Rover Group, Inc. v. Dr. Gary Clark, Jarvis Antwine, Terry Bonnie, Ernest LeBlanc, Jr., Kashi Sherman, Harry Johnson, Individually and as Members, Director or Officers of "New Community Association for Welfare of School Children, Inc.", and G. Thomas Arbour, W.T. Winfiled, Aa

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

NUMBER 2018 CA 1576

ROVER GROUP, INC.

VERSUS

DR. GARY CLARK, JARVIS ANTWINE, TERRY BONNIE,
ERNEST LEBLANC, JR., KASHI SHERMAN, HARRY JOHNSON,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MEMBERS, DIRECTORS OR OFFICERS
OF " NEW COMMUNITYASSOCIATION FOR THE WELFARE
OF SCHOOL CHILDREN, INC.", AND G. THOMAS ARBOUR,
W. T. WINFIELD, AAROLYN WHEELER, AND THE
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION FOR THE WELFARE
OF SCHOOL CHILDREN

Judgment Rendered:
DEC 12 2019

Appealed from the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Docket Number 645668

Honorable William A. Morvant, Judge Presiding

Terry L. Bonnie Counsel for Defendants/ Appellants
Baton Rouge, LA Dr. Gary Clark, Jarvis Antwine,
Terry Bonnie, Ernest Leblanc, Jr.,
Kashi Sherman, Harry Johnson,
individually and as members,
directors or officers of "New
Community Association for the
Welfare of School Children, Inc."

Mark V. Marinoff Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Baton Rouge, LA Rover Group, Inc.

Preston J. Castille, Jr. Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
Katia D. Bowman Star Hill Baptist Church, Pastor
Baton Rouge, LA Raymond Jetson, Alex Keys, Jason
B. Thrower, and the Deacons of the
Star Hill Baptist Church

David H. Ogwyn Counsel for Defendants/ Appellees
Michael E. Platte G. Thomas Arbour, W T. Winfield
Baton Rouge, LA and Aarolyn Wheeler

BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., MCCLENDON, HIGGINBOTHAM,
THERIOT, AND PENZATO, JJ.

C6yic, u S ,

U

2

WHIPPLE, C.J.

This matter is before us on appeal by appellants, Dr. Gary Clark, Jarvis

Antwine, Terry Bonnie, Ernest Leblanc, Jr., Kashi Sherman, and Harry Johnson,

individually and as members, directors or officers of Community Association for

the Welfare of School Children, Inc., from the trial court' s June 13, 2018

judgment. That judgment sustained peremptory exceptions raising the objection of

peremption filed by appellees, Star Hill Baptist Church, Pastor Raymond Jetson,

Alex Keys, Jason B. Thrower, and the Board of Deacons of Star Hill Baptist

Church, and appellee, Rover Group, Inc. The judgment also sustained the

peremptory exception raising the objection of preemption filed by defendants, G.

Thomas Arbour, W. T. Winfield, and Aarolyn Wheeler. For the following reasons,

we affirm in part and vacate in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 27, 2014, Rover Group, Inc. (" Rover") entered into a Lease with an

Option to Purchase with Community Association for the Welfare of School

Children (" CAWSC"), a non-profit corporation, through its officers, directors,

and/or members G. Thomas. Arbour, W.T. Winfield, and Aarolyn Wheeler for

property located at 440 North Foster Drive in Baton Rouge (" Rover Lease"). On

October 12, 2015, Dr. Gary Clark, Jarvis Antwine, Terry Bonnie, Ernest Leblanc,

Jr., Kashi Sherman, and Harry Johnson filed a petition for eviction in Baton Rouge

City Court, contending that they owned the North Foster Drive property by virtue

of a judgment issued in a Quo Warranto Suit on July 13, 2015 (" Quo Warranto

Suit").' Although their eviction suit was ultimately dismissed, judgment was

issued in favor of Clark, Antwine, Bonnie, Leblanc, Sherman, and Johnson, in the

Quo Warranto Suit, providing, in pertinent part, as follows:

The Quo Warranto Suit was the subject of the appeal in Antwine v. Winfield, 2015- 1850
La. App. 1St Cir. 9/ 16/ 16), 203 So. 3d 454.
3

Considering the law, evidence and argument of counsel, the
Court ruled in favor of the Petitioners, Jarvis Ant[ wi] ne and Cecil J.
Cavanaugh and against defendants, W.T. Winfield, Alfred Williams,
G. Thomas Arbour, and Aarolyn [ Wheeler].

