In Re: Raymond Charles Burkart

Supreme Court of Louisiana
June 12, 2020
Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: RAYMOND CHARLES BURKART
No.2020-B-00243
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and Recommendations
(Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
June 12, 2020
Permanent disbarment imposed. See per curiam.
JDH
BJJ
JLW
SJC
JTG
WJC
JHB
06/12/2020 "See News Release 021 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

06/12/20
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
020-B-0243
I
N RE: RAYMOND CHARLES BURKART, III
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Raymond Charles Burkart, III, a
disbarred attorney.
PRI
OR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review
respondent’s prior disciplinary history.
In 2006, respondent was conditionally admitted to the practice of law in
Louisiana, subject to a five -year period of probation, with the condition that he
comply with a Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (“JLAP”) agreement. In
2011, we found that respondent had successfully complied with all terms of his
probation and terminated the probationary period.
On November 5, 2018, we disbarred respondent for neglecting legal matters,
failing to communicate with clients, failing to refund unearned fees, failing to return
client files, mishandling his trust account, resulting in a $3,721.71 negative balance,
and failing to cooperate with the ODC in its investigations. All of this misconduct
occurred between 2009 and 2016. In re: Burkart, 18-1077 (La. 11/5/18), 255 So. 3d
999 (“Burkart I”).

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Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at
issue in the instant proceeding.

FORMAL CHARGES
Count I – The McIntosh Matter
In August 2013, Kevin McIntosh hired respondent to represent him in a civil
matter and paid him a $3,000 retainer fee. For the first few months, respondent sent
Mr. McIntosh regular mail communication notifying him of proceedings and case
updates. Thereafter, all communication stopped, and when Mr. McIntosh contacted
respondent’s office, respondent’s staff told him that respondent was in a drug
rehabilitation facility and would no longer be able to represent him. According to
Mr. McIntosh, he requested a refund of his remaining retainer fee, which he
approximated to be $2,500, but respondent’s staff told him to contact the Louisiana
State Bar Association.
In April 2017, Mr. McIntosh filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent.
The ODC sent respondent notice of the complaint via certified mail on April 13,
2017, but the notice was returned as u ndeliverable on April 20, 2017. On July 24,
2017, the ODC’s investigator personally served respondent with a copy of Mr.
McIntosh’s complaint. Respondent failed to respond to the complaint.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.3 (failure to act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to
communicate with a client), 1.5 (failure to refund an unearned fee), 8.1(c) (failure to
cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count II – The Sandifer Matter

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In December 2012, Marnisha Sandifer hired respondent to repre sent her and
her son in a personal injury matter stemming from an automobile accident. Ms.
Sandifer never received a status update from respondent or any sort of settlement
proceeds, and she learned independently that her case was dismissed.1
In May 2017, Ms. Sandifer filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent.
The ODC sent respondent notice of the complaint via certified mail on May 9, 2017,
but the notice was returned as unclaimed on June 26, 2017. On July 24, 2017, the
ODC’s investigator perso nally served respondent with a copy of Ms. Sandifer’s
complaint. Respondent failed to respond to the complaint.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(c),
and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Count III – The Criminal Harassment Matter
On December 31, 2015, respondent was arrested for stalking and harassing
his ex-girlfriend. Respondent’s ex-girlfriend had previously filed reports of similar
conduct by respondent, but warnings from the police did not hinder his efforts to
follow her. As such, she pressed charges against him.
On September 14, 2017, respondent pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of
telephone communication harassment. Respondent was sentenced to serve six
months in jail, which sentence was suspended. He was also placed on probation for
two years, with the conditions that he submit to random drug testing, seek a mental
health evaluation, and have no contact with his ex-girlfriend.
On May 8, 2017, the ODC received notice of respondent’s arrest from the 22nd
Judicial District Attorney’s Office. The ODC sent respondent notice of the

1 The record indicates that the defendant insurance company sent respondent two checks in
settlement of Ms. Sandifer’s claim. One check was in the amount of $15,908.00, and the other
check was in the amount of $5,149.20. The record further indicates that, in March 2015,
respondent filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Sandifer’s case because her claim had been settled.

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complaint via certified mail on May 11, 2017, but the notice was returned on May
18, 2017. Respondent failed to respond to the complaint.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and
8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In August 2018, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, as set forth
above. Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual
allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and
convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal
hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing
committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions.
Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the ODC’s submission on sanctions, the hearing committee
determined the factual allegations set forth in the formal charges are fully developed
and supported by the exhibits in the record. The committee also determined the
factual allegations are deemed admitted and sufficient to support a finding that
respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.
The committee then determined respondent knowingly and intentionally
violated duties owed to his clients and the legal profession. His conduct caused
actual harm to his clients and the legal profession and had the potential to cause even
more harm to his clients. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.

