In Re: Cecelia F. Abadie

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #020
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 13th day of May, 2021 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2020-B-01276 IN RE: CECELIA F. ABADIE
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.
Weimer, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Hughes, J ., concurs in pa rt, disse nts in part for the rea sons assigned by
Weimer, C.J.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Griffin, J ., concurs in pa rt, disse nts in pa rt for the rea sons assigne d by
Weimer, C.J.

05/13/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20
20-B-1276
I
N RE: CECILIA F. ABADIE
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
PER CURIAM
This d isciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Cecilia F. Abadie , an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS
By way of background, Latasha Jackson gave birth to a child in September
1997. Mark Jenkins was listed as the father on the child’s birth certificate, and he
signed an acknowledg ment of paternity. Whether the acknowledgment was an
authentic act is unknown.
Mark and Latasha married after the child’s birth, but later divorced. Latasha
sought child support from Mark through the Department of Children and Family
Services (“DCFS”), which filed a case against Mark in the Jefferson Parish Juvenile
Court (“the Juvenile Court case”). Mark and Latasha eventually agreed that Mark
would pay monthly child support to Latasha in the amount of $220.74, and the judge
handling the Juvenile Court case signed the consent judgment on October 27, 2003.
Sometime in 2011, Mark began to suspect he was not the biological father of
Latasha’s child, and he hired respondent to represent him in attempts to end his child
support obligation to Latasha. In August 2011, the Louisiana Department of Health
and Hospitals (“DHH”) provided respondent with a copy of the signed bi rth

2

certificate of Latasha’s child. The DHH also provided respondent with a letter
verifying that Mark and Latasha signed an “acknowledgment of paternity,” which
was filed on November 4, 1997.1
In February 2012, respondent filed a “Petition for Revocation of
Acknowledgment of Paternity, for Damages Due to Fraud, and for Restoration of
Payments Not Due” against Latasha in the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish
of Jefferson (“the 24 th JDC case”). In November 2012, respondent amended the
petition to include the DCFS as a defendant.
In June 2012, Latasha’s counsel filed an Exception of Prescription on the issue
of the revocation of the acknowledgment of paternity, claiming Mark had only two
years from the date he signed the acknowledgment to revoke same. On January 22,
2013, Judge Raymond Steib, Jr. denied the exception of prescription and granted
Mark’s motion for paternity testing. On Latasha’s application for supervisory writs,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed Judge Steib’s ruling and g ranted the
exception of prescription (“1 st Fifth Circuit ruling”). In light of this reversal, the
Fifth Circuit also vacated the order for paternity testing and remanded the matter to
the trial court. Respondent filed a writ application in this court, but her application
was denied as untimely on August 22, 2013. On June 30, 2014, respondent filed in
the 24
th JDC case a petition seeking to nullify the 1st Fifth Circuit ruling. However,
she withheld service of the petition and never followed up.
Meanwhile, on June 27, 2013, Judge Steib again ordered paternity testing in
the 24th JDC case, which test proved Mark was not the father of Latasha’s child. On
August 19, 2013, attorney Kristyl R. Treadaway enrolled as Latasha’s counsel of
record in the 24th JDC case.

1 The DHH indicated it did not have access to the original “acknowledgment of paternity” due to
the effects of Hurricane Katrina.

3

In October 2014, respondent filed in the 24 th JDC case a rule to show cause
why Mark’s name should not be removed from the birth certificate of Latasha’s
child. Following a show cause hearing, Judge Steib held that this was not the proper
procedure to alter or amend a birth certificate because the Louisiana Bureau of Vital
Records (“BVR”) was not a party to the 24th JDC case.
Because respondent continued to file pleadings on the issue of Mark’s
revocation of his acknowledgment of paternity, on N ovember 20, 2014, Ms.
Treadaway filed a second exception of prescription. In a judgment dated February
4, 2015, Judge Steib again denied the exception of prescription and made a finding
that Mark was not the father of Latasha’s child based upon the paternity test result.
Ms. Treadaway then filed a writ application with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal.
Respondent opposed the writ application, essentially arguing that, because neither
the BVR nor the DCFS could produce a copy of the signed acknowledgment of
paternity, the issue of whether Mark can revoke the acknowledgment was not
prescribed. Because previous pleadings filed by respondent in the 24
th JDC case
indicated that Mark signed the birth certificate and signed an acknowledgment of
paternity (considered a judicial confession by the Fifth Circuit) when Latasha’s child
was born, the Fifth Circuit reversed Judge Steib’s ruling and granted the exception
of prescription regarding the issue of Mark’s revocation of his acknowledgment of
legal paternity (“ 2
nd Fifth Circuit ruling”). The Fifth Circuit, however, found no
error in Judge Steib’s finding that Mark is not the father of Latasha’s child based on
the paternity test (which issue relates to Mark’s claims for damages due to fraud and
for restoration of payments not due). The Fifth Circuit’s ruling was dated July 31,
2015 and was signed by Judges Robert M. Murphy, Stephen J. Windhorst, and Hans
J. Liljeberg. Respondent filed a writ application with this court, which the court
denied on September 4, 2015.