IT IS ORDERED, that defendant be enjoined and prohibited
from conducting any further business in the name of or on behalf of
the Community Association for the Welfare of School Children and,
further that an election be declared and held by Petitioners and held in
accordance with the applicable article of incorporation and/ or by-laws
within sixty (60) days of the court' s issuance of this ruling.

This court amended the judgment only to provide that " defendants be enjoined...,"

finding it just, legal and proper to revise the judgment to correct a typographical

error. Antwine v. Winfield, 2015- 1850 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 9/ 16/ 16), 203 So. 3d 454,

459 and 462. The judgment in the Quo Warranto Suit prohibited W.T. Winfield,

Alfred Williams, G. Thomas Arbour, and Aarolyn Wheeler from conducting

further business in the name of CAWSC. Because the Rover Lease was entered

into on May 27, 2014, which was prior to the date of the judgment in the Quo

Warranto Suit, Rover continued its operation in accordance with its belief that the

Rover Lease remained in effect, while Dr. Gary Clark, Jarvis Antwine, Terry

Bonnie, Ernest Leblanc, Jr., Kashi Sherman, and Harry Johnson, the new members

or officers of CAWSC, maintained that the Rover Lease was a nullity and without

effect.

Accordingly, on February 2, 2016, Rover filed the instant injunction and

possessory action against Clark, Antwine, Bonnie, Leblanc, Sherman, and Johnson

the " Clark defendants"), individually and as members, directors or officers of a

group identifying itself as " New Community Association for the Welfare of School

Children, Inc." 2 and against G. Thomas Arbour, W.T. Winfield, and Aarolyn

Wheeler ( the " Arbour defendants"), who were alleged to be acting as members,

directors, and/or officers of CAWSC. Rover also sought declaratory judgment,

2O November 17, 2016, the trial court granted a motion to strike the petition' s reference
to the " New Community Association for the Welfare of School Children, Inc."
4

injunctive relief, and damages as a result of the actions of the Clark and Arbour

defendants.

In response to the lawsuit filed by Rover, the Clark defendants filed a

pleading entitled, " Motion to Correct Parties['] Names in Plaintiff' s ( Rover Group,

Inc.) Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Possessory Action, Injunctive Relief and

Damages and Reconventional Demand" (" Clark Reconventional Demand").'

Although styled as a reconventional demand, the Clark Reconventional Demand

actually asserted a reconventional demand against Rover, a cross- claim against the

Arbour defendants,' and a third -party demand against Star Hill Baptist Church and

alleged members of its Board of Deacons, Raymond Jetson, Alex Keys, and Jason

B. Thrower (" Star Hill defendants"). In their reconventional demand against

Rover, the Clark defendants alleged that the Rover Lease was a nullity, as the

Arbour defendants did not have authority and did not comply with requisite

corporate formalities to enter into the contract on behalf of CAWSC. Similarly, in

the third -party demand, the Clark defendants alleged that the purported donation of

property to the Star Hill defendants was a nullity.

On November 16, 20165 the Clark defendants filed a motion to dismiss their

reconventional demand without prejudice. However, the order granting the

dismissal was not signed until January 26, 2018. In the interim, on December 9,

2016, Rover amended and supplemented its petition, eliminating the Clark and

Arbour defendants in the principal action and naming CAWSC as a defendant in

their place.' In response, CAWSC filed exceptions of no right and no cause of

Although not found separately in this designated record, this pleading was attached as
Exhibit A to the Arbour defendant' s Motion to Strike and contained a file -date stamp which
indicates that it was filed into the record. Also, the parties do not dispute that it was filed.
Also included with the Arbour defendants as a defendant in the cross claim was Alfred
C. Williams, who is deceased.

Incidental actions survive despite a subsequent motion for dismissal or discontinuance of
the principal action. LSA-C. C. P. art. 1039.

5

action, which were denied by the trial court. CAWSC then filed writ applications

with this court and the Supreme Court, all of which were denied.

