FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #032
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 9th day of September, 2020 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2019-KK-01727 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. DENNIS JEROME BARTIE (Parish of
Calcasieu)
We affirm the court of appeal's determination that defendant's statements
during the police interview from roughly the 48-minute mark onward
were made in violation of Miranda, were not free and voluntary, and
therefore are not admissible for any purpose including impeachment at
the trial. We reverse the court of appeal's order that the first 48 minutes of
the police interview can be used only for impeachment and only if
defendant testifies, and we reinstate the district court's ruling that the first
48 minutes are admissible to the extent authorized by the rules of
evidence. We a lso reve rse the c ourt of appeal's determinati on that
defendant's statement to the corrections officer at Allen Correctional Facility
on the day after the police interview is inadmissible at trial. We remand to
the distric t c ourt to conduc t a n evidentiar y hearing a nd then rul e on the
admissibility of that statement in light of our determination that defendant's
statements during the police interview following the 48-mi nute mark were
not free and voluntary.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Retired Judge James Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice pro tempore, sitting for
the vacancy in Louisiana Supreme Court District 4.
Hughes, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with reasons.

* Retired Judge James Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice pro tempore, sitting for the vacancy in
Louisiana Supreme Court District 4.
09/09/20
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2019-KK-01727
STA
TE OF LOUISIANA
ve
rsus
DE
NNIS JEROME BARTIE
O
N WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
THIRD CIRCUIT, PARISH OF CALCASIEU
PE
R CURIAM:*
In 2006, defendant stabbed his former girlfriend more than 20 times in front
of eyewitnesses in Baton Rouge and then stole her friend’ s car, which he drove to
Lake Charles and abandoned . He was found guilty of attempted second degree
murder, La.R.S. 14:30.1 and La.R.S. 14:27 , and sentenced to 40 years
imprisonment at hard labor. State v. Bartie , 11 -2209 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/8/12),
available at 2012 WL 2061677. He was serving that sentence at Allen Correctional
Center in 2016 when DNA testing connected him to the victim of an unsolved
murder committed in 1998.
In 1998, Rose Born was murdered at her donut shop in Lake Charles. She
was stabbed more than 30 times. Her car was stolen and then abandoned about 4
miles away. Defendant was 17 years old at the time and lived in Lake Charles. In
2016, DNA analysis showed that a sample from underneath her fingernails
matched DNA from defendant. Defendant, then 35 years old, was transported from
Allen Correctional Center to the Lake Charles Police Department and interviewed.
The interview lasted more than 7 hours and this court has carefully reviewed

2

the entire video. At the outset, defendant wa s advised of his rights pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and he
indicated he understood his rights and waived them. Despite being confronted with
DNA evidence, defendant denied any involvement in or knowledge of the crime.
After about 34 minutes, defendant was first informed that he faced the death
penalty. Detectives offered him a “deal” whereby he would “come clean” and fully
confess so that Ms. Born’s family could achieve a degree of closure, and he would
not be sentenced to death. This threat of the death penalty and offer of a “deal” to
avoid it later became the dominant theme of the interview.
After about 48 minutes, defendant invoked his right to remain silent, and he
continued to try to assert that right several times throughout the interview. His
invocations were either ignored or countered by bringing up the potential “deal” to
avoid the death penalty . Immediately after his first a ttempt to invoke his right to
remain silent, detectives confronted him with post-mortem photos of the victim,
and they continued the interview.
The first two hours of the interview passed without defendant providing any
information. Then a fresh detective was brought in to hammer the theme of the
death penalty and the potential “deal” to avoid it. The detective listed the names of
several inmates on death row who were prosecuted by Rick Bryant. The detective
showed defendant photos of death row and describe d how small and hot the cells
are there. The detective pleaded with defendant to cooperate and not let prosecutor
Rick Bryant send someone else to death row.
1 In response, defendant began crying

1 Defendant was even presented with the “deal” in writing, signed by prosecutor Rick Bryant,
who detectives described to defendant as a “bad mother f —er” and who detectives boasted had
sent many defendants to death row. Defendant repeatedl y looked at this document during the
interview. Nearly every time detectives threatened defendant with the death penalty , he became

