Tamatha Faul v. Louis Robinson, Allstate Insurance Company, and State Farm Mutual Automoblile Insurance Company

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2019 CA 1450

TAMATHA FAUL

VERSUS

LOUIS ROBINSON, ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, AND STATE
FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

JUDGMENT RENDERED: DEC 16 2020

Appealed from the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge • State of Louisiana
Docket Number C651273 • Division " 25"

The Honorable Wilson E. Fields, Judge Presiding

Marcus J. Plaisance ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Mark D. Plaisance PLAINTIFF— Tamatha Faul
Prairieville, Louisiana

Brian J. Prendergast
Joseph R. Cataldie
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Matthew L. Mann ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Kellye R. Grinton DEFENDANTS— Allstate
Kirk D. Pfefferle Insurance Company and Louis
Beau C. Garon Robinson
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Michele Trowbridge Barreca
New Orleans, Louisiana

BEFORE: MCCLENDON, WELCH, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.

Cah CU iz S

WELCH, J.

The plaintiff, Tamatha Faul, appeals a judgment rendered in accordance with

a jury verdict, as well as a judgment denying a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict and alternative motion for new trial, after the jury

found that she was not injured in a motor vehicle accident. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The accident at issue occurred on September 19, 2015, when the 2016 BMW

X4 owned and operated by Lawrence Faucheaux, was rear- ended by a 2002

Chevrolet Suburban owned and operated by the defendant, Louis Robinson. Mrs.

Faul was a guest passenger in the backseat of the BMW, along with her

stepdaughter Kelly Faucheux, Mr. Faucheux' s wife. Mrs. Faul' s husband, Robert

Faul, was a guest passenger in the front seat. The Faucheuxes and Fauls had left

the Faucheux residence and were in bumper -to -bumper LSU football game -day

traffic on Gardere Lane in Baton Rouge when Mr. Robinson' s suburban struck the

BMW from the rear. Mr. Faucheux and Mr. Robinson' s vehicles were insured by

Allstate Insurance Company (" Allstate").

Mrs. Faul filed the instant suit against Mr. Robinson, Allstate ( in its capacity

as Mr. Robinson' s liability insurer' and in its capacity as Mr. Faucheux' s
insurer2),
uninsured/underinsured motorist (" UM") and State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company, Mrs. Faul' s UM insurer.' Mrs. Faul sought

damages for cervical spine injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the motor

vehicle collision.

1 The Allstate policy covering Mr. Robinson' s 2002 Chevrolet Suburban had liability limits of
500, 000. 00 per person/$ 500, 000. 00 per accident.

2 On Plaintiff' s motion, the trial court signed a judgment on December 13, 2016, dismissing all
of the plaintiff' s claims against Allstate in its capacity as Mr. Faucheux' s UM insurer uninsurer,
without prejudice.

3 Pursuant to a joint motion of partial dismissal without prejudice, the trial court signed a
judgment on November 28, 2016, dismissing all of the plaintiff' s claims against State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, without prejudice.

2

The matter was tried before a jury on February 4- 7, 2019, on the issues of

liability and damages. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a 9- 3 verdict

finding that Mrs. Faul proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr.

Robinson was at fault in causing the September 19, 2015 accident, but that Mrs.

Faul was not injured as result of the accident. Accordingly, the jury did not award

Mrs. Faul any damages. The trial court signed a judgment in conformity with the

jury' s verdict on March 4, 2019. Arguing that the jury' s verdict was unreasonable

and not supported by the evidence presented at trial, Mrs. Faul filed a motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (" JNOV"), or alternatively, a motion for new

trial, which were denied by the trial court pursuant to a judgment signed on May 8,

2019. Mrs. Faul now appeals the trial court' s March 4, 2019 and May 8, 2019

judgments.

I WAMiYA

In a personal injury suit, liability is determined under the duty -risk analysis,

which requires that the plaintiff prove: ( 1) the defendant had a duty to conform his

conduct to a specific standard of care, ( 2) the defendant failed to conform his

conduct to the appropriate standard of care, ( 3) the defendant' s substandard

conduct was a cause -in -fact of the plaintiffs injuries, ( 4) the defendant' s

substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiffs injuries, and ( 5) actual

damages. Brewer v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 2009- 1408 ( La. 3/ 16/ 10), 35 So.