In September of 2017, CAWSC answered Rover' s amended and

supplemental petition and asserted incidental demands therein. Specifically,

CAWSC asserted a third -party demand against W.T. Winfield, alleging that neither

he nor Alfred C. Williams ( deceased) were authorized to sign the Rover Lease on

behalf of CAWSC. CAWSC also reconvened against Rover, seeking various items

of damages, including damages for the continued unauthorized possession of the

North Foster Drive property at issue in the Rover Lease. Defendants Winfield and

Rover both filed answers and affirmative defenses in response to these demands by

CAWSC. Subsequently, a peremptory exception of peremption was filed by the

Arbour defendants,' which exception was later adopted and asserted by Rover. In

the exception, Rover and the Arbour defendants contended that any claims asserted

by CAWSC on the basis that the Arbour defendants were not authorized to execute

the Rover Lease were perempted pursuant to LSA-R.S. 12: 208.' These exceptions

were ultimately set to be heard by the trial court on May 21, 2018.

Although not included in the designated record, on or about February 27,

2018, the previously asserted and voluntarily dismissed third -party demand against

Although only Winfield was named as third -party defendant in CAWSC' s incidental
demand all of the Arbour defendants asserted the objection of peremption.

Louisiana Revised Statute 12: 208 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A. Invalidity of an act of a corporation, or of a conveyance or transfer of movable
or immovable property to or by a corporation, by reason of the fact that the
corporation was without capacity or power to perform such act or to make or
receive such conveyance or transfer, may be asserted only:
1) In an action by a member of the corporation to set aside such act, conveyance
or transfer, brought within one year after the act was done or the conveyance or
transfer was consummated, which time limit shall not be subject to suspension on
any ground or interruption on any ground other than timely suit[.]
LSA-R. S. 12: 208( A)( 1).

G'7

the Star Hill defendants was purportedly refiled by the Clark defendants.' In

response, Star Hill filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of

peremption ( pursuant to LSA-R.S. 12: 208( A)( 1)) and no cause of action, urging

that all claims asserted against them should be dismissed, with prejudice. The trial

court set the Star Hill defendants' exceptions for hearing on May 21, 2018.

On May 11, 2018, CAWSC filed oppositions to the exceptions filed by the

Star Hill defendants, the Arbour defendants, and Rover. The Clark defendants

filed a motion to continue the May 21, 2018 hearing on the basis that their motion

for summary judgment should be heard on the same date as the exceptions. The

trial court denied the motion to continue and heard the exceptions raising the

objection of peremption. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found

that the claims raised against the Star Hill defendants, the Arbour defendants, and

Rover were perempted under LSA-R.S. 12: 208, and therefore sustained the

exceptions. A judgment in conformity with the trial court' s rulings denying the

motion to continue, sustaining the exceptions, and dismissing the Clark

defendants' claims against the Star Hill defendants, the Arbour defendants, and

Rover, with prejudice, was signed on June 13, 2018. From this judgment, the

Clark defendants appeal,' asserting the following assignments of error and issues

for review:

8According to the memorandum in support of the exceptions filed by the Star Hill
defendants, the Clark defendants ( third -party plaintiffs) " re -filed their reconventional demand."
Also, the trial court' s reasons for judgment reference pleadings filed by the Clark defendants on
March 16, 2016, September 22, 2017, and February 27, 2018, which the trial court noted were
improperly styled, inasmuch as they were actually a reconventional demand against Rover, a
cross claim against the Arbour defendants, and a third -party demand against the Star Hill
defendants. However, on the designated record before us, it is unclear whether the Clark
defendants remained in the suit after Rover amended its petition and removed them as defendants
in the main demand and after the Clark defendants dismissed their own reconventional demand.

The record on appeal was designated in accordance with the request of appellants herein,
the Clark defendants. See LSA-C. C. P. art. 2128.

7

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

1. The trial court erred when it applied LSA-R.S. 12: 208 where there
is no action filed by a member of a nonprofit corporation, CAWSC,
against the nonprofit corporation, CAWSC.

2. The trial court erred when it failed to find that the action of W.T.
Winfield in signing the purported lease with option to purchase is null
and void ab initio.001

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the trial court should have denied the peremptory
exception of peremption filed by the Appelle [ sic] Rover?

2. Whether the trial court should have
denied the peremptory
exception of peremption filed by G. Thomas Arbour, W.T. Winfield
and Aarolyn Wheeler?

3. Whether the trial court should have denied the peremptory
exception of peremption filed by Star Hill Baptist Church, Pastor
Raymond Jetson, Alex Keys, Jason B. Thrower and the Board of
Deacons of Star Hill Baptist Church?

