Jacob Stevenson, Jesse Stevenson, Individually And

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #011
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 3rd day of April, 2020 are as follows:
BY Johnson, C.J.:
2019-C-00637 JACOB STEVENSON, JESSE STEVENSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND
ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR SON, LOGAN STEVENSON VS.
PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY AND
ANTHONY J. LEBLANC (Parish of Terrebonne)
We granted this writ to determine whether plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempts
to fax file a petition on the last day of the prescriptive period after the clerk
of court’s business hours, but before midnight, interrupted prescription
where the clerk of court’s policy was to turn off the fax machines when the
office closed. The district court sustained defendants’ exception of
prescription and the court of appeal affirmed. For the following reasons,
we reverse the rulings of the lower courts.
REVERSED.
Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for
Justice Marcus R. Clark.
Weimer, J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons.
Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

04/03/20
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2019-C-00637
JACOB STEVENSON, JESSE STEVENSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON
BEHALF OF HIS MINOR SON, LOGAN STEVENSON
VS.
PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY AND ANTHONY J.
LEBLANC
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST
CIRCUIT, PARISH OF TERREBONNE
JOHNSON, Chief Justice*
We granted this writ to determine whether plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempts to
fax file a petition on the last day of the prescriptive period after the clerk of court’s
business hours, but before midnight, interrupted prescription where the clerk of
court’s policy was to turn off the fax machines when the office closed. The district
court sustained defendants’ exception of prescription and the court of appeal
affirmed. For the following reasons, we reverse the rulings of the lower courts.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs assert they were injured in an automobile accident on December 13,
2016. On December 13, 2017, plaintiffs’ counsel prepared a petition for damages and
attempted to fax file the petition with the Terrebonne Parish Clerk of Court at
approximately 4:47 p.m.1 Fax machine receipts from counsel’s office indicate a
*Retired Judge James H. Boddie Jr. appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Marcus R.
Clark.
1 According to plaintiffs, counsel was newly hired and did not obtain plaintiffs’ file from
previous counsel until approximately 2:00 p.m. on December 13, 2017. Additionally, although the
fax machine receipt reflects 17:47 (5:47 p.m.), plaintiffs explain that counsel had not adjusted the
machine for daylight savings time. In any event, it is undisputed that plaintiffs did not attempt to fax
file the petition before the clerk’s office closed at 4:30 p.m.
1

