Alyson Mary Babcock v. Charles David Martin

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2019 CU 0326

ALYSON MARY BABCOCK

VERSUS

CHARLES DAVID MARTIN

Judgment Rendered: 2ot9-

On Appeal from the 32nd Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Terrebonne
State of Louisiana
Trial Court Number 143, 450

Honorable Randall L. Bethancourt, Judge Presiding

J. Ogden Middleton, II Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Alexandria, Louisiana Alyson Mary Babcock

Gregory J. Schwab Attorney for Defendant/Appellee,
Houma, Louisiana Charles David Martin

Dixie C. Brown Attorney for A.G.B.
Houma, Louisiana

BEFORE: HIGGINBOTHAM, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.

PENZATO, I

Appellant, Alyson Mary Babcock, appeals a judgment denying her rule to

modify custody. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant appeal is part of an ongoing child custody dispute with a long-

standing factual and procedural background.' Ms. Babcock and Charles David

Martin were never married, but had one child together, A.G.B., 2 born on

September 20, 2004. Pursuant to a consent judgment dated October 3, 2005, the

parties were granted joint custody of A.G.B., with Ms. Babcock designated as the

domiciliary parent. On December 8, 2005, Mr. Martin filed a rule seeking sole

custody of A.G.B., alleging that Ms. Babcock incorrectly gave A.G.B.

medications, exaggerated A.G.B.' s medical problems to a point where harm was

caused to the child, and deceived Mr. Martin and the court as to A.G. B.' s medical

condition. The matter came before the court on several occasions, and ultimately

on April 10, 2008, the parties agreed and consented to enter into mental health

counseling utilizing Jeanne Robertson, Ph.D, LPC.

At her initial meeting with Ms. Babcock on June 10, 2008, Dr. Robertson

developed concerns that Ms. Babcock might suffer from Munchausen Syndrome

by Proxy ( MSbP) 3 because Ms. Babcock' s description of A.G.B.' s health

problems, medication needed, and dietary regimen appeared to conflict with the

collateral documents received. In connection with a status hearing scheduled for

1 The parties previously appeared before this court litigating an order of protection issued against
Ms. Babcock by the trial court in May of 2011, See Babcock v. Martin, 2012- 0148 ( La. App. I
Cir. 12131112), 2012 WL 6758034 ( unpublished) (" Babcock F), and again in connection with the

rule to modify custody that is the subject of the instant appeal. See Babcock v. Martin, 2016-
0073 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 16/ 16), 2016 WL 4973229 ( unpublished) (" Babcock IF).

2 Although referred to as A.G.M. in the prior opinions, the minor child' s name has been legally
changed to A.G.B.

3 MSbP is a mental illness in which a caregiver, usually a mother, intentionally produces or
feigns illness or injury in a person under her care in order to assume the role of a parent who is
suffering the hardship of having a sick child. See Babcock H, * I n.3.

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August 12, 2008, Dr. Robertson advised the trial court by letter of her concerns

regarding the number of different doctors from whom Ms. Babcock sought medical

treatment for A.G.B. Dr. Robertson further advised the trial court that Ms.

Babcock stated that on A.G.B.' s chart at one doctor' s office it had been suggested

that she suffered from MSbP. Dr. Robertson indicated that she was not trained to

determine if Ms. Babcock suffered from MSbP, and she believed it was essential

that Ms. Babcock receive a complete psychological evaluation by Michael Chafetz,

On August 20, 2008, Mr. Martin filed a second rule for sole custody,

asserting that Ms. Babcock refused to undergo an immediate psychological

evaluation by Dr. Chafetz. He also sought an ex -parte order of provisional

custody, alleging that he feared for A.G.B.' s safety and welfare. The trial court

granted Mr. Martin provisional custody of A.G.B., with no visitation by Ms.

Babcock pending the hearing of the matter " due to the gravity of the

circumstances."

On August 29, 2008, and September 17, 2008, Dr. Chafetz conducted a

psychological evaluation of Ms. Babcock, and on September 7, 2008, issued a

report wherein he concluded that Ms. Babcock suffered from MSbP and should

only have supervised visitation with A.G.B. After receiving Dr. Chafetz' s

completed report, Dr. Robertson provided an evaluation to the trial court dated

September 28, 2008.

