Clerk of Court For the Court In Re: Michael Brian Rennix

The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
Clerk of Court
For the Court
IN RE: MICHAEL BRIAN RENNIX
No.2020-B-00922
_ _ _ _ _ _
IN RE: Office of Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and
Recommendations (Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
November 04, 2020
Permanent disbarment imposed. See per curiam.
SJC
JLW
JDH
JTG
WJC
JHB
Johnson, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Supreme Court of Louisiana
November 04, 2020
IN RE: MICHAEL BRIAN RENNIX
No.2020-B-00922
11/04/2020 "See News Release 042 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

11/04/20
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
020-B-0922
I
N RE: MICHAEL BRIAN RENNIX
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
Th
is disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Michael Brian Rennix, an
attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension
for threat of harm to the public. In re: Rennix, 16-1965 (La. 11/18/16), 206 So. 3d
860.
FO
RMAL CHARGES
16-DB-087
The Bankruptcy Court 90-day Suspension Matter
On September 26, 2016, Judge Jeffrey P. Norman of the United States
Bankruptcy Court, Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division (“bankruptcy
court”), held a hearing based on alleged misconduct by respondent in various
bankruptcy cases. Following the hearing, Judge Norman specifically found the
following:
1. Respondent misappropriated estate funds totaling $11,725.29 and converted
said funds to his personal use
;
2. R
espondent routinely failed to disclose payments received from clients as
required by the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules;
3. Respondent forged documents;

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4. Respondent fraudulently filed documents containing his client’s electronic
signature without authorization;
5. Respondent consistently failed to maintain or use a client tr ust account even
though he was accepting funds from clients that should have been deposited
into a trust account;
1
6. Respondent routinely failed to communicate with his clients;
7. Respondent was often delinquent in completing work, including missing
important deadlines, which was extremely detrimental to his clients; and
8. Respondent failed to comply with the bankruptcy court’s discovery orders and
continues to be in violation of those orders.
Based on the above findings, Judge Norman issued a Memorandum Opinion
dated October 4, 2016, wherein he ordered respondent suspended from the practice
of bankruptcy law in the Western District of Louisiana for a period of ninety days
(the maximum period the bankruptcy court is authorized to suspend an attorney).
The order was effective immediately and ended on February 6, 2017.
Believing additional attorney discipline was appropriate, Judge Norman
referred respondent to Chief United States District Court Judge Dee D. Drell for
initiation of attorney discipline proceedings in federal court. He also referred the
matter to the ODC, which received the Memorandum Opinion and Referral for
Attorney Discipline on October 12, 2016.

1 Specifically, Judge Norman found that respondent has failed to maintain a trust account since
September 2013 even though he was accepting funds from clients that should have been deposited
into a trust account, in violation of Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Judge Norman
also found that, when respondent did have a trust account, he did not maintain it in accordance
with Rule 1.15 because he made numerous improper disbursements from the account, including
checks for payroll, to his ex-wife, for health insurance, and to his child’s school.

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The Parker Matter
Billy Parker filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on March 31, 2011. His
Chapter 13 plan was confirmed on June 28, 2011. Both the confirmed plan and the
confirmation order provided that the “debtor shall remit to the Chapter 13 Trustee
50% of the net recovery from all personal injury and litigious claims” because Mr.
Parker had been involved in an automobile accident prior to the filing of his Chapter
13 case and any potential recovery constituted property of the estate.
On March 3, 2013, Mr. Parker filed an Application to Approve Compromise
in order to obtain court approval of the settlement of that automobile accident claim.
Mr. Parker had settled the claim for $77,500. On April 8, 2013, the bankruptcy court
approved the proposed settlement. Under the terms of the settlement, attorney’s
fees, fees for costs of litigation, and medical expenses were approved in the amount
of $54,049.43. Pursuant to the order approving the compromise and the confirmed
plan, the balance of $23,450.57 was to be equally divided between Mr. Parker and
the Chapter 13 Trustee, who would disburse her portion to creditors pursuant to the
confirmed plan.
Funds totaling $11,725.29 should have been remitted to the Trustee for
distribution under the plan. However, those funds were never remitted to the
Trustee. Therefore, on April 18, 2016, the Trustee filed a Motion to Dismiss based
on not receiving the funds. The motion to dismiss was originally scheduled for May
18, 2016 but was continued several times. At each scheduled hearing, respondent
and the Trustee or a representative from the Trustee’s office appeared. On May 18,
2016, the hearing was continued to June 8, 2016 to determine what happened to the
settlement funds. At the June 8 hearing, the parties informed the bankruptcy court
that the check had been sent to respondent, but it was still unclear what ultimately
happened to the funds. The bankruptcy court continued the matter to June 15, 2016.
During the June 15, 2016 hearing, respondent informed the bankruptcy court that

