In Re: Joslyn Renee Alex

1
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #049
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 11th day of December, 2020 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2020-B-00916 IN RE: JOSLYN RENEE ALEX
DISCIPLINE IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.
Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., heard this case as Justice pro tempore,
sitting in the vacant seat for District 4 of the Supreme Court. He is now
appearing as an ad hoc for Justice Jay B. McCallum.
Crichton, J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.

12/11/20
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20
20-B-0916
I
N RE: JOSLYN RENEE ALEX
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
PER CURIAM*
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Joslyn Renee Alex, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
PRI
OR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review
respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of
law in Louisiana in 1988.
In 2003, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for thirteen
months, fully deferred, subject to a two-year period of supervised probation with
conditions. In re: Alex , 02-1289 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So. 2d 455 (“ Alex I”). The
misconduct at issue involved respondent’s failure to timely pay third-party medical
providers, as well as commingling and conversion of client and third- party funds,
arising out of the gross mismanagement of her law practice’s financial affairs.
In 2016, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year and
one day, with all but thirty days deferred, followed by a two-year period of
supervised probation with conditions. In re: Alex, 16-1020 (La. 11/15/16), 205 So.
* Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr. heard this case as Justice pro tempore , sitting in the vacant
seat for District 4 of the Supreme Court. He is now appearing as an ad hoc for Justice Jay B.
McCallum.

2

3d 895 (“ Alex II ”). The misc onduct at issue again involved respondent’s gross
mismanagement of her client trust account.
Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at
issue in the present proceeding.

UNDERLYING FACTS
In May 2011, Kyle Jordan and Riley Mouton were driver and passenger ,
respectively, in a vehicle involved in an automobile accident.1 Because respondent
had previously represented Mr. Jordan, he contacted her to represent both him and
Mr. Mouton as plaintiffs in a personal injury case.
Ultimately, respondent only took on the representation of Mr. Mouton. In
May 2012, respondent filed a lawsuit on Mr. Mouton’s behalf against Mr. Jordan
and other parties, including EAN Holdings, LLC (commonly known as Enterprise
Rent-A-Car). Attorney Donna Green, who is licensed to practice law in both
Louisiana and Mississippi, filed an answer to the lawsuit on behalf of Mr. Jordan
and EAN.
In addition to filing an answer on Mr. Jordan’s behalf, Ms. Green also filed
exceptions and propounded discovery on Mr. Jordan’s behalf. Respondent was sent
copies of all pleadings filed by Ms. Green on Mr. Jordan’s behalf as required by the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. On all such pleadings, Ms. Green was
unambiguously identified as Mr. Jordan’s counsel.
Furthermore, Ms. Green took Mr. Mouton’s deposition in respondent’s
presence at respondent’s office on October 5, 2015. During the deposition, Ms.
Green identified herself as counsel for defendants, and the deposition transcript
identifies Ms. Green as Mr. Jordan’s counsel. Respondent also communicated with

1 The accident occurred when another vehicle tried to enter Mr. Jordan’s lane and sideswiped his
vehicle. When he swerved away from the other vehicle, his vehicle flipped several times. The
other vehicle did not stop.

3

Ms. Green about a possible settlement of the case and e -mailed Ms. Green on
October 26, 2015 asking for available dates to depose Mr. Jordan.
In March 2016, based on Mr. Mouton’s deposition testimony, Ms. Green filed
a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Mr. Mouton’s claims against
Mr. Jordan and EAN. Pursuant to the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, Ms. Green
mailed to respondent a copy of the motion and accompanying memorandum, both
of which identified her as Mr. Jordan’s counsel. Nevertheless, respondent
communicated with Mr. Jordan and had him sign an affidavit on April 22, 2016
without Ms. Green’s knowledge or consent. Because the affidavit provided
information against Mr. Jordan’s interests, respondent included it as support for her
opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
When Ms. Green received a copy of respondent’s opposition, she confronted
respondent about communicating with Mr. Jordan without her knowledge or
consent. Respondent explained that she did not realize Mr. Jordan was represented
and indicated she would withdraw the opposition and affidavit. On May 26, 2016,
respondent filed a motion to strike her response to the motion for summary judgment
and a motion to withdraw as Mr. Mouton’s counsel.
On May 27, 2016, Ms. Green submitted a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. In her complaint, Ms. Green advised the ODC that (1) respondent
inappropriately communicated with and obtained an affidavit from Mr. Jordan while
he was represented by counsel, and (2) Mr. Jordan consulted with respondent about
representation related to the subject automobile accident prior to respondent filing a
lawsuit against him on Mr. Mouton’s behalf.
Thereafter, Ms. Green had the hearing on the motion for summary judgment
reset to June 27, 2016. On that date, she drove from her office in Hattiesburg,
Mississippi to the courthouse in Crowley, Louisiana for the hearing. Respondent
did not appear at the hearing, and all pending motions were continued to August 29,

