No. 2019-B-01747 (La. Mar. 16, 2020).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- In re Richard 188 So. 3d 1035
- In re Richard 243 So. 3d 555
- In Re Banks 18 So. 3d 57
- In re S.C.T 838 So. 2d 715
- Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Reis 513 So. 2d 1173
- Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Whittington 459 So. 2d 520
- In re Richard 148 So. 3d 923
Opinion text
03/16/2020 “See News Release 010 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents.”
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
019-B-1747
I
N RE: ROY JOSEPH RICHARD, JR.
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
Th
is disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Roy Joseph Richard, Jr., an
attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension.
PRI
OR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review
respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of
law in Louisiana in 2004. In 2013, he received an admonition for failing to cooperate
with the ODC in four investigations. In 2016, we suspended him from the practice
of law for one year and one day, with all but sixty days deferred, followed by one
year of unsupervised probation, after he allowed his client trust account to become
overdrawn on one occasion in October 2013 and failed to cooperate with the ODC’s
investigation of the overdraft. In re: Richard, 16-0076 (La. 4/4/16), 188 So. 3d 1035.
Respondent was reinstated from his suspension effective June 27, 2016. On
June 1, 2017, he was declared ineligible to practice law for failure to comply with
the mandatory continuing legal education requirements. Soon thereafter, he was also
declared ineligible for failure to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment.
Respondent has never rectified his ineligibility.
2
In May 2018, we considered an emergency petition filed by the ODC,
requesting respondent’s immediate in terim suspension from the practice of law
because he posed a threat of harm to the public. The ODC’s petition was based on
the same allegations of misconduct that are at issue in the instant matter. We granted
the ODC’s request and placed respondent on interim suspension on May 25, 2018.
In re: Richard, 18-0803 (La. 5/25/18), 243 So. 3d 555.
Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at
issue in the instant proceeding.
FORMAL CHARGES
17-DB-049
In November 2015, the ODC received a disciplinary complaint from James
Jones, who had retained respondent in 2012 to represent him at a hearing on his pro
se application for post -conviction relief. A third party, Rose Disotell, paid
respondent a $5,000 fixed fee on Mr. Jones’ behalf.
On March 27, 2013, respondent enrolled and appeared in court with Mr. Jones.
The hearing on Mr. Jones’ application for post-conviction relief was continued.
According to respondent, he met with the assistant district attorney and with the
attorney who represented Mr. Jones at his trial. However, he could find no evidence
favorable to Mr. Jones. As such, he moved to have the hearing continued without
date, and his motion was granted April 9, 2014. Nothing further occurred in the
case.
In July 2015, Mr. Jones wrote to respondent requesting the status of his legal
matter. Respondent did not respond to Mr. Jones’ letter. However, after receiving
notice of Mr. Jones’ disciplinary complaint in November 2015 and providing a
sworn statement to the ODC in February 2017, respondent wrote to Mr. Jones to
schedule a meeting with him on March 16, 2017. Respondent did not appear for the
3
meeting. He subsequently informed the ODC that he did not attend the meeting
because he did not receive a confirmation of the scheduled appointment from the
prison where Mr. Jones was incarcerated. He stated that he would follow up with the
ODC regarding a new court date for the hearing on Mr. Jones’ application for post-
conviction relief. The ODC heard nothing further from respondent, and the trial
court’s docket summary does not reflect the setting of a new hearing date. In a letter
dated August 9, 2017, Mr. Jones informed the ODC that respondent had not
contacted him.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (a lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with
a client), 1.5(f)(5) (failure to refund an unearned fee), 1.16(d) (obligations upon
termination of the representation), 3.2 (failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation), and 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct).
17-DB-072
In November 2016, Larry Guillory hired r espondent to represent him in
criminal matters pending in Acadia Parish. The contract of representation provided
for a flat fee of “$4,000 at present, $5,000 should matters proceed to be more
complex, but only under new contract.” Mr. Guillory’s aunt, Ca ffie Guillory, paid
respondent $1,000 on November 17, 2016, and respondent agreed to accept the
remaining $3,000 in monthly installments.
