Cedric Howard v. Frank D. Norton, Baton Rouge Police Department, City of Baton Rouge, Parish of East Baton Rouge

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2019 CA 0565

CEDRIC HOWARD

VERSUS

FRANK D. NORTON, BATON ROUGE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
CITY OF BATON ROUGE, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

DATE OF JUDGMENT.- JUN 12 2020

ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER 622507, SECTION 24, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
STATE OF LOUISIANA

HONORABLE R. MICHAEL CALDWELL, JUDGE

Stephen M. Alexander Counsel for Plaintiff 2- " d Appellant/
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Appellee, Cedric Howard

Charles S. Lambert, Jr.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Anderson O. Dotson Counsel for Defendants -Appellants/
Arlene C. Edwards Appellees, Frank D. Norton and City
A. Gregory Rome of Baton Rouge/ Parish of East Baton
Rouge
Davis S. Rhorer, Jr.
Gwendolyn K. Brown
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND BURRIS, 1 JJ.

Disposition: AFFIRMED, AS AMENDED.

1 Judge William J. Burris, retired, is serving pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court.

CHUTZ, J.

In this personal injury case, plaintiff appealed a jury verdict, alleging the

damages he was awarded were abusively low. Defendants also appealed, alleging

the jury awarded excessive damages. For the following reasons, we amend the

award for past medical expenses, and affirm the judgment, as amended.

FACT AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 24, 2012, Cedric Howard ( plaintiff) was driving his vehicle

westbound approaching the I- 10 bridge in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The traffic

slowed before coming to a sudden stop. After Mr. Howard came to a complete

stop, his vehicle was rear- ended by a police car driven by Baton Rouge City Police

Officer Frank Norton, who was responding to a dispatch. Officer Norton testified

he pressed the brakes to the floor, but his vehicle failed to stop in time. Both

vehicles sustained only minor damage to their bumpers and were drivable after the

accident.

Although plaintiff did not experience pain immediately after the accident, he

began experiencing pain in his neck and back later that night. The following day,

plaintiff did not go to work; he went to the emergency room at Ochsner' s Hospital.

He was diagnosed with a neck and back sprain. The next day, June 26, plaintiff

began physical therapy for neck and back pain at Metropolitan Health Group,

where he was treated until September 20.

On August 8, 2012, plaintiff had an MRI, which showed a herniation at L5 -

SI and bulging at L4-L5. Plaintiff began treatments for lower back pain with a

chiropractor, Dr. William Colgin, on September 26, 2012. After several months of

treatment, Dr. Colgin referred plaintiff to Dr. Bobby Pervez for steroid injections.

Plaintiff received three injections between November 19, 2012 and February 25,

2013. While the injections gave plaintiff substantial pain relief, the relief was

short- lived.

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Dr. Colgin released plaintiff to return to work, without restrictions, on

February 4, 2013. Plaintiff returned to work as a sandblaster, the same work he

had performed before the accident. Plaintiff described the work as requiring heavy

lifting in handling the machine and hoses used in the job. He continued working in

that job until he had lumbar surgery in February 2016. Plaintiff testified he worked

with pain, but was able to work because his employer provided a helper to assist

him. After returning to work, plaintiff continued to see Dr. Colgin regularly for

several months, but thereafter saw Dr. Colgin only sporadically until his last visit

in February 2016.

In March 2013, Dr. Pervez referred plaintiff to a surgeon, Dr. Anthony

Maioriello. However, plaintiff did not consult with Dr. Maioriello for the first time

until September 2014. After seeing Dr. Maioriello again in October 2014, plaintiff

did not return for another visit until April 2015. Dr. Maioriello recommended

plaintiff undergo lumbar fusion surgery. Plaintiff then sought a second opinion

from Dr. Kevin McCarthy, an orthopedic surgeon, who began treating plaintiff on

June 25, 2015. Based on his review of plaintiff' s medical records and prior tests,

Dr. McCarthy also recommended lumbar fusion surgery.

