1026 Conti Condominiums, LLC v. 1025 Bienville, LLC

1026 CONTI * NO. 2019-CA-0826
CONDOMINIUMS, LLC
*
VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL
*
1025 BIENVILLE, LLC FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

1026 CONTI CONDOMINIUMS, NO. 2019-CA-0827
LLC

VERSUS

1025 BIENVILLE, LLC

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

1025 BIENVILLE, LLC NO. 2019-CA-0828

VERSUS

BRUNO PROPERTIES, LLC

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2009-13363, DIVISION “M”
Honorable Paulette R. Irons, Judge
******
Judge Tiffany G. Chase
******
(Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Tiffany
G. Chase)

Fred L. Herman
Matthew A. Sherman
Jacob D. Young
Nicholas R. Varisco
CHEHARDY SHERMAN WILLIAMS MURRAY RECILE STAKELUM &
HAYES, LLP
One Galleria Blvd., Suite 1100
Metairie, LA 70001

Raymond B. Landry
MOLLERE FLANAGAN & LANDRY, L.L.C.
2341 Metairie Road
Metairie, LA 70001

Leonard L. Levenson
LEONARD L. LEVENSON & ASSOCIATES
650 Poydras Street, Suite 2750
New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS

Galen S. Brown
SULLIVAN STOLIER SCHULZE LLC
909 Poydras Street, Suite 2600
New Orleans, LA 70112

Joseph M. Bruno
BRUNO & BRUNO LLP
855 Baronne Street
New Orleans, LA 70113

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

AFFIRMED
AUGUST 5, 2020

TGC
DLD
RML
This is the third appeal in a dispute between two French Quarter

landowners involving a servitude. 1026 Conti Condominiums, LLC (hereinafter

“Conti”) appeals the trial court’s judgment recognizing 1025 Bienville, LLC’s

(hereinafter “Bienville”) designation of the location of the servitude. 1026 Conti

Holding, LLC (hereinafter “Conti Holding”) appeals the trial court’s judgment

denying its motion for leave to file a petition for intervention. After consideration

of the record before this Court and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of

the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2006, Conti purchased property located at 1026 Conti Street from Bruno

Properties, LLC (hereinafter “Bruno”). The property, referred to as Lot 3 in the act

of sale, included a building containing seven condominium units. Adjacent to Lot

3, on its west side, is an alley leading to a land-locked courtyard located directly

behind Lot 3 and another adjacent property. The property description in the act of

sale provided “the right to use said alley as well as of a ‘court[yard]’ figured on

said plan and common to Lots 1, 2, and 3 and other property.” Bruno later sold

other properties in the same block, including properties bordering the

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aforementioned alley and courtyard. Bruno also sold Lot AA, which encompasses

most of the courtyard, to Bienville. Thus, in the servitude at issue, Lot AA is the

servient estate and Lot 3, 1026 Conti Street, is the dominant estate.

Initially, both Conti and Bienville shared the use of Lot AA for

approximately three years during construction. This practice ended in 2009, when

Bienville striped Lot AA for parking and posted signage asserting exclusive use of

Lot AA such that any unauthorized vehicles would be towed. On December 23,

2009, Conti filed a preliminary injunction and a request for a declaratory judgment

against Bienville regarding Conti’s right to use Lot AA. Conti subsequently filed a

motion for summary judgment “seeking a declaration as to the existence, extent

and type” of servitude granted in the sale between itself and Bruno. On May 13,

2011, the trial court granted Conti’s motion for summary judgment and declared

that a predial servitude of “access, passage, and parking for the benefit of the

Dominant Estate [Conti’s property]” existed.

Bienville appealed, and this Court reversed. 1026 Conti Condominiums,

LLC v. 1025 Bienville, LLC, 2011-1055, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/8/12), 84 So.3d

778, 785 (hereinafter “Conti I”). While this Court agreed with the trial court’s

finding that a servitude existed, we found there remained a genuine issue of

material fact as to the scope of the servitude granted to Conti. Id. We opined that

genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the servitude included the right

to park on Lot AA (the courtyard), or on any portion of it, and “whether the use the

parties made of the alley and courtyard from 2006 until 2009 … should be

considered typical and therefore determinative of the parties’ intent with regard to

the scope of the servitude.” Id.; see also La. C.C. art. 749. The matter was

remanded to the trial court for a trial on the merits. Id.

