Jenna S. Ard v. Grrlspot, LLC and Christine E. Johnson

JENNA S. ARD * NO. 2019-CA-0312

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
GRRLSPOT, LLC AND *
CHRISTINE E. JOHNSON FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

JENNA S. ARD NO. 2019-CA-0335

VERSUS

GRRLSPOT, LLC AND
CHRISTINE E. JOHNSON

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2018-04626, DIVISION “D”
Honorable Nakisha Ervin-Knott, JUDGE
******
Judge Paula A. Brown
******

(Court composed of Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods,
Judge Paula A. Brown)

Imtiaz A. Siddiqui
IAS LAW LLC
900 Camp Street, No. 4C16
New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

Peter J. Butler, Jr.
Richard G. Passler
BREAZEALE SACHSE & WILSON, L.L.P
909 Poydras Street
Suite 1500
New Orleans, LA 70112

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN
PART; VACATED IN PART
AND REMANDED; MOTION
TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED.
October 23, 2019

This matter involves a dispute over alleged partnership interests in a

business called GrrlSpot, LLC. Plaintiff/Appellee, Jenna Ard, filed suit against

Defendant/Appellant, Christine Johnson, seeking damages and injunctive relief.

The district court heard Ms. Johnson’s application for preliminary injunction based

upon the verified pleadings and supporting affidavits. The district court granted

Ms. Ard’s request for preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the district court granted

Ms. Ard’s motion to amend the preliminary injunction to furnish security and

denied Ms. Johnson’s cross-motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. In

addition to allowing Ms. Ard to furnish security, the amended preliminary

injunction ordered the same injunctive relief contained in the original injunction

and, among other things, prohibited Ms. Johnson from interfering with Ms. Ard’s

operational control of the business. Ms. Johnson appeals the district court’s

judgment granting the amended preliminary injunction. Ms. Johnson also appeals

the district court’s judgment denying her cross-motion to dissolve the preliminary

injunction arising out of Ms. Ard’s failure to furnish security in the original

1

preliminary injunction. Ms. Ard alleges Ms. Johnson failed to timely appeal the

judgment on the original preliminary injunction and requests the appeal be

dismissed.

We find the district court properly granted the motion to amend to allow Ms.

Ard to furnish security. The amended preliminary injunction, however, amounted

to a mandatory injunction and also changed the status quo, outcomes which require

an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We further find Ms. Johnson

timely appealed the judgments and deny Ms. Ard’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Ard and Ms. Johnson began marketing monthly social events for

members of the LGBT community under the name of GrrlSpot sometime in 2010.

GrrlSpot events were primarily promoted through online social media resources,

such as websites, e-mail databases, Facebook, and Instagram. Personal and

business conflicts developed between Ms. Ard and Ms. Johnson in 2017. Their

seven-year personal relationship ended in February 2017. In March 2017, Ms.

Johnson allegedly blocked access to GrrlSpot’s financial records, business email

accounts, and social media accounts.

On July 14, 2017, Ms. Ard filed a petition for damages, declaratory

judgment, and injunctive relief (the “Petition”) against Ms. Johnson and Grrlspot,

LLC, in First City Court for the City of New Orleans.1 The Petition alleged the

1
Jenna S. Ard v. GrrlSpot, LLC and Christine E. Johnson, FCC No. 2017-0512.

2

two had entered into one or more oral agreements to form a partnership2 to host

and coordinate entertainment events under the names of GrrlSpot and GrrlSpot

NOLA (collectively, “GrrlSpot.”). The Petition further alleged Ms. Ard provided

financial support and entertainment and technical services to GrrlSpot, while Ms.

Johnson performed certain logistical, bookkeeping, and financial tasks. Ms. Ard

contended Ms. Johnson breached their partnership agreement, converted assets,

and committed fraud. Citing irreparable harm, Ms. Ard requested a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”).

On July 14, 2017, following a hearing on the TRO, the City Court granted

the TRO prohibiting, in part, Ms. Johnson’s use of the GrrlSpot name and its assets

without the participation of Ms. Ard.3 On July 24, 2017, Ms. Ard and Ms.

