In Re: Francis C. Broussard

Supreme Court of Louisiana
June 22, 2020
Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: FRANCIS C. BROUSSARD
No.2020-B-00366
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and Recommendations
(Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
June 22, 2020
Discipline imposed. See per curiam.
JLW
BJJ
JDH
SJC
JTG
WJC
JHB
06/22/2020 "See News Release 022 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

06/22/20
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
020-B-0366
I
N RE: FRANCIS C. BROUSSARD
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Francis C. Broussard, a disbarred
attorney.
PRI
OR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review
respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of
law in Louisiana in 1986.
In 1998, the disciplinary board admonished respondent for engaging in
improper financial transactions with a client.
In 2002, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months,
fully deferred, subject to one year of supervised probation with conditions, for
engaging in conduct constituting a conflict of interest and for failing to disburse
settlement proceeds to a client for more than one year, during which time the balance
of his trust account dropped below the amount held on the client’s behalf. In re:
Broussard, 02-1670 (La. 9/30/02), 827 So. 2d 1133 (“Broussard I”).
In 2010, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year and
one day, with all but thirty days deferred, followed by one year of supervised
probation with conditions, for failing to communicate with a client and neglecting

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his legal matter, resulting in the dismissal of his lawsuit, and failing to release the
files of two clients upon request. In re: Broussard, 09-1814 (La. 1/8/10), 26 So. 3d
131 (“Broussard II”).
In 2017, we disbarred respondent, retroactive to February 26, 2014, the date
of his interim suspension imposed in In re: Broussard, 14 -0386 (La. 2/26/14), 134
So. 3d 579, based upon his conviction of one count of making false, fictitious, or
fraudulent claims to the IRS, arising out of his effort to employ an “OID scheme” to
claim more than $9.7 million in tax refunds over the course of four years. In re:
Broussard, 16-1441 (La. 1/25/17), 219 So. 3d 290 (“Broussard III”).
Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at
issue in the instant proceeding.

UNDERLYING FACTS
In 2011, Arthur Johnson hired respond ent to represent him in a workers’
compensation matter stemming from a March 20, 2011 injury he sustained while
working for Lou isiana Plastic Converting Corporation (“LPCC”). On October 5,
2011, respondent filed a disputed claim for compensation on Mr. Jo hnson’s behalf
with the Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”).
In March 2012, LPCC settled Mr. Johnson’s OWC claim for $1,500. On
March 20, 2012, Mr. Johnson signed the related receipt and release. On March 30,
2012, the OWC hearing officer signed the following: (1) an order approving the
$1,500 settlement; (2) an order approving respondent’s $300 fee; and (3) an order
dismissing Mr. Johnson’s claim against LPCC. On April 5, 2012, LPCC forwarded
the settlement check to respondent.
Mr. Johnson was inca rcerated and therefore did not attempt to obtain his
settlement proceeds until 2018. In July 2018, after not being able to contact
respondent, Mr. Johnson wrote to the OWC hearing officer seeking assistance. On

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July 9, 2019, LPCC’s counsel, attorney P. S cott Wolleson, provided the hearing
officer with a copy of the settlement check but was unable to provide an image of
the endorsement on the check because LPCC’s bank had already destroyed those
records.
Mr. Johnson also filed a disciplinary complaint aga inst respondent in July
2018. The ODC mailed respondent notice of the complaint, but he did not claim the
mail because he had not updated his address with the Louisiana State Bar
Association (“LSBA”).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In December 2018, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging
that his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional
Conduct: Rules 1.1(c) (failure to comply with annual professional obligations), 1.3
(a lawyer shall act w ith reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.15(a) (safekeeping property of
clients or third persons), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its
investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c)
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and
8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Respondent
answered the forma l charges, denying any misconduct. Accordingly, the matter
proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

Formal Hearing
The hearing committee conducted the hearing on November 25, 2019.
Respondent appeared via telephone and represented himself. Deputy Disciplinary
Counsel Tammy Pruet Northrup represented the ODC. The ODC introduced
documentary evidence and called two witnesses to testify before the committee.

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Respondent did not introduce any documentary evidence and did not call any
witnesses. He did, however, testify on his own behalf and on cross-examination by
the ODC.

P. SCOTT WOLLESON’S TESTIMONY
Mr. Wolleson testified that LPCC could not recover an image of the cancelled
check with endorsements from its bank because of the amount of time that had
passed. He was only able to send the hearing officer a copy of the front of the
settlement check and a copy of the April 5, 2012 transmittal letter to respondent.

ARTHUR JOHNSON’S TESTIMONY
Mr. Johnson testified that he did not receive a check for his portion of the
settlement proceeds on the day he signed the receipt and release. He never saw
LPCC’s settlement check made payable to himself and respondent; as such, he did
not endorse the back of the check. Soon after signing the receipt and release , Mr.
Johnson was sent to prison. By the time Mr. Johnson was released from prison,
respondent had closed his office, and Mr. Johnson was unable to obtain his
settlement proceeds. Therefore, he contacted the OWC and the ODC for help.
During a telephone conference call with the OWC hearing officer, Mr. Wolleson,
and respondent, respondent told Mr. Johnson that Mr. Johnson had received his
settlement proceeds. However, Mr. Johnson denied receiving any funds from
respondent.