On November 22, 2016, respondent filed a motion to enroll and a motion for
a continuance of the November 28, 2016 trial date. Both motions were granted, and
the trial was reset for July 31, 2017.
On January 27, 2017, Ms. Guillory made a $300 payment toward her
nephew’s legal fees and received a receipt from respondent. When Ms. Guillory
4
attempted to make a second $300 payment, she could not locate respondent. Text
messages, telephone calls, e -mails, and a March 25, 2017 letter went unanswered.
Ms. Guillory eventually obtained a different telephone number for respondent from
a third party. Although respondent res ponded to a few text messages that Ms.
Guillory sent to the new number, the responses were in the nature of assurances that
he would contact Ms. Guillory or her nephew, which he did not do. Later texts to
respondent went unanswered.
When Mr. Guillory app eared in court for trial on July 31, 2017, respondent
was not present. The matter was reset for a status hearing on September 11, 2017.
On that date, respondent again failed to appear, and Judge Kristian Earles advised
Mr. Guillory that respondent was ineligible to practice law.
On September 12, 2017, Judge Earles filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent with the ODC. In October 2017, the ODC received a disciplinary
complaint from Ms. Guillory.1 Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its
investigation of the complaints.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(b)(c) (a lawyer is required to comply
with annual professional obligations), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(f) (5), 1.16(d), 3.2, 8.1(b) (a
lawyer shall not knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from
a disciplinary authority), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its
investigation), and 8.4(a).
18-DB-026
1 Ms. Guillory also filed a claim with and received $ 1,300 from the Louisiana State Bar
Association’s Client Assistance Fund.
5
Hilton Wilson hired respondent to represent him in a criminal matter pending
in Evangeline Parish. Respondent was paid $11,000 for the representation, which
included an appeal, if necessary.
Mr. Wilson was convicted and sentenced in December 2016. A motion for
new trial filed by respondent was set for hearing on April 3, 2017, but respondent
failed to appear, despite being served with notice of the hearing. The matter was
reset for May 25, 2017, and once again, respondent failed to appear despite notice.
Respondent became ineligible to practice law on June 1, 2017; however, he
was present in court on June 22, 2017. He received a copy of the motion for new
trial, and the motion was set for July 3, 2017. On that date, respondent again failed
to appear. The matter proceeded with an indigent defender appointed solely to assist
Mr. Wilson at the hearing on the motion. The motion for new trial was dismissed.
The court record contains no further pleadings filed by respondent on Mr. Wilson’s
behalf and no further court appearances by respondent on Mr. Wilson’s behalf.
According to Mr. Wilson, he last spoke with respondent on the day of his
sentencing. Since then, he has been unable to contact respondent in order to learn
the status of his appeal, and he cannot locate respondent to obtain his file.
Respondent also failed to return numerous telephone calls from Mr. Wilson’s mother
on her son’s behalf.
In December 2017, the ODC received a disciplinary complaint from Mr.
Wilson. Respondent failed to cooperate w ith the ODC in its investigation of the
complaint.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(b)(c), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a) (charging an
unreasonable fee), 1.5(f)(5), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a).
18-DB-042
6
Kimberly Gartman hired respondent in September 2016 to represent her in
two criminal matters, one in Allen Parish and the other in Jefferson Davis Parish.
The parties signed a fee agreement calling for a $5,000 flat fee in each matter, with
Ms. Gartman to pay $1,000 down on each matter and monthly payments of $300.
On September 14, 2016, Ms. Gartman paid respondent $2,000. Thereafter, Ms.
Gartman made monthly payments to respondent in accordance with the agreement.
Although she was not provided with receipts, Ms. Gartman estimated the total
payments made to respondent to be in excess of $7,000.
No criminal charges have yet been filed against Ms. Gartman in Jefferson
Davis Parish. However, a bill of information was filed against Ms. Gartman in Allen
Parish on January 11, 2017. The Allen Parish court record reflects that respondent
appeared on Ms. Gartman’s behalf on February 1, 2017, making an oral motion to
enroll. Respondent appeared again with Ms. Gartman on August 7, 2017 and
October 10, 2017. On October 10, 2017, a pre -trial conference date was set for
January 18, 2018 and a trial date was set for February 5, 2018. According to Ms.