Johnson agreed to enter INTO a consent judgment. The consent judgment

dissolved the TRO and stipulated that Ms. Johnson would continue to operate

GrrlSpot, protect GrrlSpot’s assets, and provide Ms. Ard with a monthly

accounting.4 Ms. Johnson answered the underlying Petition in First City Court on

2
Although the Petition states that Ms. Ard and Ms. Johnson has formed a partnership under the
name “GrrlSpot,” the Petition also describes GrrlSpot, LLC as a single member limited liability
corporation.
3
The TRO included the following:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
considering the law and motion of counsel, that a temporary restraining order is
granted because otherwise petitioner will suffer immediate and irreparable injury,
loss and/or damages. The temporary restraining order shall be issued under
Louisiana Civil Code of Procedure article 3603; prohibiting, restraining, and
enjoining defendants, Christine E. Johnson and GrrlSpot, LLC from holding
events using the name “GrrlSpot,” advertising events using social media accounts
with the name “GrrlSpot,” and otherwise generating proceeds through the use of
the partnership’s assets, tangible, and/or tangible property, without the
participation of Ms. Ard, pending hearing on this Petition[.]
4
The Consent Judgment included the following terms:

3

August 4, 2017. She denied the allegations, arguing, in part, that Ms. Ard never

had an ownership interest in GrrlSpot.

On November 2, 2018, Ms. Ard filed a motion for preliminary injunction,

which is the subject of the present appeal, in Civil District Court for the Parish of

Orleans (“CDC”).5 Ms. Ard alleged that Ms. Johnson had improperly withdrawn

funds from GrrlSpot’s accounts, transferred GrrlSpot funds into Ms. Johnson’s

personal bank account, and used GrrlSpot funds to create a competing business—

actions which threatened to destroy Grrlspot. Ms. Ard prayed that Ms. Johnson be

enjoined from interfering with Ms. Ard’s operational control of Grrlspot, from

exerting any operational control over the partnership, and from having further

access to the partnership’s assets until the parties’ rights could be determined at a

trial on the merits. In support, Ms. Ard attached a written, notarized partnership

agreement6 executed between Ms. Ard and Ms. Johnson on July 8, 2011, Grrlspot

Christine Johnson can continue to operate GrrlSpot, LLC including all use
of the website and social media;
***
Christine Johnson will protect the net profits of GRRLSPOT, LLC and
will render an accounting of income and expenses to Jenna Ard of any
GRRLSPOT, LLC event within 30 days of said event. This provision does not in
any matter reflect any ownership interest of Jenna Ard in GRRLSPOT, LLC and
is not to be used as such in this lawsuit.
5
At the time Ms. Ard filed the motion for preliminary injunction, the underlying Petition had
been transferred from First City Court to CDC based on Ms. Ard’s representation that the
amount in controversy exceeded the $25,000.00 jurisdictional authority of First City Court.
6
The partnership agreement provided the following pertinent terms and conditions:

Partnership Agreement
GrrlSpot, LLC

Partnership agreement made on the 8th ,[sic] day of July, 2011 between Christine
Johnson, of New Orleans, Orleans Parish, Louisiana and Jenna Ard, of New Orleans, Orleans
Parish, Louisiana (“partners”).

4

bank records, and social media postings regarding GrrlSpot events and “Love

Shack Entertainment,” the alleged competing business.

In response, Ms. Johnson urged that Ms. Ard had no ownership interest in

GrrlSpot and accused Ms. Ard of forging Ms. Johnson’s signature on the

partnership agreement. Following Ms. Johnson’s attack on the validity of the

RECITALS

A. Partners desire to join together for the pursuit of common business goals.

***

In consideration of the mutual promises contained in this agreement, partners agree as
follows:

The name of the partnership shall be GrrlSpot. . . .

1. DURATION OF AGREEMENT

The term of this agreement shall commence on the date listed above and continue until
terminated by mutual consent of the parties or by operation of the provisions of this agreement.

***

7. BOOKS AND RECORDS

Books of accounts shall be maintained by Christine Johnson and proper entries made in the
books of all sales, purchases, receipts, payments, transactions, and property of the partnership. . .
Each partner shall have free access at all times to all books and records maintained relative to the
partnership business.