2

Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment on October 8,

2014, this time ruling that a predial servitude existed for access and passage only –

parking was not included. Both parties filed motions for new trial. Conti’s motion

was denied; however, Bienville’s motion, requesting greater specificity as to the

description of the properties, was granted. On December 18, 2014, the trial court

issued an amended judgment which, in relevant part: 1) recognized the existence of

“a predial servitude for access and passage only over and across” Lot AA; 2)

denied Conti the right of parking on Lot AA; and 3) assessed costs against Conti

(hereinafter “the 2014 Amended Judgment”).

Conti appealed arguing the trial court erred by denying its right to park, by

improperly relying on La. C.C. art. 750,1 and by granting Bienville the right to

designate the location of the servitude. This Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling

which denied Conti the servitude of parking on Lot AA. 1026 Conti

Condominiums, LLC v. 1025 Bienville, LLC, 2015-0301, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 4 Cir.

12/23/15), 183 So.3d 724, 730 (hereinafter “Conti II”). However, we declined to

address the trial court’s application of La. C.C. art. 750.2 Id., 2015-0301, p. 10,

1
La. C.C. art. 750 provides: “If the title does not specific the location of the servitude, the owner
of the servient estate shall designate the location.”
2
In Conti II, 2015-0301, p. 10, 183 So.3d at 730, Conti argued that the trial court erred in
holding that Bienville could designate the location of the servitude, thereby restricting its extent
and size under La. C.C. art. 750. As the 2014 Judgment was silent as to Bienville’s right to
designate the location of the servitude, we declined to address this argument:

As Conti admits, the Reasons for Judgment of the district court are distinct from
the judgment itself. It is well-established that “Reasons for Judgment” are not
controlling and do not constitute the “Judgment” of the court. Kaufman v.
Adrian’s Tree Service, Inc., 00–2381, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/31/01), 800 So.2d
1102, 1104. See also Theresa Seafood, Inc. v. Berthelot, 09–0814, p. 7 (La.App. 4
Cir. 3/10/10), 40 So.3d 132, 137, amended on reh’g (May 12, 2010) [wherein we
held that suggestions made by the trial court in its reasons for judgment are not
controlling.]. Moreover, “[a]ppeals are taken from the judgment, not the written
reasons for judgment.” Greater New Orleans Expressway Com’n v. Olivier, 02–
2795, p. 3 (La.11/18/03), 860 So.2d 22, 24.

3

183 So.3d at 750. Conti sought further review with the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Writs were denied.3

On February 12, 2016, Conti Holding, a separate entity owned by the same

principal as Conti, filed a separate suit against Bienville alleging ownership of Lot

AA.4

On March 17, 2016, after exhausting appellate review, Conti filed a motion

to enforce the 2014 Amended Judgment arguing that Bienville’s attempt to

designate the location of the servitude diminished or made inconvenient Conti’s

use of the servitude. Specifically, Conti alleged there was insufficient space for its

tenants to turn around in Lot AA. Bienville responded by filing a “Motion for

Court Approval of Designation of Location of Servitude Area (hereinafter “Motion

to Designate Location of Servitude Area”), requesting the trial court approve

Bienville’s proposed location of the servitude – a 26’6” x 9’3” portion of Lot AA –

pursuant to its rights under La. C.C. art. 750. Conti subsequently withdrew its

motion to enforce the judgment and filed an opposition to Bienville’s Motion to

Designate Location of Servitude Area. On December 30, 2016, Conti Holding

filed a motion for leave of court to file a petition for intervention in the matter sub

judice.