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two checks were sent as a result of the settlement – one directly to Mr. Parker and
one to him. Respondent indicated he endorsed the check and instructed his then-
paralegal to mail it to the Trustee. After researching the matter, respondent stated
he believed his former paralegal had stolen the check. When the bankruptcy court
indicated respondent was obligated to refer the matter to the U.S. Trustee’s Office
and to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, respondent committed to cooperate with any
investigation.
Thereafter, the Trustee engaged in discovery to determine the chain of
possession of the missing estate funds. The Trustee requested a Bankruptcy Rule
2004 Examination of respondent, as well as an order requiring respondent to produce
certain documents. Respondent failed to cooperate with the Trustee’s discovery
requests despite the fact that the bankruptcy court granted several motions to compel.
The Trustee filed a Motion for Sanctions, and this matter became part of the
hearing conducted by Judge Norman on September 26, 2016, w hich resulted in
respondent’s ninety-day suspension. At the hearing, Judge Norman received
evidence indicating that respondent deposited the check for the estate funds into his
personal checking account, converting same to his personal use. The evidence
further showed that respondent made said deposit on May 22, 2013, long before he
informed the bankruptcy court he believed his former paralegal had stolen the
endorsed check.
Also during the September 26, 2016 hearing, Chelsea Grissom, the local
branch operations manager of MidSouth Bank, testified. Judge N orman found her
to be a credible witness. Ms. Grissom authenticated a copy of check number 59215,
made payable to respondent in the amount of $12,225.29. Said check and
accompanying correspondence to respondent reflected that $500 of the check
represented the legal fee for respondent approved by the bankruptcy court on April
8, 2013. Ms. Grissom testified that, according to MidSouth Bank’s records, the

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check had been cashed on May 23, 2013 and deposited into an account at
BancorpSouth Bank.
Ellen Keller, the office manager for the Chapter 13 Trustee, also testified at
the September 26, 2016 hearing. Judge Norman found her to be a credible witness.
Ms. Keller testified regarding her knowledge of respondent’s financial situation.
According to Ms. Keller, the Trustee’s office received various federal tax liens filed
against respondent’s law firm during 2012 and 2013, which included the time period
in which respondent converted the Parker estate funds to his personal use. These tax
liens resulted in the T rustee’s office paying two checks to the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) representing funds due to respondent for legal fees he had earned
and been awarded by the bankruptcy court in Chapter 13 cases. The first check was
for $10,276.13 and was paid to the IRS on January 7, 2013. The second check was
for $10,475.10 and was paid to the IRS on February 8, 2013.
Respondent also testified at the September 26, 2016 hearing. Judge Norman
found respondent not credible because his testimony was inconsistent with his prior
statements to the bankruptcy court. Judge Norman found that respondent’s prior
assertions and allegations regarding employee theft were pure fabrications and that
respondent provided no defense. Finally, Judge Norman found that respondent
failed to comply with the orders compelling production in the Parker case.
Judge Norman referred the matter of the missing estate funds to the United
States Attorney’s Office because the bankruptcy court did not have criminal
jurisdiction and respondent may have committed a bankruptcy crime in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 152(1). This statute provides for criminal penalties for a person who
“knowingly and fraudulently conceals from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or other
officer of the court charged with control or custody of property, or, in connection
with a case under title 11, from creditors or the United States trustee, any property
belonging to the estate of a debtor.”

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In his Memorandum Opinion dated October 4, 2016, Judge Norman noted: (1)
the Chapter 13 Trustee is an officer of the court charged with the control or custody
of property belonging to the estate of the debtor; (2) the pre-petition cause of action
held by the debtor, from which the settlement funds were derived, is property of the
estate; and (3) respondent knowingly and fraudulently concealed estate funds from
the Trustee.

