Gordon R. Sibley and wife, Carolyn A. Sibley, and Katelyn D. Sibley, a minor by and through, Gordon R. Sibley, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Katelyn D. Sibley v. Heather D. Granger and Progressive Insurance Agency

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2019 CA 0411

GORDON R. SIBLEY AND WIFE, CAROLYN A. SIBLEY, AND
ATELYN D. SIBLEY, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH, GORDON R.
SIBLEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ESTATE OF KATELYN D. SIBLEY

VERSUS

HEATHER D. GRANGER AND PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE
AGENCY

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
AN 0 7 2020

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER 110174, DIVISION B, PARISH OF LIVINGSTON
STATE OF LOUISIANA

HONORABLE CHARLOTTE HUGHES FOSTER, JUDGE

Patrick H. Hufft Counsel for Plaintiffs -Appellants
New Orleans, Louisiana Gordon R. Sibley and wife, Carolyn A.
Sibley, and their daughters, Randelyn
Aub A. Ward Sibley Nelson and Kately D. Sibley
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

William C. Helm Counsel for Defendant -Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Heather D. Granger and Progressive
Security Insurance Company
Stephen F. Butterfield
New Orleans, Louisiana

Valerie Theng Matherne Counsel for Defendant -Appellee
James Matthew Matherne Herbert Benjamin Corkern, III
Colin F. Lozes
New Orleans, Louisiana

Roy C. Beard Counsel for Defendant -Appellee
Lynda Albano Tafaro Wal- Mart Louisiana, LLC
Katherine L. Swartout
New Orleans, Louisiana

BEFORE: McDONALD, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ.

Disposition: MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL DENIED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

2

Chutz, J.

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their personal injury claims on the

defendants' motions for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At approximately 2: 05 p.m. on December 23, 2004, Heather D. Granger was

driving her vehicle in Livingston Parish when she went off the road while going
around a curve, overcorrected by steering sharply to the left, and entered into the

opposing lane oftraffic. Ms. Granger' s vehicle collided head on with a vehicle being

driven by Gordon R. Sibley, causing his vehicle to flip and roll over. As a result of

the collision, Mr. Sibley suffered severe physical injuries. At the time of the

accident, Ms. Granger was driving under the influence of alcohol and prescription

medications for which she did not have prescriptions. She was arrested and

ultimately pleaded guilty to a charge of first degree vehicular negligent injuring, and

was sentenced to serve four years imprisonment at hard labor, with two years of the

sentence suspended.

On December 9, 2005, Mr. Sibley, his wife, Carolyn A. Sibley, and their

minor child, Katelyn D. Sibley (by and through Mr. Sibley), filed suit against Ms.

Granger and her automobile insurer, Progressive Security Insurance Company. In

subsequent discovery dispositions, Ms. Granger testified that on the day of the

accident, prior to leaving her workplace at the Wal-Mart in Walker, Louisiana and

while she was on the clock during the day, she consumed alcohol and took

prescription drugs ( Lortabs and Xanax) supplied to her by her supervisor, Herbert

B. Corkern, III. Ms. Granger, who was over the age of twenty-one, indicated she

had been in a sexual relationship with Mr. Corkern for several months before the

accident. At the time, Ms. Granger worked in the meat department at Wal- Mart

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department, and Mr. Corkern was the manager of the deli, seafood and meat

departments.

Ms. Granger testified Mr. Corkern frequently clocked her in for work early

when she was not actually present, approved her arriving to work tardy, and/ or

authorized her to clock out of work early so that she could meet him off premises to

drink alcohol, take prescription drugs ( Lortab and Xanax) he provided, and have

sexual relations.
According to Ms. Granger, she also frequently drank alcohol, took

Lortabs and Xanaxs supplied by Mr. Corkern, and had sexual relations with him on

Wal- Mart premises when they were both at work.

Ms. Granger claimed she was on her way to meet Mr. Corkern when the

accident at issue occurred. She testified that after Mr. Corkern left Wal- Mart that

day, he called her on her cell phone and told her to make an excuse to leave early

and come meet him at a local grocery store. She told her immediate supervisor she

had a family emergency, clocked out, then left Wal- Mart to meet Mr. Corkern off

premises.
The accident occurred shortly thereafter.