4. Whether the trial court should have granted Appellants, there [ sic]
motion to continue?

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The objection of peremption is properly brought through a peremptory

exception. LSA- C. C. P. art. 927. Peremption has been likened to the objection of

prescription such that the rules governing burdens of proof as to prescription apply

to peremption. Straub v. Richardson, 2011- 1689 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 5/ 2/ 12), 92 So.

3d 548, 552, writ denied, 2012- 1212 ( La. 9/ 21/ 12), 98 So. 3d 341, cert. denied, 569

U.S. 918, 133 S. Ct. 1805, 185, L.Ed.2d 811 ( 2013). While the exceptor bears the

burden of proof at the trial of the peremptory exception, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff if peremption is evident on the face of the pleadings. Id.

loWhile the Clark defendants assign as error the trial court' s failure to find the acts of
Winfield to be null and void, this issue was not before the trial court at the May 21, 2018
hearing. The issue was raised in the Clark defendants' motion for summary judgment, which
was not set for hearing on May 21, 2018. While the Clark defendants sought to continue the
hearing on matters set on May 21, 2018 so that the motion for summary judgment could be heard
at the same time, the trial court denied the continuance. As discussed below, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court' s denial. Therefore, this argument, raised in a motion for summary
judgment not yet heard by the trial court, is not properly before us in this appeal.
8

Peremption is a period of time fixed by law for the existence of a right.

When the peremptive period has run, the cause of action itself is extinguished

unless timely exercised.. LSA -GC. art. 3458; State through Div. of Admin. v.

McInnis Bros. Const., 97- 0742, p. 2 ( La. 10/ 21/ 97), 701 So. 2d 937, 939. Pursuant

to LSA-C. C. art. 3461, peremption cannot be renounced, interrupted, or suspended.

Louisiana Revised Statute 12: 208 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A. Invalidity of an act of a corporation, or of a conveyance or transfer
of movable or immovable property to or by a corporation, by reason
of the fact that the corporation was without capacity or power to
perform such act or to make or receive such conveyance or transfer,

may be asserted only:

1) In an action by a member of the corporation to set aside such act,
conveyance or transfer, brought within one year after the act was done
or the conveyance or transfer was consummated, which time limit
shall not be subject to suspension on any ground or interruption on
any ground other than timely suit[.]

3) In an action in damages by the corporation or by its receiver,
trustee or other legal representative, or by its members, in a derivative
or representative suit, against the incumbent or former officers or
directors of the corporation.

LSA-R. S. 12: 208( A)( 1) and ( 3). A plain reading of LSA-R.S. 12: 208( A)( 1)

demonstrates the peremptive nature of the statute: the statute both creates a right of

action and stipulates the delay within which the right may be brought. McInnis

Bros. Const., 701 So. 2d at 940- 41. Moreover, the one- year period set forth in

LSA-R.S. 12: 208( A)( 1) is not subject to interruption or suspension. However, no

time period is provided for bringing an action pursuant to LSA-R.S. 12: 208( A)(3).

Applicability of LSA-R.S. 12: 208 to the Action
Assignment of Error No. 1, Issues Presented Nos. 1- 3)

In their first assignment of error, the Clark defendants maintain that LSA-

R.S. 12: 208 does not apply when there is no action filed by a member of a

nonprofit corporation against the corporation. Specifically, they allege that

E

because the principal action against CAWSC was brought by Rover, who is not a

member of CAWSC, LSA-R.S. 12: 208 is wholly inapplicable to these proceedings.

We disagree.

CAWSC is a Louisiana nonprofit corporation, and the Louisiana Nonprofit

Corporation Law, LSA-R.S. 12: 201, et seq., is applicable. The defense of ultra

vires set forth in LSA-R. S. 12: 208 provides that the invalidity of an act or a

conveyance of immovable property by a corporation, by reason of the fact that the

corporation lacked capacity or power to perform such act or conveyance, may only

be asserted in four actions. Section 208( A)( 1) permits actions brought by members

of the corporation. Section 208( A)( 1) neither requires that a member bring the

principal action ( as opposed to an incidental action) nor that the action be brought

against the corporation." Further, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 12: 208( A)(3), the

corporation itself may bring an action for damages against the incumbent or former

officers or directors of the corporation.