3d 230, 240. In order to recover, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, both the existence of the injuries and a causal connection between the

injuries and the accident. Richardson v. Bridgefield Casualty Insurance

Company, 2014- 1587 ( La. App. lst Cir. 8/ 10/ 15), 181 So. 3d 619 64 ( citing Kelley

v. General Insurance Company of America, 2014- 0180 ( La. App. 1St Cir.

12/ 23/ 14), 168 So. 3d 528, 543, writs denied, 2015- 0157, 2015- 0165 ( La. 4/ 10/ 15),

163 So. 3d 814, 816).

3

It is well- settled that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him and is

responsible for all natural and probable consequences of his tortious conduct.

Touchard v. Slemco Electric Foundation, 99- 3577 ( La. 10/ 17/ 00), 769 So. 2d

1200, 1204. Nevertheless, the tortfeasor cannot be held liable for injuries which

are not attributable to the tortious conduct or wrongful act. Sanders v. Collins,

551 So. 2d 644, 651 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 1261 ( La.

1990). Thus, a tortfeasor is only liable for damages caused by his negligent act,

not damages caused by separate, independent, or intervening causes. Richardson,

181 So. 3d at 64; Kelley, 168 So. 3d at 543. However, where it is established that

the defendant' s negligent action aggravated a pre- existing injury or condition, he

must compensate the victim for the full extent of that aggravation. Touchard, 769

So. 2d at 1204.

On appeal, Mrs. Faul contends that she met her burden of proving that she

suffered injuries as a result of the accident and that the jury' s verdict to the

contrary was manifestly erroneous because the unrefuted medical evidence

demonstrated that her neck injuries were caused and/ or aggravated by the accident.

A jury' s determination on causation, i.e., whether an accident caused the plaintiff' s

injuries, is a factual question that should not be reversed on appeal absent manifest

error. Thongsavanh v. Schexnayder, 2009- 1462 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 5/ 7/ 10), 40 So.

3d 989, 1001, writ denied, 2010- 1295 ( La. 9/ 24/ 10), 45 So. 3d 1074; see also

Detraz v. Lee, 2005- 1263 ( La. 1/ 17/ 07), 950 So. 2d 557, 561. Under the manifest

error standard, the appellate court does not decide whether the jury was right or

wrong; rather it is required to consider the entire record to determine whether a

reasonable factual basis exists for the finding, and whether the finding is

manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Hayes Fund for First United Methodist

Church of Welsh, LLC v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain, LLC, 2014- 2592 ( La.

12/ 8/ 15), 193 So. 3d 1110, 1116.

M

Reasonable persons frequently can and do disagree regarding causation in
particular cases. But where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the

factfinder' s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

Hayes, 193 So. 3d at 1116. When findings are based on determinations regarding

the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error -clearly wrong standard demands

great deference to the jury' s findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the

variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener' s

understanding and belief in what is said. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844

La. 1989). Accordingly, appellate review of the factual circumstances and

evidence of the case will not be the basis for reversal of the trial court' s judgment,

in the absence of manifest error, even if the court of appeal is convinced that, had it

been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.

Rosell, 549 So. 2d at 844. The reviewing court must review the record in its

entirety to determine whether the factfinder' s finding was clearly wrong or

manifestly erroneous. Stobart v. State through Dep' t of Transp. and Dev., 617

So. 2d 880, 882- 83 ( La. 1993).

The Louisiana Supreme Court applies a two-part test to determine if a

factfinder' s determinations warrant reversal: ( 1) the appellate court must find from

the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial

court; and ( 2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes

that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). Graves v. Page, 96- 2201

La. 11/ 7/ 97), 703 So. 2d 566, 573.

Also at issue on appeal is the May 8, 2019 judgment denying Mrs. Faul' s

motion for JNOV and alternative motion for new trial. Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure article 1811 provides that a party may move for a JNOV and that a

motion for new trial may be joined with the motion. A JNOV can be granted only

when the trial court finds that reasonable minds could not reach a contrary verdict.