4

While Ms. Treadaway’s writ application was pending with the Fifth Circuit,
respondent sent a copy of Judge Steib’s February 4, 2015 judgment, in which he
found that Mark was not the father of Latasha’s child, to the BVR. Because the BVR
was not aware of Ms. Treadaway’s pending writ application, it reissued the birth
certificate of Latasha’s child on March 16, 2015, pursuant to respondent’s request to
remove Mark’s name as the father and to change the child’s last name. Neither
Latasha nor Ms. Treadaway was aware of respondent’s request to the BVR.
After respondent received the altered birth certificate, she filed an ex parte
motion in the Juvenile Court case on March 30, 2015, requesting that Mark’s child
support obligation be terminated. Respondent then had ex parte communications, in
the form of a telephone call and a letter, with the secretary of Juvenile Court Judge
Barron Burmaster, asking the judge to address whether Mark is the legal father of
Latasha’s child.
Beginning in August 2013, respond ent also filed several other pleadings in
the Juvenile Court case, raising some of the same issues she raised in the pleadings
she filed in the 24
th JDC case. According to respondent, she filed these duplicative
pleadings in the two courts because she was not sure which court was the proper
venue. Judge Burmaster ruled consistently that the Juvenile Court does not have
jurisdiction to revoke an acknowledgment of paternity and, until the
acknowledgment is revoked, Mark must continue to pay child support.
Nevertheless, an April 27, 2015 minute entry in the Juvenile Court case indicated
that the “parties stipulate there is no authentic act of acknowledgment.” On June 15,
2015, Ms. Treadaway requested and obtained a stay of the Juvenile Court case
proceedings pending the 2nd Fifth Circuit ruling.
Thereafter, on September 15, 2015, in light of the 2 nd Fifth Circuit ruling,
respondent drafted a letter addressed to Jefferson Parish District Attorney Paul
Connick and Louisiana Representative Chris Broadwater (“the collusion letter”). In

5

the collusion letter, respondent accused Fifth Circuit Judge Robert Murphy of
colluding with the DCFS against Mark so Mark would not be reimbursed for the
child support payments he had made to Latasha. 2 Respondent also accused Ms.
Treadaway of requesting the stay in the Juvenile Court case as a way to give the
Fifth Circuit time to collude with the DCFS. Respondent sent a copy of the collusion
letter to Ms. Treadaway and attorney Timothy O’Rourke, who represented the DCFS
in the Juvenile Court case. However, according to respondent, she did not send the
collusion letter to Mr. Connick or Mr. Broadwater even though it was addressed to
them.
In the meantime, in another attempt to fight the 2
nd Fifth Circuit ruling, on
March 10, 2016, respondent filed in the 24 th JDC case a petition to nullify the 2 nd
Fifth Circuit ruling for lack of jurisdiction and ill-practice in Ms. Treadaway’s writ
application. In response, Ms. Treadaway filed exceptions of no cause of action and
res judicata and asked for sanctions against respondent. In November 2016, Judge
Steib granted the exceptions and dismissed the petition to nullify, but he denied the
request for sanctions. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed this judgment on
February 22, 2017, and this court denied respondent’s writ application on September
6, 2017.
In March 2018, respondent filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on Mark’s behalf and aga inst Judge
Murphy and Mr. O’Rourke (“the federal lawsuit”). The federal lawsuit accused

2 During a sworn statement given to the ODC on August 25, 2016, respondent gave the following
reason for singling out Judge Murphy from the three-judge panel:
…[T]he reason I cited [Judge Murphy] and mention him by name is
because I called the Court of Appeal and I said if there’s three
signatures on a judgment how do you… know who wrote it? The
first signature is the person who wrote the judgment. So since Judge
Murphy’s signature was the first signature I didn’t do this – I didn’t
cite his name just, you know, without a basis.