“BUSY/NO SIGNAL” message and demonstrate that several attempts to fax file the
petition on December 13, 2017, failed. The Terrebonne Parish Clerk of Court’s policy
at the time was to turn off the fax machines at the close of business hours–4:30 p.m.
Plaintiffs’ suit was filed the following day–December 14, 2017.
Defendants filed an exception of prescription which was sustained by the
district court. The court of appeal affirmed. Stevenson v. Progressive Security
Insurance Company, 18-1105 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/25/19), 275 So. 3d 297. Plaintiffs
filed a writ application in this court, which we granted. Stevenson v. Progressive Sec.
Ins. Co., 19-0637 (La. 9/24/19), --- So. 3d ---.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs’ tort suit is subject to the one-year liberative prescription for delictual
actions, commencing the day the injury or damage is sustained. La. C.C. art. 3492.
The accident giving rise to plaintiffs’ suit occurred on December 13, 2016. Therefore,
the petition, filed on December 14, 2017, was prescribed on its face. Accordingly,
plaintiffs bore the burden of proof to show that the action was not prescribed. Carter
v. Haygood, 04-0646 (La. 1/19/05), 892 So. 2d 1261, 1267. Evidence can be
introduced at the trial of the peremptory exception to support or controvert any of the
objections pleaded. La. C.C.P. art. 931. If evidence is introduced at the hearing on the
peremptory exception, the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the
manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. If the findings are reasonable in light
of the record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse even though
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the
evidence differently. Carter, 892 So. 2d at 1267. However, in this case, the relevant
factual issues are not disputed. Instead, our decision involves purely legal issues
regarding interpretation and application of relevant statutes as they relate to the
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Terrebonne Parish Clerk of Court’s fax filing policy. Thus, we review this matter de
novo. See In re Tillman, 15-1114 (La. 3/15/16), 187 So. 3d 445, 449.
Prescription is interrupted when the obligee commences an action against the
obligor in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue. La. C.C. art. 3462. A civil
action is commenced by the filing of a pleading presenting the demand to a court of
competent jurisdiction. La. C.C.P. art. 421. Fax filing of pleadings is governed by
statute. La. R.S. 13:850 provides, in part:
A. Any document in a civil action may be filed with the clerk of
court by facsimile transmission. All clerks of court shall make
available for their use equipment to accommodate facsimile filing in
civil actions. Filing shall be deemed complete at the time the
facsimile transmission is received by the clerk of court. No later than
on the first business day after receiving a facsimile filing, the clerk of
court shall transmit to the filing party via facsimile a confirmation of
receipt and include a statement of the fees for the facsimile filing and
filing of the original document. The facsimile filing fee and transmission
fee are incurred upon receipt of the facsimile filing by the clerk of court
and payable as provided in Subsection B of this Section. The facsimile
filing shall have the same force and effect as filing the original
document, if the filing party complies with Subsection B of this Section.
(Emphasis added).
At the trial of the exception, plaintiffs offered, filed, and introduced into evidence fax
machine transmission sheets from counsel’s office demonstrating attempts to fax the
petition to the clerk’s office on December 13, 2017. Additionally, plaintiffs offered,
filed, and introduced into evidence an affidavit from the Deputy Clerk with the
Terrebonne Parish Clerk of Court’s office setting forth the clerk’s policy regarding
fax filing. According to the affidavit of the Deputy Clerk:
Terrebonne Parish clerk’s office turns off the fax machines around 4:30
p.m. each day because the fax machines encounter problems, such as
paper jams, with high volume filings being filed after hours.
To assist attorneys in situations where they may need to file something
after 4:30 p.m., upon their request, we may leave the fax machines on or
someone from the office may stay late to file their pleading.
During the hearing, defendants objected to these documents as irrelevant and hearsay.
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Defendants suggest these documents were not made part of the record and thus
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving the prescriptive period had not lapsed.
Although neither the transcript of the hearing nor the court minutes reflect a definitive
ruling by the district court regarding admissibility of these documents, the exhibits
are stamped by the Clerk as “Filed in Evidence.” We therefore assume they were
accepted into evidence by the district court over defendants’ objections. Furthermore,
when a court is silent as to a matter placed at issue, we presume relief was denied.
See, e.g., M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So. 2d
16, 26, amended on reh’g (La. 9/19/08); Loria v. Petunia’s Rest., 02-1712 (La. App.
4 Cir. 7/9/03), 852 So. 2d 510, 512. We find no abuse of the district court’s discretion
in admitting these documents into evidence. See La. C.E. art. 803(6); La. C.E. art.
803(8); La. C.E. art. 902(8). Moreover, although defendants objected to the
introduction of these documents, defendants acknowledge the clerk’s policy was to
turn off the fax machines at 4:30 p.m. And defendants do not dispute that plaintiffs’
counsel attempted to fax file the petition on December 13, 2017, albeit after 4:30 p.m.
Plaintiffs assert La. R.S. 13:850(A) permits litigants to file civil delictual
actions via facsimile transmission, and the statute makes clear that each clerk of
court’s accommodation of facsimile filing is mandatory by use of the word “shall.”
According to plaintiffs, in order to comply with the plain language of the statute, the
clerks of court “shall make available” equipment for fax filing until the expiration of
the prescriptive period. Thus, because the prescriptive period ends at midnight of the
last day of the period, the clerk of court in this case failed to make equipment
available because the fax machines were turned off “around 4:30 p.m.” Plaintiffs also
argue the clerk of court failed to adhere to the requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 253,2
2 La. C.C.P. art. 253 provides in relevant part: “[Pleadings] may be transmitted electronically
in accordance with a system established by a clerk of court. When a clerk of court establishes such
4