5

Adams v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2000- 0424 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 11/ 14/ 01),

804 So. 2d 679, 687, writ denied, 2002- 0448 ( La. 4/ 19/ 02), 813 So. 2d 1090 ( citing

Davis v. Wal- Mart Stores, Inc., 2000- 0445 ( La. 11/ 28/ 00), 774 So. 2d 84, 89).

The trial court should not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and all

reasonable inferences or factual questions should be resolved in favor of the non-

moving party. Adams, 804 So. 2d at 687.

In general, the standard of review of a JNOV on appeal is twofold. First, we

must determine whether the jury verdict is supported by competent evidence and is

not wholly unreasonable. If the verdict is supported by competent evidence and

not wholly unreasonable, then the trial court may not set it aside. To make this

determination, we must, after considering all of the evidence in the light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion, find that it points so strongly and

overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that reasonable persons could not

arrive at a contrary verdict on the issue. Second, after determining that the trial

court correctly applied its standard of review as to the jury verdict, the appellate

court reviews the JNOV using the manifest error standard of review. Daigle v.

United States Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company, 94- 0304 ( La. App.

1St Cir. 5/ 5/ 95), 655 So. 2d 431, 436.

DISCUSSION

At trial, the jury was presented with evidence regarding the nature of the

rear -end collision. Mr. Faucheaux, the owner and driver of the BMW, testified that

at the time of the accident, he was stopped at a red traffic light at the intersection of

Gardere Lane and Nicholson Drive in bumper -to -bumper post -LSU gameday

traffic. Once the traffic light turned green, he proceeded slowly through the light,

but because of the traffic, he had to come to a stop. At that point, the Suburban

driven by Mr. Robinson, which was behind him, collided into his BMW. Mr.

Faucheaux recalled that he " had [ his] foot on the brakes" and that the " impact was

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such that it actually jarred the car." Mrs. Faucheux testified that the BMW was

slam[ med] out of nowhere," and that all the occupants were jolted. Mrs. Faul

described the force of the collision as " severe" or " great." She testified that " all of

a sudden, it was like bam right in the back of the car. I mean, it was like hard,

hard. It was -- it was choomp -- you know, like shazam king of thing."

Mr. Faucheaux stated that the only visible damage to the BMW was

indentations on the plastic bumper. However, once the plastic bumper was

removed, more extensive damage was revealed, which he had to have repaired.

Mr. Faucheaux was unable to remember how much he paid for the repairs.

Burnell Thompson, III, a Louisiana State Trooper and the investigating

officer of this accident, described the damage to the front end of the Suburban and

to the rear bumper of the BMW as " very minor." He testified that the Suburban

and the BMW were drivable by the owners and did not have to be towed from the

scene of the accident. Trooper Thompson further stated that Mrs. Faul reported to

him that she may have possibly been injured, but she refused aid. Photographs of

the BMW taken after the collision reflect scratches and indentations on the bottom

portion of the rear bumper.

Mrs. Faul testified that immediately following the accident, she felt pain in

her neck " like it was going up the back of [her] head," and she knew that she was

about to have a headache. However, she refused medical treatment at the scene of

the accident and went with her husband and the Faucheuxes to a bar and grill at a

nearby casino to watch another football game. Mrs. Faul testified that "[ i] t didn' t

seem like it was an emergency situation" and that she " just kind of hurt [ her]

head." The group later left the casino because Mrs. Faul' s head " got to hurting

really bad."

The evidence established that Mrs. Faul had a long-standing history of neck

and back pain prior to the accident and had been involved in accidents both before

VA

and after the September 2015 accident. It was undisputed that Mrs. Faul, who was

forty-seven years old at the time of the accident, suffered from chronic neck and

back pain. Mrs. Faul first suffered injuries to her neck and back when as a

pedestrian, she was struck by a motor vehicle in June 2004. Her primary

complaint following that accident was neck and back pain. She filed a lawsuit

regarding the 2004 accident, which was settled out of court.