While this case is procedurally complex, the record clearly reflects that

members of CAWSC ( namely, the Clark defendants) and the corporation itself

CAWSC) each asserted actions challenging the validity of an act or conveyance of

immovable property by CAWSC. First, the Clark defendants asserted incidental

actions against Rover, the Arbour defendants, and the Star Hill defendants and

alleged that the Rover Lease and the donation of property to Star Hill were invalid.

Additionally, Rover later added CAWSC as a defendant in place of the Clark and

Arbour defendants. CAWSC then asserted incidental actions against one of the

Arbour defendants, Winfield ( a former officer of CAWSC), alleging the invalidity

of the Rover Lease. Accordingly, LSA-R.S. 12: 208 is applicable to these actions

brought by the Clark defendants and CAWSC.

While LSA-R.S. 208( A)(2) does provide for actions brought by members against the
corporation to enjoin the performance of an action or conveyance, this provision is not
implicated in the instant proceedings.

10

Nonetheless, based on our review of the limited record on appeal, it is clear

that the Clark defendants asserted claims encompassed in LSA-R.S. 12: 208( A)( 1)

against Rover, the Arbour defendants, and the Star Hill defendants. However,

these claims were voluntarily dismissed by motion of the Clark defendants, which

the trial court granted on January 26, 2018. The record further reflects that prior to

the dismissal of their incidental actions, the Clark defendants were removed as

defendants in the principal action pursuant to Rover' s amended and supplemental

petition on December 9, 2016. Rover then named CAWSC as defendant in place

of the Clark and Arbour defendants. CAWSC thereafter filed incidental actions

against Winfield ( one of the Arbour defendants) and Rover on September 22,

2017, to which the Arbour defendants and Rover filed peremptory exceptions of

peremption. While the Clark defendants dismissed their action against the Star

Hill defendants, a pleading was apparently filed on or about February 27, 2018,

which allegedly reasserted claims against the Star Hill defendants and reasserted

claims against Rover and the Arbour defendants. While this pleading is not

contained in the designated record, the Star Hill defendants filed an exception

raising the objections of peremption and no cause of action in response to the

February 27, 2018 pleading.

Because the underlying pleading to which the Star Hill defendants lodged

their exceptions is not contained in the record designated by the Clark defendants,

the Clark defendants present nothing for review as to the merits of this portion of

the appeal. 12 While an appellant may designate the record pursuant to LSA-C. C.P.

art. 2128, the inadequacy of the record is imputed to the appellant. Garden Park

Estates Owners Ass' n, Inc. v. Nuss, 2016- 252 ( La. App. 5th Cir. 12/ 7/ 16), 207 So.

12We note that to the extent that the February 27, 2018 pleading merely reasserted the
Clark defendants' claims against the Star Hill and Arbour defendants and Rover, the trial court
did not err in sustaining the exception raised by the Star Hill defendants based on LSA-R.S.
12: 208( A)(1).

11

3d 1181, 1183- 84. A reviewing court must presume that the trial court' s judgment

is correct when a designated record does not enable an adequate review of the

matter at issue. Id. ( citing Noel v. Noel, 2015- 37 ( La. App. 3' Cir. 5/ 27/ 15), 165

So. 3d 401, 415, writ denied, 2015- 1121 ( La. 9/ 18/ 15), 178 So. 3d 147).

Regarding CAWSC' s third -party demand alleging that Winfield was not

authorized by CAWSC to enter into the Rover Lease, the Arbour defendants filed a

peremptory exception of peremption maintaining that CAWSC' s claims were

13
perempted pursuant to LSA-R. S. 12: 208( A)( 1). According to the allegations of

CAWSC' s third -party demand, Winfield was not authorized by CAWSC to enter

into the Rover Lease. If CAWSC' s third -party demand was subject to LSA-R.S.

12: 208( A)( 1), this action would be perempted on the face of the pleading, as the

third -party demand indicates that the Rover Lease was signed on May 27, 2014,

and the third -party demand was not filed in these proceedings until September 22,

2017. However, CAWSC' s action against Winfield is not " an action by a member

of the corporation to set aside such act" ( i. e., the Rover Lease) under LSA-R.S.