In his deposition testimony, Mr. Corkern denied ever having a sexual

relationship with Ms. Granger or calling her to come meet him on the day of the

accident. He testified he had completed his work duties for the day and was at home

preparing for a hunting trip at the time the accident occurred. Mr. Corkern also

denied supplying Ms. Granger with any alcohol or drugs.

On June 23, 2014, plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Sibley, together with their

daughters, Katelyn Sibley and Randelyn Sibley Nelson, both of whom were minors

at the time of the accident but had since become majors, filed an amended petition.

The petition named Wal- Mart Louisiana, LLC, Mr. Corkern, and ABC Insurance

Company, Mr. Corkern' s homeowners and liability insurer, as additional defendants.

Plaintiffs alleged Wal-Mart was vicariously liable for the actions of its employees,

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Ms. Granger and Mr. Corkern, under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Additionally, plaintiffs alleged Wal-Mart was independently negligent in failing to

properly supervise and monitor its employees and in failing to enforce its

prohibitions against a supervisor having a sexual relationship with a subordinate and

against the consumption of alcohol and other intoxicating substances by employees

while on premises. Plaintiffs alleged Mr. Corkern was negligent because: ( 1) he

supplied Ms. Granger with alcohol and other intoxicating substances under coercive

circumstances causing her to feel compelled to consume them in order to avoid

adverse job consequences; and ( 2) he instructed Ms. Granger to leave Wal -Mart' s

premises on the date of the accident in order to meet him when he knew or should

have known that it was dangerous for her to operate a motor vehicle in her condition.

After various proceedings, Wal- Mart and Mr. Corkern each filed a motion for

summary judgment and a peremptory exception
raising the objection of

prescription.'
Following a hearing, the district court granted both motions for

summary judgment. The district court pretermitted ruling on the exceptions of

prescription in view of the granting of Wal-Mart and Mr. Corkern' s motions for

summary judgment. On November 21, 2018, the district court signed a judgment

dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Wal- Mart and Mr. Corkern. Plaintiffs have now

appealed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The district court erred in granting Wal -Mart' s motion for summary
judgment when there were issues of fact as to Wal -Mart' s independent and
vicarious liability.
2. The district court erred in finding no causal connection between Mr.
Corkern' s conduct and the accident at issue.

3. The district court erred in finding Wal -Mart' s exception of prescription to
be moot rather than denying it outright.

Wal-Mart also raised the objection of no cause of action, which the district court pretermitted on
the grounds of mootness. Plaintiffs have assigned no error to this ruling.
5

SUMMARY JUDGMENT LAW

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted only if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to

material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.

C. C. P. art. 966( A)(3). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,

appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the

district court' s determination of whether summary judgment is

appropriate. Alvarado v Lodge at the Bluffs, LLC, 16- 0624 ( La. App. 1st Cir.

3/ 29/ 17), 217 So. 3d 429, 432, writ denied, 17- 0697 ( La. 6/ 16/ 17), 219 So. 3d 340.

The burden of proof rests on the mover. See La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1).

However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is

before the court on the motion, the mover's burden does not require that all essential

elements of the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense be negated. Instead, the

mover must point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one

or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense.

Thereafter, the adverse party must produce factual evidence sufficient to establish

that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the adverse

party fails to meet this burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and

the mover is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P. art.

966( D)( 1); Alvarado, 217 So. 3d at 432.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court' s role is not to evaluate

the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to

determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Factual inferences

reasonably drawn from the evidence must be construed in favor of the party opposing

the motion, and all doubt must be resolved in the opponent' s favor. Alvarado, 217

So. 3d at 432- 33.

11

LIABILITY OF WAL-MART
Assignment of Error Number One)

In their first assignment of error, plaintiffs argue summary judgment was

improper due to the existence of issues of material fact concerning Wal -Mart' s

vicarious liability for the tortious actions of its employers, Ms. Granger and Mr.

Corkern, as well as Wal -Mart' s own independent negligence. We disagree. Based

on our de novo review, we find the district court properly granted summary judgment

dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Wal- Mart.