R
ESPONDENT’S TESTIMONY
Respondent testified that he does not specifically remember receiving the
settlement check, but he is certain he did receive it. He also has no memory of
having Mr. Johnson endorse the settlement check or of giving Mr. Johnson a check

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for his portion of the proceeds. He indicated, however, that Mr. Johnson probably
signed a power of attorney to allow respondent to endorse the settlement check on
Mr. Johnson’s behalf.
Respondent further testified that he closed his office when he was interimly
suspended in 2014, and he discarded all of his records in the summer of 2017. As
such, the records for Mr. Johnson’s workers’ compensation matter were destroyed.
When he received the settlement check in 2012, his trust account was with Chase
Bank, but Chase Bank no longer has those records. Therefore, he has no records to
show he paid Mr. Johnson his portion of the settlement proceeds. Respondent also
testified that he did not receive notice of Mr. Johnson’s disciplinary complaint until
March or April of 2019 when he received a telephone call from the ODC asking for
his current address.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee found the following:
All witnesses appeared to attempt to testify truthfully. Most likely, respondent
did not give Mr. Johnson his portion of the settlement proceeds, but the records are
too old to prove this by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, the committee
could not determine what actually happened with the settlement funds paid by LPCC
and sent to respondent. However, the record does prove that respondent failed to
keep his contact information current with the LSBA, failed to act with reasonable
diligence and promptness while representing Mr. Johnson, an d failed to keep Mr.
Johnson reasonably informed about the status of his legal matter. The record does
not show any communication by respondent to Mr. Johnson about the settlement;
respondent destroyed Mr. Johnson’s file and has no recollections that woul d
contradict the allegations against him.

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Based on these findings, the committee determined respondent violated Rules
1.1(c), 1.3, and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, the committee
determined respondent did not violate Rules 1.15(a), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), or 8.4(d).
The committee then determined respondent violated duties owed to his client
and the legal system. He acted intentionally with respect to his failure to keep
records showing what happened to Mr. Johnson’s funds. He also acted intentionally
in failing to keep his contact information current with the LSBA. His conduct caused
harm to his client and caused the disciplinary process to become unnecessarily
burdensome. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is suspension.
In aggravation, the committee found a prior disciplinary record and multiple
offenses. According to the committee, the sole mitigating factor is respondent’s full
and free disclosure t o the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the committee determined that a suspension from the practice of law for
one year and one d ay is appropriate. However, noting that respondent is already
disbarred, the committee recommended that the time period in which he can apply
for readmission from his disbarment be extended by one year and one day.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s
report. Therefore, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G), the disciplinary
board submitted the committee’s report to the court for review.
1

1 As amended effective May 15, 2019, Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G) provides that “[i] f the
parties do not file objections to the hearing committee report, the board shall promptly submit the
hearing committee’s report to the court.”

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DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93 -2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.
The record of this matter definitely proves that respondent failed to update his
address with the LSBA as required, which resulted in his failure to respond to the
ODC’s notice of Mr. Johnson’s disciplinary complaint. The hearing committee also
made factual findings that respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness while representing Mr. Johnson and failed to keep Mr. Johnson
reasonably informed about the status of his legal matter. Based on these facts,
respondent has violated Rules 1.1(c), 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(c), and 8.4(a) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct as charged.
The committee could not, however, determine what actually happened with
the settlement funds paid by LPCC and sent to respondent because the records were
old and had already been destroyed by LPCC’s bank and by respondent and his bank.
Despite making a specific finding that respondent acted intentionally with respect to
his failure to keep records showing what happened to Mr. Johnson’s funds, the
committee, nonetheless, determined respondent did not violate Rules 1.15(a), 8.4(c),
or 8.4(d).
The fact that respondent destroyed his records is to his benefit and makes it
impossible for the ODC to meet its burden of proof with respect to the allegation

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that he failed to safeguard Mr. Johnson’s funds and forward same to Mr. Johnson.
We addressed a somewhat similar situation in Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Krasnoff,
488 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1986). In Krasnoff, an attorney failed to maintain a client trust
account, and there was no direct evidence that the attorney had used funds belonging
to his client for his personal use. However, we found that the Bar Association had
proven “by clear and convincing evidence or to a high probability” that the attorney
had converted the funds to his own use. We then established the following:
When an attorney relies upon a “black box” defense, viz.,
that he kept client funds secretly but securely in a private
safe or similar unregulated depository, the likelihood of
actual embezzlement is so great, and the policy of
professional responsibility in protecting the client from
such risks so strong, that it should be presumed that the
attorney is guilty of embezzlement unless he successfully
carries both the burden of going forward with the evidence
and the burden of persuasion otherwise.

As in Krasnoff, respondent in this matter failed to produce any evidence to overcome
a presumption of conversion. I n fact, the committee made a factual finding that
respondent destroyed Mr. Johnson’s file and has no recollections that would
contradict the allegations against him. Therefore, based on Krasnoff, we find
respondent failed to deliver the $1,200 due to Mr. Johnson, in vio lation of Rules
1.15(a) and 8.4(c).
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedin gs are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).

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Respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to his client
and the legal profession, causing actual harm. Based on the ABA’s Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the applicable baseline sanction in this matter is
suspension.
Aggravating factors include a prior disciplinary record, vulnerability of the
victim, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1986), and
indifference to making restitution. Mitigating factors include respondent’s full and
free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we note that the instant
misconduct occurred after the misconduct for which respondent was disbarred in
Broussard III. Therefore, additional discipline is warranted. We addressed a similar
situation in In re: Jones-Joseph, 15-1549 (La. 10/9/15), 181 So. 3d 651, and simply
extended the time period in which the disbarred attorney could apply for
readmission. We agre e with the committee that the same approach is appropriate
here.
In light of the above, we will adopt the committee’s recommendation and
extend the minimum time period in which respondent may seek readmission by one
year and one day.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee,
and considering the record, it is ordered that the minimum period within which
Francis C. Broussard, Louisiana Bar Roll number 17259, may seek readmission from
his disbarment in In re: Broussard , 16 -1441 (La. 1/25/17), 219 So. 3d 290, be
extended for a period of one year and one day. All costs and expenses in the matter
are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1,

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with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s
judgment until paid.