12: 208( A)( 1). Rather, it is " an action in damages by the corporation [... ] against

the incumbent or former officers or directors of the corporation" pursuant to LSA-

R.S. 12: 208( A)(3). CAWSC, the corporation, sued Winfield, a former officer of

CAWSC, asserting claims based upon the invalidity of the Rover Lease. 14 Unlike
Section 208( A)( 1), Section 208( A)(3) does not contain a specific peremptive

period or prescribe a time limitation for bringing the action.15 In light of the failure

of the legislature to provide a peremptive period, the time period for bringing an

13As noted previously, only Winfield was named as third -party defendant in CAWSC' s
third -party demand; however, all of the Arbour defendants responded by asserting the objection
of peremption.

14
Specifically, CAWSC alleged that Winfield was not authorized by CAWSC to sign the
Rover Lease and that the Rover Lease was illegal, null, and void ab initio.

15The prescriptive period applicable to an action is determined by the character of the
action disclosed in the pleadings. Born v. City of Slidell, 2015- 0136 ( La. 10/ 14/ 15), 180 So. 3d
1227, 1232.

12

action under Section 208( A)(3) ( an action for damages by the corporation against

the incumbent or former officers or directors of the corporation) cannot be

presumed to be peremptive. See Sibley v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Louisiana,

2013- 0924 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 3/ 20/ 14), 142 So. 3d 1022, 1024- 25 ( stating that

peremptive statutes are strictly construed against peremption and in favor of the

claim). Rather, actions brought under Section 208( A)(3) are subject to a

prescriptive period, which period is determined by the nature of the action itself

and which this court is not called upon to determine at this time. Absent a

statutory provision stating that the action brought by CAWSC is subject to

peremption, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court erred in sustaining

the Arbour defendants' peremptory exception raising the objection of peremption

16
in response to CAWSC' s third -party demand for damages. Accordingly, we

vacate this portion of the June 13, 2018 judgment.

With respect to the claims brought by CAWSC in its reconventional

demand, including claims for damages as a result of Rover' s allegedly

unauthorized occupancy and use of the property subject to the Rover Lease, LSA-

R.S. 12: 208 is not applicable. While the underlying transaction or occurrence upon

which CAWSC' s claims against Rover are based is the Rover Lease, which is

alleged to be an invalid act of the corporation, CAWSC' s action against Rover is

not one within the four actions provided in LSA-R.S. 12: 208. 17 The trial court

16Prescription cannot be supplied by the court, and prescription was not pled by the
Arbour defendants. LSA- C. C. art. 3452; LSA- C. C. P. art. 927( B).

17Louisiana Revised Statute 12: 208 provides as follows:

A. Invalidity of an act of a corporation, or of a conveyance or transfer of
movable or immovable property to or by a corporation, by reason of the
fact that the corporation was without capacity or power to perform such act
or to make or receive such conveyance or transfer, may be asserted only:

1) In an action by a member of the corporation to set aside such act,
conveyance or transfer, brought within one year after the act was done or
the conveyance or transfer was consummated, which time limit shall not be
13

sustained Rover' s peremptory exception raising the objection of peremption, which

exception was directed to CAWSC' s reconventional demand filed on September

22, 2017, 18 and which exception was based on the peremptive nature of an action

brought pursuant to LSA-R.S. 12: 208. Therefore, the trial court erred to the extent

that it sustained Rover' s exception to CAWSC' s reconventional demand, and we

must vacate this portion of the June 13, 2018 judgment. 19

Motion to Continue

The Clark defendants allege that the trial court erred in failing to grant a

continuance of the hearing on the exceptions. However, a trial court has wide

subject to suspension on any ground or interruption on any ground other
than timely suit;
2) In an action by a member against the corporation to enjoin the
performance of any act or the transfer of movable or immovable property
by or to the corporation. If the unauthorized act, conveyance or transfer
sought to be enjoined is being, or is to be, performed or made pursuant to
any contract to which the corporation is a party, the court may --if all of the
parties to the contract are parties to the action, if the corporation is without
capacity or power to perform the act or make or receive the transfer sought
to be enjoined, and if the court considers such relief to be equitable --enjoin
the performance of such contract, and in so doing may allow to the
corporation, or to the other parties to the contract, compensation for any
loss or damage sustained by any of them which may result from the action
of the court in enjoining the performance of such contract, but anticipated
profits to be derived from the performance of the contract shall not be
awarded by the court as loss or damage sustained,
3) In an action in damages by the corporation or by its receiver, trustee or
other legal representative, or by its members, in a derivative or
representative suit, against the incumbent or former officers or directors of
the corporation;

4) In an action by the state to dissolve the corporation, or to enjoin the
corporation from the transaction of unauthorized business.