On February 22, 2016, plaintiff had a two-level lumbar fusion surgery at L4-

5 and L5 -S 1 performed by Dr. McCarthy. According to Dr. McCarthy, the typical

recovery time for the surgery was twelve to fourteen months. Dr. McCarthy

released plaintiff to work in November or December of 2017, with the restriction

that he could lift no more than forty to fifty pounds. Dr. McCarthy explained that a

patient with a two- level fusion was not someone he would typically recommend

returning to an occupation requiring heavy lifting. According to plaintiff, his

employer considered work with such a restriction to be light-duty work, which it

did not have available. Unable to work as a sandblaster, plaintiff began working as

a car salesman, earning less than he had at his former occupation.

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Plaintiff filed this personal injury suit naming as defendants Officer Norton
and his employer, the Baton Rouge Police Department, City/Parish of Baton

Rouge. Defendants admitted liability, i.e., that Officer Norton was at fault in

causing the accident and that he was acting within the course of scope of his

employment at the time. A jury trial was held on the issue of quantum on June 25-

27, 2018. The jury returned a verdict awarding plaintiff total damages of

771, 000, consisting of. $50, 000 for past and future physical pain and suffering;

30, 000 for past and future mental anguish and distress; $ 10, 000 for loss of

enjoyment of life; $ 278, 000 for past medical expenses; $ 149, 000 for past lost

wages; and $ 254, 000 for future lost wages/ earning capacity. On July 23, 2018, the

trial court signed a judgment awarding plaintiff damages in accordance with the

jury' s verdict. Defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict

JNOV) and/ or alternatively, motion for new trial, which the trial court denied after

a hearing. Plaintiff appealed the judgment, arguing in three assignments of error

that the jury awards for past medical expenses, general damages, and future loss

wages were abusively low and should be increased. Defendants also appealed,

contending the jury awarded plaintiff excessive damages for past and future

physical pain and suffering, past medical expenses, and past and future lost wages.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a personal injury suit, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving every

element of his case, including the causal connection between an accident and his

resulting damages, by a preponderance of the evidence. Jones v. Bravata, 18- 0837

La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 9/ 19), 280 So. 3d 226, 232, writ denied, 19- 01850 ( La.

2/ 26/ 20), So. 3d ; Tate v. Kenny, 14- 0265 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 12/ 23/ 15),

186 So. 3d 119, 127. Whether the accident caused the plaintiff's injuries is a

2 Defendants also assigned error to the trial court' s denial of their motion for JNOV and/ or, in the
alternative, motion for new trial. However, we deem this assignment of error to be abandoned
since it was not briefed by defendants. See Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-
12. 4( B)( 4); Brown v. Alsco, Inc., 16- 1670 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 29/ 17), 224 So. 3d 45, 47 n. l.

AS

factual question that should not be reversed on appeal absent manifest error. Tate,

186 So. 3d at 127.

It is well- settled that a judge or jury is given great discretion in its

assessment of quantum for both general and special damages. Guillory v. Lee, 09-

0075 ( La. 6/ 26/ 09), 16 So. 3d 1104, 1116; Tate, 186 So. 3d at 127. Louisiana Civil

Code article 2324. 1 provides that " much discretion" must be left to the judge or

jury in the assessment of damages. The jury' s assessment of quantum or

determination of the appropriate amount of damages is a determination of fact that

is entitled to great deference on appeal. On review, an appellate court must be

cautious not to re -weigh the evidence or to substitute its own factual finding just

because it would have decided the case differently. Guillory, 16 So. 3d at 1116- 17;

Tate, 186 So. 3d at 127.

PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES

Plaintiff contends the jury award of $278, 000 for past medical expenses was

abusively low and clearly wrong when plaintiff established he incurred actual

medical expenses of $ 313, 140. 32. Moreover, plaintiff argues his treating

physician, Dr. McCarthy, testified all of the medical treatment plaintiff received

was related to plaintiff' s June 2012 accident and was reasonable.

In its appeal, defendants argue it was unreasonable for the jury to award

plaintiff $278, 000 in past medical expenses when he was released to return to work

as a sandblaster, a strenuous, physically -demanding job, within eight months of the

June 2012 accident. Additionally, defendants point out that, following the June

2012 accident, plaintiff had several other automobile accidents and/ or falls that

exacerbated his injuries and prolonged his recovery period. Therefore, defendants

allege the record does not support a finding that all of the medical expenses

plaintiff incurred were related to the June 2012 accident.