The Peyton Matter
Orlando Peyton filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on February 8, 2016. The
Chapter 13 plan was never confirmed. On August 16, 2016, respondent filed an Ex
Parte Motion to Dismiss Mr. Peyton’s case. That same day, the bankruptcy court
learned respondent had been ineligible to practice law since June 3, 2016 for failing
to comply with mandatory continuing legal education (“MCLE”) requirements.
2
The bankruptcy court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered respondent to appear
and show cause because he continued to practice law in the bankruptcy court for a
period of 76 days while he was ineligible to do so. During the hearing, the Chapter
13 Trustee introduced records indicating respondent had filed 24 bankruptcy cases
while he was ineligible to practice law.
Following the hearing, the bankruptcy court found respondent’s testimony
that he did not know he was ineligible to practice to not be credible. Furthermore,
the bankruptcy court found that respondent willfully and intentionally failed to
notify it, the Trustee, and his clients of his ineligibility.
On August 25, 2016, the bankruptcy court suspended respondent from the
practice of law in the Western District of Louisiana for 76 days, the same number of
days he continued to practice in the bankruptcy court while ineligible to do so. The

2 Respondent rectified his MCLE issue, and his eligibility was reinstated on August 18, 2016.

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bankruptcy court also ordered the Trustee to suspend attorney’s fees disbursements
to respondent pending further orders of the bankruptcy court. Noting that respondent
received payments for legal services he was not legally entitled to receive, the
bankruptcy court additionally ordered said fees received by respondent during his
period of ineligibility to be disgorged.

The Alford Matter
Respondent represented Barbara Alford as a debtor in a bankruptcy case. On
August 17, 2016, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on a plan modification in Ms.
Alford’s case. Respondent did not appear at the hearing, but Ms. Alford did appear
and testified. The bankruptcy court specifically asked Ms. Alford whether
respondent informed her he was ineligible to practice law, and she indicated he had
not. Ms. Alford also provided the bankruptcy court with a copy of text messages
she received from respondent, in which he advised her not to attend the hearing. The
bankruptcy court specifically found respondent’s advice to Ms. Alford to not attend
the hearing to be misconduct. The bankruptcy court also found that respondent took
action in the case while ineligible to practice law.

The Rennix, et al. Matter
Shortly after the bankruptcy court issued the order suspending respondent for
76 days, which is the subject of the Peyton Matter above, the bankruptcy court began
receiving correspondence from some of respondent’s clients. The bankruptcy court
initiated a miscellaneous proceeding, and each correspondence was docketed.
The first piece of correspondence was from a client who hired respondent to
initiate a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on her beh alf because her husband had abandoned
her and she had numerous garnishments being drafted from her payroll check. The
client paid respondent $750, which she borrowed from her mother, on June 15, 2016.

8

That same day, she brought respondent all required documentation needed to file her
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Respondent deposited the client’s check on June 23, 2016,
but he never filed the bankruptcy case even though he repeatedly told the client he
would do so. Eventually, the client was unable to contact respondent. Garnishments
were still being withdrawn from her paycheck and she had been sued by one of her
creditors when she sent the correspondence to the bankruptcy court.

The Gobert Matter
Karen Gobert hired respondent on September 28, 2015 to file a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case on her behalf, paying him $1,500. More than nine months later, on
July 8, 2016, while he was ineligible to practice law, respondent filed Ms. Gobert’s
bankruptcy case. When the bankruptcy court learned respondent was ineligible to
practice law when he accepted the legal fees from Ms. Gobert, it entered an Order
Regarding Suspension of Attorney Michael B. Rennix into the proceeding.
The bankruptcy court then set a hearing to determine whether respondent had
complied with the disgorgement order, and this matter became a part of the hearing
conducted by Judge Norman on September 26, 2016, which resulted in respondent’s
ninety-day suspension. Based on evidence presented at the hearing, Judge Norman
made the following findings specifically regarding the Gobert case:
1. Respondent did not have a client trust account into which he could deposit the
funds Ms. Gobert paid him;
2. Ms. Gobert completed her required credit counseling class on October 14,
2015. Credit counseling is a prerequisite t o the filing of a consumer
bankruptcy case. On October 14, 2015, Ms. Gobert completed and
transmitted to respondent all documents to begin work on her bankruptcy
case, yet respondent took no action for nine months;

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3. Ms. Gobert e-mailed and telephoned respondent on numerous occasions but
received no response;
4. Respondent filed a “Skeleton Petition” of only eleven pages and forged Ms.
Gobert’s signature on the documents filed. Ms. Gobert testified she never
signed the petition;
5. Ms. Gobert’s credit counseling certificate expired before respondent filed her
bankruptcy case. Realizing the certificate had expired, respondent
fraudulently generated a new credit counseling certificate for Ms. Gobert
dated July 8, 2016; and
6. Respondent forged a client contract and presented it to the Chapter 13 Trustee.
Ms. Gobert testified she never signed the client contract presented to the
Trustee. Furthermore, the letterhead on the contract respondent presented to
the Trustee showed an address for respondent to which he had not yet moved
at the time the contract was purportedly executed.
Following the September 26, 2016 hearing, Judge Norman noted in his
October 4, 2016 Memorandum Opinion that respondent had failed to disgorge Ms.
Gobert’s funds as previously ordered. In the same Memorandum Opinion, Judge
Norman noted that Ms. Gobert’s experience with respondent was not isolated. Judge
Norman had seen at least fifty cases with respondent involving similar issues. These
issues included: (1) debtor payments to respondent but undisclosed to the bankruptcy
court; (2) signatory irregularities on debtors’ schedules filed by respondent; (3) no
trust accounting and/or the lack of a trust account by respondent; (4) a lack of
communication with clients by respondent; and (5) unnecessary delays by
respondent in providing legal services to his clients.