3

and admitted some involvement in Ms. Born’s murder , but claim ed he was on
drugs at the time and his memory was impaired.
Thereafter, defendant’s gradually elicited admissions were vague, tentative,
and often spoken in a questioning tone. Detectives on more than one occasion used
compound questions in which the ques tion itself provided the desired answer.
Defendant frequently tried to backpedal and disavow his earlier admissions as
guesses he was making to try to satisfy the detectives, but he was met with threats
that he w ould lose the “deal” and receive the death p enalty if he did not confess
satisfactorily. Ultimately, defendant admitted he was on drugs and he entered the
donut shop intending to steal the owner’s car but instead stabbed and killed her
during a struggle . Although he said he picked up the murder weapon at the scene
of the crime and left it there afterward, he was unable to explain why police did not
find it. He was also unable to explain unusual details not iced by police, such as
when, why, or how the phone line to the donut shop was cut.
Near the end of the interview, after about six hours and twenty minutes, an
emotional defendant sought to confirm that detectives were satisfied with his
confession and he would not receive the death penalty. At around the seventh hour
of the interview, prosecutor Ric k Bryant entered the room to reassure defendant
that he would only be charged with second degree murder and armed robbery and
he would not receive the death penalty.
Since 2005, d efendant has been categorically exempt from capital
punishment because he wa s 17 years old at the time of the crime. In Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the United State s

emotional and visibly distressed. Nearly every time defendant revealed any new information to
detectives, the revelation was preceded by another threat that defendant would lose the “deal”
and be sentenced to death.

4

Supreme Court held that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for
offenders under the age of 18, and therefore the death penalty cannot be imposed
on juvenile offenders. The prosecutor here was clearly aware of the more recently
decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012),
which decision relied heavily on Roper v. Simmons . In Mil ler v. Alabama , the
United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders. When defendant asked whether he would be sentenced to life in pris on
without parole, Mr. Bryant informed him that the law had changed and a special
sentencing hearing was now required before a person who commits second degree
murder as a juvenile can be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole
eligibility. In its brief, the State characterizes falsely informing defendant he would
receive the death penalty if he did not satisfactorily confess as permissible tactical
deception, and argues that, regardless of whether the deception was permissible, it
did not render defe ndant’s confession involuntary because he was hardened,
experienced in the legal system, and unaffected by the toothless threats. The video,
however, shows otherwise.
On the next day after the interview and after defendant was transported back
to Allen Correctional Facility, a corrections officer conducted a routine mental
health check and asked defendant how he was feeling. Defendant replied, “I am ok
they brought me for an old charge that happened in the past. Man Major Vic, I am
kind of glad this happened now I don ’t have to keep looking over my shoulder it’s
like a weight off me. Now I can put this behind me and move on with my time.”
The State gave notice pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 768 of its intent to
introduce at trial the recorded police interview and defendant ’s statement to the

5

correctional officer on the following day , treating these as two separate and
unrelated statements.2 Defendant filed a motion to suppress the police interview. 3
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion to
suppress, finding that the totality of the circumstances indicated that defendant’s
statements during the recorded interview were free and voluntary . Defendant
sought supervisory review from the court of appeal.
The court of appeal found that defendant, beginning at around the 58-minute
mark of the interview,4 repeatedly invoked his right to remain silent, but that police
ignored the invocation, and thus the entire statement was inadmissible because it
was obtained in violation of Miranda. State v. Bartie , 18 -0131 (La. App. 3 Cir.
3/22/18) (unpub ’d), writ denied, 18-0640 (La. 7/9/18), 247 So.3d 116 (Guidry,
Clark, Crichton, JJ., would grant and docket).
Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress the statement he made to
the corrections officer at Allen Correctional Center . Defendant also filed a motion
for clarification concerning defendant’s statements during the police interview. In
response, the state argued that everything prior to the 58 -minute mark of the police
interview was admissible, and that the motion to suppress the statement to the
corrections officer was untimely. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the

2 Code of Criminal Procedure art. 768 provides:

Unless the defendant has been granted pretrial discovery, if the state intends to
introduce a confession or inculpa tory statement in evidence, it shall so advise the
defendant in writing prior to beginning the state ’s opening statement. If it fails to
do so a confession or inculpatory statement shall not be admissible in evidence.

3 While defendant did not mention his statement to the corrections officer in his original motion
to suppress, he argued at the suppression hearing that this statement must also be suppressed as
fruit of the poisonous tree.

4 The court of appeal focused on defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent at around the
58-minute mark. The court of appeal did not discuss defendant ’s earlier attempt to invoke this
right at around the 48-minute mark.