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In aggravation, the committee cited respondent’s prior disciplinary record and
illegal conduct. Additionally, the committee noted respondent’s “[r]epetitive pattern
of failure to communicate with clients, to exercise due diligence and to promptly
return an unearned fee,” his lack of remorse, and his “[r]epetitive pattern of failure
to communicate and cooperate with the ODC.” The committee found no mitigating
factors present.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee first examined
respondent’s misconduct relative to his misconduct in Burkart I. Noting that the
instant misconduct occurred between 2012 and 2017, the committee determined the
misconduct here and in Burkart I occurred during the same time period and must be
considered together pursuant to La. State Bar Ass’n v. Chatelain, 573 So. 2d 4 70
(La. 1991), wherein we held:
When a second disciplinary proceeding against an attorney
involves misconduct which occurred during the same time
period as the first proceeding, the overall discipline to be
imposed should be determined as if both proceedings were
before the court simultaneously.

The committee then determined that the entirety of respondent’s misconduct
here and in Burkart I , which includes mishandling his trust account, inappropriate
cash withdrawals from his trust account, conversion of client funds, neglecting six
legal matters, failing to refund unearned fees to three clients, and engaging in serious
criminal conduct, falls under Guideline 1 (repeated or multiple instances of
intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm) of the permanent
disbarment guidelines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix D. In further
support of permanent disbarment, the committee cited In re: Alleman, 07-2060 (La.
5/30/08), 982 So. 2d 814, and In re: Straub, 08-2354 (La. 1/30/09), 999 So. 2d 1123.
In Alleman, an attorney neglected numerous legal matters, abandoned his law
practice, failed to refund approximately $20,000 in unearned fees and unused costs,
converting those funds to his own use, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in

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several investigations. We imposed permanent disbarment upon the attorney based
on Guideline 1 of the permanent disbarment guidelines. In Straub, an attorney
neglected numerous legal matters, failed to communicate with numerous clients,
failed to refund more than $40,000 in unearned fees, failed to cooperate with the
ODC in its investigations, and failed to repay a loan obtained from a client. Again,
we imposed permanent disbarment upon the attorney based on Guideline 1 of the
permanent disbarment guidelines.
Under these circumstances, the committee recommended respondent be
permanently disbarred. The committee also recommended respondent be ordered to
refund Mr. McIntosh’s unearned fee with interest.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the committee’s report
and recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
Like the hearing committee, the disciplinary board ackn owledged that the
factual allegations set forth in the formal charges are deemed admitted and proven.
The board also agreed with the committee that respondent violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct as charged.
The board then determined respondent knowingly and intentionally violated
duties owed to his clients, the legal profession, and the public. His conduct caused
actual and potential harm. Specifically, the board found that respondent failed to
refund $2,500 in unearned fees to Mr. McIntosh and settled the claims of Ms.
Sandifer and her son for more than $20,000 without telling her and without
disbursing any of the funds to her.
In aggravation, the board found a prior disciplinary record, a pattern of
misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings
by failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, indifference

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to making restitution, and illegal conduct. Like the committee, the board found no
mitigating factors present.
With respect to an appropriate sanction, the board agreed with the committee
that a Chatelain analysis should be applied here and that the instant misconduct
should be considered together with the misconduct in Burkart I when determining a
sanction. Like the committee, the board concluded that respondent’s combined
conduct falls under Guideline 1 of the permanent disbarment guidelines. In further
support of permanent disbarment, the board cited In re: Meyer , 13 -2410 (La.
1/17/14), 131 So. 3d 43, and In re: Murphy, 17-0068 (La. 6/29/17), 224 So. 3d 947.
In Meyer, an attorney neglected his clients’ legal matters, failed to communicate
with his clients, failed to refund $1,100 in unearned fees, failed to return his clients’
files, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigations. We imposed
permanent disbarment based on Guideline 1 of the permanent disbarment guidelines.
In Murphy, an attorney neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients,
failed to refund $7,150 in unearned fees, attempted to solic it clients from other
attorneys, engaged in dishonest conduct, made misrepresentations to the court,
practiced law while ineligible to do so, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
after being placed on interim suspension, engaged in criminal conduct, and failed to
cooperate with the ODC in its investigations. We imposed permanent disbarment
based on Guideline 1 and Guideline 8 (following notice, engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law during the period of time in which the lawyer is
suspended fr om the practice of law or disbarred) of the permanent disbarment
guidelines.
Based on the above, the board recommended respondent be permanently
disbarred. The board further recommended respondent be ordered to refund any
unearned fees to Mr. McIntosh an d provide an accounting and disbursement of
settlement funds to Ms. Sandifer.