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Ordinarily, a plaintiff may recover reasonable medical expenses he incurs as

a result of an injury. Past medical expenses are special damages that are capable of

being determined with reasonable mathematical certainty and, as such, they must

be proven by the person seeking them by a preponderance of the evidence. The

medical evidence must show the existence of the claimed injuries and a causal

connection between the injuries and the accident. Mack v. Wiley, 07- 2344 ( La.

App. 1st Cir. 5/ 2/ 08), 991 So. 2d 479, 489, writ denied, 08- 1181 ( La. 9/ 19/ 08), 992

So. 2d 932.

When medical expenses have been incurred for the treatment of multiple

injuries or conditions, and a jury finds that some, though not all, of those injuries

or conditions were caused by the event in question, the jury' s great discretion

permits it to award something less than the full amount of medical expenses.

Jones, 280 So. 3d at 238. If the victim has proven his medical expenses by a

preponderance of the evidence, however, a jury manifestly errs if it fails to award

the full amount of the medical expenses proven. The tortfeasor is required to pay

for medical treatment of the victim, even over -treatment or unnecessary treatment,

unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith. Mack, 991 So. 2d at

Pursuant to the verdict form, the jury specifically concluded plaintiff

sustained damages as a result of the June 2012 accident. Moreover, the jury

obviously rejected defendants' contention that plaintiff suffered only a short-term

soft tissue injury of approximately eight months duration. Given the verdict it

rendered, the jury clearly concluded the symptoms plaintiff experienced and the

necessity for his surgery were caused by the June 2012 accident. This finding is

reflected in the fact the jury awarded plaintiff recovery for past medical expenses,

past lost wages, and future lost wages for a period far beyond plaintiff' s initial

return to work after the accident in February 2013. It would have been inconsistent

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for the jury to allow plaintiff to recover for damages incurred after February 2013

if the jury had concluded the injuries caused by the accident had resolved by that

time.

There is a legal presumption that a medical condition resulted from an

accident if, before the accident the injured person was in good health, but shortly

after the accident the disabling condition manifested itself. Housley v. Cerise, 579

So. 2d 973, 980 ( La. 1991). Further, it is a well- settled that a defendant takes his

victim as he finds him and is responsible for all natural and probable consequences

of his tortious conduct. When the tortfeasor' s conduct aggravates a pre- existing

condition, the tortfeasor must compensate the victim for the full extent of the

aggravation. Mack, 991 So. 2d at 491.

In this case, the evidence established plaintiff had no pain in his back prior

to the June 2012 accident. While the August 2012 MRI showed plaintiff had some

degenerative changes in his lumbar spine, which Dr. McCarthy indicated ninety

percent of persons over thirty-five have, plaintiff was asymptomatic prior to the

accident. Dr. McCarthy testified that, without the trauma of the accident, plaintiff

likely would have never had such symptoms [ pain]," which led to the surgery in

this case. Plaintiff began experiencing pain on the evening of the accident and

sought medical treatment the following day. Thereafter, he was unable to return to

work until February 2013. Even though he returned to work as a sandblaster for

three years, he testified he worked with pain and required a helper to assist him in

performing his job.

A jury' s finding on causation is a factual finding, which cannot be disturbed

in the absence of manifest error. Hart v. Riverside Medical Center, 01- 2428 ( La.

App. 1st Cir. 11/ 8/ 02), 835 So. 2d 771, 773. Based on the evidence presented,

particularly plaintiff's testimony that his symptoms began shortly after the June

2012 accident and continued until after his surgery, as well as Dr. McCarthy' s

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opinion that the accident caused the condition requiring plaintiff' s surgery, we

cannot say the jury' s conclusion that the June 2012 accident either caused

plaintiff' s lumbar injuries or caused the degenerative condition in his back to

become symptomatic was manifestly erroneous. See Stobart v. State through

Department of Transportation & Development, 617 So. 2d 880, 882 ( La. 1993).

Nevertheless, despite the jury' s finding of causation, the jury failed to award

plaintiff the full amount of medical expenses he incurred. The difference between

plaintiff' s actual medical expenses and the amount awarded was $ 35, 142. 68.

Since the jury obviously found plaintiff's lumbar injury was caused by the June

2012 accident, and there was medical evidence that all his other medical treatment

was reasonable, it is unclear why the jury declined to award plaintiff the full

amount of medical expenses incurred. None of plaintiff' s medical bills equal the

exact amount excluded by the jury.