***

14. FIDUCIARY DUTY

The partners shall be under a fiduciary duty to conduct the affairs of the limited liability
company and the partnership in the best interest of the limited liability company and all of its
members.

15. BREACH OF AGREEMENT

In the event any partner should breach this agreement, or any terms and conditions
contained in this agreement, the remaining partner(s) shall have authority to bring suit against the
party in breach, on behalf of the partnership. The partnership shall be responsible for all costs
and attorneys’ fees occasioned by any suit to enforce the rights and obligations described herein,
and the prevailing partner shall retain ownership of partnership assets.

5

partnership agreement, Ms. Ard supplemented her motion for preliminary

injunction with the affidavit of Chad P. Youngblood, the Notary to the partnership

agreement. In his affidavit, Mr. Youngblood verified the authenticity of the

partnership agreement, attesting that on July 8, 2011, he personally witnessed Ms.

Ard and Ms. Johnson execute the partnership agreement before him. Mr.

Youngblood also attested that he confirmed with Ms. Johnson the authenticity of

his notarial attestation of the partnership agreement in a telephone conversation

with her.

The district court fixed the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction

for November 27, 2018, and ordered, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3609, the matter

be heard on the verified pleadings or affidavits.7 At the conclusion of the hearing,

the district court granted Ms. Ard’s request for a preliminary injunction against

Ms. Johnson, enjoining Ms. Johnson from interfering with Ms. Ard’s operational

control of GrrlSpot pending trial on the merits, among other things. The

preliminary injunction also ordered Ms. Johnson to provide Ms. Ard with certain

information pertaining to GrrlSpot, but it did not include an order to furnish

security as required by La. C.C.P. art. 3610.8

7
La. C.C.P. art. 3609 provides, in part, the following:

The court may hear an application for a preliminary injunction or for the
dissolution or modification of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction upon the verified pleadings or supporting affidavits, or may take proof
as in ordinary cases. If the application is to be heard upon affidavits, the court
shall so in writing, and a copy of the order shall be served upon the defendant at
the time the notice of hearing is served.
8
La. C.C.P. art. 3610 states, in relevant part:

A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction shall not issue
unless the applicant furnishes security in the amount fixed by the court, except

6

The following day, November 28, 2019, Ms. Ard, recognizing that security

had not been furnished, filed a motion to amend the preliminary injunction

(“motion to amend’) to add a provision for her to furnish security. Ms. Ard also

filed a separate motion for contempt, complaining that Ms. Johnson had not taken

immediate steps to comply with the terms of the preliminary injunction. In turn,

Ms. Johnson filed an opposition to the motion to amend, along with a cross-motion

to dissolve and/or modify the preliminary injunction (“motion to dissolve”). Ms.

Johnson asserted the original preliminary injunction was invalid on its face as it

had been issued without a security bond in violation of La. C.C.P. art. 3610.

On December 18, 2018, the district court conducted a hearing on both

parties’ motions. At the conclusion of the hearing, on December 19, 2018, the

district court rendered two separate judgments. In the first judgment, the district

court granted Ms. Ard’s motion to amend; denied Ms. Ard’s motion for contempt;

and denied Ms. Johnson’s motion to dissolve. In the second judgment, the district

court issued an amended preliminary injunction. The amended preliminary

injunction ordered the same injunctive relief as contained in the original November

28, 2018 preliminary injunction order. Additionally, the amended preliminary

injunction required Ms. Ard to post a $1000.00 security bond and noted that the

injunction would not issue until the security was posted.

where security is dispensed with by law. The security shall indemnify the person
wrongfully restrained or enjoined for the payment of costs incurred and damages
sustained. . . .

7

Ms. Johnson filed, in this court, a supervisory writ application on the

judgment granting Ms. Ard’s motion to amend and denying her motion to dissolve.

In a separate action, Ms. Johnson appealed the judgment issuing the amended

preliminary injunction. The supervisory writ was ultimately treated as a motion for

appeal and consolidated with the appeal of the amended preliminary injunction.9

On appeal, Ms. Ard filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Johnson’s appeal as untimely,

which we will address, infra.