which requires the clerk to adopt and implement procedures for electronic filing,
because the deputy clerk’s affidavit demonstrates inconsistent practices regarding the
exact time the fax machines were turned off.
By contrast, defendants argue no statute requires that fax filing be allowed
beyond the 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. statutorily mandated hours of operation for the
clerk of court. See La. R.S. 13:756. Neither La. C.C.P. art. 253 nor La. R.S. 13:850
require the clerk of court to accept fax filings after normal business hours. Rather, the
statutes give the clerk of court the ability to establish his or her own system for
electronic transmission filing and to adopt and implement his or her own procedures
for this system. Defendants point out that plaintiffs did not attempt to fax file their
petition until after normal business hours when the fax machines were turned off
pursuant to the clerk’s established procedures. Thus, defendants argue plaintiffs’
petition–filed the following day–is prescribed.
In affirming the district court’s ruling on the exception, the court of appeal
agreed with defendant and found the plaintiffs’ failed attempts to fax file the petition
were insufficient to interrupt prescription:
As the defendants point out, neither LSA-C.C.P. art. 253 nor LSA-R.S.
13:850 require Louisiana clerks of court to accept electronic filings after
the close of business. Instead, the legislature has given clerks of court
broad discretion to develop and implement electronic filing procedures
appropriate for the needs of their parish and the court’s capabilities. For
instance, the Deputy Clerk for the Terrebonne Parish Clerk of Court
explained, via affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs, that the clerk’s fax
machines are turned off at 4:30 p.m. because the machines “encounter
problems, such as paper jams, with high volume filings being filed after
hours.” The Deputy Clerk further advised that the fax machines may be
left on or an employee of the clerk’s office may remain at the office after
the close of business if an attorney advises the clerk’s office that she
intends to file a pleading after 4:30 p.m. Plaintiffs’ counsel apparently
did not contact the clerk’s office prior to the close of business on
December 13, 2017 to inquire about the clerk’s procedure. Counsel
a system, he shall adopt and implement procedures for the electronic filing and storage of any
pleading, document, or exhibit.”(Emphasis added).
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admits that “a simple telephone call to the Terrebonne Parish Clerk of
Court’s Office would have been able to cure the dilemma.”
***
Louisiana Revised Statute 13:850(A) unambiguously provides that the
filing will not be deemed complete until the clerk of court receives the
facsimile transmission. When a law is clear and unambiguous, and its
application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as
written, with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative
intent. *** Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs did not attempt to fax
file the petition prior to 4:30 p.m. when the clerk’s office closed. It is
further undisputed that the clerk’s office never received the fax
transmission. In fact, the clerk’s office did not receive the petition until
it was hand-delivered the day after prescription expired. Under these
facts, we cannot find that the plaintiffs’ failed attempt to fax file the
petition was sufficient to interrupt prescription.
Stevenson, 275 So. 3d at 301-02. After review of the record, and considering the law
and arguments of the parties, we find the lower courts erred in sustaining defendants’
exception of prescription.
In this case, the relevant prescriptive period ended at midnight on December
13, 2017. See La. C.C. art. 3456; Tillman, 187 So. 2d at 450. La. R.S. 13:850 provides
that a filing is not deemed complete until the clerk of court receives the facsimile
transmission. However, that statute also mandates that clerks of court make fax
equipment “available.” Thus, the issue is whether plaintiffs’ attempts to fax file the
petition on December 13, 2017, before midnight, interrupted prescription when the
clerk turned off the fax machines at 4:30 p.m., thus making the fax machine
unavailable and preventing the fax transmission from being received by the clerk’s
office on December 13, 2017. The starting point in the interpretation of any statute
is the language of the statute itself. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its
application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written
and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.
Red Stick Studio Dev., L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 10-0193 (La.
1/19/11), 56 So. 3d 181, 187-88.
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Although La. R.S. 13:756 mandates that clerks of court keep their offices open
from 8:30 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. every day except Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays,
and in cases of public emergency, the statutory language “shall make available” in La.
R.S. 13:850 relative to fax filing is not qualified and does not impose any hourly
restrictions. Making equipment “available” is not the same as keeping the clerk’s
office open. Thus, while clerks of court are prescribed certain hours when the office
must be open, based on the clear language of La. R.S. 13:850, the same limitation
does not apply to hours of availability for the clerk’s fax machines. Our interpretation
and application of the statute is consistent with the principle that “prescriptive statutes
are strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be
extinguished; thus, of two possible constructions, that which favors maintaining, as
opposed to barring, an action should be adopted.” Carter, 892 So. 2d at 1268. In this
case, the reason plaintiffs’ petition was not received by the clerk’s office on
December 13, 2017, was the clerk’s policy of turning off the fax machines at 4:30
p.m. The fax filing would have been successful but for the unavailability of the
clerk’s fax machine. Based on these facts, we find the clerk of court failed to make
its fax equipment “available” as required by the statute.
Moreover, the clerk’s policy of turning off the fax machines at 4:30 p.m.
effectively shortens a tort victim’s one-year prescriptive period and we find it invalid.
See Tillman, 187 So. 3d at 455. Allowing every clerk of court to establish a different
rule regarding the hours their fax machines are “available” can result in inconsistent
determinations of whether a petition is deemed timely filed. Based on the rulings of
the lower courts, a plaintiff could not timely fax file a petition at 10:00 p.m. on the
last day of the prescriptive period in Terrebonne Parish because that clerk turns off
the fax machines at 4:30 p.m., but the same petition faxed at 10:00 p.m. in a parish
7