At trial, defendants elicited testimony that plaintiff was involved in an

automobile accident in July 2016, another automobile accident, and two falls

thereafter, which may have prolonged his recovery. However, none of these

incidents occurred between the time of the June 2012 accident and plaintiff' s

February 2016 lumbar fusion surgery. The second automobile accident occurred

approximately four months after plaintiff' s lumbar surgery, and the other

automobile accident and two falls occurred subsequent to that date. Plaintiff

testified the July 2016 automobile accident caused his pain to flare up but it

resolved within a few months. Moreover, he was still receiving physical therapy

after his surgery and was under Dr. McCarthy' s post-operative care, and did not
Dr.
seek any additional medical treatment as a result of the July 2016 accident.

McCarthy indicated the accidents subsequent to plaintiff' s February 2016 lumbar

fusion surgery prolonged his recovery for a " short period of time." Since Dr.

McCarthy also testified the typical recovery period for lumbar fusion surgery is

twelve to fourteen months, and he released plaintiff to return to work in November

or December of 2016, it is clear any delay in plaintiff' s recovery was extremely

brief. Additionally, plaintiff incurred only a very small portion of his $ 313, 140. 32

in medical expenses after the July 2016 motor vehicle accident and the subsequent

accident and falls.

Accordingly, the record does not support the jury' s refusal to award plaintiff

35, 140. 32 of his medical expenses. It was clearly wrong for the jury not to award

plaintiff the full amount of past medical expenses he incurred in treating the

injuries caused by the June 2012 accident since the record establishes all the

expenses were necessitated by the June 2012 accident. Therefore, we will amend

the award for past medical expenses to allow plaintiff full recovery for all his past

medical expenses.

GENERAL DAMAGES

Plaintiff argues the jury' s $ 90, 000 award for general damages ($ 50, 000 for

past and future physical pain and suffering: $ 30, 000 for mental anguish: and

10, 000 for loss of enjoyment of life) was abusively low. Plaintiff maintains the

jury abused its discretion in view of the severe lumbar pain and injuries he

suffered, which required extensive conservative treatment over the course of four

and one- half years and eventually two- level fusion surgery.

Conversely, in their appeal, defendants argue the $ 90, 000 general damages

award was excessive for a seven- month soft tissue injury. In support of their

argument, defendants point out plaintiff originally was released to return to work in

February 2013, he continued to work as a sandblaster for the following three years,

and there were several gaps where he received no medical treatment other than a

few sporadic visits to his chiropractor.

I

General damages may not be fixed with pecuniary exactitude because they

involve mental or physical pain or suffering, inconvenience, the loss of intellectual

gratification or physical enjoyment, or other losses of life or life- style that cannot

be definitely measured in monetary terms. Kaiser v. Hardin, 06- 2092 ( La.

4/ 11/ 07), 953 So. 2d 802, 808. Vast discretion is accorded the factfinder in fixing

general damage awards. Thus, an appellate court should rarely disturb an award

of general damages. La. C. C. art. 2324. 1; Kaiser, 953 So. 2d at 809.

The role of the appellate court in reviewing an award of general damages is

not to decide what it considers to be an appropriate award. Kaiser, 953 So. 2d at

809. Reasonable persons frequently disagree about the measure of general

damages in a particular case. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corporation, 623 So. 2d

1257, 1261 ( La. 1993). An appellate court' s initial inquiry is whether the

factfinder abused its discretion in assessing the amount of damages. Only after a

determination that the factfinder has abused its " much discretion" is a resort to

prior awards appropriate and then only for the purpose of determining the highest

or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion. Kaiser, 953 So. 2d at

809. Finally, in reviewing a general damage award, an appellate court does not

review a particular item in isolation. Instead, the entire damage award is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. Kelley v. General Insurance Company ofAmerica, 14-

0180 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 23/ 14), 168 So. 3d 528, 546, writs denied, 15- 0157, 15-

0165 ( La. 4/ 10/ 15), 163 So. 3d 814 & 816.

In the instant case, plaintiff was awarded general damages totaling $ 90, 000,

which plaintiff argues is too low and defendants argue is too high. As previously

discussed, the jury rejected defendants' contention that plaintiff suffered only a

soft-tissue injury of several months duration. This rejection undermines

defendants' argument that the total general damage award was excessive. It does

not mean, however, that the jury award was necessarily too low.