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The White Matter
Helen White hired r espondent to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on her
behalf. She paid him a total of $1,331, which included a payment of $331 on July
16, 2014, a payment of $500 on September 21, 2015, and a final payment of $500
on December 8, 2015. Respondent never disclosed these payments to the bankruptcy
court and filed a disclosure statement showing Ms. White had not paid him anything.
Respondent also filed an Application to Pay Filing Fee in Installments even though
Ms. White had already paid him the entire filing fee. Respondent filed Ms. White’s
Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on January 16, 2015, but her plan has not yet be en
confirmed.
On June 22, 2016, the bankruptcy court entered an order requiring respondent
to appear to answer Ms. White’s allegations of attorney negligence and misconduct.
Ms. White alleged the following: (1) respondent failed to timely file a motion t o
approve a home loan modification; (2) respondent failed to timely file a motion
concerning the disposition of insurance proceeds from an accident involving Ms.
White; (3) respondent failed to communicate with her; and (4) respondent may have
filed an incorrect disclosure of attorney compensation pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
2016(b) because he filed a disclosure of attorney compensation form indicating he
received no attorney’s fees from Ms. White. Ms. White testified that she paid
respondent as much as $1,000 prior to the filing of her bankruptcy case.
The bankruptcy court issued a preliminary show cause hearing to be held July
28, 2016 to determine whether it should impose sanctions against respondent for his
conduct in Ms. White’s case and a final show cause hearing to be held September
26, 2016. Ms. White testified at both hearings.
During the July 28, 2016 hearing, the bankruptcy court required respondent
to present documents with original signatures to the Chapter 13 Trustee because
there were allegations that he did not acquire or maintain documents with original

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signatures as required by the bankruptcy court’s administrative rules. The
bankruptcy court continued the hearing in order for respondent to produce these
documents. At the continued hearing, the bankruptcy court issued an interim order
finding that respondent had violated its administrative rules, which require the
attorney of record or the party filing any documents in a bankruptcy case to maintain
the original signed documents for at le ast five years after the case is closed. The
administrative rules also provide that, upon request, the original documents must be
provided to other parties or the bankruptcy court for review. The bankruptcy court
found that respondent repeatedly violated the administrative rules because he did not
produce any original signed documents as ordered.
This matter eventually became a part of the hearing conducted by Judge
Norman on September 26, 2016, w hich resulted in respondent’s ninety -day
suspension. In Judge Norman’s Memorandum Opinion dated October 4, 2016, he
found the following with respect to Ms. White’s case:
1. The Application to Pay Filing Fee in Installments purportedly signed by Ms.
White was not signed by her. Ms. White testified she did not sign the
document, and it was respondent’s long term practice to electronically sign
his client’s signatures to documents without his client’s permission;
2. The Chapter 13 Trustee demonstrated respondent’s long term practice by
identifying seventeen additional b ankruptcy cases with the same or similar
fact patterns as Ms. White’s case. In each case, respondent either failed to
pay the filing fee, and the case was dismissed, or he filed an application to pay
the filing fee in installments even though his client had already paid the filing
fee. In each of these cases, respondent forged his client’s signature. In most
of these cases, respondent also failed to disclose that he had ever received any
payment from the debtor. Respondent did disclose his client’s paym ents of

12

the filing fee in three of the seventeen cases, but he still fraudulently filed an
application to pay the filing fee in installments;
3. Respondent failed to communicate with Ms. White and failed to diligently
represent her in her bankruptcy case. He failed to file a motion to approve a
home loan modification, failed to write a letter of consent giving the mortgage
company permission to speak directly to Ms. White, and failed to file the
necessary motion to address $11,633.67 in insurance proceeds for a vehicle
destroyed by flood.
In his Memorandum Opinion, Judge Norman ordered that respondent
disgorge the $1,331 paid to him by Ms. White. Judge Norman also ordered that,
given the overwhelming evidence of signature manipulation and forgery committed
by respondent, no documents could be filed by respondent with electronic signatures
in the Western District of Louisiana, and he ordered the clerk of court for the
Western District of Louisiana to strike any document filed by respondent with
electronic signatures. Judge Norman also noted that respondent’s representation of
debtors fell below the standard of care required for lawyers as the bankruptcy court
primarily deals with consumer bankruptcy debtors who are often economically
challenged, undereducated, and unsophisticated.