that does not turn off its fax machines would be deemed timely filed. We cannot
allow a unilateral policy or rule set by an individual clerk of court to affect
prescription. The same prescriptive period must be available in every judicial district
of the state.
We also reject the contention of the court of appeal that plaintiffs’ counsel
could have easily “cured the dilemma” by calling the clerk’s office prior to the close
of business to take advantage of the clerk’s policy to accommodate attorneys who
need to file a pleading after 4:30 p.m. This “policy,” described by the deputy clerk in
her affidavit, is concerning. The exception to the 4:30 p.m. rule is an unpublished
policy which effectively extends a courtesy to attorneys who happen to be aware of
its existence. The unpublished policy unquestionably favors only those attorneys who
are aware of it, and demonstrates inconsistency and unfairness in the application of
the clerk’s fax filing policy. In effect, certain parties are prejudiced simply by being
unaware of the unpublished policy. We decline to find plaintiffs should have known
to take advantage of an unpublished discretionary policy, or that plaintiffs were
obligated to seek out a different method of filing their petition, when they were
unable to file it in a manner provided by law solely due to the clerk’s action of
making the fax machines unavailable. See Saxon v. Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. Newark,
N.J., 224 So. 2d 560, 562 (La. 1969).
Based on the facts of this case, we find plaintiffs’ attempts to fax file their
petition with the clerk of court prior to midnight on the last day of the prescriptive
period were sufficient to interrupt prescription. In so ruling, we agree with the
reasoning of the court in Lloyd v. Monroe Transit Auth. ex rel. City of Monroe,
50,292 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/16), 185 So. 3d 866, writ denied, 16-0277 (La. 4/8/16),
191 So. 3d 585. In Lloyd, plaintiff attempted to fax file a petition on the last date of
8