On October 2, 2008, the matter came before the trial court for hearing. Both

Dr. Chafetz' s and Dr. Robertson' s reports were made part of the record without

objection. The parties entered into an agreement that was reduced to judgment

signed December 1, 2008, granting Mr. Martin sole legal and physical custody of

A.G.B. The consent judgment further decreed that Ms. Babcock was to have

supervised visitation of A.G.B. upon complying with the following conditions: ( 1)

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Ms. Babcock shall begin and maintain active therapy with a psychologist or

psychiatrist who understands the disorders identified in Dr. Chafetz' s report; ( 2)

the mental health professional shall be approved by the trial court and report on a

monthly basis to the trial court; ( 3) Ms. Babcock' s visitation shall be supervised by

a registered nurse who is acceptable to the trial court and to the parties; and ( 4) the

trial court shall set the frequency and times of the visitation periods upon

compliance with the conditions and recommendations of A.G.B.' s therapist and

Ms. Babcock' s therapist.

Ms. Babcock did not appeal the December 1, 2008 judgment. On July 27,

2009, Ms. Babcock filed a rule seeking the appointment of James R. " Randy"

Logan, Ph. D., as the court- appointed psychologist to provide the therapy required

in the December 1, 2008 judgment. In connection therewith, Dr. Logan testified

before the trial court on October 21, 2009 as to his competency to provide

treatment. However, the hearing was not completed at that time, and was

continued.

Prior to the trial court' s ruling on Dr. Logan' s appointment as Ms.

Babcock' s treating psychologist, Ms. Babcock began therapy with Dr. Logan. On

June 19, 2010, Dr. Logan advised the trial court by letter that after meeting with

Ms. Babcock on six occasions, he was convinced that the diagnosis of MSbP must

be called into question. In his opinion, the methodology used by Dr. Chafetz was

inadequate and incomplete, and the data presented in Dr. Chafetz' s report was

inconsistent with MSbP. Dr. Logan opined that a more likely explanation was that

immediately after birth A.G.B. presented with multiple life-threatening medical

challenges that would likely overwhelm any parent; in the face of such complex

medical issues, it was probable that Ms. Babcock' s response to medical

instructions was less than optimal; and as a further exacerbating variable the above

issues occurred in the context of a high -conflict, intensely adversarial custody

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dispute. Dr. Logan advised that the primary focus of his work with Ms. Babcock

was preparing her for resumption of contact with A.G.B.

Ms. Babcock' s rule to appoint psychologist was re -set for hearing on

February 1, 2011. The trial court denied the appointment of Dr. Logan as treating

psychologist, indicating Dr. Logan' s disagreement with Dr. Chafetz' s diagnosis.

In a judgment signed May 23, 2011, the trial court ordered that the Department of

Psychiatry at the LSU Health Science Services in Shreveport, Louisiana, ( LSU -S)

be approved and appointed as Ms. Babcock' s treating therapist in conformity with

the December 1, 2008 consent judgment. The trial court further ordered that

counsel for Ms. Babcock would endeavor to make an appointment for Ms.

Babcock with LSU -S, seek to procure the names of professional treating

psychiatrists, and provide such names to counsel for Mr. Martin. Ms. Babcock did

not appeal this judgment.

Following a significant period of dormancy in the proceedings, on January

14, 2015, Ms. Babcock filed a " Rule to Enforce Monetary Relief and Modify

Judgment." In relevant part, Ms. Babcock requested the trial court modify the

custody and psychiatric care provisions of the December 1, 2008 consent judgment

and May 23, 2011 order on her rule to appoint a treating psychiatrist, so as to

provide her with greater access to her minor child. Ms. Babcock claimed that it

was in the best interests of A.G.B. for the consent judgment to be vacated. She

further requested that the trial court revise the order on her rule to appoint a

treating psychiatrist, arguing that LSU -S did not have expert psychiatric doctors or

psychologists on its staff capable of providing therapy for MSbP.

