State Of Louisiana v. Margaret Camaille Stockstill (Parish of St. Tammany) We reverse the ruling o f the c ourt of appea l, w hich affirmed defendant's conviction for the second degree murder of Cody Couch and her sentence of life im prisonment witho

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #041
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 20th day of October, 2020 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2019-K-01235 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. MARGARET CAMAILLE
STOCKSTILL (Parish of St. Tammany)
We reverse the ruling o f the c ourt of appea l, w hich affirmed defendant's
conviction for the second degree murder of Cody Couch and her sentence of
life im prisonment without parole eligibility . We vaca te defendant's
conviction and sentence. We re mand this matter to the distric t court for a
new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Retired Judge James Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice pro tempore, sitting for
the vacancy in Louisiana Supreme Court District 4.
Retired Judge Jimmie C. Peters appointed as Justice ad hoc sitting for Crain,
J., recused in case number 2019-K-01235 only.
Hughes, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for the reasons assigned by
Justice Crichton.
Crichton, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Genovese, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for the reasons assigned by
Justice Crichton.

* Retired Judge James Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice pro tempore, sitting for the vacancy in
Louisiana Supreme Court District 4. Retired Judge Jimmie C. Peters, appointed Justice ad hoc,
sitting for Crain, J., recused.
10/20/20
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
N
o. 2019-K-01235
S
TATE OF LOUISIANA
v
ersus
M
ARGARET CAMAILLE STOCKSTILL
O
N WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant shot and killed Cody Couch during an alcohol-fueled argument and
physical fight in the home of Kristin Copeland on April 14, 2017, in Folsom. Couch
and Copeland had a five-month-old daughter together, who was present in the home
during the conflict along with Copeland’s six-year-old son. The conflict began when
Couch, who had a pending DWI charge, borrowed defendant’s car to go out drinking
with friends rather than spend the evening at home with Copeland.
After Couch left, Copeland drank, complained to defendant about him, and
angrily called and texted him at the bar repeatedly. Copeland set some clothing on
fire in the yard and sent him a picture of it. Copeland told Couch not to return that
night, she piled some of his belongings on the porch, and she locked him out. Couch
eventually returned.
The details of w hat happened next are disputed. What is clear is that Couch
entered the home through the back door , he refused to leave, and the conflict
escalated. Couch and the two women argued and fought. They fought throughout the
home and broke furniture, including a crib that contained the youngest child. The
fight ended when defendant shot Couch once at close range . Copeland called 911
and defendant spoke to the dispatcher and then to police when they arrived. Couch

2

died from the single gunshot wound.
The grand jury indicted defendant for the second degree murder of Cody
Couch. Defendant testified at trial that she shot the victim in self -defense and in
defense of Copeland when he would not stop attacking them. The St. Tammany
Parish jury found defendant guilty as charged. The district court sentenced defendant
to serve life imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility. The court of
appeal affirmed the conviction and the sentence. State v. Stockstill , 18-1586 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 7/3/19) (unpub’d).
The court of appeal found the evidence sufficient to prove defendant
committed second degree murder . The court of appeal found the S tate carried its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self -
defense, and the court of appeal rejected defendant’s claim that the evidence, at best,
proved she committed manslaughter. In reaching those conclusions, the co urt of
appeal found that Copeland’s testimony conflicted with defendant’s version of the
conflict, with some of the physical evidence, and with a partial recording of the
incident, captured by defendant with her cell phone. Stockstill, 18-1586, p. 14.
After reviewing the record, we find the court of appeal greatly minimized the
extent of the conflict. Both Copeland and defendant’s testimony reflect a chaotic
fight, which Copeland characterized as all three “pushing and shoving” one another
into various pieces of furniture, and knocking each other down to the ground or
falling on top of one another, where they continue d to grapple and struggle.
Defendant characterized the fighting as Couch hitting and “slinging” the women into
furniture and around the room, with the women hitting and pushing Couch to protect
themselves and each other. Both Copeland and defendant agreed that the baby’s crib,
which held a young child who could have been injured, and a wooden shelf unit were