The McGilvray Matter
On October 25, 2016, the ODC received a telephone call from Carol
McGilvray, a retired bankruptcy attorney currently working at a non- profit
organization associated with Northwestern State University. Ms. Mc Gilvray
reported to the ODC that several boxes of respondent’s files were found in a
dumpster near her office. When asked to review a few files from the boxes and upon
realizing said files related to active bankruptcy cases, Ms. McGilvray contacted the

13

ODC. She also attempted to retrieve all files contained in the boxes seen in the
dumpster, but the dumpster had already been emptied.

The Failure to Cooperate Matter
James Smith filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent, alleging that
he paid resp ondent $1,250, but respondent failed to file his bankruptcy case or
communicate with him. Respondent accepted notice of the complaint but failed to
file a written response. The ODC scheduled respondent’s sworn statement for June
23, 2016 and issued a subpoena on May 16, 2016. The Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office
attempted to serve respondent with the subpoena at his primary registration address.
However, on May 20, 20 16, the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s O ffice returned the
subpoena, indicating respondent had relocated to Bossier City. The ODC
rescheduled respondent’s sworn statement for August 24, 2016 and issued a
subpoena on July 13, 2016. The Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office returned the
subpoena on July 18, 2016, indicating respondent was personally served a t his last
known address. Respondent failed to appear for his sworn statement.
Respondent has since been uncooperative with the ODC’s investigations. It
appears he has abandoned his law practice. The ODC’s efforts to reach him by
telephone have been un successful. The ODC has also attempted to contact
respondent at the primary and secondary addresses he has registered with the
Louisiana State Bar Association (“LSBA”), as well as the last known address of
respondent’s law office. Additionally, the ODC has attempted to e-mail respondent
at the e-mail address he has registered with the LSBA. All attempts by the ODC to
contact and communicate with respondent have been unsuccessful.

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Alleged Rule Violations
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the aforementioned matters
violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3
(failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4
(failure to communicate with a client), 1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.15(a)(c)
(safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 3.3(a)(1) (candor toward the
tribunal), 5.5(a)(b)(2) (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(c) (failure
to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c) (engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d)
(engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

17-DB-043
The Miller Matter
On October 27, 2015, Dr. Kenneth Miller and Janet Miller hired respondent
to file a bankruptcy case on their behalf, paying him $2,500. According to the
Millers, respondent never filed their bankruptcy case, and they have been unable to
reach him. In August 2016, the Millers visited respondent’s office and found a note
on the door indicating the office was closed because respondent was ill. On August
30, 2016, they learned respondent’s telephone number was disconnected.
In November 2016, the Millers filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. The ODC sent notice of the complain t to respondent at his LSBA
primary registration address, his LSBA secondary registration address, and his last
known address. All notices were returned by the post office.

15

The bankruptcy court indicated that respondent moved to South Carolina and
provided the ODC with respondent’s cell phone number. However, the ODC’s
attempts to reach respondent by telephone and mail have been unsuccessful.

The Wallace Matter
On June 13, 2016, Bobbi Wallace hired respondent to handle his divorce,
paying him a total of $850 in three installments. Mr. Wallace’s wife did not contest
the divorce and went to respondent’s office to sign a waiver. Thereafter, respondent
informed Mr. Wallace he would be filing the necessary pleadings to finalize the
divorce, but he never did so. According to Mr. Wallace, he has attempted to contact
respondent since December 19, 2016 but has been unsuccessful.
In late December 2016, Mr. Wallace filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respo ndent at his LSBA
primary registration address and his LSBA secondary registration address. Both
notices were returned by the post office.
The bankruptcy court indicated that respondent moved to South Carolina and
provided the ODC with respondent’s cell phone number. However, the ODC’s
attempts to reach respondent by telephone and mail have been unsuccessful.

The Rollins Matter
On July 10, 2015, Monica Rollins hired respondent to file a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case on her behalf, paying him $1,500. Accor ding to Ms. Rollins,
respondent filed her bankruptcy case, but the case was dismissed because respondent
did not file all required documents. Ms. Rollins indicated that respondent told her
he would refile the bankruptcy case at his expense, but he never d id so. She also
had difficulty communicating with him.