Vicarious Liabilitv:

Plaintiffs assert that, because Mr. Corker was a salaried supervisor who did

not have to clock in or out of work or keep upper management apprised of his

location, he " was ostensibly still working in the course and scope of his managerial

position" when he demanded that Ms. Granger meet him off Wal -Mart' s premises

on the day of the accident. They further argue Ms. Granger believed she was

required to comply with Mr. Corkern' s " demands" in order not to jeopardize her

employment at Wal- Mart. According to plaintiffs, Wal-Mart is vicariously liable

for the actions of Ms. Granger and Mr. Corkern because " Mr. Corkern used his

position in Wal-Mart management to actualize his sexual desires by creating a

hostile work environment for Ms. Granger."

Under La. C. C. art. 2320, an employer is answerable for the damage

occasioned by its servant " in the exercise of the functions in which [ the servant is]

employed."
Specifically, an employer is vicarious liable for a tort committed by its

employee if, at the time, the employee was acting within the course and scope of his

employment.
Holt v. Torino, 12- 1579 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 26/ 13), 117 So. 3d 182,

184- 85, writ denied, 13- 1161 ( La. 8/ 30/ 13), 120 So. 3d 267. An employee is acting

within the course and scope of his employment when the employee' s action is of the

kind that he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits

of time and space, and is activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the employer.

Orgeron on Behalf of Orgeron v. McDonald, 93- 1353 ( La. 7/ 5/ 94), 639 So. 2d 224,

226- 27; Holt, 117 So. 3d at 185.

Generally, courts consider four factors when assessing vicarious liability,

including whether the tortious act: ( 1) was primarily employment rooted; ( 2) was

reasonably incidental to performance of employment duties; ( 3) occurred during

working hours; and (4) occurred on the employer' s premises. It is not necessary that

each factor is present in each case, and each case must be decided on its own merits.

Holt, 117 So. 3d at 185. The determinative question is whether the employee' s

tortious conduct was so closely connected in time, place, and causation to his

employment duties as to be regarded as a risk of harm fairly attributable to the

employer' s business, as compared with conduct motivated by purely personal

considerations entirely extraneous to the employer' s interest. Holt, 117 So. 3d at

185.

If the purpose of serving the master' s business actuates the servant to any

appreciable extent, the master is subject to liability if the act is otherwise within the

service. The scope of risk attributable to an employer increases with the amount of

authority and freedom of action granted to the servant in performing his assigned

tasks. Holt, 117 So. 3d at 185- 86. Further, an employer is not ordinarily liable for

an employee' s torts committed while going to and from work. Holt, 117 So. 3d at

IBM

The accident in this case did not occur either during Ms. Granger' s work hours

or on Wal -Mart' s premises. The accident happened approximately twenty minutes

after Ms. Granger clocked out of work and left Wal -Mart' s premises in her personal

vehicle. Ms. Granger' s job in the meat department did not require her to perform

tasks off premises, and she was not on a mission for Wal- Mart at the time of the

accident. Further, Ms. Granger' s consumption of alcohol and drugs was not a

function of her employment, specifically being in violation of Wal -Mart' s policies

a fact she was aware of), and did not benefit Wal- Mart in any way. Plaintiffs have

presented no evidence showing Ms. Granger' s tortious conduct of driving while

impaired by intoxicating substances in order to meet Mr. Corkern was either

employment rooted or incidental to the performance ofher j ob duties. Ms. Granger' s

actions were motivated purely by personal considerations. Despite plaintiffs'

contentions that Ms. Granger was coerced into having an intimate relationship with

Mr. Corkern out of fear of losing her job, Ms. Granger admitted that she continued

her affair with Mr. Corkern for over a year after she left her job at Wal-Mart.

Considering the circumstances, it is clear Ms. Granger' s conduct of driving

while under the influence of alcohol and drugs, allegedly in order to meet Mr.
Corkern, was not so closely connected in time, place, and causation to her

employment duties in Wal -Mart' s meat department as to be regarded as a risk of

harm fairly attributable to Wal -Mart' s retail business. Ms. Granger' s conduct was

motivated by personal considerations entirely extraneous to Wal -Mart' s interests.