DISCUSSION

Ms. Johnson raises several assignments of error which we have consolidated

as following: (1) the district court erred in issuing an amended preliminary

injunction as the original preliminary injunction was invalid on its face due to Ms.

Ard’s failure to furnish security; (2) the district court erred in issuing a mandatory

preliminary injunction that changed the status quo without conducting a full trial

on the merits or an evidentiary hearing as required by law; and (3) the district court

erred in: (a) issuing a preliminary injunction that lacked reasonable detail; (b)

failing to fix adequate security; and (c) failing to award attorney’s fees arising out

of Ms. Johnson’s motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Before we address

9
On January 2, 2019, Ms. Johnson filed a notice of intent to seek supervisory writ from the
judgment granting Ms. Ard’s motion to amend and denying Ms. Johnson’s motion to dissolve.
On January 3, 2019, the district court also granted Ms. Johnson’s motion for devolutive appeal
from the judgment issuing the amended preliminary injunction. Ms. Johnson timely filed her
writ application on January 18, 2019. This Court granted the writ for the sole purpose of
remanding this matter to the trial court to treat Ms. Johnson’s timely filed notice of intent as a
timely filed notice of appeal, reasoning that La. C.C.P. art. 3612(B) permits an appeal to be taken
as a matter of right from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary motion. See Jenna S. Ard
v. GrrlSpot, LLC and Christine E. Johnson, 2019-0065 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/24/19). On February
25, 2019, the district court granted a devolutive appeal from the judgment granting the motion to
amend and denying the motion to dissolve. This Court granted Ms. Johnson’s motion to
consolidate the appeals on April 25, 2019.

8

the merits of these errors, we will first consider Ms. Ard’s motion to dismiss

appeal.

Motion to Dismiss Appeal

Ms. Ard argues Ms. Johnson’s appeal should be dismissed as untimely due

to Ms. Johnson’s failure to timely appeal the original preliminary injunction dated

November 27, 2018, within fifteen days from the date of judgment as required by

La. C.C.P. art. 3612.10 Ms. Ard contends that delays for an appeal from a

preliminary injunction are not suspended or interrupted by subsequent judgments

relating to the underlying preliminary injunction. In support, Ms. Ard relies on

Bayou Hunting Club v. Desoto Parish Jury, 569 So.2d 252 (La. App. 2nd Cir.

1990). We find the facts in the case sub judice distinguishable from the facts

presented in Bayou Hunting Club.

In Bayou Hunting Club, the plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions to

enjoin the DeSoto Parish Police Jury from blocking their access to two roadways.

On October 24, 1989, the district court granted the preliminary injunction as to

roadway one and denied it as to roadway two. A writ of injunction was issued the

same day regarding roadway one and served on the police jury on October 27,

1989. On November 6, 1989, the district court signed a “Judgment on Application

for Preliminary Injunction” regarding roadway one submitted by both parties. The

judgment fixed security, expanded the scope of the preliminary injunction and re-

urged that injunctive relief had been denied as to roadway two on October 24,

1989. In response to the plaintiffs’ request, the district court provided written

10
La. C.C.P. art. 3612(C) provides, in part, that “[a]n appeal from an order or judgment relating
to a preliminary injunction must be taken, and any bond required must be furnished, within
fifteen days from the date of the order or judgment.”

9

reasons for judgment on November 7, 1989. On November 17, 1989, the plaintiffs

moved for and were granted an appeal from that part of the November 6, 1989

judgment which had denied the injunction as to roadway two. On appeal, the

Second Circuit dismissed the appeal as untimely because the appeal had not been

brought within fifteen days from the October 24, 1989 judgment. The plaintiffs

argued that appeal delays should run from the November 6, 1989 judgment which

fixed security because the October 24, 1989 preliminary injunction judgment was

invalid for its failure to fix security at the time of the preliminary injunction’s

issuance. In rejecting that argument, the Second Circuit reasoned that any possible

deficiencies in the October 24, 1989 judgment which granted the injunction as to

roadway one and denied the injunction as to roadway two—a judgment which was

not appealed—did not impact the time delays to appeal the denial of the injunction

as to roadway two. Id., at 254. The Second Circuit also opined that the November

6, 1989 judgment merely confirmed the written October 24, 1989 judgment. Id., at

255.