Dr. Martin A. Langston, a specialist in physical medicine, rehabilitation, and

pain management, treated Mrs. Faul following her 2004 accident on a referral from

her primary physician, Dr. Jeri Johnson. From the 2004 accident until the 2015

accident, Dr. Langston treated Mrs. Faul' s neck and back pain " conservatively" by

performing diagnostic testing, trigger point injections, cervical and lumbar epidural

steroid injections (` RSIs"), radiofrequency ablations (" RFAs"), medial branch

blocks, electromyograms (" EMGs"), nerve conduction studies, and other treatment

and tests on an intermittent basis. Mrs. Faul also underwent three cervical MRIs

during this time: in 2004, in 201 1, and on June 21, 2014. Dr. Langston testified

that Mrs. Faul' s three cervical MRIs showed common, degenerative changes.

Three months prior to the accident at issue herein, Mrs. Faul underwent

cervical and lumbar ESIs, and she reported lingering cervical pain at her follow-up

visit with Dr. Langston on June 22, 2015. Five days prior to the accident herein,

Mrs. Faul saw Dr. Langston on September 14, 2015, for an unscheduled visit after

she injured herself while exiting a vehicle. She complained of lower back pain,

buttock pain, hip pain, and lower extremity pain. However, at trial, Mrs. Faul' s

counsel referred to her preexisting neck pain as a " little pesky medical problem."

Mrs. Faul testified that she " was doing fine" before the accident. She described

Dr. Langston' s treatment of her cervical and lumbar spine as treatment of "aches

and pains."

E

Mrs. Faul testified that three days after the September 19, 2015 accident, she

called a nurse at her primary care physician' s office to report her injuries " in case

she] needed to get a refill or something ... a muscle relaxer...." On September 29,

2015, ten days after the accident, Mrs. Faul visited her primary care physician, Dr.

Jeri Johnson, but made no mention of the accident or of any injuries to her neck or

back.

On October 7, 2015, three weeks post -accident, Mrs. Faul complained of

neck and back pain to Dr. Langston at a visit that was scheduled prior to the

accident. She informed Dr. Langston that she had been involved in an accident,

but that she had also aggravated her neck and back pain while performing regular

household duties. At that visit, Mrs. Faul indicated that her pain level was a 5 out

of 10. Dr. Langston performed trigger point injections into her muscles for

immediate relief and ordered a lumbar MRI.

Mrs. Faul returned to Dr. Langston on October 29, 2015, for a follow-up

visit and had X-rays performed, which showed no disc bulging/herniation or

ligament laxity, only muscle spasms. Dr. Langston scheduled a cervical ESI and

prescribed a muscle relaxer and pain medication. Mrs. Faul indicated that her pain

level was a 3 out of 10. She had the cervical ESI on November 20, 2015.

Approximately four months later, on February 18, 2016, Mrs. Faul returned to Dr.

Langston complaining of increased lower back pain. Dr. Langston prescribed a

muscle relaxer and pain medication and scheduled trigger point injections. During

his deposition, Dr. Langston testified:

Q: Her conditions really weren' t changing ...
any? It wasn' t getting any better in February of ' 16?
A: She was, yes, still having some flare- ups of
neck and back pain.
Q: Okay. The same sort of complaints that she

had had since going back to 2004?
A: Correct.

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Dr. Langston saw Mrs. Faul on May 9, 2016, where she complained of

mainly left shoulder pain. He prescribed anti- inflammatory medication and muscle

relaxers and scheduled a cervical MRI, EMG, and nerve conduction studies. The

cervical MRI, performed on May 16, 2016, showed no changes from her MRIs

prior to the accident.

On Dr. Langston' s recommendation, Mrs. Faul went to see Dr. Richard

Allen Stanger on May 19, 2016. At that visit, she complained of back pain, neck

pan, pain radiating into her left arm, pain in her left leg, numbness in her fourth

and fifth digits, and tingling in her hand. Mrs. Faul indicated to Dr. Stanger that

she had been in a motor vehicle collision in September 2015, and that her pain was

worse following the accident. Recognizing that Mrs. Faul' s symptoms had been

ongoing for a long time, Dr. Stanger indicated that she could continue with the

ESIs or consider surgery. Mrs. Faul opted for surgery— an anterior cervical

discectomy and fusion, which Dr. Stanger performed in June 2016. The surgery

fused two levels in her cervical spine C- 5 to C- 7. Dr. Stanger initially wanted to

fuse three levels, C- 5 to T- 1, but was unable to access the bottom T- 1 level. At her

first post- operative visit on June 14, 2016, Mrs. Faul reported worsening

symptoms; however, she admitted that she had fallen while trying to change a light

bulb prior to this visit. Dr. Stanger indicated that it was possible the fall could

have aggravated the non- fused cervical level that soon after her surgery. He

ordered a cervical MRI, which was performed on July 21, 2016, and it showed no

disc herniation.

