2019-C-0377 Precedential Writ Granted; Judgment Vacated; Remanded Processed

Steven Jackson v. Greenwich Insurance Company, Shane Benoit, Testing Holdings USA, Inc., and/or Intertak AKA Intertek USA, Inc., Geico and Liberty Personal Insurance Company

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit · Filed July 31, 2019

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

STEVEN JACKSON * NO. 2019-C-0377

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL

GREENWICH INSURANCE * FOURTH CIRCUIT
COMPANY, SHANE BENOIT,
TESTING HOLDINGS USA, * STATE OF LOUISIANA
INC., AND/OR INTERTAK
AKA INTERTEK USA, INC., *******
GEICO AND LIBERTY
PERSONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2018-10830, DIVISION “G-11”
Honorable Robin M. Giarrusso, Judge

******
JUDGE SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS
******

(Court composed of Chief Judge James F. McKay, III,
Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins)

Peter R. Brigandi, Jr.
THE BRIGANDI LAW FIRM, LLC
1630 Franklin Street
Gretna, Louisiana 70053

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RELATOR

Terry Thibodeaux
THE THIBODEAUX LAW FIRM, LLC
P.O. Box 2090
One Lakeshore Drive, Suite 1220
Lake Charles, LA 70602

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED

JULY 31, 2019

Plaintiff/relator, Steven Jackson, seeks review of the trial court’s March 19,

2019 judgment granting the exception of improper venue in favor of

defendants/respondents, Shane Benoit, Greenwich Insurance Company, Testing

Holdings USA, Inc., and Intertek USA, Inc., and transferring this case to the 24 th

Judicial District Court in Jefferson Parish. Based on our de novo review of this

case, in light of the applicable law and jurisprudence, we find the trial court erred

in granting defendants’ exception of improper venue without conducting a

contradictory hearing to determine whether plaintiff was in bad faith when he filed

suit in Orleans Parish. Accordingly, we vacate and set aside the trial court’s

judgment and remand this matter to the trial court to conduct a contradictory

hearing and rule anew on the exception of improper venue.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 26, 2017, Mr. Jackson, an Orleans Parish domiciliary, was

involved in an automobile accident with Shane Benoit, a Jefferson Parish

domiciliary, in Kenner, Louisiana, Jefferson Parish. According to the accident

report taken at the scene of the accident by Kenner Police Department, Mr. Jackson

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was driving a vehicle owned by Claudell Anderson and insured by GEICO, and

Mr. Benoit was driving a vehicle owned by Intertek and insured by Greenwich.

Prior to filing suit, between November 2017 and June 2018, Mr. Jackson’s

attorney sent three letters addressed to York Risk Services Group, the insurance

adjuster for defendants, requesting declaration insurance policy limits. Plaintiff

did not receive any response from the insurance adjuster.

On October 26, 2018, plaintiff filed his petition for damages in Orleans

Parish Civil District Court, naming the following defendants: Mr. Benoit, the

alleged tortfeasor; Testing Holdings and/or Intertek, the alleged employers of Mr.

Benoit; Greenwich, the alleged liability insurer for Mr. Benoit, Testing Holdings,

and/or Intertek; GEICO, the liability insurer for the vehicle driven by plaintiff; and

Liberty Personal Insurance Co., plaintiff’s uninsured/underinsured motorist

(“UM”) insurer. Along with his petition for damages, plaintiff filed and requested

service on defendants for his first set of interrogatories and requests for production

and inspection of documents. Among the requested information and documents,

plaintiff sought certified copies of all insurance policies that may provide coverage

to defendants.

On December 19, 2018, defendants Mr. Benoit, Intertek, Testing Holdings,

and Greenwich, filed declinatory exceptions of insufficiency of citation,

insufficiency of service of process, lack of jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant, and improper venue.1 At the hearing on the exceptions, on February 15,

2019, the trial court heard arguments regarding the exception of improper venue

only. Defendants argued that proper venue for this action is in East Baton Rouge

1
GEICO and Liberty Personal Ins. Co. did not file declinatory exceptions to plaintiff’s petition.
GEICO filed an answer to plaintiff’s petition on January 15, 2019; Liberty Personal Ins. Co. filed
an answer on January 3, 2019.