the prescriptive period, but the transmission was not confirmed as received by the
clerk of court’s fax machine until the next morning. Specifically, plaintiff’s counsel
attempted a fax filing beginning at 4:24 p.m., before the end of the business day.
Other attempts continued into the evening. As in this case, it was the clerk of court’s
policy to turn off the fax machine at the close of regular business hours at 4:30 p.m.
In finding the suit timely, the court explained that a fax transmission need not be
received during regular working hours so long as a transmission occurred before
midnight on the final date for the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the court
considered the issue of whether plaintiff’s fax filing attempts before and after the
legal closing time on the final date of the prescriptive period should serve to interrupt
prescription. The court reasoned:
Once the clerk has implemented electronic filing capabilities and
procedures for its office, “the official record shall be the electronic
record.” La. C.C.P. art. 253(B). The electronic record in this case does
clearly establish that Lloyd attempted to use the clerk’s fax facility.
Exactly why the “busy” response occurred is unclear. The machine, at
4:24 p.m., may have been receiving another fax transmission. Later, the
machine was apparently turned off, but that would not have been made
clear to Lloyd’s counsel by the continuous “busy”’ notifications.
The argument can be made that Lloyd should have been more diligent
and persistent with the filing efforts on May 1 and been prepared for an
alternate plan to complete the filing within the clerk’s regular hours or
possibly thereafter through some direct contact with the clerk.
Nevertheless, Lloyd elected to use the fully authorized electronic filing
within a timely manner. Since we agree that such electronic filing should
be deemed proper even when receipt of the fax transmission occurs after
business hours, the clerk’s actual registry of the filing as a new suit
record would not be necessary on the date of the electronic filing. That
registering of the new suit record did in fact occur in that manner in this
case, one day after the electronic record recorded Lloyd’s actions, and
the suit proceeded with service and notice to defendants in the usual
manner.
From this assessment of Lloyd’s efforts on May 1, we find that the
electronic record supports the conclusion that the actions for
interruption of prescription occurred timely.
Lloyd, 185 So. 3d at 870-71. We recognize the plaintiff in Lloyd first attempted to fax
9

his petition at 4:24 p.m., prior to the 4:30 p.m. close of business. However, we do not
find that fact dispositive, nor does that fact mandate a different result in this case. It
is a plaintiff’s attempt to fax file with the clerk prior to the midnight prescription
deadline that is relevant. As in Lloyd, we decline to put the onus on plaintiffs to find
another method of filing the petition when fax filing is a fully authorized method and
counsel attempted to use that method before the prescriptive period ended.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we reverse the rulings of the lower courts. Based on the facts
of this case, plaintiffs’ attempts to fax file their petition prior to midnight on the last
day of the prescriptive period served to interrupt prescription.
DECREE
REVERSED.
10

04/03/20
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2019-C-00637
JACOB STEVENSON, JESSE STEVENSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON
BEHALF OF HIS MINOR SON, LOGAN STEVENSON
VS.
PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY
AND ANTHONY J. LEBLANC
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT,
PARISH OF TERREBONNE
WEIMER, J., concurring in the result.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that, under the unique facts and
circumstances of this case, the lower courts erred in concluding the plaintiffs’ claims
are prescribed.
Louisiana R.S. 13:850(A) directs that “[a]ll clerks of court shall make available
... equipment to accommodate facsimile filing in civil actions.” In connection with
this requirement, La. C.C.P. art. 253(B) instructs that when a clerk of court
establishes an electronic filing system, “he shall adopt and implement procedures for
the electronic filing.” The clerk is afforded broad discretion to establish a system for
electronic transmissions and to adopt and implement procedures for this system
appropriate to the needs of the parish and the court’s capabilities.
In the present case, it is undisputed that, while the clerk adopted a policy and
procedures with respect to facsimile filings, the entirety of that policy was not
published or disseminated. That lack of full disclosure operated to the detriment of
the plaintiffs in this case, who were not made aware of the unpublished policy of the

clerk’s office to accommodate attorneys who need to file pleadings after office hours
upon receiving a request from the attorneys to leave the fax machine on.
The basic goal or aim of any procedural rule is “to implement the substantive
law, and to implement that law in a manner which will provide maximum fairness to
all parties with a minimum expenditure of judicial effort.” Stevens v. Bd. of
Trustees of Police Pension Fund of City of Shreveport, 309 So.2d 144, 151 (La.
1975). Certainly, that is the aim of La. C.C.P. art. 253 insofar as it seeks to
implement the statutory requirement that facsimile equipment be made available for
filings in civil actions.
For this reason, I respectfully concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the
rulings of the lower courts.
2