4

2016. At that time, respondent was allowed to withdraw. On October 31, 2016, the
judge granted the motion for summary judgment.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In June 2017, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that
her conduct as set forth above violated the following provisions of the Rules of
Professional Conduct: Rules 1.18 (duties to prospective clients) and 4.2
(communication with persons represented by counsel). Respondent answered the
formal charges, first a rguing that an attorney -client relationship was never
established between Ms. Green and Mr. Jordan. Respondent then denied ever being
aware Mr. Jordan was represented by Ms. Green because he answered no when she
asked him if he had an attorney before gett ing him to sign the affidavit. When she
learned he did have an attorney, respondent immediately withdrew as Mr. Mouton’s
counsel so as not to prejudice the litigation with this error. In light of respondent’s
answer to the formal charges, the matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee made factual findings consistent with the underlying facts set
forth above. Based on these fac ts, the committee determined respondent violated
Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct but did not violate Rule 1.18.
Regarding Rule 4.2, the committee found respondent admitted to this
violation. Respondent also admitted that her justification f or communicating with
Mr. Jordan when he was represented by counsel has no basis in law or fact. In
addition to these admissions, the committee found that the un-contradicted evidence
proves respondent communicated with Mr. Jordan when she knew he was
represented by Ms. Green and without Ms. Green’s consent.

5

Regarding Rule 1.18, the committee found the evidence to be conflicting, but
after carefully considering all evidence, the committee found the ODC failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated her duty to Mr.
Jordan as a prospective client. According to Mr. Jordan, he told respondent the
details of the accident, and she never told him that she did not represent him.
However, according to respondent and Mr. Mouton, respondent told Mr. Jordan that
she could not represent him. They also agreed that Mr. Mouton never told
respondent the details of the accident.
The committee then determined that respondent knowingly and intentionally
violated duties owed to Ms. Green, the lega l system, and the legal profession.
According to the committee, respondent knew Ms. Green represented Mr. Jordan at
least by late 2015 when she asked Ms. Green for available dates to take Mr. Jordan’s
deposition. Because Mr. Jordan was represented, the only ethical way to elicit sworn
testimony from him was by deposing him. Instead, she contacted Mr. Jordan directly
to have him sign an affidavit, in clear violation of Rule 4.2. Respondent’s conduct
caused actual harm to Mr. Jordan and EAN by delaying th e granting of the motion
for summary judgment, requiring Ms. Green to appear an additional time in court,
and causing her clients to incur additional defense costs. After considering the
ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined the
baseline sanction is suspension. In aggravation, the committee noted only
respondent’s prior disciplinary record. In mitigation, the committee found a timely
good faith effort to rectify the consequences of the misconduct and remorse.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year, with six months deferred, followed by six months of
probation. The committee further r ecommended that, during the probationary