Ms. Ard argues, akin to Bayou Hunting Club, that the district court’s

amendment of the original preliminary injunction on December 19, 2018, to permit

the posting of security did not start anew the time delays for Ms. Johnson to appeal

the original preliminary injunction signed on. We disagree.

Our review of the record herein shows the proposed amended preliminary

injunction was an amendment to the original preliminary injunction that is the

subject of the appeal. We also note that it was Ms. Ard who moved to amend,

recognizing the original preliminary injunction did not comply with the formalities

required by La. C.C.P. art. 3610. A preliminary injunction granting injunctive

relief may only issue after a bond is posted, unless a bond is not statutorily

10

required. Yokum v. Nicholas S. Karno, Inc., 2010-0357, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir.

8/26/10), 47 So.3d 1014, 1016. Here, after the district court granted the motion

to amend, the amended preliminary injunction specifically ordered that, “pursuant

to La. Code Civ. Pro. Art. 3610, this preliminary injunction shall not issue unless

Jenna S. Ard furnishes security in the amount of $1,000.00.” Hence,

notwithstanding that the injunctive relief granted in the original preliminary

injunction was the same as that granted in the amended preliminary injunction, the

original preliminary injunction did not effectively issue on November 27, 2019.

Rather, the injunction issued on December 19, 2018, the date Ms. Ard posted

security.11

“An appeal from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary injunction

must be taken, and bond furnished, within fifteen days from the date of the order of

judgment.” Id., 2010-0357, p. 2, 47 So.3d at 1016 (citation omitted). Therefore,

Ms. Johnson’s appeal, taken on January 2, 2019, was timely filed within fifteen

days of the issuance of the December 19, 2018 amended preliminary injunction.

Accordingly, Ms. Ard’s motion to dismiss appeal is denied. We now review Ms.

Johnson’s assigned errors.

Motion to Amend Preliminary Injunction

11
The district court acknowledged that the November 27, 2018 injunction was not properly
issued. In granting the motion to amend and denying the motion for contempt, the district court
reasoned:

In accordance with that article [La. C.C.P. art. 3610], the Court’s November 27,
2018 order was not properly issued. As the preliminary injunction failed to
address security, the injunction was insufficient as to form. Due to the Court’s
failure to set an amount for security for Ms. Ard, the court amends the preliminary
injunction and sets security in the amount of $1,000.00. And as the preliminary
injunction was insufficient as the form, the Court will not hold Ms. Johnson in
contempt at this time. However, I am not dissolving or modifying the rest of the
injunction.

11

Ms. Johnson argues, in her first assigned error, that the district court lacked

authority to amend a preliminary injunction issued without security by fixing

security after judgment on the preliminary judgment had been rendered. Ms.

Johnson contends an injunction must first issue before it can be amended; and in

this instance, she argues the original preliminary injunction was necessarily void at

its inception because no security was furnished.

Ms. Johnson relies on Cochran v. Crosby, 411 So.2d 654, 655 (La. App. 4

Cir. 1982) in support of her argument. In Cochran, this Court, citing La. C.C.P.

art. 3610, determined that a preliminary injunction issued without a bond was

invalid and vacated the injunction. Cochran recognized that the Second Circuit, in

a case where the district court had failed to furnish security,12 reached a different

result. The Second Circuit chose to remand to the district court with directions for

security to be furnished, rather than vacate the injunction. Notwithstanding,

Cochran opined that “this court has consistently held that the better approach is to

vacate the injunction,” citing the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 3610, which require

security for an injunction to issue. Id.