We find no genuine issue of material fact that would support a finding that Ms.

Granger was acting in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the

accident.

We also reach the same conclusion with regard to Mr. Corkern, who denied

engaging in any sexual relationship with Ms. Granger or supplying her with alcohol

or drugs. Even if Mr. Corkern did engage in such conduct, he was aware of Wal -

Mart' s policies prohibiting him from having a sexual relationship with a subordinate

employee or providing her with alcohol or unauthorized prescription drugs. Any

such prohibited conduct by Mr. Corkern was not related to the performance of his

job duties or in furtherance of Wal -Mart' s interests. Moreover, it is undisputed that

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both at the time that Mr. Corkern allegedly called Ms. Granger and told her to meet

him off premises and at the time of the accident, Mr. Corkern was not on Wal -Mart' s

premises. Mr. Corkern testified in his deposition that, although he had worked

earlier in the day, he was at home preparing to go hunting at the time of the accident.

We find no merit in plaintiffs' contention that because Mr. Corkern was a

salaried supervisor who was not required to punch a time clock or report to anyone

when he left Wal -Mart' s premises, he was still acting within the course and scope of

his employment when he allegedly called Ms. Granger shortly before the accident
and " demanded" she meet him off premises. Plaintiffs have cited no authority for
such a proposition.
At the time the call was allegedly made, Mr. Corkern was off

premises, was not on a mission for Wal- Mart, and was not performing any act

reasonably incidental to his employment duties. Rather than being employment

based, Mr. Corkern' s alleged conduct was motivated solely by personal

considerations related to his alleged intimate relationship with Ms. Granger. His

actions were entirely extraneous to his job duties and did not benefit Wal- Mart in

any way.

Independent Nealikence:

Plaintiffs contend that in addition to being vicariously liable for its employers'

actions, Wal- Mart is also liable for its own independent negligence in failing to

properly supervise its managers and employees. They argue the accident would not

have happened if Wal- Mart had properly supervised and monitored workplace

conditions so that Mr. Corkern could not have engaged in an inappropriate sexual

relationship with Ms. Granger, manipulated her time cards to cover up the

relationship, or provided her with alcohol and drugs on Wal -Mart' s premises during

work hours. According to plaintiffs, the frequent, approved deviations Ms. Granger

10

was allowed from her scheduled work hours should have been a red flag to Wal-

Mart that something irregular was occurring and led to an investigation.

Louisiana courts have adopted a duty -risk analysis in determining whether to

impose liability under the general negligence principles of La. C. C. art. 2315. For

liability to attach under a duty -risk analysis, a plaintiff must prove five separate

elements: (
1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard

of care; ( 2) the defendant failed to conform his conduct to the appropriate standard;

3) the defendant' s substandard conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiffs injuries;

4) the substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff' s injuries; and ( 5) actual

damages. A negative answer to any of these inquiries results in a determination of

no liability. Bellanger v. Webre, 10- 0720 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 6/ 11), 65 So. 3d 201,

207, writ denied, 11- 1171 ( La. 9/ 16/ 11), 69 So. 3d 1149.

Thus, one of the threshold issues in any negligence action is whether the

defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 08- 1163 ( La.

5/ 22/ 09), 16 So. 3d 1065, 1086. In Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 05- 1095

La. 3/ 10/ 06), 923 So. 2d 627, 633, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

Whether a duty is owed is a question of law. In deciding whether to
impose a duty in a particular case, the court must make a policy decision
in light of the unique facts and circumstances presented. The inquiry is
whether the plaintiff has any law ( statutory, jurisprudential, or arising
from general principles of fault) to support the claim that the defendant
owed him a duty. [ Citations omitted.]

There is an almost universal duty on the part of a defendant in a negligence

action to use reasonable care to avoid injury to another. Rando, 16 So. 3d 1086.

Further, the owner or operator of a facility generally has a duty to exercise reasonable

care for the safety of persons on his premises and the duty of not exposing such

persons to unreasonable risks of injury or harm. While a business establishment is

under a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of its patrons, it is not the insurer

11

of their safety. Peterson v. Gibraltar Savings and Loan, 98- 1601 ( La. 5/ 18/ 99), 733

So. 2d 1198, 1204.

