2019CA0977 Nonprecedential Processed

Dr. Ralph Slaughter v. Louisiana State Employees Retirement System

Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit · Filed June 1, 2020

Also decided on this docket: La. Ct. App. 1st Cir., July 8, 2020

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2019 CA 0977

DR. RALPH SLAUGHTER

VERSUS

LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM

judgment Rendered: JUN 0 12020

On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Docket No. C612525, Sec. 24

Honorable R. Michael Caldwell, Judge Presiding

Scott D. Wilson Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellant
John S. McLindon Dr. Ralph Slaughter
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Tina Vicari Grant Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee
R. Stephen Stark Louisiana State Employees'
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Retirement System

BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND HOLDRIDGE, 77.

McCLENDON, J.

This case is before us on appeal by plaintiff, Dr. Ralph Slaughter, from a

judgment of the trial court denying plaintiff's " motion for judgment on the record." For

the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The background of this case is set forth in the Supreme Court' s earlier opinion in

Slaughter v. Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System, 2015- 0324 ( La.

10/ 14/ 15), 180 So. 3d 279, 280- 81 ( per curiam):

In 2009, plaintiff, Dr. Ralph Slaughter, retired as president of

Southern University System (" Southern") after thirty- five years of service.
Upon retirement, the Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System
LASERS") began paying plaintiff retirement benefits of $ 24, 487 per
month.

In 2009, plaintiff filed suit against Southern for past due wages.
The district court ruled that Southern had miscalculated plaintiff's income
base by including supplemental pay plaintiff had received from the
Southern University Foundation, and determined plaintiff's terminal pay
500 hours of unused leave) and retirement should have been calculated
only on his $ 220, 000 annual base salary due from Southern. The court of
appeal affirmed on appeal, noting plaintiff " manipulated the system and
used his position for his own benefit." [ Slaughter v. Bd. of Supervisors
of Southern Univ. & Agr. & Mech. Coll., 10- 1049 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
8/ 2/ 11), 76 So. 3d 438, writ denied, 11- 2110 ( La. 1/ 13/ 12), 77 So. 3d 970
Slaughter I ')].

In the meanwhile, on January 22, 2010, Southern sent a letter to
LASERS advising it had committed an error in including supplemental
funds in plaintiff's earnings. Because the [ Slaughter I] suit was ongoing
at the time, LASERS filed a concursus proceeding ( hereinafter referred to
as [" Slaughter II"]) seeking to deposit the disputed amount of plaintiff's

benefit in the registry of court pending resolution of the [ Slaughter I]
litigation. Plaintiff filed an exception of no cause of action. The district
court granted the exception and dismissed [ Slaughter II] with prejudice.
LASERS did not appeal this judgment, and it is now final.

On April 27, 2012, after [ Slaughter I] became final, LASERS sent
correspondence to plaintiff advising it intended to retroactively reduce his
retirement benefit starting June 1, 2012 " due to an error made by
Southern University in the reporting of your earnings." Relying on La. R. S.
11: 192, LASERS maintained it may adjust benefits and further reduce the
corrected benefit to recover overpayment within a reasonable number of
months.

Plaintiff then filed the instant suit against LASERS, seeking a writ of
mandamus, injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment confirming
LASERS has no authority or ability to reduce his retirement benefits. The
petition alleged plaintiff's retirement benefits should be calculated based
on the entirety of his earnings over thirty-five years of employment,
including salary supplements.

2

After a bench trial, the district court granted plaintiff's petition for
declaratory judgment. Without reaching the merits of plaintiff's arguments
regarding the calculation of benefits, the court held LASERS was not
entitled to reduce plaintiff's retirement benefits because it failed to follow
the procedural requirements set forth in La. R. S. 11: 407. Specifically, the
court found LASERS failed to introduce any evidence indicating it
submitted documentation of the administrative error to the LASERS board
of trustees as required by La. R. S. 11: 407.

LASERS appealed this ruling. Plaintiff answered the appeal,

asserting that any attempt by LASERS to reduce his benefits was barred
by res judicata and prescription.

On appeal, the court of appeal rejected plaintiff's res judicata and
prescription arguments. However, the court affirmed the district court's
judgment in favor of plaintiff, finding LASERS failed to prove that it
followed the proper procedure before initiating action to reduce and
recoup plaintiff's retirement benefits. [ Slaughter v. Louisiana State
Employees' Retirement System, 13- 2255 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 4/ 14),
2014 WL 6854536 ( unpublished)]. One judge concurred and another
judge dissented [" Slaughter III"].