6

Judge Murphy, Mr. O’Rourke, and Ms. Treadaway of conspiring “to allow Judge
Murphy to usurp the issue of legal paternity from Juvenile Court.” More
specifically, the federal lawsuit alleged that “[t]he conspirators stopped Juvenile
Court from deciding legal paternity, so that it could take the place of biological
paternity, which was the issue decided in the district court.” Respondent eventually
added Ms. Treadaway and Judge Burmaster as defendants. The federal lawsuit was
dismissed, but respondent appealed the dismissal. On January 10, 2020, the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the federal law suit.
On December 14, 2020, the Un ited States Supreme Court denied respondent’s
petition for writ of certiorari.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In September 2015, Ms. Treadaway filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. In September 2017, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent,
alleging that her conduct as set forth above violated the following provisions of the
Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1 (failure to provide competent
representation to a client), 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 3.3 (candor
toward the tribunal), 3.5 (engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal), 8.2 (a
lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless
disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a
judge), and 8 .4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct). Respondent
answered the formal charges, essentially denying any misconduct. Accordingly, the
matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the testi mony and evidence presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee found that all of the witnesses were credible and that each witness

7

appeared to believe they were testifying truthfully to the best of their abilities. The
committee further found that respondent draft ed a letter to Mr. Connick and Mr.
Broadwater, accusing Judge Murphy of colluding with the Juvenile Court and the
DCFS, but respondent did not send the letter to its intended recipients. Instead, she
sent the collusion letter to Mr. O’Rourke and Ms. Treadaway. Therefore, t he
committee found respondent did attack the integrity of a judge and continues to do
so. Additionally, t he committee found respondent did not provide competent
representation to her client because she failed to file a w rit application with the
Supreme Court within the time delays, filed pleadings that were duplicative in both
the Juvenile Court case and 24th JDC case, confused matters with multiple pleadings,
failed to request service on certain pleadings, failed to allow a waiver of service in
the federal lawsuit, confused the pending litigation and disrupt ed the tribunal by
filing numerous and duplicative pleadings, failed to know certain procedural rules,
and filed pleadings that unduly complicated the proceedings.
Based on these facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rules 1.1
and 8.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and, in violating these rules, also
violated Rule 8.4(a). The committee, however, determined the ODC failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rules 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 as
alleged in the formal charges.
Specifically regarding Rule 1.1, the committee found respondent testified that
Mark’s case may have been the only filiation case she worked on during her more
than 29-year-long law career. The committee also found that, for the last several
years, Mark appears to have been respondent’s only client. According to the
committee, the record is replete with several filings that are curious and support the
allegation that respondent failed to provide competent representation. One or two
filings, procedural errors, or incidents do not rise to the level of incompetency in the
committee’s opinion, but in this case, there are numerous incidents that collectively

8

rise to incompetent representation. First, respondent admitted she missed a crucial
deadline to file a writ application on a ruling against her client, but she was not upset
by it because, as she testified, the missed deadline “had no effect on the case.” Yet,
Mr. O’Rourke, who worked with the DCFS in that specific area of practice, testified
he told respondent to file the writ application because he thought she had a cause of
action. The committee determined that, a fter this missed dea dline, r espondent
became determined to pursue an alternate theory of relief for her client, which led to
multiple filings in different courts. Additionally, the case is procedurally convoluted
due to respondent filing multiple pleadings and actions simultaneous ly in two
separate courts , and she failed to establish that both courts had subject matter
jurisdiction over all the issues upon which she was requesting relief. Respondent
also filed a motion to have the presiding judge correct the court minutes fr om a
hearing without a contradictory hearing, without a certificate of service or requesting
service on opposing counsel, and without requesting a transcript . Respondent
requested that a lower court act as a supervisory court over its corresponding court
of appeal. Additionally, she wrote a letter to a judge ’s secretary concerning legal
issues and procedural matters and did not send a copy to opposing counsel.
Respondent further showed her lack of legal knowledge and skill w hen she filed
pleadings but did not serve opposing counsel or parties in the underlying cases.
Respondent then filed the federal lawsuit but did not allow Ms. Treadaway and Mr.
O’Rourke to waive service of the lawsuit, despite their testimony that they both filed
a waiver of service. Her actions were not only inconsiderate but also did not conform
to federal court procedures. She filed a motion to dismiss child support retroactive
to a particular date, but when she decided she could request that the dismissal be
retroactive to an e arlier date, instead of amending the motion, she dismissed and
refiled it. Other pleadings showed respondent to be naive and to not know the proper
procedures. However, for the purpose of brevity , the committee chose the above