Mr. Martin responded to Ms. Babcock' s rule seeking modification of the

trial court' s prior judgments by filing dilatory exceptions of prematurity and

improper use of summary procedure, declinatory exceptions of lis pendens and

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and peremptory exceptions of res judicata and

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no cause of action.
These several exceptions came for a hearing before the trial

court on July 8, 2015. The trial court signed a judgment denying the exceptions of

improper use of summary proceedings, lis pendens, lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, and res judicata on October 26, 2015. 4 However, the trial court

granted the dilatory exception of prematurity, reasoning that Ms. Babcock " has not

yet begun to meet the court- ordered conditions for her to reclaim visitation rights."

Babcock II, *2- 4.

Ms. Babcock appealed that decision, and in Babcock II, we converted the

appeal to an application for supervisory writ, reversed the judgment granting the

dilatory exception of prematurity, and remanded the case. Thereafter, following a

twelve -day trial, the trial court denied Ms. Babcock' s " Rule to Enforce Monetary

Relief and Modify Judgment" and her request to name Dr. Logan as her court-

appointed therapist by judgment signed December 18, 2018, offering extensive

reasons in support of its ruling. The trial court concluded that Ms. Babcock did not

carry her burden of proof to warrant a custody modification, or even to resume

communications with A.G.B., stating as follows:

The central focus of the trial testimony was on the mother, [Ms.
Babcock]. She was diagnosed with [ MSbP], which she denounces.
Ms. Babcock] was ordered to receive therapeutic treatment for
MSbP] as one of several conditions for communication to resume and
supervised visitation to begin; she has not done so. Although she saw
19th
Dr. Logan 34 times in 8 years ( through May of 2018) and asks the
court to appoint him as her approved therapist, he denounces the
MSbP] diagnosis, has yet to provide even one minute of counseling
or therapy for [ MSbP]. He firmly believes that [ Ms. Babcock] has
been unjustly vilified. Most importantly, [ Ms. Babcock] has not
offered any evidence that the proposed modification would serve the
child' s best interest. The only witness with any degree of knowledge
of how the child would be impacted if [Ms. Babcock]' s request is
granted is Dr. Zoe Tanner. She testified that it is not in the child' s
best interest at this time.

4 The trial court pretermitted consideration of the peremptory exception of no cause of action. In
addition, the trial court denied as moot the declinatory exception of lis pendens, which pertained
to an unsatisfied money judgment not at issue in this appeal, because counsel for Ms. Babcock
acknowledged that the money judgment was satisfied and all sums due were paid.

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Ms. Babcock appeals the December 18, 2018 judgment, the
challenging

methodology used by Dr. Chafetz in reaching the MSbP diagnosis, and alleging
that the trial court erred by failing to apply La. C. C. art. 134 as amended.5

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In cases such as the instant case, where the underlying custody decree is a

stipulated judgment, a party seeking a modification must prove that: ( 1) there has

been a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child since

the original ( or previous) custody decree was entered; and ( 2) the proposed

modification is in the best interest of the child. Tinsley v. Tinsley, 2016- 0891 ( La.

App. I Cir. 1/ 18/ 17), 211 So. 3d 405, 412. Thus, the burden of proof to change the

December 1, 2008 consent judgment fell on Ms. Babcock to show that there had

been a material change in circumstances affecting the welfare of A.G.B. since the

December 1, 2008 consent judgment was entered, and that the proposed

modification was in the best interest of the child.

Each child custody case must be viewed in light of its own particular set of

facts and circumstances. Gill v. Dufrene, 97- 0777 ( La. App. I Cir. 12/ 29/ 97), 706

So. 2d 518, 521. The paramount consideration in any determination of child

custody is the best interest of the child. La. C. C. art. 131; Evans v. Lungrin, 97-

0541 ( La. 2/ 6/ 98), 708 So. 2d 731, 738.