At the trial on Bienville’s Motion to Designate Location of Servitude Area,

each party presented testimony from an expert witness submitting its theories as to

the location of the servitude area. Bienville’s owner also testified. The trial court

took the matter under advisement after which the parties jointly moved to offer
3
1026 Conti Condominiums, LLC v. 1025 Bienville, LLC, 2016-0144 (La. 3/14/16), 189 So.3d
1067.
4
1026 Conti Holding, LLC v. 1025 Bienville, LLC, Orleans Parish Civil District Court No. 2016-
1438.

4

further deposition testimony from Bienville’s expert pertaining to photographs

entered into evidence. The parties also agreed to submit Conti Holding’s motion

for leave to file a petition for intervention for a decision on the briefs.

On June 27, 2019, the trial court issued two separate judgments. The first

judgment granted Bienville’s Motion to Designate Location of Servitude Area

which also contained a site diagram displaying the exact location of the servitude.

The judgment further awarded all costs incurred by Bienville in bringing the

motion due to Conti’s refusal to work cooperatively with Bienville in the

administration of the servitude. In the second judgment, the trial court denied

Conti Holding’s motion for leave to file petition for intervention as untimely and

for lack of a justiciable interest in the action. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts review findings of fact pertaining to servitudes under the

manifest error standard of review. Conti II, 2015-0301, p. 4, 183 So.3d at 727

(citing Allen v. Cotten, 2011-1354, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/12), 93 So.3d 681,

683). “An appellate court may not set aside a trial court’s findings of fact unless

they are manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Id. (citing Rosell v. ESCO, 549

So.2d 840 (La. 1989)). “To reverse under the manifest error rule, an appellate

court must find from the record that there is no reasonable basis for the trial court’s

finding and that the record shows the finding to be manifestly erroneous.” Id.

(citing Stobart v. State, Dep’t of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993)).

DISCUSSION

Conti and Conti Holding’s assignments of error coalesce into two main

arguments. First, Conti argues the trial court erred in granting Bienville’s Motion

to Designate Location of Servitude Area. Second, Conti Holding maintains the

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trial court erred in denying Conti Holding’s motion for leave to file a petition for

intervention.

PREDIAL SERVITUDES

In the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, servitudes are divided into personal and

predial. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; General Principles: Louisiana

and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1968). A predial servitude is a charge

on a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate and the two estates must

belong to different owners. La. C.C. art. 646. “In the civilian literature, the estate

burdened with a predial servitude is designated as ‘servient’ (praedium serviens);

the estate in whose favor (or in whose owner’s favor) the servitude is established is

designated as ‘dominant’ (praedium dominans).” Yiannopoulos, supra, at 5.

Pursuant to La. C.C. art. 647, there must be a benefit to the dominant estate and

there is no predial servitude if the charge imposed cannot be reasonably expected

to benefit the dominant estate. The owner of the servient estate is not required to

do anything. His obligation is to abstain from doing something on his estate or to

permit something to be done on it. La. C.C. art. 651.

The establishment of a predial servitude may be by an owner on his estate or

acquired for its benefit. Our Civil Code provides that the use and extent of such

servitudes are regulated by the title by which they are created. La. C.C. art. 697.

However, in the absence of such regulation, they are governed by the rules set

forth in La. C.C. arts. 698 through 774. See La. C.C. art. 697. “Predial servitudes

involving toleration of certain activities on the servient estate may be for the use of

that estate for certain purposes, for example, in connection with rights of way.”

Yiannopoulos, supra, at 7. Comment (b) to La. C.C. art. 697 provides greater

insight into the public policy considerations of such burdens:

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Owners have the right to establish on their estate, or to acquire for the
benefit of their estate, such predial servitudes as they deem proper.
This freedom, however, is tempered by the rules of public policy
enacted in the general interest. C.C. art. 11. Apart from general
limitations, the creation of predial servitudes by juridical act is subject
to special rules that are largely insusceptible of modification by
agreement. These rules, limiting contractual and testamentary
freedom, are designed to effect a balance between individual demands
for the recognition of modification of property rights to suit individual
needs and social demands for the preservation of a relatively simple
system of unencumbered property. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights:
Limits of Contractual and Testamentary Freedom, 30 LA. L. REV. 44
(1969).