Following her cervical discectomy and fusion with Dr. Stanger, Mrs. Faul

returned to Dr. Langston on July 14, 2016, reporting radicular pain to the left upper

extremity. She also told Dr. Langston that she had fallen and injured herself. Dr.

Langston recommended that Mrs. Faul return to Dr. Stanger and continue her pain

medication. Mrs. Faul returned to Dr. Stanger on July 26, 2016, and he

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recommended a CT scan, which was performed that same day, based on her

continuing and worsening post- operative pain. On August 24, 2016, Dr. Stanger

then performed a second surgery on Mrs. Faul, a C7- T1 laminectomy, to fuse the

third level that he was unable to fuse during her first surgery. After the second

surgery, Mrs. Faul' s surgical wound became infected, and she was ultimately

admitted to the hospital to drain fluid from the infected wound. Mrs. Faul then

returned to Dr. Stanger for follow up visits regarding her wound infection on

September 15, 20, and 27, 2016. On later visits with Dr. Stanger on October 11

and 25, 2016, December 1, 2016, January 5, 2017, and May 11, 2017, Mrs. Faul

reported neck pain, numbness in her fourth and fifth digits, left arm pain, back

pain, pain in both lower extremities, pain in her left leg, and pain in her right ankle.

Dr. Stanger recommended conservative treatment for her back pain,
including

injections and possibly surgery to decompress nerves in an attempt to alleviate her

arm pain and finger numbness.

Mrs. Faul then returned to Dr. Langston on November 3, 2016, complaining

of some residual posterior cervical pain, and pain to the mid and upper thoracic

region that was caused by muscle spasms. Dr. Langston continued her on muscle

relaxers and pain medication and her exercise program per Dr. Stanger. Mrs. Faul

saw Dr. Langston' s physician' s assistant on September 13, 2017, where she

complained of increased, aching neck pain. Dr. Langston' s office continued her on

pain medication and physical therapy.

Mrs. Faul, relying on the testimony of Dr. Langston and Dr. Stanger,

maintains that the evidence established a causal link between her complaints of

pain and the September 19, 2015 automobile collision. Dr. Langston specifically

testified during his deposition that he referred Mrs. Faul to Dr. Stanger because she

had unresolved complaints that were aggravated by the September 19, 2015

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accident. However, Dr. Langston deferred to Dr. Stanger as to the degree or extent

of aggravation or exacerbation.

During Dr. Stanger' s deposition, the following exchange occurred:

Q: Can you say in your medical opinion that
had the September 19, 2015 motor vehicle accident not
occurred, that she would not have needed the surgery that
she had in -- I guess it was two surgeries in 2015?
A: It really [ would] just depend on her --
honestly, it would be her symptoms, you know, because
people can have a terrible -looking MRI. If they' re
feeling fine, we' re not going to do surgery.
Q: ... [ H] ow did this accident -- if you can tell
us -- if you can' t tell us, I just need to know you can' t say

but based upon what you know today, your history,
what she' s given you, the limited history that you have
identified about her going back to 2004, and everything
that' s changed since you first saw her with the two
surgeries, etcetera, etcetera, can you tell us that you feel
that because of the motor vehicle accident September
2015, you' re relating the need for surgery to that event?
Do you feel comfortable about making that connection?
A:
The way I phrase it is, you know, if her
symptoms were very manageable before the accident,
and she' s going along fine with conservative treatment,
and she' s doing fine, and then the accident occurs --
because when I saw her, her symptoms were not

manageable. She was in terrible pain. And there' s no

way -- from what I saw there, there' s no way she would
have been doing that for 6 years, you know, been fine
with the amount of pain that she was in. So I would say
the amount of pain that I saw her in when I first saw her,
I would say she wasn' t in that amount of pain before. I
would say the accident did precipitate the need for
surgery based on her symptoms then.
Q: Your decision to operate on [ Mrs.] Faul in
June of 201[ 6], was because those symptoms had risen to
that level, that she could no longer manage it?
A: Yes.