3

broken during the fight. Crime scene photos show that a cedar chest was broken as
well. While reasonable jurors could conclude from some of the discrepancies in the
testimony and evidence that defendant somewhat exaggerated her description of the
conflict, the record clearly establishes that this was no mere “tussle,” as the court of
appeal described it. See Stockwell, 18-1586, p. 14.
At some point during the conflict, defendant began recording the incident with
her phone, which she left in her purse. The court of appeal found this recording
disproved defendant’s testimony in several respects. However, t he recording does
not differ as greatly from defendant’s testimony as the court of appeal opinion
suggests. Breaking furniture, screaming, and loud banging can all be heard on the
recording. All three voices were raised (particularly as the conflict escalated) ,
contrary to the court of appeal’s characterization of Couch’s voice having “an overall
calm tone.” Stockwell, 18-1586, p. 14.
During a brief flash of video captured when defendant rummaged through her
purse for the phone, Couch is visible looming over her from behind. Defendant then
drops the phone, and a scuffle can be heard while a woman screams, “Get off of
me!” Defendant recovers the phone, and warns Couch, “I got your ass,” before she
turns the phone off. While the State argues t his statement captures the moment
defendant decided to shoot Couch, it could just as easily reflect her belief that she
had finally captured Couch and some portion of his attack on video.
Shortly therea fter, defendan t shot Couch once . Defendant reported to the
police that right before she shot him, he had backed her into a wall and was taunting
and menacing her. According to defendant, Couch grabbed her gun, and then she

4

shot him because she believed her life was in danger.1 Copeland reported that when
defendant shot Couch, he had “gotten into her face because we are both screaming
at him to leave. He had been drinking too. But he got right up in there and he’s like
I’m not leaving, this is my house.” Copeland also told police Couch was about a foot
away, approaching defendant with his hands raised in a taunting, but not threatening,
manner.
Copeland called 911 but was incoherent, so defendant took over the call. She
told the 911 operator that she had shot the victim because he would not stop hitting
Copeland, and she remained on the phone describing the victim’s condition until the
paramedics and police arrived. Defendant voluntarily turned over her gun and phone
to police, and gave two voluntary statements.
Under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 443
U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. Because defendant claimed that she shot the victim in
self-defense (or defense of others), the State also had the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not perpetrated in self -defense. State v.
Taylor, 02-1834, p. 7 (La. 5/25/04), 875 So.2d 58, 63; State v. Brown, 414 So.2d
726, 728 (La. 1982). Thus, when a defendant challenges the suffi ciency of the
evidence in a self-defense case involving a homicide, the question becomes whether,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

1 While the State makes much of the fact that gunshot residue was not found on Couch’s hands,
none was found on Copeland or defendant’s hands either. The gunshot residue analysis report
dated June 28, 2017, concluded that the tests could not determine whethe r any of the three had
discharged a firearm or were in proximity to a discharged firearm.

5
of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide w a s not
committed in self-defense or in the defense of others. See, e.g., State v. Matthews,
464 So.2d 298, 299 (La. 1985) (“On review, the question therefore is not whether a
rational fact-finder could have found that the state had proved the essential elements
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The applicable standard is whether a
rational fact-finder, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not
committed in self-defense or in defense of others.”).
Whether the State carried its burden here, and whether any rational juror —
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution—could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not shoot and kill Couch in self-
defense or in defense of Copeland and her children, is a very close question. It is
much closer than one might infer from the opinion of the court below. It is also much
closer than one might think if one only read the State’s carefully curated description
of the evidence, which does not accurately reflect the record.
2
2 For example, the State contends defendant lied when she claimed Couch tried to kick open the
front door, and then successfully kicked open the back door, because the crime scene photos show
the doors are undamaged. In fact, some photographs do not show the damage. However, two
photographs very clearly show damage to the back door and doorframe. In addition, Copeland
testified that defendant tried to kick open the front door with sufficient force that “you could feel
it.” While her testimony did not confirm that defendant kicked open the back door, it did not deny
it either.
T
he State also contends defendant lied when she testified that defendant “slung” her into a coffee
table because the crime scene photos show that the table was not broken. However, the crime scene
photos show that the coffee table was wedged at an angle into a corner and blocking other furniture.
It clearly had been moved. While the State contends defendant lied when she testified that
defendant broke a lamp over her head, the crime scene photos show broken glass strewn on the
floor. The State contends defendant lied about the degree of violence in the fight in the baby’s
room because a “Bless ed Mother statuette” is “undisturbed.” However, the crime scene photos
show this statuette precariously balanced nearly halfway off a table. The photos also depict a chest
shoved into a corner, wedging a box of diapers sideways and suspended above the floor between
the chest and the wall, with broken sunglasses protruding from the chest. The chest is split and
broken where it impacted the diaper box. These crime scene photos do not show that defendant
entirely lied about the violence of the conflict, as the State claims.