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or Jefferson Parish only, based on where the accident occurred and because their

insurance policies were in excess of $15 million, and that plaintiff had no reason to

join his UM insurer in this suit, except to obtain venue in Orleans Parish.

However, defendants did not offer or introduce copies of the insurance policies or

declaration pages at the hearing.2 The trial court then left the matter open for 30

days to allow defendants to supplement the record with the insurance policy

declaration pages, and the trial court stated it would issue its judgment “depending

on what I see.”

On March 11, 2019, defendants submitted a letter to the trial court stating

that certified copies of all effective insurance policies had been provided to

plaintiff’s counsel; and enclosed with the letter, defendants submitted to the trial

court redacted insurance policy declaration pages issued by Greenwich, Navigator

Insurance Company, and American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company.3

On March 19, 2019, the trial court issued a judgment and written reasons

for judgment granting the exception of improper venue in favor of defendants and

transferring the matter to the 24th Judicial District Court in Jefferson Parish.4 On

that same date, the trial court filed the letter and declaration pages, submitted by

defendants, into the record of this case as Exhibits “Court 1” and “Court 2.”

Plaintiff timely filed a notice of intent to apply for supervisory review of the

trial court’s March 19, 2019 judgment. Plaintiff also requested a stay of

proceedings pending a decision on its writ application by this Court and, if writs

2
Defendants stated that they provided plaintiff’s counsel a copy of the primary insurance policy
on the morning of the hearing.
3
Defendants redacted the pricing information from the policy declaration pages.
4
The trial court’s judgment granted only the exception of improper venue, which is the subject
of this writ, and pretermitted the other exceptions to be transferred to and decided by the 24th
Judicial Court.

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are timely sought, final decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The trial court

granted the stay and set a return date. Plaintiff’s timely writ application followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s ruling granting an exception of improper venue is reviewed de

novo, because venue is a question of law. Matthews v. United Fire & Cas. Ins.

Co., 16-0389, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/8/17), 213 So.3d 502, 505 (citing Premier

Dodge, L.L.C. v. Perrilloux, 05-0554, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/25/06), 926 So.2d

576, 577.

DISCUSSION

Venue means the parish where an action or proceeding may properly be

brought and tried under the rules regulating the subject. La. C.C.P. art. 41. Under

the general rules of venue, provided in La. C.C.P. art. 42, venue is proper at “the

‘home base’ of the entity sued.” Underwood v. Lane Memorial Hosp., 97-1997, p.

4 (La. 7/8/98), 714 So.2d 715, 717. According to the general rules of venue, an

action against an individual domiciled in the state shall be brought in the parish of

his domicile; an action against a domestic corporation or a domestic insurer shall

be brought in the parish where its registered office is located; and an action against

a foreign insurer shall be brought in the parish of East Baton Rouge. La. C.C.P.

art. 42. These general rules of venue, however, are subject to the exceptions

contained in La. C.C.P. arts. 71 through 85, and as otherwise provided by law. La.

C.C.P. art. 43. Among those exceptions, La. C.C.P. art. 76 provides that an action

on an accident insurance policy may be brought in the parish where the insured is

domiciled, or in the parish where the accident occurred. In addition, La. C.C.P. art.

73(A) provides in pertinent part that an action for the recovery of damages against

joint or solidary obligors may be brought in the parish where the plaintiff is

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domiciled if the parish of plaintiff’s domicile would be a parish of proper venue

against any defendant under La. C.C.P. art. 76. See Chesne v. Mayeaux, 03-0570,

pp. 6-7 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/5/03), 865 So.2d 766, 770.

An objection of improper venue is raised by declinatory exception. See

La. C.C.P. art. 925. On the trial of the declinatory exception, evidence may be

introduced to support or controvert the objection when the grounds thereof do not

appear from the petition. La. C.C.P. art. 930. “If the grounds for the objection of

improper venue do not appear on the face of plaintiff’s petition, the burden is on

defendant to offer evidence in support of his position.” Matthews, 16-0389, p. 4,

213 So.3d at 505 (quoting Vital v. State, 522 So.2d 151, 152 (La. App. 4th Cir.

1988)). “When no evidence is introduced at the trial of the exception the court is

restricted to the allegations of the petition, which for purposes of the exception are

to be accepted as true.” Id.