Since predial servitudes form restraints on the free disposal and use of property,

predial servitudes are in derogation of public policy and are not entitled to be

viewed with favor by the law and can never be sustained by implication.

Palomeque v. Prudhomme, 1995-0725, p. 7 (La. 11/27/95), 664 So.2d 88, 93.

Thus, “[d]oubt as to the existence, extent or manner of exercise of a servitude must

be resolved in favor of the estate claimed to be burdened by the servitude.” St.

Andrews Place, Inc. v, City of Shreveport, 40,260, p. 11 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/4/05),

914 So.2d 1203, 1210; La. C.C. art. 730. In creating a servitude, the parties may

limit the extent and mode of using a servitude of passage. Sanders v. Plaquemines

Cable TV, Inc., 407 So.2d 524, 526 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).

Nonetheless, “the existence of a predial servitude does not confer any semblance of

ownership of the land burdened with the servitude upon the owner of the dominant

estate.” One River Place Condominium Ass’n Inc. v. Mitchell, 609 So.2d 942, 948

(La.App. 4th Cir. 1992). Thus, courts must consider the above principles in

determining the location and servitude area when the act of sale is silent.

7

MOTION TO DESIGNATE SERVITUDE

Conti’s primary argument is that the trial court erred in designating the

location of the servitude area to the limited area set forth in the June 27, 2019

judgment. Conti also submits that the trial court erred in issuing a ruling that

contradicts its prior May 11, 2011 judgment which permitted use over the

“entirety” of Lot AA.5 We find no merit to these arguments.

Conti’s procedural argument is that the trial court’s ruling was in

contravention of La. C.C.P. art. 1951, the law of the case doctrine or res judicata.

In Conti I, this Court was tasked with determining whether the trial court’s ruling

granting summary judgment as to the existence, extent, and type of servitude was

appropriate. While we agreed with the trial court’s recognition of the existence of

a servitude, we reversed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment, finding

there remain genuine issues of material fact as to “the scope of the servitude

granted to Conti.” Conti I, 2011-1055, p. 12, 84 So.3d at 785. Specifically, we

questioned whether the servitude includes the right to park on Lot AA (the

courtyard) or on any portion of it. Id. Our disposition in Conti I resulted in the

case being remanded for a trial on the merits to resolve the factual issues. Id.

“Generally, ‘the effect of a general and unqualified reversal of a judgment, order,

or decree is to nullify it completely and to leave the case standing as if such

judgment, order, or decree had never been rendered, except as restricted by the

opinion of the appellate court.’” O’Brien v. O’Brien, 347 So.2d 1288, 1289-90

(La.App. 1st Cir. 1977) (quoting 58 C.J.S. Appeal and Errors 1950). Thus, the

2011 judgment rendered by the trial court was extinguished by our decision in

5
Conti argues that the trial court committed legal error when issuing the June 27, 2019
judgment contrary to the principles of res judicata, law of the case, and La. C.C.P. art. 1951’s
prohibition against substantive amendments to final judgment.

8

Conti I. Conti’s argument that the designation of the servitude by the trial court in

the June 27, 2019 judgment is res judicata is without merit.

Now we turn to Conti’s primary argument that the trial court erred in

designating the location of the servitude to a limited area proposed by Bienville.

The evolution of this case is germane to our review of whether the trial court was

manifestly erroneous in its determinations. We note that the same trial judge has

presided over this case since 2009 and has had the benefit of two appellate court

opinions from this Court. Contrary to the assertions of Conti, this is the first

instance whereby the trial court held a trial, considered testimony and evidence,

and delineated the location of the servitude area on Lot AA.

In Conti II, we examined the 2014 Amended Judgment that provided for “a

predial servitude for access and passage only over and across” the servient estate,

Lot AA. In analyzing the trial court’s judgment, we determined that the “district

court considered three possible types of use for the servitude at issue: access,

passage and parking.” Conti II, 2015-0301, p. 7, 183 So.3d at 729. The trial court

rejected Conti’s request for parking and described, in detail, the dimensions of both

the servient and dominant estates. We affirmed. On appeal in the case sub judice,

Conti suggests that the language of the 2014 Amended Judgment extends the

servitude over the entirety of Lot AA. Our examination of the judgment does not

reveal that the word “entirety” appears anywhere in the 2014 Amended Judgment.