Upon the application of LASERS, we granted certiorari to review the
correctness of that decision. [ Slaughter v. Louisiana State
Employees' Retirement System, 13- 0324 ( La. 6/ 1/ 15), 171 So. 3d 258]
Slaughter IV"].

Footnotes omitted.]

Upon review of this court's decision in Slaughter III, the Supreme Court in

Slaughter IV found that this court had properly rejected plaintiff's arguments of res

judicata and prescription. The Slaughter IV Court then stated that as to the merits of

this court' s decision in Slaughter III, "the narrow question presented for our

resolution is whether LASERS failed to follow the proper procedure before initiating

action to reduce and recoup plaintiff's retirement benefits." The Slaughter IV Court

concluded that this court and the trial court had erred in finding LASERS failed to prove

that it followed the proper procedure before initiating action to reduce and recoup

plaintiff's benefits, and reversed this court's judgment on that point. The Slaughter IV

Court affirmed this court's judgment in all other respects and remanded to the trial

court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. Slaughter IV, 180

So. 3d at 281- 84.

Following Slaughter IV, on September 20, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion for

summary judgment seeking restoration of plaintiff's retirement benefits in the amount

of $ 24,487. 95 per month, as originally calculated, and injunctive relief preventing

LASERS from interfering with payment of that amount. Plaintiff argued that although

3

LASERS may have followed the proper procedure to initiate action to reduce and recoup

benefits, no reduction or recoupment was appropriate. Plaintiff maintained that there

was no genuine issue of material fact precluding judgment in his favor on this point,

and requested that the trial court:

R] equire LASERS to restore to Dr. Slaughter all retirement benefits to
which he is due, with interest, and award him attorney fees, costs, and
other legal, general, and equitable relief, including a declaration that Dr.
Slaughter is entitled to retirement benefits in the amount of $ 24, 487. 95
per month and injunctive relief preventing LASERS from interfering with
payment of this amount in retirement benefits to Dr. Slaughter.

In response, LASERS filed an exception raising the objection of res judicata. The

trial court heard plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and LASERS' exception

together on January 22, 2018, and executed a written judgment denying both on

February 14, 2018.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a pleading entitled " Motion for Declaratory Judgment"

on June 28, 2018, seeking " judgment that all earned compensation, including the salary

supplement paid to him by the Southern University System, be found to be a part of his

average monthly compensation for purposes of retirement benefits...." Plaintiff filed a

memorandum in support of his motion for declaratory judgment, in which he repeated

the arguments and requests for relief set forth in his September 20, 2017 motion for

summary judgment. The record demonstrates that neither the trial court nor the parties

took any action on plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment.

On September 6, 2018, plaintiff filed a pleading entitled " Plaintiff's Post -Trial

Brief on Remand in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Record," (" motion for

judgment on the record"). Plaintiff specifically sought an order from the trial court

directing LASERS to show cause " why plaintiff should not be awarded judgment as

prayed for in his lawsuit, on remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court, based on the

record already generated in this court." The motion for judgment on the record again

repeated the arguments and requests for relief made in plaintiff's September 20, 2017

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not submit any new evidence in support of

the motion for judgment on the record.

The trial court heard plaintiff's motion for judgment on the record on February

11, 2019. On March 6, 2019, the trial court executed a written judgment denying the
motion for judgment on the record, which provided in pertinent part:

Considering the pleadings, evidence, the memoranda, and the
argument of counsel:

It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment on the Record be and is hereby DENIED at plaintiff's costs.

An identical written judgment was executed on March 19, 2019. 1 Plaintiff then

filed the instant appeal.

Upon the lodging of the record with this court, we issued an ex proprio mote rule

ordering the parties to show cause by briefs why the instant appeal should not be

dismissed as the March 6, 2019 judgment was not a final, appealable judgment.2

Plaintiff filed a ' Motion to Remand and Supplement the Record with an Amended

District Court Judgment," recognizing that the March 6, 2019 judgment was defective

and requesting the remand of this matter to the trial court for the purpose of obtaining

an amended judgment that would be final and appealable in nature, and to supplement

the appellate record with such judgment. On October 28, 2019, this court referred

plaintiff's motion to the panel hearing the merits of the appeal.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Appellate courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte,

even when the parties do not raise the issue, and we are obligated to recognize any

lack of jurisdiction if it exists. Quality Envtl. Processes, Inc. v. Energy Dev. Corp.,

2016- 0171 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 12/ 17), 218 So. 3d 1045, 1052- 53. The appellate

jurisdiction of this court extends to final judgments, which determine the merits in

I
Inexplicably, the trial court signed a judgment on March 19, 2019, that was identical to the March 6,
2019 judgment. Once a trial court has rendered a valid final judgment, it has no authority to render a
second final judgment, which is practically identical to the first judgment and adjudicates the same
issues. See Giavotella v. Mitchell, 2019- 0100 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 10/ 24/ 19), 289 So. 3d 1058, 1066 n. 3,
writ denied, 2019- 01855 ( La. 1/ 22/ 20). Accordingly, the March 19, 2019 judgment is a nullity and
without legal effect. See Judson v. Davis, 2011- 0623 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 9/ 11), 81 So. 3d 712, 722, writ
denied, 2011- 2747 ( La. 2/ 17/ 12), 82 So. 3d 288.

