26, 28 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (quoting

Bennett v. Sedco Maritime, 520 So.2d 894, 902 (La. App. 3d Cir.1987)). “A trial

court’s determination will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.

4 The joint motion referenced the fact that four of the five cases that comprise these consolidated

writ applications were remanded back to state court. This Court lifted the stay and allowed
supplemental briefing in these four cases – Case Nos. 2018-C-0346, 2018-C-0348, 2018-C-0349,
and 2018-C-0350. In the one case still pending in federal court – Case No. 2018-C-0347 – this
Court ordered its deconsolidation from the other four cases and maintained the stay pending further
orders of this Court.

3

(citing Savoie v. McCall's Boat Rentals, Inc., 491 So.2d 94, 99 (La. App. 3d Cir.

1986)).

Respondent filed suit alleging violations under the SLCRMA. In accordance

with the mandatory venue provision under this Act, a civil action “must be brought

in any parish in which the use or activity is situated.” La. R.S. 49:214.36(G). As the

basis of these lawsuits relate to coastal erosion in Plaquemines Parish, Respondent

properly filed suit in Plaquemines Parish. Relators filed motions to change venue

asserting Plaquemines Parish residents have a personal and financial interest in the

outcome of this litigation, which creates a serious risk that a fair and impartial jury

cannot be empaneled in Plaquemines Parish. Relators maintain that proceeding with

this litigation in this Parish would violate their due process rights to a fair trial before

an impartial jury.

In their briefs, Relators argue the trial court applied an incorrect legal test in

requiring proof of actual juror bias against the oil and gas industry. According to

Relators, they are only required to show a serious risk of actual bias. To support their

contention, Relators cite Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., highlighting the United

States Supreme Court’s statement regarding due process:

[T]he Due Process Clause has been implemented by objective standards
that do not require proof of actual bias. In defining these standards the
Court has asked whether, “under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness,” the interest “poses such a risk of
actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the
guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.”

556 U.S. 868, 883-84, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) (internal citations

omitted). However, Caperton is factually distinguishable from the matter herein as

that case involved the failure of a state supreme court justice to recuse himself under

circumstances that indicated a high probability of bias. Here, we are dealing with a

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jury trial and Relators’ failure to put forth evidence demonstrating community-wide

partiality against oil and gas companies in such a way that warrants a change of

venue. Moreover, we note the standards for judicial recusals and change of venue

under La. C.C.P. art. 122 are not the same. The language of La. C.C.P. art. 122 is

clear – a person attempting to change venue must show “proof that he [or she] cannot

obtain a fair and impartial trial . . . .” Thus, Relators needed to put forth evidence

that the potential jurors in Plaquemines Parish are incapable of being impartial.

The majority of Relators’ arguments in favor of a change in venue fall within

the “some other sufficient cause” category of La. C.C.P. art. 122 – Plaquemines

Parish residents have financial and personal interests in the outcome of this

litigation. Focusing on the financial interest, Relators attach as exhibits several

publications that allude to the financial benefits of coastal restoration in Plaquemines

Parish, ranging from decreased insurance premiums to a rejuvenated economy.

Relators cite to Wilson v. City of New Orleans, in which our Supreme Court stated,

“Due Process requires that a decision maker not have a direct or indirect financial

stake which would give a possible temptation to the average person as a decision

maker to make him partisan . . . .” 479 So.2d 891, 901 (La. 1985) (citing Ward v.

Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972); Tumey v.

Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)). Further, Relators cite

to Andry v. Cumis Ins. Soc. Inc., where this Court suggested a juror is “per se

incapable of the impartiality required of a juror” when he or she has a pecuniary

interest in the outcome of the case. 387 So.2d 1374, 1377 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).

Nevertheless, the cases cited by Relators are distinguishable as neither case

deals with a change of venue under La. C.C.P. art. 122. In Wilson, the issue pertained

to the City’s procedure for immobilizing vehicles with excessive parking tickets and

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whether the decision to “boot” vehicles was made before a neutral decision maker.

And, in Andry, the issue was the trial court’s refusal of a challenge for cause made

against jurors during voir dire, who believed their insurance rates would increase if

plaintiffs were adequately compensated. In the matter before this Court, we are

dealing with motions to change venue where Relators are asserting community-wide

partiality prior to voir dire without evidence of any inquiry into Plaquemines Parish

residents’ potential prejudice or partiality. Although news articles and reports

indicate possible financial incentives related to this litigation, there are also media

publications criticizing this litigation due to the negative effects these cases could

have on Louisiana’s oil and gas industry. Thus, we find Relators failed to put forth

evidence showing they would be unable to empanel a fair and impartial jury in

Plaquemines Parish due to the residents’ financial interest in the litigation.

Pivoting to the personal interest, Relators cite to the 2017 Louisiana’s

Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast, where the State acknowledged:

Flooding costs are not just about dollars and cents. When a home or
business floods, people suffer. They lose family treasures, they lose
sleep, and they lose precious time trying to get back to a starting point
that is threatened by each new flood. Even when there is a respite from
disaster, coastal residents must live with the question of whether they
and their homes will be safe in the long run.