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Plaintiff testified he suffered physical pain beginning from the date of the

accident until after his surgery, without any gaps other than for short periods when

the steroid injections gave him relief. He also asserts he suffered mental anguish

and anxiety, including strain upon his family as a result of his inability to do things

he previously did with his children and the financial strain caused by his reduced

income. Plaintiff contends the award for general damages should be increased to

350, 000, the lowest reasonable amount for his general damages.

Nevertheless, plaintiff was able to work for three years after the accident at a

very strenuous occupation. Moreover, in the years between the June 2012 accident

and the lumbar fusion surgery in February 2016, there were extended periods

during which plaintiff sought no medical treatment other than sporadic visits to his

chiropractor. After he was first referred to a surgeon in March 2013, plaintiff

waited over seventeen months before consulting with Dr. Maioriello in September

2014. Considering these facts, the jury reasonably could have concluded plaintiff

did not suffer constant, severe pain throughout the four -and -one -half-year period

referred to by plaintiff. The jury also could have concluded from the fact that

plaintiff was able to work as a sandblaster for three years after the accident that his

physical activities, including familial activities, may not have been as restricted as

he indicated.

After a thorough review of the record, even though we believe the awards

for general damages totaling $ 90, 000 may be on the low end of the range of

reasonable awards, we cannot say the jury abused its vast discretion in making the

awards.

PAST LOST WAGES

In their appeal, defendants argue the jury erred in awarding plaintiff

149, 000 in past lost wages. Specifically, defendants argue plaintiff was entitled

to lost wages only from the date of the June 2012 accident until he first returned to

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work in February 2013. Using the average weekly earnings figure delineated by

plaintiff' s expert economist, Dr. Lamar Jones, defendants calculated plaintiff was

only entitled to $ 28, 564. 48 in lost wages for this period ( i.e., $ 892. 64 x 32 weeks).

A plaintiff seeking damages for past lost wages bears the burden of proving

lost earnings, as well as the duration of time missed from work due to the accident.

The trial court is accorded broad discretion in assessing awards for past lost

earnings, but there must be a factual basis in the record for the award. A plaintiff

bears the burden of proving his claim for lost earnings. For purposes of

determining damages, the amount of lost earnings need not be proved with

mathematical certainty, but by such proof as reasonably establishes the claim, and

such proof may consist only of the plaintiff' s own testimony. An award for past

lost wages is subject to the manifest error standard of review because such

damages must be proven with reasonable certainty. Driscoll v. Stucker, 04- 0589

La. 1/ 19/ 05), 893 So.2d 32, 53; Lemings v. Sanasac, 16- 0052 ( La. App. 1st Cir.

12/ 22/ 16), 209 So. 3d 396, 398- 99.

The record herein shows that in addition to the initial period after the

accident when plaintiff was unable to work, he missed many days of work due to

pain and was totally incapacitated and unable to work for another extended period

during his post- surgical recovery. Additionally, after the surgery, he was unable to

return to work as a sandblaster due to weight restrictions on the amount he could

lift. Consequently, plaintiff began working as an automobile salesman earning less

than he had as a sandblaster. Dr. Jones calculated plaintiff' s past lost earnings

from the date of the accident to trial by comparing the amount plaintiff would have

earned working as a sandblaster to the amount plaintiff actually earned during that

period, arriving at a figure of $148, 648.

Given the facts of this case, we cannot say the jury was clearly wrong or

manifestly erroneous in rejecting defendant' s contention that plaintiff was only

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entitled to past lost wages until he returned to work in February 2013. The record

contains a factual basis supporting the award to plaintiff for $ 149, 000 in past lost

wages.

FUTURE LOST WAGES/ EARNING CAPACITY

Plaintiff contends the jury' s award of $254, 000 for future lost wages was

abusively low in view of the unconverted testimony of Dr. Jones. According to

plaintiff, the award should be raised to $ 415, 436, the lowest amount in the range of

potential future lost wages testified to by Dr. Jones.

In a related assignment of error in defendants' appeal, defendants assert the

award made for future lost wages was excessive and unsupported by the record.

Defendants argue it cannot be said that but for the June 2012 accident plaintiff

would have been able to continue working as a sandblaster or would not have

needed the lumbar fusion surgery.