This Court’s position on the validity of injunctions issued without security,

however, has evolved since Cochran. Although this Court acknowledges, infra,

that a preliminary injunction requires security unless a statutory exception exists,

we no longer mandate that a preliminary injunction issued without security can

never be validated. In Liberty Bank and Trust Co. v. Dapremont, 2000-2146, p. 8

(La. App. 4 Cir. 12/12/01), 803 So.2d 387, 391-92, this Court held that the district

court erred in granting an injunction without requiring the defendants to post

12
See Jackson v. Town of Logansport, 322 So.2d 281 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1975).

12

security. However, instead of vacating the preliminary injunction, the matter was

remanded to the district court to fix the amount of the bond. The Liberty Bank

court reasoned that it was faced with two alternatives—“to remand the case to the

trial court with directions that security be furnished or reverse the judgment that

granted the preliminary injunction.” Id. (citations omitted). Reasoning that the

“posting of bond would best serve the interests of justice and efficient

administration,” we remanded the matter to the district court to fix the amount of

the bond. Id. A similar result was also reached in Yokum v. Van Calsem, 2005-

0797, (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/21/06), 935 So.2d 736. In Van Caslem, this Court again

found the district court had erred when it failed to require security before granting

the preliminary injunction. Id., 2005-0797, p. 6, 935 So.2d at 739-40. Upon

determining that the underlying facts justified the issuance of the preliminary

injunction, the Van Caslem Court amended the judgment on appeal to require that

security be posted. Id.13

Based on the jurisprudence discussed supra, this Circuit provides two

options in the event an injunction is issued without security—the injunction may

be vacated or the district court may be ordered to fix security, dependent upon the

facts offered in support of the injunction. Without ruling on the merits of this case,

we conclude the district court acted within its jurisprudential authority to grant Ms.

Ard’s motion to amend and in conjunction therewith, issue the amended

preliminary injunction, and deny Ms. Johnson’s motion to dissolve. This

assignment of error lacks merit.
13
Van Caslem, 2005-0797, p. 6, 935 So.2d at 740, distinguished its findings from the results
reached in Licfro, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control, 2003-
0737 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/1/03), 859 So.2d 739. Licfro declined to follow Liberty Bank and
vacated the preliminary injunction issued by the district court where the facts did not support the
granting of the preliminary injunction and the injunction was issued without a bond. See Licfro,
2003-0737, pp. 5-6, 859 So.2d at 743.

13

We next review the alleged deficiencies in the preliminary injunction.

Preliminary Injunction

A preliminary injunction is an interlocutory procedural device designed to

preserve the existing status quo between the parties, pending trial on the main

demand. See Desire Narcotics Rehab. Inc. v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps.,

2007-0390, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/17/07), 970 So.2d 17, 20. To obtain a

preliminary injunction, the mover must establish by prima facie evidence that: (1)

it will suffer irreparable injury, loss, or damage if the motion is not granted; and (2)

it is entitled to the relief on a showing that it will likely prevail on the merits.

Easterling v. Estate of Miller, 2014-1354, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/15), 184

So.3d 222, 228 (citations omitted).

This Court explained the standard of review to determine if a preliminary

injunction was properly granted or denied in Yokum v. Pat O’Brien’s Bar, Inc.,

2012-0217, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/15/12), 99 So.3d 74, 80, as follows:

“A trial court has broad discretion in the granting or denial of a
preliminary injunction, and will not be disturbed on review absent
clear abuse of that discretion.” Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v.
Triton Coal Co., [19]91–1816, 590 So.2d 813, 816 (La. App. 4th
Cir.1991); Smith v. West Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 373 So.2d 488, 493
(La.1979). That broad standard is, of course, based upon a conclusion
that the trial court committed no error of law and was not manifestly
erroneous or clearly wrong in making a factual finding that was
necessary to the proper exercise of its discretion. See South East Auto
Dealers Rental Ass'n, Inc. v. EZ Rent To Own, Inc., [20]07–0599, pp.
4–5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/27/08), 980 So.2d 89, 93.

However, the standard of proof required to meet the elements for a

preliminary injunction differs, contingent upon whether the preliminary injunction

sought is a prohibitory injunction or a mandatory injunction. See Denta-Max v.

Maxicare Louisiana, Inc., 1995-2128, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/14/96), 671 So.2d

995, 997. A mandatory injunction is one which orders the doing of something.