6

period, respondent reimburse the entity that paid Ms. Green’s fees incurred after
May 31, 2016.
Respondent filed an objection to the committee’s report, arguing that the
recommended sanction was too harsh.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board determined the hearing committee’s
factual findings are not manifestly erroneous and adopted same. Additionally, the
board found the following:
1. Mr. Jordan’s testimony that respondent represented him in a social security
matter when the accident occurred but that respondent transferred the social
security matter to attorney Jo Ann Nixon so respondent could represent him
in connection with the accident is not credible; respondent’s testimony that
she did not represent Mr. Jordan in connection with the social security matter
at any time is credible. Accordingly, Mr. Jordan was not respondent’s client
at the time she filed Mr. Mouton’s lawsuit against him;
2. Respondent represented Mr. Jordan in a past crim inal matter, but the
representation had ended prior to her filing Mr. Mouton’s lawsuit. The ODC
did not charge respondent with violating a duty owed to Mr. Jordan as a
former client, only as a prospective client;
3. After the accident, Mr. Jor dan approached respondent in the courthouse,
handed her a copy of the police report, and asked her to represent him as a
plaintiff in connection with the accident. Respondent told him she would
review the report and determine whether she would represent him. However,
when she reviewed the report, she determined Mr. Jordan was liable because
he overcorrected. Respondent, therefore, decided she would represent Mr.
Mouton as the plaintiff in a lawsuit against Mr. Jordan;

7

4. Mr. Jordan, Mr. Mouton, and responde nt never formally met to discuss how
the accident occurred. Instead, they briefly convened in respondent’s office
lobby, at which time respondent told Mr. Jordan she could not represent him,
and then took Mr. Mouton back to her office to discuss the accident;
5. Respondent did not discuss the details of the accident with Mr. Jordan before
filing the lawsuit and did not obtain any of the information contained in the
affidavit from Mr. Jordan. Moreover, when she called Mr. Jordan to ask him
to sign the affidav it, she only read it to him, and he agreed the information
contained therein was accurate; and
6. Respondent did not inform Mr. Jordan that the affidavit contained information
against his interest.
Based on these facts, the board agreed with the committee tha t respondent violated
Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct but did not violate Rule 1.18.
The board then determined respondent knowingly and intentionally violated
duties owed to Ms. Green, the legal system, and the legal profession. Her conduct
caused significant actual harm. The board agreed with the committee that the
baseline sanction is suspension. The board also agreed with the aggravating and
mitigating factors found by the committee. In additional aggravation, the board
found respondent has substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1988).
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct and finding that no portion of the suspension should be deferred in light
of the aggravating factors present and the seriousness of the misconduct, the board
recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Additionally, the board recommended respondent be required to reimburse the entity
responsible for paying the defense c osts incurred after May 31, 2016. One board
member dissented and would recommend imposing the sanction recommended by
the committee.

8

Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation,
asserting that the recommended sanction is too severe. Pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b), the case was set on our docket. Thereafter, the parties
agreed to waive oral argument and submit the matter on briefs; however, respondent
ultimately did not file a brief . Accordingly, we now consider the case based upon
the record and the brief filed by the ODC.

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
In this matter, respondent communicated with and obtained an affidavit
regarding the subject of ongoing litigation from a represented party without the
knowledge or consent of the party’s counsel. This is clearly a violation of Rule 4.2
of the Rules of Profession al Conduct as charged. However, we agree with the
hearing committee and the disciplinary board that the ODC did not prove a violation
of Rule 1.18 as Mr. Jordan never communicated the details of the accident to
respondent; instead, she used the police rep ort and Mr. Mouton’s statements and
deposition to draft the affidavit in question.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining

9

a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to the
opposing party, the legal system, and the legal profession. Her conduct caused actual
harm and had the potential to cause even more significant harm. The baseline
sanction is suspension. The record supports the aggravating and mitigating factors
found by the board.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we note that prior cases
addressing a Rule 4.2 violation also addressed other misconduct. For example, in In
re: DeBose-Parent, 03-2422 (La. 2/20/04), 869 So. 2d 80, an attorney communicated
with a person known to be represented by counsel, failed to timely pay a third-party
medical provider in a client’s personal injury case, and failed to properly maintain
her trust account; for this misconduct, we suspended the attorney from the practice
of law for six months, with all but two months of the suspension deferred, followed
by one year of probation with conditions. In In re: Williams-Bensaadat, 15-1535
(La. 11/6/15), 181 So. 3d 684, an attorney communicated with a party known to be
represented by counsel, mishandled a fee dispute, and filed a frivolous lawsuit
against her former client to recover her attorney’s fees; for this misconduct, we
suspended the attorney from the practice of law for one year, with six months
deferred, followed by two years of supervised probation with conditions. In In re:
Juakali, 97-1460 (La. 9/5/97), 699 So. 2d 361, an attorney improperly charged
curator fees to a party without court approval, directly contacted the party in an