A trial court' s determination of a child' s best interests is usually based

heavily on factual findings. Henry v. Henry, 2008- 0689 ( La. App. I Cir. 9/ 23/ 08),

995 So. 2d 643, 645. The trial court is in the best position to ascertain the best

interest of the child given each unique set of circumstances. Accordingly, a trial

5 Ms. Babcock listed twelve assignments of error in her brief. However, she only briefed the
assignments of error that challenge the MSbP diagnosis and the assignment of error alleging that
the trial court failed to apply the current version of La. C. C. art. 134. The court may consider as
Uniform
abandoned any assignment of error or issue for review which has not been briefed.
Rules -Courts of Appeal, Rule 2- 12.4( B)( 4). See also Louisiana Commerce & Trade Ass' n, SIF
v. Williams, 2014- 1680 ( La. App. I Cir. 6/ 5/ 15), 174 So. 3d 696, 699. Accordingly, the
remaining assignments of error are deemed abandoned.

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court' s determination of custody is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed

on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. Major v. Major, 2002-

2131 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 14/ 03), 849 So. 2d 547, 550.

It is well settled that an appellate court may not set aside a trial court' s

findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly

wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 ( La. 1989). If the findings are

reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not

reverse those findings even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of

fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id.

Where there is conflict in testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility

and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review. Stobart v.

State, Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So. 2d 880, 882

La. 1993). When a fact finder is presented with two permissible views of the

evidence, the fact finder' s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or

clearly wrong. Id. at 883. Additionally, when findings are based on determinations

regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error -clearly wrong standard

demands great deference to the trier of fact' s findings; for only the factfinder can

be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on

the listener' s understanding and belief in what is said. Rosell, 549 So. 2d at 844.

Further, the trial court is not required to give any extra credence to the

testimony of experts. Givens a Givens, 2010- 0680 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 10), 53

So. 3d 720, 729. It is well settled in Louisiana that the fact finder is not bound by

the testimony of an expert, but such testimony is to be weighed the same as any

other evidence. Id. The fact finder may accept or reject in whole or in part the

opinion expressed by an expert. Id. The effect and weight to be given expert

testimony is within the trial court' s broad discretion. Morgan v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 2007- 0334 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 2/ 07), 978 So. 2d 941, 946.

3

As the trial court recognized, the central focus of the trial was the 2008

MSbP diagnosis. Through the testimony of Dr. Logan and Alicia Pellegrin, Ph.D.,

LPC, Ms. Babcock attacked the methodology used by Dr. Chafetz. In this appeal,

Ms. Babcock argues that the trial court failed to fulfill its obligation under La. C. E.

art. 7026 as a gatekeeper, by admitting and relying upon Dr. Chafetz' s MSbP

diagnosis in the absence of proof that he employed the reliable methodology

required by La. C. E. art. 702. Ms. Babcock further contends that Dr. Chafetz' s

methodology of using test results and symptoms validity testing does not survive a

Dauberfforet/Cheairs7 analysis.

Dr. Chafetz testified at length regarding his diagnosis of Ms. Babcock. In

addition to evaluating her, he interviewed Mr. Martin and his wife, Leslie;

observed and spoke with A.G.B; spoke with A.G.B.' s current and previous

pediatricians; and reviewed medical records provided to him. Dr. Chafetz noted

that A.G.B. had a very large medical record; his examination of the record revealed

that Ms. Babcock took A.G.B. to the hospital or doctor " at the drop of a hat," and

the findings usually did not substantiate the claims.

6 Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 702 provides in pertinent part that:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

1) The expert' s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

2) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

3) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

4) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.

7 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d
469 ( 1993), the United States Supreme Court set forth a means for determining the reliability of
expert scientific testimony. The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the test set forth in Daubert
in State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 ( La. 1993), and further specified the admissibility of expert
testimony in Cheairs v. DQTD, 2003- 0680 ( La. 12/ 3/ 03), 861 So. 2d 536.