Plaintiffs have presented no authority establishing Wal-Mart owed a duty to

third persons who were not patrons or on Wal -Mart' s premises to supervise its

managers and employees to prevent inappropriate conduct or to monitor their time

cards for irregularities. Any duty Wal-Mart may have had in this respect was owed

for the protection of Wal -Mart' s patrons and other persons on its premises. See

Peterson, 733 So. 2d at 1204. Even assuming arguendo that Wal-Mart owed a duty

to plaintiffs, such duty did not encompass within its protection the risk that impaired

driving by a Wal-Mart employee who had secretly consumed alcohol and

prescription drugs supplied by her supervisor during work hours would cause injury

to a third person off premises after the employee had clocked out and departed Wal-

Mart. A risk may not be within the scope of a duty when the circumstances of the

plaintiff' s particular injury could not be reasonably foreseen or anticipated because

there is no ease of association between the risk and the legal duty. Rando, 16 So.3d

at 1092. No ease of association exists herein between plaintiffs' injuries and any

duty Wal-Mart may have had to supervise its supervisors and employees or to

monitor their time cards.

Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment

dismissing plaintiffs' negligence and vicarious liability claims against Wal-Mart.

LIABILITY OF MR. CORKERN
Assignment of Error Number Two)

Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in dismissing their claims against Mr.

Corkern based on the court' s finding that no causal connection existed between Mr.

Corkern' s conduct and the accident caused by Ms. Granger' s impaired driving. They

contend the district court erred because without the influence and coercion Mr.

Corkern exerted upon Ms. Granger, she would not have consumed alcohol and drugs

12

supplied by Mr. Corkern and then left work early to drive across town to meet him.

Plaintiffs argues genuine issues of material facts exist regarding Mr. Corkern' s

comparative fault under La. C. C. art. 2323 for his part in causing the foreseeable

accident that occurred as a result of his supplying alcohol and drugs to Ms. Granger

and then " demanding" she drive across town to meet him.

Based on our de novo review, we find no merit in plaintiffs' contentions. Even

if Mr. Corkern' s alleged actions were a cause -in -fact of plaintiffs' damages, there is

no genuine issue of material fact that his actions were not a legal or proximate cause

of those damages. In enacting La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1, the legislature expressed in the

strongest possible way a public policy ofholding adults who consume alcohol, rather

than the person who furnishes or supplied the alcohol, personally responsible for any

consequences arising out of the consumption of alcohol. Bell v. Hurstell, 99- 1333

La. App. 4th Cir. 6/ 16/ 99), 743 So. 2d 720, 721, writ denied, 99- 2021 ( La.

10/ 29/ 99), 748 So. 2d 1165; see also Vaughan v. Hair, 94- 86 ( La. App. 3d Cir.

10/ 5/ 94), 645 So. 2d 1177, 1182, writ denied, 95- 0123 ( La. 3/ 10/ 95), 650 So. 2d

1186. Specifically, La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1( A) states:

The legislature finds and declares that the consumption of intoxicating
beverages, rather than the sale or serving or furnishing of such
beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury, including death and
property damage, inflicted by an intoxicated person upon himself or
upon another person.

At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs argued La. R.S.

9: 2800. 1 did not apply in cases such as this one where the intoxicated person is

encouraged by another to drink alcoholic beverages. However, the only statutory

exceptions provided by La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1 are when the intoxicated person was

forced to consume alcoholic beverages or it was falsely represented to him that the

beverage had no alcohol, or if a minor was provided with or sold alcoholic

13

beverages. La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1( E); Aucoin v. Rochel, 08- 1180 ( La. App. 1st Cir.

12/ 23/ 08), 5 So -3d 197, 201, writ denied, 09- 0122 ( La. 3/ 27/ 09), 5 So. 3d 143.

Ms. Granger admitted in her deposition that Mr. Granger did not force her to

consume alcohol or the drugs he provided. Nor was there any allegation Mr. Corkern

falsely represented to Ms. Granger that there was no alcohol in the beverages he

provided to her.