Nonetheless, it is undisputed there was no designation of the location and extent of

the servitude in the act of sale transferring the dominant estate to Conti; thus

Bienville properly exercised its rights under La. C.C. art. 750 by filing the Motion

to Designate Location of Servitude Area.

9

Louisiana Civil Code art. 697 provides that the use and extent of predial

servitudes, when not regulated by title, are governed by rules set forth in our Civil

Code. When the title does not specify the location of the servitude, the owner of

the servient estate shall designate the location. La. C.C. art. 750. As the act of sale

establishing Conti’s servitude of access and passage is otherwise silent, the

servitude’s extent and location must be suitable for the kind of traffic or utility

necessary for its reasonable use. See La. C.C. art. 705. Although Bienville may do

nothing to diminish or make more inconvenient Conti’s servitude, Conti must

exercise its servitude in a way least inconvenient to Bienville. See La. C.C. arts.

743 and 748. This determination is an issue of fact. See Toups v. Abshire, 2007-

1147, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/08), 979 So.2d 616, 618. Further, any doubt must be

resolved in favor of Bienville.6 See La. C.C. art. 730. Against this legal

framework, we examine the evidence presented to the trial court.

Bienville’s expert architect, John Williams (hereinafter “Mr. Williams”)

testified that the servitude area selected by Bienville was sufficient to grant Conti

use of the servitude. Mr. Williams also testified to having experience working on

at least five hundred projects in the French Quarter and that he is familiar with the

unique constraints of designing parking for that area of the city. He conducted

turning experiments by driving a Toyota 4Runner down the alley leading to Lot
6
In support of its position, Bienville cites to Palgrave v. Tallieu, 508 So.2d 97 (La.App. 5th Cir.
1987) (hereinafter “Palgrave I”). In Palgrave I, the court held that the owners of the dominant
estate were “entitled to a servitude sufficient to allow them to bring their boats in and out of
Bayou Barataria.” 508 So.2d at 100. This established a servitude of passage. However, after
rendition of the opinion, the parties entered into a dispute as to the extent of the servitude
necessitating the perfection of a subsequent consent judgment determining its location. Palgrave
v. Gros, 2002-0249, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/02), 829 So.2d 579, 581; see also Claitor v.
Brooks, 2013-0178, pp. 12-13 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/27/13), 137 So.3d 638, 647 (discussing the
Palgrave cases). Similar to Palgrave I, Conti II established the servitude at issue to be a
servitude of access and passage only. However, instead of perfecting a consent judgment, the
dispute over the extent of the servitude between Conti and Bienville now manifests itself in the
current appeal. The extent of the servitude had yet to be determined until the trial court’s June
2019 judgment on Bienville’s Motion to Designate Servitude.

10

AA. Mr. Williams opined that the servitude area designated by Bienville was

sufficient to drive into, turn around, and exit Lot AA without having to back out of

the alley. Mr. Williams accomplished this by making a gradual turn where a driver

would turn slightly, reverse, repeat the process and exit. Mr. Williams

acknowledged that while a thirty-foot truck would require greater space than that

designated by Bienville, it would not be common for trucks of such size to enter

interior lots in the French Quarter. He also stated that a smaller box truck, carrying

an appliance, could make deliveries in the space designated. Vincent Marcello,

Bienville’s owner, testified that when one of his tenants operated a furniture store

on his property, their twenty-six foot truck could load and unload on nearby

Rampart Street rather than the interior lot. Conti submits that Mr. Williams’

opinion is wholly unreliable because vehicles parked in specific locations interfere

with Conti’s ability to effectively turn around in or otherwise use Lot AA pursuant

to its servitude. However, as argued by Bienville, the photographs referenced

depict vehicles parked in common alleys in derogation of the law. See Burgess-

Blanchard v. Sciacca, 2001-0891, pp. 8-10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/27/02), 819 So.2d

352, 356-57.