16

In late December 2016, Ms. Rollins filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent at his LSBA
primary registration address and his LSBA seconda ry registration address. Both
notices were returned by the post office.
The bankruptcy court indicated that respondent moved to South Carolina and
provided the ODC with respondent’s cell phone number. However, the ODC’s
attempts to reach respondent by telephone and mail have been unsuccessful.

The Paul Matter
In January 2016, Richard Paul paid respondent $1,750 to file a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case on his behalf. According to Mr. Paul, respondent falsely informed
him he had filed the bankruptcy case around January 11, 2016. Mr. Paul also
claimed that he has been unable to reach respondent and that his wages are now
being garnished.
In early March 2017, Mr. Paul filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent at his LSBA
primary registration address, but the notice was returned by the post office.
The bankruptcy court indicated that respondent moved to South Carolina and
provided the ODC with respondent’s cell phone number. However, the ODC’s
attempts to reach respondent by telephone and mail have been unsuccessful.

Alleged Rule Violations
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the aforementioned matters
violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3,
1.4, 1.5, 1.15(a)(c), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).

17

17-DB-054
The Roppolo Matter
In February 2016, Peggy Roppolo paid respondent $400 to transfer ownership
of her and her husband’s house into her name. According to Ms. Roppolo,
respondent failed to perform the work and failed to communicate with her.
In late August 2016, Ms. Roppolo filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent at his LSBA
primary registration ad dress, but the notice was returned by the post office. The
ODC also sent notice to respondent’s last known address. Although this notice was
delivered to the front desk on September 12, 2016, respondent failed to respond.

The Maxwell Matter
In June 201 6, Kimberly Maxwell hired respondent to file a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case on her behalf to stop the garnishment of her wages. Ms. Maxwell
paid $750 towards the $1,500 fee. According to Ms. Maxwell, the remainder of the
fee was not due until the garnishment ceased. Respondent never filed her bankruptcy
case.
In early September 2016, Ms. Maxwell filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent at his LSBA
primary registration address and his last known address. Both notices were returned
by the post office.

The Neal Matter
In March 2015, Annie Neal hired respondent to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
case on her behalf, paying him $1,700. According to Ms. Neal, her bankruptcy case
was never filed, and she routinely tried to communicate with respondent, to no avail.
At one point, Ms. Neal sent her daughter to respondent’s office because she could

18

not reach him by telephone, and her daughter informed her that respondent’s office
was vacant.
In September 20 16, Ms. Neal filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent at his LSBA
primary registration address and his last known address. Both notices were returned
by the post office.

The de Pingre Matter
Ben de Pingre hired respondent to respond to a lawsuit against a former
business that Mr. de Pingre owned. According to Mr. de Pingre, he paid respondent
$2,200, but the legal work was not performed. Mr. de Pingre also indicated that
respondent failed to respond to his telephone calls, text messages, e -mails, and
letters.
In September 2016, Mr. de Pingre filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. Despite receiving notice of the complaint at his last known address,
respondent failed to respond.

The Roby Matter
In February 2016, Roston Roby hired respondent to file a bankruptcy case on
his behalf, paying him $320. According to Mr. Roby, respondent informed Mr.
Roby that he had filed the bankruptcy case when, in fact, he did not do so. Mr. Roby
learned that nothing had been filed on his behalf when he checked at the courthouse
on September 21, 2016.
In late September 2016, Mr. Roby filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent at his LSBA
primary registration address, his LSBA secondary registration address, and his last
known address. All three notices were returned by the post office.

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The Player Matter
In July 2016, Kynshana Player hired respondent to file a Chapter 13
bankruptcy case o n her behalf, paying him $325. According to Ms. Player,
respondent never filed the bankruptcy case, and when she contacted him via e-mail
to request a refund, he never replied.
In October 2016, Ms. Player filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent.
The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent at his LSBA primary
registration address, his LSBA secondary registration address, and his last known
address. All three notices were returned by the post office.

The Abandonment of Law Practice Matter
On information and belief, respondent has abandoned his law practice. The
ODC’s efforts to reach him by telephone and mail have been unsuccessful. Thus
far, respondent has been uncooperative throughout each of the aforementioned ODC
investigations. The ODC has also attempted to contact respondent at his primary
and secondary addresses registered with the LSBA, as well as at the last known
address of his law office. Additionally, the ODC has attempted to e-mail respondent
at his e-mail address registered with the LSBA. All attempts by the ODC to contact
and communicate with respondent have been unsuccessful.

Alleged Rule Violations
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct in the aforementioned matters
violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3,
1.4, 1.5(f) (failure to account for or refund an unearned fee), 1.15(a)(c), 8.1(c),
8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).