An award of loss of future income is not based upon the difference between

the plaintiff's earnings before and after a disabling injury. Rather, the award is

predicated upon the difference between a plaintiff' s earning capacity before and

after a disabling injury. Lemings, 209 So.3d at 399: Levy v. Bayou Industrial

Maintenance Services, Inc., 03- 0037 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 26/ 03), 855 So. 2d 968,

973, writs denied, 03- 3161, 03- 3200 ( La. 2/ 6/ 04), 865 So. 2d 724 & 727. The

factfinder' s determination of the amount, if any, of an award of damages, including

lost earning capacity, is a finding of fact. Such awards are inherently speculative

and are intrinsically insusceptible of being calculated with mathematical certainty.

Therefore, the factfinder is given much discretion in fixing these awards. See La.

C. C. art. 2324. 1; Lemings, 209 So. 3d at 399. Nevertheless, a projection of loss of

future earning capacity must have a factual basis in the record, and an award may

not be based upon speculation, possibility, or conjecture. Lemings, 209 So. 3d at

399.

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In this case, plaintiff was not totally disabled. While unable to work as a

sandblaster, he was able to work. Nevertheless, his earnings as a car salesman

were less than what he had earned at his former occupation. At trial, Dr. Jones

calculated the range of plaintiff' s future lost wages to be between $ 415, 436 and

636, 177.3 In calculating this range, Dr. Jones first used the 2017 national average
earnings of a sandblaster, $ 52, 442 annually, projected over plaintiffs work life

expectancy of 13. 3 years, to arrive at $ 415, 436 ( after application of appropriate

interest and discount rates) as the lowest end of the range. Next, Dr. Jones used the

highest average earnings for an experienced sandblaster, which exceeded $ 69, 000

annually, to arrive at a potential loss of future wages in the amount of $636, 177.

In weighing expert testimony, a jury may accept or reject the expert' s

testimony, in whole or in part. The jury may substitute common sense and

judgment for that of an expert witness when such a substitution appears warranted

on the record as a whole. Lemings, 209 So. 3d at 399. Even though defendants did

not present expert evidence in opposition to Dr. Jones' testimony, a basis existed

for the jury to reject Dr. Jones' estimates of plaintiffs' future lost wages.

Specifically, Dr. Jones admitted he used national average earnings of

sandblasters rather than plaintiff' s actual earnings in calculating the loss of future

wages. On cross- examination, he acknowledged the distinction could make " quite

a difference" in the overall amount of the award for future lost earnings.

Moreover, plaintiff only presented evidence of his partial earnings records from the

time of the accident to trial. Dr. Jones admitted he only had incomplete earnings

records from plaintiff in making his calculations. It is uncertain how he calculated

plaintiffs earning capacity as of the time of trial.

3 Dr. Jones testified the range of plaintiff' s past and future lost wages was $ 564,084 to $ 784, 825.
After subtracting his projected past lost wages of $148, 648, the range for future lost wages was
415, 436 to $ 636, 177.

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During trial, plaintiff testified he had earned an average of a little more than

1, 000 per week as a sandblaster, depending on how much overtime he worked.

He further testified he was earning approximately $ 750 a week as a car salesman

post- surgery. The difference was $ 250 per week from his prior earnings as a

sandblaster. It is difficult to reconcile these figures with Dr. Jones' estimate of

plaintiff' s future lost earnings over a period of 13. 3 years as being between

415, 436 and $ 636, 177. Further, the jury heard from plaintiff that there was a

possibility he could be hired as a supervisor by his former employer in the future,

which would likely increase his earnings.

A jury' s determination of the amount of an award of damages for future lost

wages is a finding of fact. Lemings, 209 So. 3d at 399. Considering the record as a

whole, we cannot say the jury was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous in

rejecting Dr. Jones' testimony regarding the amount of plaintiff' s future lost wages

and reaching its own conclusion on this matter. The $ 249,000 award made by the

jury for future lost wages is reasonably supported by the record.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons assigned, the July 23, 2018 trial court judgment is hereby

amended to increase the award made to plaintiff for past medical expenses from

278, 000. 00 to $ 313, 140. 32. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Defendants, Frank Norton and the Baton Rouge Police Department, City/Parish of

Baton Rouge, are to pay all costs of these appeals, in the amount of $2, 491. 00.

AFFIRMED, AS AMENDED.

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