In this case, defendants raised the exception of improper venue, asserting

that proper venue lies in either East Baton Rouge or Jefferson Parish only and that

plaintiff’s inclusion of claims for uninsured/underinsured coverage lack legal

foundation and are in bad faith solely to confer venue in the place of plaintiff’s

domicile in Orleans Parish. In opposition, plaintiff argued that venue is proper in

Orleans Parish, his own domicile, in accordance with the venue provisions of La.

C.C.P. arts. 76 and 73. Plaintiff further argued that defendants could not meet their

burden to prove he was in bad faith in joining his UM insurer, because despite

plaintiff’s repeated, diligent efforts to obtain the pertinent insurance policy limit

information from defendants, at the time of the filing of the petition, plaintiff had

no knowledge of defendants’ insurance policy limits. In the trial court’s written

reasons for granting defendants’ exception, the trial court found the only basis for

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venue in Orleans Parish is plaintiff’s inclusion of UM claims; defendant Intertek

has insurance; and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his claims will exceed

defendants’ insurance policy limits.

Plaintiff now argues the trial court erred in granting the exception of

improper venue, because defendants failed to meet their burden to offer evidence

controverting the allegations in plaintiff’s petition or proving plaintiff acted in bad

faith by filing suit against his UM insurer. Plaintiff notes that defendant did not

offer or introduce any evidence at the hearing, and the affidavit attached to

defendants exception of improper venue and the declaration pages attached to the

letter to the trial court are not proper record evidence to be considered by the trial

court.

Reviewing the exception of improper venue de novo, we first look to

whether the objection of improper venue is evident on the face of the pleadings.

Finding that Orleans Parish is a proper venue under the venue rules, we then turn

to whether defendants offered evidence in support of their argument that plaintiff

acted in bad faith in joining his UM insurer solely for the purpose of making venue

proper in Orleans Parish.

In his petition for damages, plaintiff, a domiciliary of Orleans Parish, joined

his UM insurer as a defendant. As recognized by this Court’s jurisprudence, citing

the venue provisions in La. C.C.P. arts. 76 and 73, a plaintiff may file suit against

his UM insurer in the parish of his own domicile, because he is the insured under

the policy; and, when the parish of plaintiff’s domicile is the proper venue as to

one solidary obligor, it is proper venue as to all solidary obligors. See Gavin v.

USAA Cas. Ins., 98-0614 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/21/99), 747 So.2d 577; Gaspard v.

Louisiana Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 96-2148 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/6/96), 684 So.2d 55;

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Cantrelle v. State Farm, 94-1940 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/13/95), 654 So.2d 790; see

also Saldana v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 39, 094 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/04),

889 So.2d 1170; Laborde v. American Nat. Property & Cas. Companies, 00-01091

(La. App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 780 So.2d 501. Thus, our jurisprudence holds that when

plaintiff joins his UM insurer as a defendant, venue is proper in the parish of

plaintiff’s domicile. Accordingly, on the face of the petition, Orleans Parish is a

proper venue.

However, if after a contradictory hearing on the exception, the trial court

determines that the joinder of the UM insurer was in bad faith solely for the

purpose of obtaining venue in the parish of plaintiff’s domicile, then the trial court

should maintain the exception of improper venue. Farrar v. Haedicke, 97-2923

(La. 12/2/97), 702 So.2d 690 (per curiam). As stated previously herein, a

defendant raising the declinatory exception of improper venue bears the burden of

offering evidence to support that objection when the grounds thereof do not appear

on the face of the petition. See La. C.C.P. art. 930; Matthews, 16-0389, p. 4, 213

So.3d at 505.

The record of these proceedings reflects that defendants failed to offer or

introduce any competent evidence to support their exception of improper venue

based on plaintiff’s bad faith in joining his UM insurer. At the hearing on the

exception, defendants acknowledged that the “fundamental part of the exception is

the issue of whether or not plaintiff is in good faith”, which plaintiff correctly

argued was defendants’ burden to prove with competent record evidence.

Defendants then relied upon the affidavit of David Oberst, Associate Counsel for

Intertek, that was attached to defendants’ exception, to demonstrate that defendants

were insured for $15 million under their primary and excess insurance policies.