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2019-C-00637
JACOB STEVENSON, JESSE STEVENSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON
BEHALF OF HIS MINOR SON, LOGAN STEVENSON
VERSUS
PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY
AND ANTHONY J. LEBLANC
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST
CIRCUIT, PARISH OF TERREBONNE
CRAIN, J., dissenting.
The plaintiffs maintain they were prevented from timely filing suit because
the Terrebonne Parish Clerk of Court , pursuant to her policy, turned off her fax
machine at 4:30 p .m. when business hours legally end ed. See La. R.S. 13:756.
According to the plaintiffs, that action violated the clerk’s statutory obligation to
“make available . . . equipment to accommodate facsimile filing in civil actions.”
See La. R.S. 13:850. In effect, the majority find s the quoted language mandates
every clerk of court “make available” a fax machine twenty-four hours a day, 365
days a year. I disagree.
While Section 850 plainly and unambiguously requires a clerk of court to
“make available” a fax machine to accept civil filings, it does not say when the fax
machine must be availabl e. Other statutes provide guidance. Louisiana Revised
Statute 13:756 requires clerks to “keep their offices open from 8:30 A.M. to 4:30
P.M. every day except Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, and in cases of public
emergency.” Section 756 also grants clerks the discretion to extend their mandated
hours, stating a clerk “may open their offices at an earlier time or close their offices
at a later time.” For fax filings, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 253
requires a clerk to establish a “system” for such filings and to “adopt and implement
procedures for the electronic filing and storage of any pleading.” Construing these
04/03/20

2

provisions in pari mat eria, I believe a clerk of court must make a fax machine
available during mandated working hours and, at the clerk’s discretion, may make it
available before or after those hours.
Here, the clerk ’s policy made the fax machine available during normal
working hours and, when requested, after hours . I find nothing improper or
unauthorized about that system. I do not agree that the clerk’s accommodation
allowing after-hours use of the fax machine, upon request, “is an unpublished policy
which effectively extends a courtesy to attorneys who happen to be aware of its
existence.” Neither Article 253 nor Section 850 requires publication of a clerk’s fax
machine policy, particularly after-hours use. Nor is that needed when an interested
party can easily learn the after-hours policy by c alling the clerk’s office during
normal working hours and asking. No form of publication, however widespread, is
a substitute for minimal effort to make oneself aware of the policy.
The plaintiffs’ claims are prescribed on the face of the petition , having been
filed more than one year after the injury -causing event. Consequently, the court
must determine, and the plaintiffs must prove, whether prescription was suspended
or interrupted. I belie ve the doctrine of contra non valentem is the appropriate
analytical framework for that determination. Under that doctrine, prescription does
not run against a party who is prevented from enforcing his cause of action by some
reason external to his own will, such as a condition that prevented his access to the
courts. Corsey v. State, Through Department of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319, 1322
(La. 1979). T he doctrine only applies in exceptional circumstances and will not
exempt a claim from prescription if the plaintiff’s ignorance is attributable to his
own wilfulness or neglect; that is, a plaintiff will be deemed to know what he could
by reasonable diligence have learned. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp. , 09-2368
(La. 10/19/10), 48 So. 3d 234, 246.
04/03/20

3

The plaintiffs presented no evidence indicating that some condition prevented
them from filing suit before 4:30 p.m. on the last day of prescription or , through
reasonable diligence, from learning the clerk’s policy for after -hours fax filings.
Prescription was not suspended by the clerk turning off her fax machine at the close
of business on the last day of prescription, any more so than locking her office doors
at 4:30 p.m. “shorten[ed]” the prescriptive period . Turning off the fax machine at
4:30 p.m. i s completely consistent with the clerk’s statutory obligation to accept
filings during mandated business hours. The plaintiffs’ suit is untimely. I would
affirm the lower courts’ judgments granting the exception of prescription.
04/03/20