In supplemental briefing, Relators reference the 2023 Louisiana’s Comprehensive

Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast, which they contend affirms the personal interest

articulated in the 2017 Master Plan. Additionally, Relators reference a Times

Picayune article, which said, “The fact that South Louisiana is sinking and that our

coastline is washing away is not news to people here. The evidence is everywhere.

… But in the post-Katrina age, we have discovered that we are more vulnerable than

many of us realized.” Relators cite to non-Louisiana cases to establish courts have

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ordered a change of venue when a community of prospective jurors have a direct,

personal interest in the outcome of a case. First, we acknowledge these cases are

non-binding on this Court. Second, in Ex parte Monsanto Co., 794 So.2d 350, 358

(Ala. 2001), the Alabama Supreme Court did not order a change in venue; rather, it

directed the trial court to rule on the motion to change venue. Although the Alabama

Supreme Court later recognized the trial court ordered the motion to change venue,

it did not provide any insight as to the trial court’s reasoning for the change in venue

nor did its opinion address this issue. See Ex parte Monsanto Co., 862 So.2d 595,

600 (Ala. 2003). Next, in Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. 1984), the North

Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision granting a change in venue.

However, the affidavits that the trial court relied on in rendering its decision

provided actual insight as to the thoughts and attitudes of the residents in that county.

See Haugo, 349 N.W.2d at 27-28. Last, in Althiser v. Richmondville Creamery Co.,

215 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1961), the New York state appellate court affirmed the trial

court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion to change the place of trial. Even

so, the appellate court’s decision rested on its finding that defendants provided

sufficient proof to meet the minimal statutory requirements regarding change of

venue. See Althiser, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 124. As such, we are not persuaded by these

non-binding cases.

This Court addressed a motion to change venue in Atkins, supra. In Atkins,

plaintiff brought a racial discrimination suit against a law firm and three partners,

who made disparaging comments about black judges and juries. Id. at 27.

Defendants filed a motion to change venue, asserting it would be impossible to

obtain a fair trial in Orleans Parish due to the nature of the allegations. Id. At the

hearing on the motion, defendants presented an expert who conducted a random

7

sampling of 500 potential Orleans Parish voters. Id. This expert explained the results

of the sampling showed that forty percent of the black potential Orleans Parish jurors

who said they could remain unbiased would find the law firm guilty after hearing

the top three most relevant allegations in plaintiff’s petition. Id. The expert further

opined that if this percentage was added to the voters who had “no stated position”,

it was possible that eight out of ten potential black jurors who said they could remain

unbiased would find defendants liable. Id. Plaintiff also presented an expert-

psychiatrist who questioned the results of the sampling. Id. The trial court denied the

motion, stating, in part, “This [c]ourt cannot believe at this point that an impartial

panel of twelve individuals cannot be selected after extensive voir dire, careful and

liberal challenges of jurors for cause, and the standard peremptory challenges.” Id.

at 27-28. The trial court concluded its reasons for judgment by stating, “In the event

that an impartial jury cannot be empaneled, the defendants may renew their motion

to suggest other appropriate alternatives.” Id. at 28.

On application for supervisory writ, this Court denied writ, noting defendants’

expert “did not state that it was impossible to empanel a fair jury, rather that a

percentage of black prospective jurors may not be fair” and “there remains

prospective black jurors who can be impartial under the alleged facts of this

litigation.” Id. We recognized “[t]he trial court properly denied the motion for a

change of venue with the stated reservation that the defendants may renew their

motion.” Id.

Just as the trial court in Atkins evaluated the evidence presented and

determined the motion to change venue was not warranted, the trial court in this

matter evaluated the evidence presented and determined the motions to change

venue were not warranted. Unlike the Atkins defendants, whose expert sampled

8

potential jurors in Orleans Parish to arrive at the assertion that it would be impossible

to empanel a fair and impartial jury, Relators provide no data to support their position

that a fair and impartial jury cannot be obtained in Plaquemines Parish. Relators

attempt to use local and national news reports and their journalism expert, Mr.

Goldstein, to show the extensive media coverage regarding coastal erosion and this

litigation. The voluminous news reports and articles show the public’s knowledge

of coastal erosion, its effect on Louisiana – particularly Plaquemines Parish – and

the potential financial pros and cons of this litigation. However, neither the news

articles and reports nor Mr. Goldstein’s review of these articles and reports

demonstrate Plaquemines Parish residents are partial, thus, necessitating a change in

venue. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court stated:

Defendants [Relators] are essentially asking the [c]ourt to assume
without adequate proof that every potential juror in this parish is
incapable of being unbiased and impartial as to the oil and gas industry
because of their financial self-interest and the threat of coastal erosion
to the residents of the parish.

The trial court determined Relators did not present evidence of the Plaquemines

Parish community’s actual thoughts about this litigation and the potential prejudicial

effects of pretrial publicity. We agree. Based on the record, Relators have not

demonstrated that they cannot receive a fair trial in Plaquemines Parish. Therefore,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to change venue.