2 LASERS filed a memorandum in response to this court's rule to show cause order, arguing that the
March 6, 2019 judgment is not a final, appealable ruling on the basis that it lacks decretal language.
LASERS further argued that the March 6, 2019 judgment did not contain a ruling on the merits " because
the trial court had already done so."

5

whole or in part. See LSA- C. C. P. arts. 1841 and 2083; Rose v. Twin River Dev., LLC,

2017- 0319 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 1/ 17), 233 So. 3d 679, 683.

A valid judgment must be precise, definite, and certain. Laird v. St. Tammany

Parish Safe Harbor, 2002- 0045 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 20/ 02), 836 So. 2d 364, 365. A final

appealable judgment must also contain decretal language and must name the party in

favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and

the relief that is granted or denied. DeVance v. Tucker, 2018- 1440 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

5/ 31/ 19), 278 So. 3d 380, 382. Additionally, a final appealable judgment must contain

appropriate decretal language disposing of or dismissing claims in the case. Quality

Envtl. Processes, Inc., 218 So. 3d at 1053; State in Interest of J. C., 2016- 0138

La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 3/ 16), 196 So. 3d 102, 107. These determinations should be evident

from the language of the judgment without reference to other documents in the record.

Advanced Leveling & Concrete Sols. v. Lathan Company, Inc., 2017- 1250

La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 20/ 18), 268 So. 3d 1044, 1046 ( en band). A judgment that does not

contain appropriate decretal language cannot be considered as a final judgment for the

purpose of an appeal. Johnson v. Mount Pilgrim Baptist Church, 2005- 0337

La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 24/ 06), 934 So. 2d 66, 67.

The March 6, 2019 judgment from which this appeal arises is titled simply

Judgment," and provides in its entirety:

The Motion for Judgment on the Record filed by the plaintiff, Dr.
Ralph Slaughter, came up for hearing before the Honorable R. Michael
Caldwell on February 11, 2019. Representing the plaintiff was Scott D.
Wilson. Representing the defendant were Tina Vicari Grant and R.
Stephen Stark.

Considering the pleadings, evidence, the memoranda, and the
argument of counsel:

It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment on the Record be and is hereby DENIED at plaintiff's costs.

While the March 6, 2019 judgment specifically denies plaintiff's motion for

judgment on the record, the judgment is defective and not a final judgment for the

purpose of an appeal. We acknowledge that the denial of a request for a writ of

mandamus is an appealable judgment. City of Baton Rouge v. Douglas, 2016- 0655

La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 12/ 17), 218 So. 3d 158, 163. Likewise, a declaratory judgment has the

0

force and effect of a final judgment or decree. See LSA- C. C. P. arts. 1871 and 1878;

Steiner v. Reed, 2010- 1465 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 11/ 11), 57 So. 3d 1188, 1192. Further,

an appeal may be taken as a matter of right from an order or judgment relating to a

preliminary or final injunction...." LSA- C. C. P. art. 3612( 6); see Clipper Estates Master

Homeowners' Assn, Inc. v. Harkins, 2013- 1833 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 30/ 14) 2014 WL

4892546, at * 4 ( unpublished. Although plaintiff's motion for judgment on the record

sought a writ of mandamus, mandatory injunctive relief, and declaratory judgment, the

March 6, 2019 judgment appealed herein does not reference the relief plaintiff sought

in the " motion for judgment on the record." Therefore, the relief that is granted or

denied by the judgment is not evident from the language of the judgment without

reference to other documents in the record. The judgment does not contain appropriate

decretal language dismissing any claims or the petition. See University Medical

Center v. Schnauder, 2019- 0149 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 10/ 23/ 19), 2019 WL 5485181, at * 1

unpublished) ( This court dismissed an appeal of a judgment denying, but not

dismissing, a petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the judgment was " defective

and not a final judgment for the purpose of an appeal because it [ did] not contain

appropriate decretal language dismissing any claims or the petition"). 3 Such a judgment

is not precise, definite, or certain.