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17-DB-065
The Brown Matter
In April 2016, Teresa Brown hired respondent to file a bankruptcy case on her
behalf, paying him $1,371. According to Ms. Brown, respondent failed to file the
bankruptcy case. Ms. Brown sent several e -mails to respondent in an attempt to
reach him to finalize her bankruptcy pleadings. The bankruptcy trustee obtained an
order from the bankruptcy court ordering respondent to disgorge the entire fee he
collected from Ms. Brown.
In August 2017, Ms. Brown filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent.
The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent at his LSBA primary
registration address, his LSBA secondary registration address, and his last known
address. The notices to respondent’s primary and secondary addresses were returned
by the post office. The notice to respondent’s last known address was signed for on
August 28, 2017.
After being placed on interim suspension, r espondent essentially abandoned
his law practice. The ODC’s efforts to reach him by telephone and mail have been
unsuccessful. The bankruptcy court indicated that respondent moved to South
Carolina and provided the ODC with respondent’s cell phone number. The ODC
has been unable to reach respondent by calling his cell phone but has left messages
for him.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(b),
8.4(c), and 8.4(d).

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18-DB-036
The Scully Matter
In November 2015, Thomas Scully hired respondent to file a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case on his behalf, paying respondent $1,750. According to Mr. Scully,
respondent failed to file the bankruptcy case. On June 10, 2017, the bankruptcy
court ordered respondent to disgorge the fee paid by Mr. Scully.
Mr. Scully filed a claim with the LSBA’s Client Assistance Fund. In October
2017, Mr. Scully also filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. The ODC
sent notice of the complaint to respondent at his LSBA primary registration address,
his LSBA secondary registration address, and his last known address. The no tices
to respondent’s primary and secondary addresses were returned by the post office.
Respondent signed for the notice sent to his last known address on December 4,
2017.
After being placed on interim suspension, r espondent essentially abandoned
his law practice. The ODC’s efforts to reach him by telephone and mail have been
unsuccessful. The bankruptcy court indicated that respondent moved to South
Carolina and provided the ODC with respondent’s cell phone number. The ODC
has been unable to reach respondent by calling his cell phone but has left messages
for him.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and
8.4(d).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In November 2016, the ODC filed the formal charges in 16-DB-087. In July
2017, the ODC filed the formal charges in 17-DB-043. In September 2017, the ODC
filed the formal charges in 17-DB-054. In November 2017, the ODC filed the formal

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charges in 17-DB-065. Finally, in May 2018, the ODC filed the formal charges in
18-DB-036.
Respondent failed to answer all five sets of formal charges. Accordingly, the
factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and
convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). The matters
were then consolidated for consideration by one hearing committee. No formal
hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the committee
written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent
filed nothing for the committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission encompassing all
five matters, the hearing committee found that respondent neither responded to any
of the five sets of formal charges in this matter nor appeared for the sworn statement
scheduled for August 24, 2016. The committee also found that the record is replete
with evidence of respondent accepting payments for legal services not rendered,
misrepresenting to his clients that he had rendered the legal services for which he
was hired, and failing to communicate with clients. The committee further found
specific evidence of a conversion of $11,725.29 in the Parker matter, which
respondent misrepresented to the bankruptcy court had been stolen. Respondent
then failed to cooperate with the Trustee’s investigation when the bankruptcy court
received evidence indicating he deposited the funds into his personal checking
account, converting same to his personal use. Additionally, the committee found
specific evidence that respondent forged Ms. Gobert’s signature and fraudulently
generated a new credit counseling certificate for her. Respondent also practiced law
for 76 days while he was ineligible to do so, for which the bankruptcy court
suspended him for 76 days. Based on these facts, the committee determined

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respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 3.3, 5.5, 8.1(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c),
and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The committee then determined respondent knowingly and intentionally
violated duties owed to his clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal
profession, causing actual harm. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.
In aggravation, the committee found the following: a dishonest or selfish
motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders
of the disciplinary agency, and vulnerability of the victims. The committee found
no mitigating factors present.
After considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be permanently disbarred.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s
report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary bo ard first noted that the formal charges have
been deemed admitted and proven. The board then determined the hearing
committee’s factual findings are not manifestly erroneous and adopted same with
one clarification. The board acknowledged the committee’s finding that the
bankruptcy court suspended respondent for 76 days for practicing law while
ineligible but added that the bankruptcy court later suspended respondent for ninety
days based on Judge Norman’s findings in his October 4, 2016 Memorandum
Opinion and Referral for Attorney Discipline.
Based on those facts, the board adopted the committee’s legal conclusions
regarding respondent’s violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The board