B. In any action brought pursuant to subsection A( 1) or ( 2) of this section,
the plaintiff shall sustain the burden of proof that he has not at any time
prior thereto assented to the act, conveyance or transfer in question, and
that in bringing the action he is not acting in collusion with officials of the
corporation.

18Rover adopted the exception filed by the Arbour defendants, and specifically referenced
the September 22, 2017 pleading filed by CAWSC.
19Moreover, we note that the June 13, 2018 judgment sustaining Rover' s exception
dismissed the Clark defendants' claims against Rover; however, the relief requested by Rover in
its exception did not include a request for such relief, as Rover adopted the Arbour defendants'
exception, which only sought dismissal of CAWSC. Rover did not seek dismissal of the Clark
defendants independently. Notwithstanding, the Clark defendants did not raise this as an
assignment of error, and this court is unable to decipher the actual procedural posture of this case
due to the incomplete record designated by the Clark defendants. The inadequacy of the record
is imputed to the appellant. Garden Park Estates Owners Ass' n, Inc., 207 So. 3d at 1183- 84.
14

discretion in the control of his docket, case management, and the determination of

whether a motion for continuance should be granted, and the trial court' s ruling

will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of that

discretion. Daigle v. Tallow Creek, LLC, 2012- 1656 ( La. App. 11t Cir. 6/ 7/ 13)

2013WL2487746, * 5 ( unpublished opinion) ( citing Willey v. Roberts, 95- 1037

La. App. 1" Cir. 12/ 15/ 95), 664 So. 2d 1371, 1374, writ denied, 96- 0164 ( La.

3/ 15/ 96), 669 So. 2d 422; Norwood v. Winn Dixie, 95- 2123 ( La. App. 1St Cir.

5/ 10/ 96), 673 So. 2d 360, 362). Considering the record as designated on appeal,

we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its vast discretion in failing to

grant the motion for continuance.

Exception of No Cause of Action and No Right of Action

The Clark defendants also filed peremptory exceptions with this court

alleging that Rover' s petition did not state a cause of action or a right of action.

Provided that the exception is pled prior to the submission of the case and proof of

the grounds for the exception are in the record, an appellate court has the discretion

to consider a peremptory exception filed for the first time at the appellate level.

LSA-C. C. P. art. 2163; Adams v. S. Lafourche Levee Dist., 2015- 0507 ( La. App. I"

Cir. 6/ 27/ 16), 199 So. 3d 20, 24. However, in this limited and purposefully

designated record, it is unclear against which pleading the Clark defendants'

exceptions are lodged against.2° Accordingly, we deny the Clark defendants'

exceptions on the showing made.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, we vacate those portions of the Tune

13, 2018 judgment of the trial court granting G. Thomas Arbour, W.T. Winfield,

21While Rover initially named the Clark defendants in the original petition fled on
February 2, 2016, Rover filed a First Amending and Supplemental Petition on December 9, 2016
removing the Clark defendants from the principal demand. The sole remaining defendant in the
principal action filed by Dover is CAWSC.
15

Aarolyn Wheeler, and Rover Group, Inc.' s peremptory exceptions raising the

objection of peremption. Those portions of the June 13, 2018 judgment, denying

the motion to continue filed by Dr. Gary Clark, Jarvis Antwine, Terry Bonnie,

Ernest Leblanc, Jr., Kashi Sherman, and Harry Johnson, individually and as

members,
directors or officers of Community Association for the Welfare of

School Children, Inc., and sustaining the peremptory exception raising the

objection of peremption filed on behalf of Star Hill Baptist Church, Raymond

Jetson, Alex Keys, Jason B. Thrower and the Board of deacons of Star Hill, are

hereby affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Costs of the appeal are assessed one- half each to appellants, Dr. Gary Clark,

Jarvis Antwine, Terry Bonnie, Ernest Leblanc, Jr., Kashi Sherman, and Harry

Johnson, individually and as members, directors or officers of Community

Association for the Welfare of School Children, Inc., and appellee, Rover Group,

Inc.

PEREMPTORY EXCEPTIONS RAISING THE OBJECTION OF NO
CAUSE OF ACTION AND NO RIGHT OF ACTION DENIED ON THE
SHOWING MADE; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART
AND VACATED IN PART; REMANDED FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.

16