However, the trial court did not expressly afford Relators the opportunity to re-urge

their motions. In line with the Atkins Court, we amend the trial court’s judgment for

the limited purpose of allowing Relators the opportunity to re-urge their motions in

the event an impartial jury cannot be empaneled.

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Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Mr. Goldstein

“A trial court has broad discretion when considering evidentiary matters,

including motions in limine.” PVCA, Inc. v. Pacific West TD Fund LP, 2020-0327,

p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/20/21), 313 So.3d 320, 326 (quoting Certain Underwriters at

Lloyd’s London v. United States Steel Corp., 2019-1730, p. 1 (La. 1/28/20), 288

So.3d 120, 121). “Thus, we are tasked with determining ‘whether the trial court

abused its great discretion in ruling on a motion in limine.’” Id. (quoting Cooper v.

Pub. Belt R.R., 2002-2051, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/22/03), 839 So.2d 181, 183).

In support of their motions to change venue, Relators attach an affidavit from

Mr. Goldstein, in which he analyzed media coverage of the coastal erosion in

Plaquemines Parish. In his affidavit, Mr. Goldstein attested he reviewed publications

that service the Plaquemines Parish community – The Plaquemines Gazelle, The

Times Picayune, and The New Orleans Advocate – as well as academic studies,

government documents, national press, and local broadcasts. He opined that media

coverage of the coastal erosion story is remarkable in that the story directly affects

the entire community, and the intensity of the story has increased over time. Mr.

Goldstein further attested his research revealed how significantly coastal erosion is

woven into the lives of the Plaquemines Parish community.

Responding to the motions to change venue, Respondent filed a motion in

limine to exclude Mr. Goldstein’s proffered testimony, asserting he is not qualified

to provide opinion testimony that prejudice exists in Plaquemines Parish so as to

warrant a change in venue. Additionally, Respondent asserted Mr. Goldstein did not

utilize reliable methodology to arrive at his conclusions; his opinions were

irrelevant; and his opinions did not meet the standards for expert testimony

established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113

10

S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116 (La. 1993).5

Respondent attached Mr. Goldstein’s deposition to its motion in limine. Although

Mr. Goldstein reviewed local and national publications and broadcasts related to

coastal erosion, when deposed, he admitted he did not interview any Plaquemines

Parish residents prior to reaching his conclusions. Mr. Goldstein further

acknowledged he did not poll the Plaquemines Parish residents to evaluate their

opinions about the lawsuit; did not scientifically analyze how the population in

Plaquemines Parish thought or received information; and could not offer an opinion

as to whether “there [was] any prejudice one way or the other in Plaquemines

Parish.” Additionally, when questioned whether he knew the effects the media

coverage had on the Plaquemines Parish population, Mr. Goldstein responded he

could make “informed speculation.”

“The requirements of expert testimony are set forth in La. C.E. art. 702, which

provides: If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier

of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified

as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify

thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Versluis v. Gulf Coast Transit Co.,

2008-0729, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/29/09), 17 So.3d 459, 463. Further, “[a] trial court

has broad discretion in determining who should or should not be permitted to testify

as an expert and whether the expert testimony is admissible, and its judgment with

respect to such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly erroneous.”

Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., 2021-0626, p. 22 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/5/23), 356

5 In State v. Foret, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility

of expert testimony in Louisiana state courts. 628 So.2d at 1123.

11

So.3d 1147, 1162 (citing Iteld v. Four Corners Const., L.P, 2012-1504, 2012-1505,

2012-1506, p. 25 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/5/13), 157 So.3d 702, 718).

The trial court stated in its reasons for judgment:

[T]he opinion evidence provided by Goldstein does nothing to assist
the [c]ourt in determining whether venue should be changed. All
Goldstein did was read articles from local newspapers to point out that
the issue of costal erosion has been frequently featured…the Court does
not need an expert such as Goldstein to help it understand that the
residents of this parish have been regularly exposed to news coverage
about coastal erosion.

The facts are undisputed. Mr. Goldstein did not speak with any Plaquemines Parish

residents regarding their attitudes about the lawsuit, and he could not opine on

whether the residents were prejudiced by the media coverage. As stated above, a

change of venue is proper when a party can show that he or she “cannot obtain a fair

and impartial trial because of the undue influence of an adverse party, prejudice

existing in the public mind, or some other sufficient cause.” La. C.C.P. art. 122. In

the matter herein, prejudice and impartiality are at issue. Mr. Goldstein’s testimony

was irrelevant regarding whether a change in venue was warranted based on

prejudice and a lack of impartiality. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in granting the motion in limine.

DECREE
Based on the foregoing reasons, we grant Relators’ writ applications and

affirm the trial court’s judgment with respect to the motions to change venue and

motion in limine. However, we amend the judgment for the limited purpose of

reserving Relators’ right to renew their motions to change venue if a fair and

impartial jury cannot be empaneled in Plaquemines Parish.

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED; AFFIRMED AS AMENDED

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