Gartman, October 10, 2017 was the last time she spoke with respondent.
On January 18, 2018, Ms. Gartman appeared in court for purposes of the pre-
trial conference. Respondent was not present, and Ms. Gartman advised the Allen
Parish District Attorney’s Office that she had been unable to contact respondent. On
February 5, 2018, Ms. Gartman appeared in court alone for trial, and the matter was
continued until March 20, 2018. Unable to locate respondent, Ms. Gartman hired
new counsel.
Respondent did not file a motion to withdraw as Ms. Gartman’s counsel and
has not refunded any of the fee paid. Furthermore, when respondent appeared in
court with Ms. Gartman on August 7, 2017 and October 10, 2017, he was ineligible
to practice law.
7
In March 2018, the ODC received a disciplinary complaint from Ms.
Gartman.2 Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the
complaint.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(b)(c), 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a), 1.5(f)(5),
1.16(d), 5.5(a) (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a),
and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In September 2017, the ODC filed the formal charges in 17- DB-049. In
December 2017, the ODC filed the formal charges in 17-DB -072. In March 2018,
the ODC filed the formal charges in 18-DB -026. In May 2018, the ODC filed the
formal charges in 18-DB-042. Respondent failed to answer all four sets of formal
charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed
admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). The first matter was considered by Hearing Committee No.
22 while the other three matters were consolidated for consideration by Hearing
Committee No. 05. No formal hearings were held, but the parties were given an
opportunity to file with the hearing committees written arguments and documentary
evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for either hearing
committee’s consideration.
2 Ms. Gartman also filed a claim with and received $3,800 from the Client Assistance Fund.
8
Hearing Committee Reports
17-DB-049
After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing
committee acknowledged that the factual allegations set forth in the formal charges
were deemed admitted and proven. Additionally, the committee found that
respondent acknowledged it was reasonable for Mr. Jones to expect respondent’s
investigation to be completed in the three ye ars between the 2012 fee payment and
the filing of Mr. Jones’ disciplinary complaint in 2015. The committee concluded
that, in all respects, respondent abandoned his representation of Mr. Jones. Based
on these facts, the committee determined respondent v iolated the Rules of
Professional Conduct as charged.
The committee then determined that respondent knowingly, if not
intentionally, violated a duty owed to his client. Based on the ABA’s Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined t he baseline sanction is
suspension.
In aggravation, the committee found a prior disciplinary record, a dishonest
or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction
of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or
orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the
conduct, vulnerability of the victim, substantial experience in the practice of law,
and indifference to making restitution. The committee found no mitigating factors
present.
After considering respondent’s conduct in light of this court’s prior
jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the committee recommended
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for thirty months, with six months
deferred, followed by one year of supervised probation with the condition that
respondent make restitution.
9
The ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report. Specifically,
the ODC reserved the right to argue for harsher discipline upon the consolidation of
17-DB-049 with the other three matters before consideration by the disciplinary
board.
17-DB-072, 18-DB-026, & 18-DB-042
After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission in these
consolidated matters, the hearing committee acknowledge d that the factual
allegations set forth in each of the three sets of formal charges were deemed admitted
and proven. Based on these facts, the committee determined that respondent violated
the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged by the ODC in each s et of formal
charges.
The committee then determined that respondent intentionally violated duties
owed to his clients, causing actual harm. Based on the ABA’s Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined the baseline sanction is
disbarment. In aggravation, the committee found the following: bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the
rules or orders of the disciplinary agency and indifference to making restitution.
In the light of the above, the committee recommended that respondent be
disbarred.
The ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report. Specifically,
the ODC reserved the right to argue for permanent disbarment upon the
consolidation of these three matters with 17-DB-049 before consideration by the
disciplinary board.