6

district court ruled that the State would be able to use the police interview prior to
the 48:49 mark (where defendant first invoked his right to remain silent), as long as
it is relevant and otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence . The district
court also found that the remaining portion of the police interview (the portion
obtained after his first invoc ation of his right to remain silent was not honored )
could be only used for impeachment purposes if defendant himself testified .
Finally, the district court determined that the motion to suppress the statement to
the corrections officer was untimely under La.C.Cr.P. art. 521 .5 Defendant sought
supervisory review from the court of appeal.
The court of appeal noted that it previously found defendant’ s invocation of
his right to remain silent was not honored, and it further found that the district
court erred in determining that defendant’s statements were freely and voluntarily
made. The court of appeal determined that defendant’ s statements were the result
of an impermissible inducement, i.e. the repeated threats that defendant would be
sentenced to death if he did not confess. Therefore, the court of appeal found that
the defendant’ s statements during the police interview following his first
invocation of his right to remain silent, which occurred at a bout the 48 -minute
mark, would be inadmissible for any purpose at trial. However, the court of appeal
found that defendant’ s statements that preceded his invocation of his right to
remain silent were also inadmissible unless defendant testified, in which case the
statements preceding the 48-minute mark could be used to impeach him . Finally,
the court of appeal found the district court erred in treating defendant’ s motion to

5 Code of Procedure art. 521(A) provided at the time, “ Pretrial motions shall be made or file d
within fifteen days after arraignment, unless a different time is provided by law or fixed by the
court at arraignment upon a showing of good cause why fifteen days is inadequate. ” This article
has been amended by 2020 La. Acts 252 to change 15 days afte r arraignment to 30 days after the
receipt of initial discovery.

7

suppress his statement to the corrections officer as untimely. The court of appeal
ruled that defendant’s statement to the corrections office r was also inadmissible
because the State must not be permitted to use this stateme nt as a way to introduce
the contents of defendant’ s inadmissible police interview to the jury. State v.
Bartie, 19-0250 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/25/19) (unpub’d).
The State now concedes there were numerous violations of Miranda during
the police interview and that defendant’ s invocations of his right to remain silent,
beginning at about the 48-minute mark and continuing after, were not honored.
The State argues, however, that the court of appeal erred in placing any restriction
on the use of anything defendant said during the police interview that precedes the
48-minute mark because defendant was Mirandized and this portion of defendant’s
statement was free and voluntary.
The State is correct that the court of appeal cited no authority for this part of
its ruling, and none can be found. The evidence presented at the suppression
hearings supports the district court’s conclusion that the initial portion of the police
interview, unti l roughly the 48 -minute mark, was conducted after advising
defendant of his rights pursuant to Miranda and obtaining a waiver of those rights.
Defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent until roughly the 48 -minute
mark. In addition, there is no in dication defendant’s statements, which consisted
primarily of identifying personal information and general denials of any
involvement in or knowledge of the crime, were not free and voluntary. Detectives
did first threaten defendant that he would be sentenced to death if he did not
confess during this initial portion. However, that threat did not become effective
until those detectives were replaced with others and the thre at repeated and
intensified over the course of the interview.

8

Defendant offers other reasons why the initial portion of the interview might
not be admissible at trial, such as the fact that it contains other crimes evidence or
information that may not be relevant. However, it is important to note that the
district court ruled only that th is initial portion of the interview need not be
excluded because of any constitutional violation and would be admissible only to
the extent allowed by the rules of evidence. In the absence of any indication that
defendant’s statements up until roughly the 48 -minute mark were obtained in
violation of Miranda or were not free and voluntary, the district court did not err in
refusing to suppress them pre -trial, and the restriction placed on their use by the
court of appeal is unsupported by law.
The State als o contends that the court of appeal erred in finding that the
remainder of defendant’s statements during the police interview (following the 48-
minute mark) were the result of an impermissible inducement. According to the
State, threatening a defendant who is categorically exempt from capital punishment
with the death penalty is a permissible strategic deception that can be used by
police to encourage a suspect to confess, and the use of this tactic did not result in
statements that were not free or volunta ry under the totality of the circumstances
here. Therefore, the State contends the remainder of the statement, while not
admissible in the State ’s case-in-chief, should be admissible to impeach defendant
if he testifies, in accordance with Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643,
28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), because it was free and voluntary.
“Before what purports to be a confession can be introduced in evidence, it
must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the
influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises.”
La.R.S. 15:451. If a confession is obtained as the result of promises or