The jury also heard the deposition expert medical testimony of neurosurgeon

Dr. Najeeb Thomas, who performed an independent medical examination of Mrs.

Faul' s medical records. Though Dr. Thomas never performed a physical

examination of Mrs. Faul, he had access to her complete medical history. Dr.

Thomas, noting Mrs. Faul' s extensive history and worsening MRIs, testified that

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while the September 19, 2015 accident may have aggravated Mrs. Faul' s chronic

neck pain, she would have required cervical surgery regardless of the accident.

The trier of fact' s credibility determinations, even when based on the

depositions of experts offered in lieu of live testimony, are accorded great

deference. Further, in reaching its conclusions, the trier of fact need not accept all

of the testimony of any witness as being true or false and may believe and accept a

part or parts of an expert witness' s testimony and refuse to accept other parts.

These rules apply equally to the evaluation of expert testimony, including the

evaluation and resolution of conflicts in expert testimony. Landry v. Doe, 2019-

0880 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 6/ 26/ 20), So. 3d , 2020 WL 3481703, at * 5,

writs denied, 2020- 00952, 2020- 00948 ( La. 10/ 20/ 20), 303 So. 3d 313, 316.

The weight afforded a treating physician' s testimony is largely dependent

upon the facts upon which his opinion is based. Edwards v. State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company, 2010- 2216 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 6/ 11), 2011 WL

2617384, at * 3 ( unpublished); Wells v. Allstate Insurance Company, 510 So.2d

763, 768 ( La. App. 1St Cir.), writ denied, 514 So. 2d 463 ( La. 1987). The

plaintiff' s credibility is especially significant when a physician must relate a

medical condition to an accident based on the plaintiffs history. See Peters v.

Harmsen, 2003- 1296 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 4/ 2/ 04), 879 So. 2d 157, 162. A plaintiff' s

lack of credibility on factual issues can serve to diminish the veracity of his

complaints to a physician. Meneses v. IFCO Systems, Inc., 2004- 1686 ( La. App.

1St Cir. 9/ 23/ 05), 923 So. 2d 111, 117; Peters, 879 So. 2d at 162. Thus, in many

cases, the credibility of the history given by the plaintiff to her physicians becomes

as important as the medical opinions based on that history. Meneses, 923 So. 2d at

116- 17.

It is apparent, from our review of the record, that Mrs. Faul' s credibility was

the critical issue at the trial and that the jury rejected her testimony. Furthermore,

13

Mrs. Faul' s credibility ( or lack thereof) affected not only her testimony, but also

the medical opinions of her doctors regarding the causal relationship between the

accident and the alleged injuries. See Richardson, 181 So. 3d at 68, Meneses, 923

So. 2d at 116- 17, and Peters, 879 So. 2d at 162. Causation in this case rested

largely on Mrs. Faul' s credibility both in reporting her medical condition and her

level of pain to her treating physicians. The jury was presented with evidence of

numerous accidents in which Mrs. Faul had been involved that could have

accounted for her complaints of pain— the 2004 accident, when she injured herself

while exiting a vehicle ( sometime in early September 2015 before the accident),

and when she fell while trying to change a light bulb ( sometime in June 2016 after

the accident and first surgery). The jury apparently concluded that Mrs. Faul

suffered no increase in her chronic pain after this accident and the record

reasonably supports the jury' s conclusion in this regard. Thus, we cannot say that

the jury' s failure to find that Mrs. Faul sustained injuries or that her pre- existing

condition was aggravated from the September 19, 2015 accident was manifestly

erroneous. See Hayes, 193 So. 3d at 1116; Edwards, 2011 WL 2617384, at * 3.

Since the jury' s finding that Mrs. Faul was not injured as result of the accident was

reasonably supported by the record, its failure to award damages to Mrs. Faul was,

likewise, neither manifestly erroneous nor clearly wrong. As such, the trial court

properly denied Mrs. Faul' s motion for JNOV and, alternatively, motion for new

trial. The assignments of error directed at these findings are without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the March 4, 2019 and the May 8, 2019

judgments of the trial court. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff,

Tamatha Faul.

JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED.

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