In the absence of a valid final judgment, this court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. Advanced Leveling & Concrete Sols., 268 So. 3d at 1046- 47. We

therefore dismiss plaintiff's the appeal from the March 6, 2019 judgment.4 In view of

this court's holding in Marrero v. I. Manheim Auctions, Inc., 2019- 0365 ( La. App. 1

Cir. 11/ 19/ 19), 291 So. 3d 236, 239, we also deny plaintiffs motion to remand and

3 Judge McClendon notes her dissent in University Medical Center, but finds it to be distinguishable.
4 We recognize that this court has discretion to convert an appeal of a non -appealable judgment to an
application for supervisory writs. See Stelluto v. Stelluto, 2005- 0074 ( La. 6/ 29/ 05), 914 So. 2d 34, 39.
Generally, appellate courts have exercised that discretion when the motion for appeal was filed within the
thirty -day time period allowed for the filing of an application for supervisory writs under Uniform Rules—
Courts of Appeal, Rule 4- 3, and where reversal of the trial court's decision would terminate the litigation,
or where clear error in the trial court' s judgment, if not corrected, will create a grave injustice. However,
when the jurisdictional defect lies in the non -finality of a judgment, an appellate court will generally
refrain from the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction when an adequate remedy exists by appeal,
particularly when an adequate remedy by appeal will exist upon the entry of the requisite precise,
definite, and certain decretal language necessary for appellate review. Accordingly, we decline to exercise
our discretion to convert this appeal of a judgment that is not final for lack of decretal language to an
application for supervisory writs. See Boyd Louisiana Racing, Inc. v. Bridges, 2015- 0393, 2015- 0394,
2015- 0395 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 23/ 15), 2015 WL 9435285, at ** 3- 4 ( unpublished.

7

supplement the record with an amended trial court judgment. ( Although the trial court

may correct any misstatements, irregularities or informalities, or omission of the trial

record on appeal, there is no authority for a trial court to amend a judgment after it is

divested of jurisdiction upon the signing of an order of appeal.)

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to remand and

supplement the record with an amended trial court judgment is denied. The appeal of

the district court's March 6, 2019 judgment is hereby dismissed. Costs of the appeal are

assessed against Dr. Ralph Slaughter.

MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.

SLAUGHTER NO. 2019 CA 0977

VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL

LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES FIRST CIRCUIT
RETIREMENT SYSTEM

HOLDRIDGE, J., concurring.

I respectfully concur. I agree that this court does not have appellate

jurisdiction and that the appeal should be dismissed, but not for the reasons stated

in the opinion. While the opinion finds that the lack of decretal language renders

the judgment non -appealable, I conclude that the denial of a motion for judgment

on the record is an interlocutory judgment that is not appealable.

Pursuant to La. C. C. P. art. 2083A, this court' s appellate jurisdiction extends

to " final judgments." A " final judgment" is defined in La. C. C.P. art. 1841 as "[ a]

judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part." On the other hand, an

interlocutory judgment" is a judgment that does not determine the merits, but only

decides preliminary matters in the course of the action. La. C. C. P. art. 1841. An

interlocutory judgment is appealable only when expressly provided by law. La.

C. C. P. art. 2083C.

A judgment denying a motion for judgment on the record is not a final

judgment in any manner but is an interlocutory judgment. It is similar in nature to

a judgment that denies a motion for a new trial and a judgment that denies a

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. All three motions request the

trial court to render a determination on the merits based upon a previously

generated record.
It is well settled that judgments which deny a motion for a new

trial and those that deny motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict are

interlocutory rulings. See Brehm v. Amacker, 2015- 1531 ( La. App. 1St Cir.

12/ 7/ 17), 236 So. 3d 621, 629 ( the denial of a motion for new trial is generally

considered to be a non -appealable interlocutory judgment); Brister v. Continental

Insurance Company, 30429 ( La App. 2nd Cir. 4/ 8/ 98), 712 So. 2d 177, 180 ( a trial

court' s judgment denying motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and

new trial is an interlocutory ruling). The denial of Dr. Slaughter' s motion did not

determine the merits of his claim and it did not end the matter, as Dr. Slaughter' s

motion for a declaratory judgment has not yet been decided by the trial court.

Because there is no law expressly authorizing the appeal of a judgment denying a

motion for a judgment on the record, the trial court' s judgment is a non -appealable

judgment under La. C. C. P. art. 2083C. The inclusion of decretal language therein

could not transform the non -appealable interlocutory judgment into a final

appealable judgment.