14

Denta-Max, 1995-2128, p. 2, 671 So.2d at 997. On the other hand, a prohibitory

injunction seeks to restrain conduct. Yokum, 2012-0217, p. 9, 99 So.3d at 81

(citation omitted). As this Court explained in Meredith v. I Am Music, LLC, 2018-

0659, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/13/19), 265 So.3d 1143, 1146:

“[A] prohibitory injunction, which simply preserves the status quo
until a full trial on the merits, may be issued on a prima facie showing
by the party seeking the injunction.” [Denta-Max, 1995-2128, p. 3,
671 So.2d at 997]. A mandatory injunction, however, has the same
basic effect as a permanent injunction, and may not be issued on
merely a prima facie showing that the party seeking the injunction can
prove the necessary elements. Id. “Instead, the party seeking a
mandatory injunction must show by a preponderance of the evidence
at an evidentiary hearing that he is entitled to the preliminary
injunction. Id. (citing Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc. v. U.S.
Marine, Inc., 595 So.2d 756, 759 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992)).

In her second assigned error, Ms. Johnson asserts the preliminary injunction

issued is invalid as it not only constituted a mandatory injunction, but also changed

the status quo, requiring a full trial or evidentiary hearing. Ms. Johnson argues that

she always had operational control of GrrlSpot. The record supports that Ms.

Johnson denied the existence of a partnership in her answer to the Petition and

disputed the authenticity of the partnership agreement in her opposition to Ms.

Ard’s requests for injunctive relief. At the hearing on the preliminary injunction,

Ms. Johnson cited to, among other evidence: (1) the Petition in which Ms. Ard

acknowledges GrrlSpot as a single member limited liability corporation and

references oral, rather than written, partnership agreements; and (2) the consent

judgment, which provided, in part, that “Christine Johnson can continue to operate

GRRLSPOT, LLC, including all use of the website and social media. (Emphasis

added.)

The district court, after oral argument of counsel, issued the following

amended preliminary injunction in pertinent part:

15

1. Christine Johnson is prohibited, restrained, and enjoined from
interfering with Jenna Ard’s operational control of their business
partnership, GrrlSpot, until this matter can be heard at a trial on the
merits or further order of this Court;

2. Christine Johnson is prohibited, restrained, and enjoined from
interfering with Jenna Ard’s access to any of GrrlSpot’s assets
(including both tangible assets such as bank accounts and other
financial records and intangible assets such as social media and
online accounts[)]; and

3. Christine Johnson is prohibited, restrained, and enjoined from
disposing any of the assets, whether tangible and/or intangible,
without agreement of Jenna Ard.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
Christine Johnson is to immediately provide Jenna Ard with all login
information for all GrrlSpot associated online accounts including but
not limited to those with the following: Google Apps, Verizon,
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, GoDaddy, and WordPress (A Small
Orange).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
Christine Johnson is to immediately provide Jenna Ard with the login
information and all records of account for all GrrlSpot associated bank
accounts, including but not limited to those held at Gulf Coast Bank
and Trust, Chase Bank, and Capital One.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
Christine Johnson is to within thirty (30) days providing[sic] to Jenna
Ard and [sic] accounting on a monthly basis for the time period from
2011 to 2018 of the revenues and expenses during each month along
with the details for all income and each expense, along with
supporting documentation for all revenues and expenses. . . .

Ms. Johnson complains the preliminary injunction granted permanent injunctive

relief in determining a partnership agreement existed and created a new status quo

when the district court ordered that Ms. Ard be given operational control of

GrrlSpot and GrrlSpot’s accounts. We find this assignment of error has merit.

