Earl A. Adams, Jr. v. Chevron USA, Inc.

EARL A. ADAMS, JR., ET AL. * NO. 2019-CA-0210

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
CHEVRON USA, INC., ET AL. *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

EARL ADAMS, ET AL NO. 2019-C-0198

VERSUS

CHEVRON USA, INC., ET AL

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

EARL ADAMS, ET AL NO. 2019-C-0199

VERSUS

CHEVRON USA, INC., ET AL

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

EARL A. ADAMS, JR., ET AL NO. 2019-C-0708

VERSUS

CHEVRON, U.S.A., ET AL

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

EARL A. ADAMS, JR., ET AL. NO. 2020-CA-0069

VERSUS

CHEVRON USA, INC.

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

ELDA LONG, ALTHEA SMART, NO. 2020-CA-0070
EARL HYNES, EDWARD
WILLIAMS, KENNETH
MOUILLE, MALCOLM HARRIS,

JR., AND MERLE MCINTYRE

VERSUS

JOSEPH GREFER AND THE
ESTATE OF CAMILLE GREFER

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2002-19308, DIVISION “D”
Honorable Nakisha Ervin-Knott, Judge
******
JAMES F. MCKAY
CHIEF JUDGE
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge James F. McKay III, Judge Terri F. Love, Judge
Roland L. Belsome)

ROBERT G. HARVEY
LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT G. HARVEY, SR., APLC
600 North Carrollton Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana 70119
-and-
DARLEEN MARIE JACOBS
THE LAW OFFICES OF DARLENE M JACOBS
823 St. Louis Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
-and-
ALAN DEAN WEINBERGER
HANGARTNER, RYDBERG & TERRRELL
Hancock Whitney Center, Suite 310
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
-and-
DONALD C. DOUGLAS, JR.
THE DOUGLAS LAW FIRM, LLC
1070 West Causeway Approach, Suite B
Mandeville, Louisiana 70471
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/ APPELLANTS

EBERHARD D. GARRISON
PETER N. FREIBERG
KEVIN HUDDELL
LINDSAY E. REEVES
CHRISTOPHER W. SWANSON
JONES SWANSON HUDDELL & GARRISON, LLC
601 Poydras Street, Suite 2655
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

REVERSED AND REMANDED

FEBRUARY 24, 2021

JFM
TFL
RLB This case arises out of the contamination of a parcel of land with naturally

occurring radioactive material (NORM), resulting from of oil-field supply cleaning

activities.1 The neighboring landowners filed suit against several defendants

involved in the oil-field supply cleaning activities, as well as the landowners of the

contaminated property. Eventually, the plaintiffs2 entered into settlement

agreements with most of the defendants with the exception of the landowners. 3

The landowners did not participate in the settlements, did not contribute to the

settlements, and were not parties to the settlements.

Several years after the plaintiffs had entered into the settlement agreements

with other defendants, the landowner defendants, on June 20, 2018, filed a motion

to enforce settlement agreement against the plaintiffs. A hearing on the motion

took place on August 30, 2018. After considering the motions, supporting

memoranda, and the exhibits thereto and opposition, as well as the oral arguments

1
For a more detailed history regarding the background of this case, one may wish to consult
Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 02-1237 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/8/07), 965 So.2d 511, cert. denied, 553
U.S. 1014, 128 S.Ct. 2054(mem), 170 L.Ed.2d 810.
2
The named plaintiffs in this case are Elda Long, Althea Smart, Earl Hynes, Edward Williams,
Kenneth Mouille, Malcom Harrison, and Merle McIntyre.
3
The named defendants in this case are Joseph Grefer and Camille Grefer.

1

presented by counsel, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed

the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice on September 11, 2018. It is from this

judgment that the plaintiffs now appeal.4

The issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in preventing the

plaintiffs from offering evidence of the intent of the actual settling parties

regarding the scope of the settlement and in dismissing the plaintiffs’ case.

The issue presented by this appeal is a question of law. Questions of law are

reviewed de novo, with judgment rendered “ ‘on the record, without deference to

the legal conclusions of the tribunals below.’ ” Holly J. Smith Architects, Inc. v. St.

Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., 06-0582, p. 9 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037,

1045; quoting Louisiana Municipal Association v. State, 04-0227, p. 35 (La.

1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 836. “We are also mindful that when legal error

committed by the trial court interdicts the fact-finding process, the appellate court

must conduct a de novo review of the record.” Kennedy-Fagan v. Estate of

Graves, 07-1062, p. 11 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/21/08), 993 So.2d 255, 264; citing Levy

v. Bayou Industrial Maintenance Services, Inc., 03-0037, p. 7 ((La.App. 1 Cir.

9/26/03), 855 So.2d 968, 974.

When a dispute arises as to the scope of a compromise agreement, extrinsic

evidence can be considered to determine exactly what differences the parties

intended to settle. Maggio v. Parker, 17-1112, p. 4 (La. 6/27/18), 250 So.3d 874,

4
This consolidated appeal involves the judgment enforcing the settlement agreement, a judgment
compelling discovery, and several writs. However, based on the statements made by
plaintiffs/appellants’ counsel, on the date of oral argument in this Court, it seems only the
judgment enforcing the settlement agreement is now being appealed.

2

879 (internal citations omitted). In Maggio, the Louisiana Supreme Court

explained and affirmed a long history of cases which established, recognized, and

applied an exception to the “four corners” rule when interpreting settlement

agreements. Id. at 879; See Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 93-1019 (La. 1/14/94), 630

So.2d 741. A compromise settles only those differences that the parties clearly

intended to settle. Maggio at 879. See La. C.C. art. 3076. Accordingly, the

plaintiffs in the instant case contend that a clearly established exception to the

“four corners” rule allows them to offer evidence.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the landowner defendants are not

parties to any settlement agreement with the plaintiffs. It is also undisputed that

the landowner defendants did not contribute to any settlement agreement with the

plaintiffs. As the landowner defendants are never mentioned in the four corners of

any of the settlement agreements, the only way they could have been dismissed is

by reference to something outside the agreements themselves.

Under these circumstances, the trial court should have considered the

evidence of the intent of the actual parties to the settlement concerning whether the

landowner defendants would or would not be released. To not do so interdicted the

fact-finding process. Therefore, the district court erred as a matter of law in

refusing to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to offer evidence of the intent of the

settling parties, i.e., a contradictory hearing where the parties could have called

witnesses and introduced other extrinsic evidence to establish the true intent of the

parties to the settlement.

3

For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is

reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

4