In any event, even if La. R.S. 9: 2800. 1 is not applicable, we find the summary

judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Mr. Corkern was proper for the

additional reasons expressed by the learned district court in its written reasons for

judgment, as follows:

Corkern argue[ s] a lack of legal causation under the fourth prong of
Louisiana' s duty -risk analysis. Under this analysis, even when a duty
exists, the scope of this duty must extend to the risk at hand. This
portion of the duty risk analysis asks whether the rule extends to or is
intended to protect this plaintiff from this type of harm arising in this
manner. The Louisiana Supreme Court has provided:

In determining the limitation to be placed on liability for a
defendant' s substandard conduct— i. e., whether there is a
duty -risk relationship— we have found the proper inquiry
to be how easily the risk of injury to plaintiff can be
associated with the duty sought to be enforced. Restated,
the ease of association inquiry is simply: " How easily does
one associate the plaintiff' s complained -of harm with the
defendant' s conduct?"... Although ease of association
encompasses the idea of foreseeability, it is not based on
foreseeability alone. Absent an ease of association
between the duty breached and the damages sustained, we
have found legal fault lacking.

In this case, even accepting Granger' s testimony as true, the
Court does not find Corkern' s actions to be the legal cause of the
accident.
In employing the duty -risk analysis the required ease of
association is absent in this matter. Corkern' s actions were not
concurrent with Granger' s act of colliding with Plaintiff' s vehicle. It
was Granger' s decision to drive under the influence of drugs and
alcohol. Her independent decision to drive intoxicated was an
intervening cause, making Corkern' s actions too attenuated under the
duty -risk analysis.

Citations omitted.)

14

EXCEPTION OF PRESCRIPTION
Assignment of Error Number Three)

Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in finding the exceptions of

prescription filed in this matter were moot. They argue the district court should

instead have denied the exceptions outright.

A court is not required to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or

to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which

cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In re E. W., 09-

1589 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 7/ 10), 38 So. 3d 1033, 1037; also see Central Properties v

Fairway Gardenhomes, LLC, 16- 0111 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 16/ 16), 204 So. 3d 240,

249; reversed on other grounds, 16- 1855 ( La. 6/ 27/ 17), 225 So. 3d 441. Because the

district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against Wal-Mart and Mr. Corkern, with

prejudice, pursuant to their motions for summary judgment, we find no error in the

district court pretermitting a ruling on the exceptions of prescription filed by Wal-

Mart and Mr. Corkern on the grounds of mootness.

MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL

After the record was lodged in this matter, Mr. Corkern filed a motion in this

court to seal all appellate briefs filed by the parties. Mr. Corkern asserted his privacy

interests outweighed the public' s interest in this matter. This court provisionally

granted the motion, but reserved " the final determination as to whether these briefs

should remain under seal" to the panel to which the appeal was assigned. Gordon

R. Sibley et al. v. Heather D. Granger and Progressive Insurance Agency, 19- 0411

La. App. 1st Cir. 8/ 5/ 19) ( unpublished).

The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that individuals involved in

civil litigation may be compelled to produce documents of a confidential nature.

Louisiana has no specific statute providing authority to a court to seal its record of a

civil case from public inspection. See Dipaola v. Municipal Police Employees'

15

Retirement System, 14- 0037 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 25/ 14), 155 So. 3d 49, 51 n. I, writ

denied, 14- 2575 ( La. 2/ 27/ 15), 159 So. 3d 1071. Thus, we conclude there is no valid

reason to extend the district court's order sealing portions of the record. Without

making any ruling as to the sound discretion of the district court's original

order sealing portions of the trial court record, we hereby deny the motion

to seal the appellate briefs filed in this matter. See Dipaola, 155 So. 3d at 51.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons assigned, the November 21, 2018 judgment of the district

court dismissing, with prejudice, the claims of plaintiffs, Gordon Sibley, Carolyn A.

Sibley, Katelyn D. Sibley, and Randelyn S. Nelson, against defendants, Wal- Mart

Louisiana, LLC and Benjamin B. Corkern, III, is affirmed. Additionally, we deny

the motion to file the appellate briefs under seal. All costs of this appeal are to be

paid by plaintiffs.

MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL DENIED; JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.

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