9

inducements, it is not admissible. State v. Serrato, 424 So.2d 214, 222 (La. 1982).
As described above , detectives promised defendant he would not be
prosecuted for capital murder and sentenced to death if he confessed. This promise
was made in writing and signed by the prosecutor, despite the fact that the
defendant was 17 years old at the time he is alleged t o have committed the crime
and thus he was not eligible for the death penalty. This promise was the dominant
theme of the police interview and defendant was threatened repeatedly that he
would be sentenced to death if he did not confess.
This court summarized the framework for evaluating the voluntariness of a
confession in State v. Turner, 16-1841 (La. 12/5/18), 263 So.3d 337:
The analytical framework for evaluating the voluntariness of
defendant’s confession is well settled. The Supreme Court previously
adhered to the view that any inducement “however slight” taints a
confession. Bram v. United States , 168 U.S. 532, 542 -43, 18 S.Ct.
183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). However, under current standards,
voluntariness is determined by the totality of the circumstances , with
the ultimate focus on whether “the statement was the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice or the result of an overborne
will.” State v. Lewis , 539 So.2d 1199, 1205 (La. 1989) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). See al so Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)
(“In determining whether a defendant’ s will was overborne in a
particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances— both the characte ristics of the accused
and the details of the interrogation.”). What survives of Bram is the
principle that a confession of guilt induced by a government promise
of immunity is “coerced” and may not be used against the accused.
Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 347, 83 S.Ct. 448, 9
L.Ed.2d 357 (1963).

State v. Turner, 16-1841, pp. 96–97, 263 So.3d at 399. In Turner, the interrogating
officer referred to himself as a “lifeline” for defendant. This court found that such a
statement was not a promise of immunity from the death penalty. Moreover, in
looking at the totality of the circumstances, this c ourt found that it was not the
death penalty that ultimately swayed defendant to confess —it was the fact that

10

defendant was presented with increas ingly incriminating evidence linking him to
the two murders that ultimately broke down defendant’ s earlier denials of any
involvement. In contrast, defendant here was initially perplexed but unmoved by
the DNA evidence. It was the repeated threat of a deat h sentence that moved
defendant both to tears and to confess.
Defendant cannot be sentenced to death for this crime. While a
misrepresentation, in and of itself, may not vitiate the voluntariness of an otherwise
voluntary confession, see Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22
L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (misrepresentations are relevant but do not make an otherwise
voluntary confession inadmissible), the repeated threat s that defendant would be
sentenced to death if he did not confess satisfactorily went beyond a mere
misrepresentation. It was the theme of the interrogation to which detectives always
returned. At one point, a detective even theatrically added defendant’s name to a
list of persons successfully prosecuted by Rick Bryant and sentenced to death.
While voluntariness is determined by the totality of the circumstances, the video
makes it clear that the repeated threats here overbore defendant’s will and induced
him to confess.
Thus, defendant’s inculpatory statements during the police interview th at
follow the 48-minute mark are inadmissible pursuant to La.R.S. 15:451, and those
statements may not be used to impeach defendant if he testifies because the State
has failed to convincingly show that they are free and voluntary when the video so
clearly shows otherwise. See generally State v. Kent , 371 So.2d 1319, 1320 (La.
1979) (“As a prerequisite to admission of a confession or inculpatory statement,
the state must discharge its burden of proving affirmatively and beyond a
reasonable doubt that the st atement was freely and voluntarily made and was not

11

the result of threats, coercion or promises. ”). To the extent the court of appeal
reached the same conclusion, we affirm that part of the court of appeal’s decision.
Finally, the State contends the court of appeal erred in finding defendant’ s
motion to suppress his statement to the corrections officer was timely, and in
finding this statement must also be suppressed to keep the jury from becoming
aware of the inadmissible portions of the police interview . Regarding the latter
determination, the State argues that the court of appeal’ s ruling is unsupported by
law.
In response to the State ’s notice of its intent to introduce at trial defendant’s
interview with police and his statement to a corrections offic er the next day,
defendant moved to suppress the former. While defendant neglected to mention the
latter in his motion to suppress, the State called the corrections officer to testify
about this statement at the suppression hearing, and defendant argued at the
hearing that the statement to the corrections officer was “fruit of the poisonous
tree.” While defendant did not formally move to suppress this statement until two
years later, we find good cause for defendant’ s otherwise late filing under the
unusual circumstances here, which include confusion over admissibility resulting
from the court of appeal’s shifting positions.
Defendant argued the statement to the corrections officer was fruit of the
poisonous tree, in this instance the poisonous tree being t he coercive police
interview from roughly the 48 -minute mark onward. “Fruit of the poisonous tree”
is a figure of speech drawn from Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct.
407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), in which the United States Supreme Court held that
evidence and witnesses discovered as a result of a search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment must be excluded from evidence. The Wong Sun doctrine applies as