Conversely, Conti’s expert architect, Dean Duplantier (hereinafter “Mr.

Duplantier”), opined that the space designated by Bienville is insufficient for Conti

to make use of its servitude even for vehicles such as small passenger vehicles and

pickup trucks. He based his opinion on diagrams covering a wide range of

vehicles up to a thirty-foot truck. The diagrams depicted turning radiuses pursuant

to guidelines established by the American Association of State Highway

Transportation Officials in contrast to the gradual turns performed by Mr.

Williams. On cross-examination, Mr. Duplantier admitted that for larger vehicles

11

to make turns in accordance with his diagrams, many of Bienville’s parked

vehicles would have to be moved from the lot.

A trial court has broad discretion in determining the weight given to expert

testimony including the discretion to substitute common sense and judgment when

warranted by the record. See 429 Bourbon Street, LLC v. RMDR Investments, Inc.,

2016-0800, p. 15 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/15/17), 230 So.3d 256, 266 (citations

omitted). Where findings of fact are based on determinations regarding the

credibility of expert witnesses, the manifest error standard requires appellate courts

to give great deference to a trial court’s findings. See Bellard v. American Cent.

Ins. Co., 2007-1335, p. 27 (La. 4/18/08), 980 So.2d 654, 672 (citing Rosell, 549

So.2d at 844). Thus, where a trial court’s determination is based on its decision to

credit one expert over another, such a finding can virtually never be manifestly

erroneous. Id. (citing Rosell, 549 So.2d at 845). The trial court, in assessing the

credibility of the experts, chose to accept the testimony of Mr. Williams over the

testimony of Mr. Duplantier. Given the legal framework provided by our Civil

Code for the interpretation of predial servitudes, the trial court was within its

discretion in determining that the area depicted in the judgment was the most

suitable for its use and least inconvenient to Bienville. See La. C.C. arts. 705, 730,

743, 748 and 750; see also One River Place, 609 So.2d at 948 (predial servitudes

do not confer ownership interests). After reviewing the record and considering the

applicable law, we find that the trial court did not err in granting Bienville’s

Motion to Designate Location of Servitude Area. Additionally, we find the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the costs associated with the Motion

to Designate Servitude to Bienville. See Pelleteri v. Caspian Group Inc., 2002-

12

2141, p. 19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1230, 1241 (citing La. R.S.

13:3666(B) and La. C.C.P. art. 1920).

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR INTERVENTION

Conti Holding argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for leave

to file a petition for intervention. Interventions by third persons in a pending

action are governed by La. C.C.P. art. 1091. It is well settled by jurisprudence that

the requirements for intervention are twofold: (1) the intervenor must have a

justiciable interest in, and connexity to, the principal action, and (2) the interest

must be so related or connected to the facts or object of the principal action that a

judgment on the principal action will have a direct impact on the intervenor’s

rights. In re Interdiction of Campbell, 2001-0863, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/15/02),

807 So.2d 908, 910 (citation omitted). A justiciable interest is the right of a party

to seek redress or a remedy against either the plaintiff or defendant in the original

action or both, where those parties have a real interest in opposing it. Id. The right

must be so related or connected to the facts or object of the principal action that a

judgment on the principal action will have a direct impact on the intervenor’s

rights. Id., pp. 4-5, 807 So.2d at 910. Ownership of Lot AA is not a contested

issue in this underlying suit, rather the issue pertains to the location of the

servitude. Furthermore, Conti Holding has a separate suit currently pending

against Bienville in Orleans Parish Civil District Court wherein it can protect its

interest as to its claim of ownership. See Suites at New Orleans, L.L.C. v. Lloyd’s

London, 2009-0562, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/27/09), 13 So.3d 241, 243 (quoting

Parish v. Holland, 166 La. 24, 116 So. 580 (1928)). There is an insufficient

connexity to justify the intervention. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not

err in denying Conti Holding’s motion for leave to file an intervention.

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DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the June 27, 2019 judgments of the trial court are

affirmed.

AFFIRMED

14