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Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the board’s report and
recommendation.
DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57.
In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual
allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supr eme Court Rule XIX, §
11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations
contained in the formal charges after those cha rges have been deemed admitted.
However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow
from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a
violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts,
additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions
that flow from the admitte d factual allegations. In re: Donnan , 01 -3058 (La.
1/10/03), 838 So. 2d 715.
The record in this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent
neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients, failed to refund
unearned fees, was arr ested for stalking and harassment before pleading guilty to
telephone communication harassment, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its
investigations. As such, he has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as
charged, with one exception. The rec ord contains no evidence and the deemed
admitted facts do not indicate that respondent engaged in any type of dishonest
conduct in the McIntosh matter. Therefore, we find the ODC failed to prove a Rule
8.4(c) violation.

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Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients,
the legal profession, and the public, causing actual and potential harm. The baseline
sanction for this type of misconduct is disbarment. Aggravating factors include a
pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the
disciplinary agency, indifference to making restitution, and illegal conduct. No
mitigating factors are evident from the record.
With the exception of respondent’s failure to cooperate with the ODC’s
investigations of the instant disciplinary complaints, all of respondent’s misconduct
at issue here occurred during the same time period as the misconduct at issue in
Burkart I. Theref ore, we agree with the hearing committee and the disciplinary
board that we should address the current misconduct in conjunction with the
misconduct in Burkart I. The concept of simultaneously considering new charges
based on conduct occurring at the same time as earlier misconduct originated in our
opinion in Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Chatelain , 573 So. 2d 470 (La. 1991) , in
which we explained:
Since the attorney-respondent cannot control the timing of
the institution of disciplinary proceedings, it is generally
inappropriate to disbar a previously disbarred attorney an

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additional time when the violations at issue occurred
before or concurrently with the violations which resulted
in the initial disbarment. When a second disciplinary
proceeding against an attorney involves misconduct which
occurred during the same time period as th e first
proceeding, the overall discipline to be imposed should be
determined as if both proceedings were before the court
simultaneously.

In Chatelain, we were concerned th at it would be potentially unfair for a
lawyer to receive a greater sanction simply because of the timing of the prosecution.
However, as the jurisprudence has evolved, we have also recognized that the lawyer
should not benefit in cases where it is obvious that the cumulative effect of the
newly-charged misconduct and the prior misconduct would have caused us to
impose a greater sanction had we been aware of that misconduct at the time we
rendered our initial judgment. See, e.g., In re: Holley , 03-1366 (La. 10/3/03), 856
So. 2d 1197 (“[h]ad we considered the instant misconduct together with the
misconduct in Holley I, it is likely we would have imposed a more severe sanction,
probably in the range of eighteen months, with some period of deferral and
probation.”). In short, our overriding consideration has been to determine the
appropriate overall sanction for the lawyer’s misconduct, ignoring any distortions
that may be caused by the timing of the filing of formal charges.
Applying this reasoning to the instant case, we recognize that the substantive
misconduct in the instant charges is part of the continuing series of professional
breaches by respondent that we first addressed in Burkart I. In Burkart I, respondent
neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients, failed to refund more
than $500 in unearned fees, failed to return client files, mishandled his trust account,
resulting in a $3,721.71 negative balance, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in
its investigations. Similarly, in the instant matter, respondent neglected his clients’
legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, failed to refund unearned fees,
and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigations. Additionally, he was

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arrested for stalki ng and harassment before pleading guilty to telephone
communication harassment.
In Appendix D to Supreme Court Rule XIX, we set forth guidelines
illustrating the types of conduct that might warrant permanent disbarment.
Guideline 1 applies to “re peated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of
client funds with substantial harm. ” Taken as a whole, respondent’s conduct here
and in Burkart I falls within Guideline 1. R espondent has intentionally failed to
remit or refund a significant amount of client funds and unearned fees, essentially
converting approximately $27,000 to his own use and causing those clients actual
harm. Had we been aware of the instant misconduct at the time of Burkart I, we
would have permanently disbarred respondent.
Accordingly, we will adopt the board ’s recommendation and impose
permanent disbarment. We will further order respondent to refund any unearned
fees to Mr. McIntosh and provide an accounting and disbursement of settlement
funds to Ms. Sandifer.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and the disciplinary board , and considering the record, it is ordered that Raymond
Charles Burkart, III, Louisiana Bar Roll number 30320, be and he hereby is
permanently disbarred. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his
license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. Pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be
permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. It
is further ordered that respondent shall refund any unearned fees to Kevin McIntosh,
with legal interest, and provide an accounting and disbursement of settlement funds
to Marnisha Sandifer, with legal interes t. All costs and expenses in the matter are

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assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1,
with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s
judgment until paid.