6
A
s close as the question is, after reviewing the entire record, we cannot
conclude that a rational juror— after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution—could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was
not committed in self-defense or in defense of others. While the discrepancies in the
testimony and evidence are exaggerated by the court below and by the State here,
there are still discrepancies. In applying the Jackson standard, the reviewing court
will not assess credibility nor re-weigh the evidence. State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965,
968 (La.1986). It is the role of the fact -finder to weigh the respective credibility of
the witnesses, and this court will not second-guess the credibility determinations of
the trier of fact beyond our sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of
review.
3 See State v. Richardson , 425 So.2d 1228 (La. 1983). Resolving t he
discrepancies here required the jury to make credibility determinations, which this
court cannot second-guess.
However, t he close nature of the question above readily answers the next
question before the court. At trial, the State presented the testimony of Couch’s
childhood friend, Brandon Tate. Tate was not a witness to the conflict, and he could
The State also relies on two carefully selected photographs , which it describes in its brief as
“representative samples,” that show defendant and Copeland apparently uninjured. These
photographs are not representative. The full selection of police photographs show that defendant
and Copeland had numerous bruises and abrasions.
T
he State contends defendant lied when she told police that she believed cuts sustained by
Copeland were inflicted by a putty knife Couch wielded at some point during t he conflict . A
detective testified at trial that police did not find a putty knife and that none is present in the crime
scene photographs. However, one photographic exhibit shows a rusty putty knife on the floor under
a small table next to a diaper bag. It appears that the State may have shown jurors a printed version
of this image at trial, which is much darker than the digital picture . In the darker printed version,
the putty knife is more difficult to discern.
3 Similarly, we cannot conclude under the Jackson standard that the evidence could support , at
most, a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, which is an equally close question here that does not
merit a separate discussion.

7

not testify as to any facts in dispute. Instead, Tate offered his opinion as to how the
jury ought to interpret Couch’s statements, recorded by defendant’s phone . In
particular, Tate offered his opinion as to what Couch’s emotional state was during
the recorded portions of the conflict, i.e. whether he was calm or upset, and the
degree to which he may have been upset. As the court of appeal correctly found, this
lay opinion testimony was clearly inadmissible.4 However, we do not agree with the
court of appeal’s determination that the error in admitting this testimony was
harmless. See Stockstill, 18-1586, pp. 25–26.
Erroneous admission of evidence requires reversal only where there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence might have contributed to the verdict.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23–24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827–828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705
(1967). Under Chapman, the relevant inquiry is whether the reviewing court may
conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e. was the guilty
verdict actually rendered unattributable to the error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993).
The Chapman standard for harmless error is not satisfied here. This is a close
case in which defendant claims she shot the victim in self -defense (or defense of
another), and a significant portion of the evidence supports her defense—which left

4 Code of Criminal Procedure art. 701 authorizes lay opinion testi mony limited to those opinions
or inferences which are:

(1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and

(2) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact
in issue.