E

Dr. Chafetz testified that in his report he listed the kinds of non -credible

behaviors exhibited by Ms. Babcock that could be involved in a factitious disorder,

painting a picture of the kinds of things [ he] was thinking about." He did not

automatically assume that this was a factitious disorder case and if the results

concerning illness deception had gone another way, he would have been obliged

not to diagnose this as such. Dr. Chafetz testified that he utilized validity testing in

reaching his conclusion. He administered to Ms. Babcock a number of

psychological tests, including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory -2
MMPI -2"). According to Dr. Chafetz, Ms. Babcock' s MMPI -2 revealed

elevated levels on the " L scale," which was reflective of deception. He also noted

an elevation of the " faking good index" of the Child Abuse Potential Inventory,

which he also administered to Ms. Babcock. According to Dr. Chafetz, taken

together these results made it clear that there was an attempt by Ms. Babcock to

portray herself and A.G.B. as having certain kinds of problems or illnesses, while

at the same time attempting to portray herself as being free from any kind of

psychological distress or psychological pathology. Dr. Chafetz testified that he

also administered to Ms. Babcock the Structured Inventory of Malingered

Symptomology, and that based upon the findings on all of the administered tests,

he concluded that there was an almost 84% probability that Ms. Babcock was

feigning, or engaging in illness deception. He further testified that in connection

with the other findings in the case, including interviewing doctors and reviewing

the various medical records, the positive findings on the tests he administered led

to his diagnosis.

At trial, Dr. Logan testified that at the time of Dr. Chafetz' s evaluation, the

MSbP diagnosis was contained in an appendix to the Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders, 4" Edition (" DSM -IV") and is now included in the

DSM -V. According to Dr. Logan, the DSM -V requires objective data for a

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diagnosis of MSbP and he did not observe the kind of robust evidence necessary
for the diagnosis in Dr. Chafetz' s report. A finding that A.G. B. had a large

medical file and was taken to the doctor frequently is insufficient for such a

diagnosis. In Dr. Logan' s opinion, Dr. Chafetz misinterpreted the results of the

tests he administered to Ms. Babcock to conclude she was malingering; Dr. Logan

believed the more parsimonious explanation is that Ms. Babcock was nervous and

scared. Dr. Logan concluded that his review of Dr. Chafetz' s work did not support

the findings of a diagnosis of MSbP.

Dr. Pellegrin was retained on behalf of and evaluated Ms. Babcock, and

issued a report dated December 22, 2013, concluding therein that there was

insufficient evidence to conclude that Ms. Babcock suffers from MSbP. At trial,

Dr. Pellegrin testified that it is extremely difficult to diagnose a disorder as rare as

MSbP. According to Dr. Pellegrin, the diagnosis requires intentional conduct on

the part of the person being diagnosed; it is very hard to ascertain the presence of a

motivation to deceive and a deliberate intention to falsify a health situation, health

information, or diagnostic indicators. In her trial testimony, Dr. Pellegrin criticized

the methodology used by Dr. Chafetz, stating that it was not in harmony with her

peers in the realm of forensic custody evaluations. According to Dr. Pellegrin, Dr.

Chafetz' s expertise is with Social Security cases, and his methodology is perhaps

in harmony with determining whether someone is malingering for financial gain.

Dr. Pellegrin testified that she has never seen the methodology employed by Dr.

Chafetz used or even discussed in terms of rendering a diagnosis of a factitious

disorder. According to Dr. Pellegrin, there is no evidence that anyone other than

Dr. Chafetz believes that his is an appropriate methodology to diagnose MSbP.

Following the testimony of Dr. Logan and Dr. Pellegrin, Dr. Chafetz

responded, testifying that their criticisms of him were false and not based upon

psychological science. He indicated that Dr. Pellegrin was clearly not an expert in

II

the area, as she conflated positive findings on validity testing with malingering and

incorrectly asserted that malingerers do not show elevations on scales of positive

impression management. According to Dr. Chafetz, Dr. Pellegrin is apparently

confused about the purposes and potential findings of validity testing. With regard

to Dr. Logan, he recognized that as her therapist, Dr. Logan needs to be an

advocate for Ms. Babcock. However, he cautioned against confusing therapeutic

advocacy with science and noted that Dr. Logan provided no evidence that he was

able to evaluate the methodology used by Dr. Chafetz. Dr. Chafetz concluded that,

I] n [ his] opinion, it would be less important for any therapist to opine about

whether Ms. Babcock meets criteria for any disorder, and instead very important to

provide the Court with evaluative evidence of her progress with parenting skills,

clean boundaries, and appropriate interactions with the medical profession."