In Hyman v. Puckett, 2015-0930 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/16), 193 So.3d 1184,

this Court considered whether relief granted by a preliminary injunction issued by

the district court constituted a mandatory injunction. In Hyman, property owners

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sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting their neighbors from interfering with

construction of a fence along a disputed strip of land and a permanent injunction

requiring the neighbors to remove a portion of a fence that allegedly encroached on

the property owners’ property. The district court heard the request for the

preliminary injunction based solely upon verified pleadings, affidavits, and

memoranda. The preliminary injunction issued by the district court declared the

property owners were the owners of the disputed strip, ordered the neighbors to

remove a portion of their rear fence that extended onto the property owners’

property, and enjoined the neighbors from interfering with the property owners’

construction of a fence along the disputed boundary between the properties. On

appeal, the Hyman Court found the district court’s issuance of a preliminary

injunction was improper because the injunction contained prohibitory, as well as

mandatory orders, i.e., requiring the neighbors to remove the “dog-leg” portion of

their fence. Given that mandatory and prohibitory injunctions have different

procedural rules and evidentiary burdens, the court reasoned, as a matter of law, it

is not possible to issue a mandatory preliminary injunction. Hyman, 2015-0930, p.

8, 193 So.3d at 1189. Further, the Hyman Court noted that a comparative review

of the relief requested by the property owner showed the district court adjudicated

all the material issues in the property owner’s petition without a full evidentiary

hearing. Upon finding that the district court was required to vet the underlying

facts of the principal dispute, including ownership of the disputed strip, at a full

trial on the merits and the district court failed to do so, the Hyman Court held the

district court erred in granting a permanent, mandatory preliminary injunction

absent a full evidentiary hearing. Hyman, 2015-0939, pp. 8-9, 1190. We find the

facts of this case merit a similar outcome.

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Ms. Ard’s motion for preliminary injunction prayed that Ms. Johnson be

enjoined from interfering with Ms. Ard’s operational control of GrrlSpot and from

exerting any operational control of GrrlSpot. Ms. Ard, at the hearing, re-urged her

desire to have Ms. Johnson prohibited from interfering with the operational control

of the business, insisting, “[s]o what we are asking for is to, instead of having the

one particular partner be allowed to operate it, let’s switch it over. Let’s try the

other one. We can’t do any worse. . . . And so in our motion we ask for the order

along the lines that I outline. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Upon review, the district

court’s orders for Ms. Johnson not to interfere with Ms. Ard’s operational control

of GrrlSpot, not to interfere with Ms. Ard’s access to any of GrrlSpot’s assets, and

not to dispose of any of GrrlSpot assets without the agreement of Jenna Ard,

although framed in the negative, constituted a command for Ms. Johnson to “do

something”—give Ms. Ard exclusive access and control of GrrlSpot. Also,

inherent in the district court’s order for Ms. Ard to have operational control is a

finding that a partnership existed between Ms. Ard and Ms. Johnson, one of the

principal issues in dispute raised in the main demand.14 The district court granted

the injunction based on verified pleadings and affidavits, in particular, the affidavit

of the Notary Public who attested that a written partnership agreement existed

between Ms. Ard and Ms. Johnson—prima facie evidence sufficient to obtain a

prohibitory injunction—however, this was insufficient evidence to grant

mandatory or permanent injunctive relief. As referenced in Hyman, supra, and

Meredith, 2018-0659, p. 6, 265 So.3d at 1146 (citation omitted), the party seeking

a mandatory injunction must prove by a preponderance of the evidence at an

14
Ms. Ard’s Petition, requested in part, “[a] judgment declaring that Jenna Ard and Christine
Johnson have operated and continue to operate partnership doing business as “GrrlSpot. . .”

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evidentiary hearing, “with live evidence and stipulations of fact by the parties,” the

party’s right to a mandatory injunction.

Therefore, as the requisite evidentiary hearing was not provided, we vacate

the amended preliminary injunction. Having determined that the amended

preliminary injunction issued herein was a mandatory permanent injunction that

requires the matter to be remanded to the district court for a full evidentiary

hearing, we pretermit discussion of Ms. Johnson’s other remaining assignments of

error.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s December 19,

2018 judgment granting Ms. Ard’s motion to amend and denying Ms. Johnson’s

motion to dissolve. As to the district court’s December 19, 2018 judgment issuing

the amended preliminary injunction, we hereby vacate the amended preliminary

injunction and remand for a full evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion.

Further, we deny Ms. Ard’s motion to dismiss.

JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED IN
PART; VACATED IN PART
AND REMANDED; MOTION
TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED.

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