Tate was not involved in the conflict. He w as not even present. While the two women’s
appreciation of the danger posed by Couch during the fight was relevant to determining
whether defendant acted justifiably with a reasonable apprehension of danger, Tate’s
impression of Couch’s emotional state based on the partial recording was not. His
testimony was not helpful to determining any fact in issue and should have been excluded
from the trial.

8

the jury with the difficult task of carefully weighing all of the evidence and
evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Under those circumstances, it is impossible
to say beyond a reasonable doubt that there i s no reasonable possibility that the
erroneously admitted lay opinion testimony contributed to the guilty verdict
rendered by the jury.
Moreover, t he partial recording of the conflict was an important piece of
evidence for the jury to use in evaluating the State’s case and the defense presented
at trial. The importance of this evidence is reflected in the degree to which the court
below found (and the State continues to argue ) that this recording shows the jury
reasonably rejected defendant’s assertion that she acted justifiably against the threat
posed by the victim. The fact that the jurors heard the recording and could draw their
own inferences from it does not render the witness’s improperly admitted testimony
about what he inf erred from it cumulative. “ Cumulative evidence is generally
understood to be additional evidence of the sa me kind tending to prove the same
point as other evidence already given[.]” State v. Phillips, 343 So.2d 1047, 1053 (La.
1977). The recording itself, and the witness’s inferences about what the recording
reveals about the victim’s emotional state , are wholly different things. Under the
circumstances here, there is certainly a reasonable possibility that this erroneously
admitted evidence may have contributed to the jury’s decision to reject defendant’s
claim that she acted in defense of herself or another, and to the jury’s decision to
return a verdict of guilty of second degree murder rather than a verdict of guilty of
manslaughter.
Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal, which affirmed
defendant’s conviction for the second degree murder of Cody Couch and her
sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility. We vacate defendant’s

9

conviction and sentence. We remand this matter to the district court for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED

10/20/20
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2019-KK-1235
S
TATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
MARGARET CAMAILLE STOCKSTILL
ON
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY
C
richton, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
I agree with the majority that the testimony of Mr. Tate was erroneously
admitted and the error was not harmless, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
and therefore concur in that portion of the judgment. In my view, however, after
viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of second degree murder
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979). Here, the defendant asserted self-defense or defense of others, and when the
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in such a case, the more specific
question becomes whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the homicide was not committed in self-defense or in the defense of others. See,
e.g., State v. Davis, 46-267 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/11), 69 So. 3d 538, writ denied
,
11
-1561 (La. 1/13/12), 77 So. 3d 952. The majority calls this a “very close question”
in this case, but I do not believe it is close, nor do I believe it is a question that can
be answered in the state’s favor.
In my view, the evidence in the record supports a reasonable belief on the part
of the defendant that Mr. Couch posed an immediate risk of great bodily harm to the

women and children in the house, including the defendant, and shooting the victim
was necessary to prevent the harm. See R.S. 14:20; R.S. 14:22. See also State v.
Jackson, 419 So. 2d 425, 430 n.3. (La. 1981) (“[I]t is the reasonableness of the
apprehension and not the actuality of danger that determines the question of self -
defense under La. R.S. 14:20.”). As set forth in the per curiam, it is undisputed that
Mr. Couch on the one hand, and the defendant and Ms. Copeland on the other,
engaged in an “escalating” and “chaotic” physical altercation. Mr. Couch repeatedly
knocked both women to the ground or pushed them over furniture. The altercation
was so forceful that multiple pieces of furniture were broken, including a baby crib—
which held a baby at the time it was broken. Both women repeatedly beseeched Mr.
Couch to leave, and he refused to do so. Finally, after all of this transpired, the
defendant pointed her gun at Mr. Couch. In response, he raised his arms and
aggressively taunted her from less than a foot away. It was then that she shot him
once at close range.
Under these circumstances, it is my view that the defendant reasonably feared
for her life and belie ved that lesser actions would not prevent the victim from
harming her or the others in the home. Jackson, 419 So. 2d at 427. Therefore, I would
reverse the court of appeal and vacate the defendant’s conviction and sentence on
sufficiency grounds.