Both Dr. Logan' s and Dr. Pellegrin' s testimony at trial focused on the

methodology used by Dr. Chafetz in reaching the conclusion contained in his

September 7, 2008 report. Significantly, Ms. Babcock did not challenge Dr.

Chafetz' s methodology or request a Daubert hearing at the October 2, 2008

hearing on Mr. Martin' s rule for sole custody, and Dr. Chafetz' s report was

introduced into evidence without objection.

The factual basis for an expert opinion determines the credibility of the

testimony. It is the responsibility of the opposing party to explore the factual basis

for the opinion and thus, determine its reliability. Leard v. Schenker, 2006- 1116

La. 6/ 16/ 06), 931 So. 2d 355, 357. Thus, the failure to raise an objection to the

admissibility and reliability of expert testimony constitutes a waiver of such an

objection. La. C. E. art. 103( A)( 1); Harris v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 2007-

1566 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 10/ 08), 997 So. 2d 849, 868, writ denied, 2008- 2886 ( La.

2/ 6/ 09), 999 So. 2d 785. A contemporaneous objection to the disputed evidence

must be entered on the trial record in order to preserve the objection for appellate

12

review. Furthermore, when the objecting party fails to request an evidentiary

gatekeeping" hearing, his objections to the admissibility of an expert witness' s

testimony under Daubert are not preserved for appeal. Id.

Ms. Babcock waived her objection concerning the admissibility and

reliability of Dr. Chafetz' s testimony when she failed to raise it at the October 2,

2008 hearing. See Leard, 931 So. 2d at 357. Any objection to Dr. Chafetz' s

methodology could not have formed the basis for an attack had Ms. Babcock

appealed the December 1, 2008 consent judgment. See Id. Likewise, it cannot

form the basis of this appeal of the trial court' s December 18, 2018 judgment.

Moreover, Dr. Chafetz explained the methodology he used in reaching his

diagnosis and addressed the challenges to his methodology raised by Drs. Logan

and Pellegrin. The effect and weight to be given expert testimony is within the

broad discretion of the trial judge. Morgan, 978 So. 2d at 946. We do not find the

trial court abused its discretion in recognizing Ms. Babcock' s agreement, as

embodied in the December 1, 2008 consent judgment, that she would have

supervised visitation of A.G. B. only upon beginning and maintaining active

therapy with a psychologist or psychiatrist who understands the disorders

identified in Dr. Chafetz' s September 7, 2008 report.

In addition, as noted above, to alter the December 1, 2008 consent judgment,

Ms. Babcock had the burden of proving that there had been a material change in

circumstances affecting the welfare of A.G.B. since the December 1, 2008 consent

judgment was entered, and that the proposed modification was in the best interest

of the child. She failed to identify any change in circumstances. Neither Dr.

Logan nor Dr. Pellegrin testified regarding any change since 2008. Further, Ms.

Babcock failed to produce any evidence that the proposed modification—greater

access to A.G.B.—was in AG.B.' s best interest. As the trial court noted, the only

evidence regarding the effect of Ms. Babcock having greater access to A.G.B. was

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offered by A.G.B' s therapist, Dr. Tanner. Dr. Tanner testified that in recent

sessions, A.G.B. has become anxious and afraid in response to the idea that

supervised visitation may resume. Dr. Tanner testified that access to Ms. Babcock

even for short windows of time would be damaging to A.G.B., and that in her

opinion Ms. Babcock should not be allowed to see A.G. B. at this time. Finally, we

note that Ms. Babcock failed to prove that the trial court erred in failing to apply

the recently amended version of La. C. C. art. 134.

Thus, after reviewing the testimony and evidence presented at trial, we do

not find the trial court erred in denying Ms. Babcock' s rule to modify custody.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the December 18, 2018 judgment

is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Alyson Mary Babcock.

AFFIRMED.

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