12

well when the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation is a confession. In the
context of the Fifth Amendment, however, the doctrine of the “fruit of the
poisonous tree” is not applied as broadly as it is in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 –07, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1291 –
92, 84 L.Ed. 2d 222 (1985). 6 For exam ple, it does not apply to every technical
violation of Miranda; there must also be an underlying Fifth Amendment violation.
Thus, d espite the fact that patently voluntary statements taken in violation of
Miranda must be excluded from the prosecution’ s case, the presumption of
coercion, absent actual coercion, does not bar their use for impeachment purposes
on cross-examination. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d
1 (1971). “When a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that passes between
confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the
interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has carried over into the second
confession.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310, 105 S.Ct. at 1293.
As a general rule, this c ourt reviews trial court rulings under a deferential
standard with regard to factual and other trial determinations, while legal findings
are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hampton, 98-0331, p. 18
(La. 4/23/99), 750 So.2d 867, 884; see also Crichton & Kottle, Appealing

6 The United States Supreme Court explained:

The Miranda exclusionary rule, however, serves the Fifth Amendment and
sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in
the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation. The Fifth Amendment prohibits use
by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony. Failure to
administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion.
Consequently, unwarned sta tements that are otherwise voluntary within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence
under Miranda. Thus, in the individual case, Miranda’s preventive medicine
provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no id entifiable
constitutional harm.

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306–07, 105 S.Ct. at 1291–92 (footnote omitted).

13

Standards: Louisiana’s Constitutional Provision Governing Appellate Review of
Criminal Facts, 79 La.L.Rev. 369, 382– 84 (2018) . When a trial court makes
findings of fact based on the weight of the testimony and the cr edibility of the
witnesses, a reviewing court owes those findings great deference, and may not
overturn those findings unless there is no evidence to support those findings. State
v. Bourque , 622 So.2d 198, 222 (La. 1993) (A “trial judge ’s ruling [on a fac t
question], based on conclusions of credibility and weight of the testimony, is
entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is no
evidence to support the ruling.”).
Here, however, the district court has yet to rule on whether defendant’s
statement to the corrections officer constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree because
that court found defendant did not timely file a motion to suppress that statement.
The court of appeal correctly found the district court erred because there is good
cause for the defendant’s delay. However, the court of appeal erred in then ruling
on the admissibility of the statement in the first instance. Accordingly, we reverse
that part of the court of appeal’s opinion, and we remand to the district co urt with
instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to decide whether defendant ’s
statement to the corrections officer must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous
tree.
For the reasons above, we affirm the court of appeal’ s determination that
defendant’s statements during the police interview from roughly the 48-minute
mark onward were made in violation of Miranda, were not free and voluntary, and
therefore are not admissible for any purpose including impeachment at the trial.
We reverse the court of appeal ’s order that the first 48 minute s of the police
interview can be used only for impeachment and only if defendant testifies, and we

14

reinstate the district court’ s ruling that the first 48 minutes are admissible to the
extent authorized by the rules of evidence. We also reverse the court of appeal’ s
determination that defendant’ s statement to the corrections officer at Allen
Correctional Facility on the day after the police interview is inadmissible at trial.
We remand to the district court to cond uct an evidentiary hearing and then rule on
the admissibility of that statement in light of our determination that defendant’s
statements during the police interview following the 48-minute mark were not free
and voluntary.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED

09/09/20
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2019-KK-01727
S
TATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
DENNIS JEROME BARTIE
O
n Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Calcasieu
H
ughes, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
W
hile I agree with most of the majority opinion, I would find the defendant’s
statement to the corrections officer the next day to be fruit of the poisonous tree.
But for the suppressed portion of his statement, defendant would have had
nothing to comment on, and the suppressed portion should not come in the back
door.