10
Disciplinary Board Recommendation
17-DB-049, 17-DB-072, 18-DB-026, & 18-DB-042
After reviewing these consolidated matters, the disciplinary board noted that
the factual allegations in each set of formal charges were deemed admitted and
proven. The board determined that the record supports the deemed admitted facts
as well as the factual findings of each hearing committee. Based on these facts, the
board agreed with the committees that respondent violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct as charged, with one exception. With respect to Rule 1.5(a), the board
found that the flat fees respondent charged in 18-DB -026 and 18-DB -042 do not
appear to be unreasonable and no evidence was presented to pr ove they were
unreasonable in violation of Rule 1.5(a).
The board then determined that respondent knowingly and intentionally
violated duties owed to his clients and the legal profession, causing actual harm.
Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the board
determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.
In aggravation, the board found the following: a prior disciplinary record, a
dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the
rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the
practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. The board found that the
record supports no mitigating factors.
After considering respondent’s conduct in light of the permanent disbarment
guidelines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix D, as well as in light of
the court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the board
recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred. The board further
recommended that respondent be ordered to refund all unearned fees.
11
Although neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the board’ s
recommendation, on January 24, 2020, we ordered briefing addressing the issue of
an appropriate sanction. The ODC filed a brief in response to the court’s order;
respondent did not file a brief.
DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57.
In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual
allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supr eme Court Rule XIX, §
11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations
contained in the formal charges after those cha rges have been deemed admitted.
However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow
from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a
violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts,
additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions
that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan , 01 -3058 (La.
1/10/03), 838 So. 2d 715.
The records of these four deemed admitted matters support a finding that
respondent neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients, failed to
refund unearned fees, practiced law while ineligible to do so, and failed to cooperate
with the ODC in its investigations. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct as found by the disciplinary board.
12
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Rei s, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients,
the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct caused actual harm in the
form of delay in legal proceedings and loss of fees paid by or on behalf of his clients.
The baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is disbarment.
The record supports the aggravating factors found by the disciplinary board.
No mitigating factors are apparent from the record.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we agree with the board that
permanent disbarment is warranted. Guideline 1 of the permanent disbarment
guidelines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix D, indicates that
permanent disbarment may be warranted for “[r]epeated or multiple instances of
intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm.” Respondent accepted
fees totaling $13,300 to represent three clients in criminal matters, but there is no
evidence respondent did any significant work for these clients and he has not
returned any of the fees. Further, he has not returned any unearned portion of the
$11,000 fee he was paid to represent a fourth client, despite abandoning the client’s
case after filing a motion for new trial. Therefore, Guideline 1 is applicable.
Additionally, we have made it clear that the permanent disbarment guidelines
are illustrative and are not intended to bind our decision-making process. Supreme
13
Court Rule XIX, Appendix D ; In re: Richard, 14 -1684 (La. 10/3/14), 148 So. 3d
923, 926; In re: Bark, 11-1737 (La. 10/21/11), 72 So. 3d 853, 860. In addition to
the conversion of unearned fees by respondent which falls under Guideline 1, we
find other circumstances exist here which would support permanent disbarment
although they do not fall squarely under any of the Guidelines. These additional
circumstances include respondent’s prior disciplinary history, his apparent
abandonment of his clients, his prolonged ineligibility for failure to comply with
administrative professional obligations, his repeated failure to respond to requests
for information or participate in disciplinary investigations (eight matters from 2012
to 2018), his failure to engage at all in these consolidated proceedings, and the
presence of numer ous other aggravating factors and complete absence of any
mitigating factors. Respondent’s consistent pattern of misconduct, including his
continuing failure to address the obligations he owes as a professional, demonstrates
a clear lack of moral fitness to practice law.
Based on this reasoning, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and
permanently disbar respondent. We will further order respondent to make restitution
of all unearned fees to his clients and/or the Client Assistance Fund, as appropriate.
DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees
and disciplinary board, and considering the record and the brief filed by the ODC, it
is ordered that Roy Joseph Richard, Jr. , Louisiana Bar Roll number 28981, be and
he hereby is permanently disbarred. His name shall be stricken fr om the roll of
attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent
be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state.
It is further ordered that respondent shall make full restitution of all unearned fees,
14
with legal interest, to his clients and/or repay to the Louisiana State Bar
Association’s Client Assistance Fund any amounts paid to claimants on his behalf.
All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance
with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days
from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.