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But, “[a] sworn affidavit is hearsay and is not competent evidence unless its use is

specifically authorized by statute.” Michael F. Smith, CPA v. Alford, 04-0586, p. 4

(La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So.2d 674, 676; see also Pyburn v. Walle Corp., 454

So.2d 1128, 1130 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984). Even if defendants had formally

offered the affidavit of David Oberst into evidence at the hearing, it would not

have constituted admissible evidence. See Alford, supra. Defendants also did not

offer or introduce any evidence or testimony regarding the insurance policy limits,

which is the sole basis for defendants’ argument that plaintiff is in bad faith for

joining his UM insurer. Even when the trial court left the matter open for

defendants to submit documentation of the insurance policy declaration pages,

defendants submitted a letter with attachments to the trial court rather than filing a

supplemental pleading with exhibits into the record.

Although the trial court itself filed defendants’ letter and the attached

documentation into the record, we find these exhibits were not properly considered

by the trial court. “Evidence not properly and officially offered and introduced

cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the record.” Denoux v.

Vessel Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 07-2143, p. 6 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 87.

In addition, we find that the trial court failed to make the factual

determination as to whether plaintiff named his UM insurer in bad faith solely for

the purpose of obtaining venue in Orleans Parish. When the trial court left the

matter open for defendants to submit the insurance policy declaration pages, it

stated “I want to [sic] keep it open to see a deck [sic] page because if there is 15

million I’m going to grant the exception[,] [i]f it’s not, one million you may be in

Orleans Parish.” The trial court later stated it would issue its judgment “depending

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on what I see” in the declaration pages. Then, the trial court’s written reasons for

judgment stated only as follows:

The only basis for venue in Orleans Parish is plaintiff’s
inclusion of uninsured/underinsured motorist claims. After review of
the policies, Intertek is neither. It has insurance, and plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate that his claim will exceed the policy limits.

Notably, the trial court made no inquiry at the hearing, nor any determination in its

written reasons for judgment, regarding whether plaintiff was in bad faith for

joining his UM insurer.

Moreover, we note that the trial court’s determination of whether plaintiff

was in bad faith when he filed suit in Orleans Parish should not be determined

solely upon the aggregate of the policy limits. The determination of bad faith turns

on the facts and circumstances of the case, such as whether plaintiff failed to

reasonably investigate and determine whether the tortfeasor, Mr. Benoit or his

alleged employer, was adequately insured before naming plaintiff’s own UM

insurer and filing in the parish of plaintiff’s domicile, which would otherwise not

be a proper venue. See Gray v. Gray, 07-1606 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/23/08), 977

So.2d 1049, 1053-55 (Tobias, J., concurring) (submitting that considerations for

the bad faith determination should include the amount of time and effort

plaintiff/plaintiff’s counsel used to investigate the claim and the tortfeasor’s ability

to respond in damages before filing in plaintiff’s parish of domicile that but for the

UM policy would not be a proper venue); Cf. Smith v. Audubon Ins. Co., 95-2057,

p. 9 (La. 9/5/96), 679 So.2d 372, 377 (“[T]he determination of … bad faith turns

on the facts and circumstances of each case. … The determination of good or bad

faith in an insurer’s deciding to proceed to trial involves the weighing of such

factors, among others, as … the adequacy of the insurer’s investigation, and the

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openness of communications between the insurer and insured.”). And the trial

court must make its determination based on facts supported by evidence entered

into the record at a contradictory hearing.

Based on our review of the record and the applicable law and jurisprudence,

we find the trial court erred in granting defendants’ exception of improper venue

without holding a contradictory hearing, at which testimony and evidence is

offered and introduced into the record, and making a specific determination as to

whether plaintiff named his UM insurer in bad faith solely for the purpose of

obtaining venue in Orleans Parish. See Gray v. Gray, 07-1606, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4

Cir. 1/23/08), 977 So.2d 1049, 1051-52; Haines v. Millet, 06-0289 (La. 5/26/06),

950 So.2d 678; Farrar, 97-2923, 702 So.2d at 691. Accordingly, the trial court’s

March 19, 2019 judgment is vacated and set aside, and this matter is remanded to

the trial court to conduct a contradictory hearing on whether plaintiff joined his

UM insurer in bad faith solely for the purpose of obtaining venue in Orleans

Parish.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED

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