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also made additional findings with respect to respondent’s violations of Rules 8.4(a),
8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). Specifically, the board found that respondent converted
Mr. Parker’s funds by keeping his settlement funds from a personal injury claim and
converted other client funds by accepting fees, providing no legal work, and failing
to refund the fees; respondent’s conversion of these funds is a criminal act in
violation of Rule 8.4(b). Regarding Rule 8.4(c), the board found that respondent
engaged in dishonest conduct when he converted client funds, made
misrepresentations to the bankruptcy court concerning the whereabouts of Mr.
Parker’s settlement funds, practiced law while ineligible, forged clients’ signatures,
manipulated clients’ electronic signatures, created a false credit counseling
certificate, failed to disclose correct fee payment information, collected improper
fees, and misled his clients about the status of their legal matters. The board found
that respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) by practicing law while ineligible, abandoning
his law practice without notice, failing to cooperate with the ODC in its
investigations, making misrepresentations to the bankruptcy court, and failing to
comply with the bankruptcy court’s numerous orders to disgorge fees. Finally, the
board found that by violating the other Rules of Professional Conduct, respondent
also violated Rule 8.4(a).
The board then determined respondent knowingly and intentionally violated
duties owed to his clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession,
causing significant actual harm. The board a greed with the committee that the
baseline sanction is disbarment.
In aggravation, the board found the presence of a dishonest or selfish motive,
a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the
disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct,
vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted

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1997), and indifference to making r estitution. In mitigation, the board found the
absence of a prior disciplinary record and the imposition of other penalties or
sanctions.
After further considering respondent’s conduct in light of this court’s prior
jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct as well as the permanent disbarment
guidelines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix D, the board
recommended respondent be permanently disbarred. The board further
recommended respondent be ordered to make restitution as follows: (1) $1,500 to
Karen Gobert; (2) $1,250 to James Smith; (3) $11,725.29 to the Chapter 13 Trustee
in Billy Parker’s bankruptcy case; (4) $1,331 to Helen White; (5) $2,500 to the
Millers; (6) $850 to Bobbi Wallace; (7) $1,500 to Monica Rollins; (8) $1,750 to
Richard Paul; (9) $400 to Peggy Roppolo; (10) $750 to Kimberly Maxwell; (11)
$1,700 to Annie Neal; (12) $2,200 to Ben de Pingre; (13) $320 to Roston Roby; (14)
$325 to Kynshana Player; (15) $1,371 to Teresa Brown; and (16) $1,750 to Thomas
Scully or the Client Assistance Fund, as applicable.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s
recommendation.

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57.
In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual
allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supr eme Court Rule XIX, §
11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations

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contained in the formal charges after those cha rges have been deemed admitted.
However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow
from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a
violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts,
additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions
that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan , 01 -3058 (La.
1/10/03), 838 So. 2d 715.
The records of these five deemed admitted m atters support a finding that
respondent neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients, failed to
refund unearned fees, converted client funds, practiced law while ineligible to do so,
engaged in dishonest conduct, and failed to cooperate wit h the ODC in its
investigations. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct as charged.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients,
the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct caused significant
actual harm to multiple clients, the legal system, and the legal profession. We agree
with the hearing committee and the disciplinary board that the baseline sanction is

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disbarment. The record supports the aggravating and mitigating factors found by
the board.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we also agree with the
committee and the board that permanent disbarment is warranted. Guideline 1 of
the permanent disbarment guidelines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX,
Appendix D, indicates that permanent disbarment is warranted for “[r]epeated or
multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds with substantial harm.”
Here, respondent converted to his own use almost $12,000 of Mr. Parker’s funds,
which he should have forwarded to the Chapter 13 Trustee. He also converted funds
belonging to multiple other clients when he accepted fees for legal services, failed
to perform those services, and then failed to refund the unearned fees. In total,
respondent intentionally converted more than $31,000 of his clients’ money, which
caused significant harm to these vulnerable clients. Clearly, Guideline 1 applies
here.
In light of the above, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and
permanently disbar respondent. We will further order respondent to make restitution
to his clients and/or the Client Assistance Fund, as indicated by the board.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Michael Brian
Rennix, Louisiana Bar Roll number 23397, be and he hereby is permanently
disbarred. His name shall be stricken fr om the roll of attorneys and his license to
practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that res pondent be permanently prohibited
from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. It is further ordered that
respondent shall make restitution to his clients and/or repay to the Louisiana State

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Bar Association’s Client Assistance Fund any amounts paid to claimants on his
behalf, as set forth above. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against
respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest
to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.