10

attempt to collect the curator’s fees after the party retained counsel, delayed
resolution of the case, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation; for
this misconduct, we suspended the attorney from the practice of law for one year,
with six months deferred, followed by two years of probation with conditions.
Finally, in In re: Nguyen, 17-0214 (La. 4/13/17), 215 So. 3d 668, an attorney, while
admitted pro hac vice , inappropriately communicated with a criminal defendant
without the permission of the defendant’s counsel and failed to cooperate with the
ODC in its investigation; we held that the attorney was guilty of conduct warranting
a one-year suspension from the practice of law if he were a member of the Louisiana
bar and enjoined the attorney for a period of one year from seeking full admission
to the Louisiana bar or seeking admission to practice in Louisiana on any temporary
or limited basis.
Although the instant matter does not involve any misconduct other than the
Rule 4.2 violation, respondent’s conduct was extremely reckless, if not intentional,
and caused actual harm. Her actions in obtaining an affidavit from Mr. Jordan when
she could have just as easily obtained the same affidavit from her clie nt, or more
properly by deposing Mr. Jordan, borders on gross incompetence. This misconduct
coupled with the aggravating factors present justify the one -year suspension
recommended by the board.
Accordingly, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and suspend
respondent from the practice of law for one year. We will further order respondent
to reimburse the entity responsible for paying the defense costs incurred after May
31, 2016.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the record and the brief filed by the ODC, it

11

is ordered that Joslyn Renee Alex, Louisiana Bar Roll number 18760 , be and she
hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one year. It is further ordered that
respondent shall reimburse the entity responsible for paying the defense costs
incurred after May 31, 2016. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed
against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal
interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of th is court’s judgment
until paid.

12/11/20

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2020-B-00916

IN RE: JOSLYN RENEE ALEX

Attorney Disciplinary Proceeding

CRICHTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons:
I agree with the majority’s finding that respondent has violated Rule 4.2 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct, in that she communicated with and obtained an
affidavit concerning the subject of ongoing litigation from a represented party
without the knowledge or consent of the party’s counsel. However, I disagree with
the sanction imposed by the Court, as I find it too lenient given the circumstances of
respondent’s misconduct. Specifically, respondent has twice been previously
suspended by this Court for mismanagement of client funds and her law practice’s
financial affairs, and as a result, is no stranger to our lawyer disciplinary process.
See In re: Alex, 02-1289 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So.2d 455 and In re: Alex, 16-1020 (La.
11/15/16), 205 So.3d 895. Moreover, n otwithstanding her familiarity with said
process, respondent has chosen now to all but abandon any regard for her license to
practice law, noticea bly failing to file a brief on her behalf in this Court, despite
requesting an extension of time to do so. In my view, her history of careless office
practices, present violation of Rule 4.2, and such blatant unconcern for the
disciplinary process clearly demonstrate her indifference to the consequences of her
actions. As I have stated before, I find such apathy troubling . See , e.g., In re
Gaubert, 18 -1980 (La. 2/11/19), 263 So.3d 408 (Crichton, J. additionally
concurring, noting the troublesome nature of any attorney refusing to participate
meaningfully in disciplinary proceedings); In re: Reid, 18 -0849 (La. 12/5/18), –––
So.3d ––––, 2018 WL 6382109 (Crichton, J. dissenting, noting “lack of cooperation

with ODC, the Hearing Committee, the Disciplinary Board, and this Court
demonstrates [a] stunning indifference to this noble profession”); and In re: Klaila,
18-0093 (La. 3/23/18), 238 So.3d 949 (Crichton, J., additionally concurring,
emphasizing respondent's failure to cooperate warranted the suspension imposed) .
For these reasons, I would impose a suspension of one year and one day, with no
time deferred, thus requiring that respondent must apply f or readmission to the bar
pursuant to La. Sup. Ct. Rule XIX, § 24 (A), (B).