9

specific incidents that were brought out at the hearing and illustrated respondent’s
lack of competence.
Specifically regarding Rule 8.2, the committee noted that re spondent
acknowledges she wrote and transmitted the collusion letter, which attacked Judge
Murphy’s integrity. Her defense for sending the letter is that she only sent it to two
people and did not publish it publicly. Respondent’s unspoken defense , however,
seemed to be that she believes the allegations contained in the collusion letter and
the f ederal lawsuit. Responde nt based her allegations against Judge Murphy on
speculation and conjecture rather than on any solid evidence. Therefore, the
committee found the ODC met its burden of proving that respondent violated Rule
8.2.
With respect to Rule 3.1, the committee dete rmined that, w hile neither Ms.
Treadaway nor Mr. O’Rourke may have agreed with all of respondent’s legal
theories, the ODC did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent
filed frivolous pleadings.
Regarding Rule 3.3, the committee determined that r espondent intended to
show candor to each tribunal. She appeared to believe the allegations she made in
her pleadings and in the testimony she presented to the committee. Thus, the ODC
did not establish that respondent knowingly made a false statement to a tribunal.
Finally, with respect to Rule 3.5, the committee determined the ODC did not
prove that respondent intentionally disrupted court proceedings. All of respondent’s
actions were fueled by a sincere desire to assist her client, to argue for him before
the tribunal, and to convince each tribunal that her position was correct, even when
she was wrong. No evidence was presented that respondent acted as she did for the
intended purpose of causing disruption, chaos, or confusion.
The committee determined respondent knowingly and intentionally violated
duties owed to the legal system and the public. Her conduct caused actual harm to

10

the judges and attorneys she wrote about and filed suit against by harming their
reputations, causing the m stress and anxiety, and causing them to have to defend
against a lawsuit. Specifically, Ms. Treadaway had to pay a $5,000 deductible
towards her malpractice insurance to defend against the federal lawsuit. Mr.
O’Rourke was distressed because he did not know if he would have to pay out of
pocket to defend the lawsuit against him. If Mark had to pay for all of the filing fees
and legal fees for respondent’s duplicative filings and the legal fees for her untimely
or improper filings, then he was also harmed.
In aggravation, the committee found substantial experience in the practice of
law (admitted 1990) and a lack of remorse. In mitigation, the committee found the
absence of a prior disciplinary record and the absence of a dishonest or selfish
motive.
After considering respondent’s conduct in light of this court’s prior
jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the committee recommended
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with all but six
months deferred. The committee furth er recommended that, following the active
portion of the suspension, respondent be placed on supervised probation for two
years, during which a probation monitor will meet with her monthly to monitor her
practice and review her client files and any pleadings she signs.
Respondent filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s
factual findings are not manifestly erroneous, with one exceptio n. The committee
found that respondent filed a motion in the Juvenile Court case to have the presiding
judge correct the court minutes from a hearing without requesting a contradictory
hearing, without a certificate of service or requesting service on opposing counsel ,

11

and without requesting a transcript , and the board determined that respondent did
include a certificate of service on the order accompanying this motion. In all other
respects, the board adopted the committee’s factual findings. Based on those facts,
the board determined the committee’s conclusions regarding rule violations are
supported by the evidence and testimony and adopted same.
The board determined respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties
owed to her client, the public, and the legal system. She caused harm to Judge
Murphy, Judge Burmaster, Ms. Treadaway, and Mr. O’Rourke by making
unsupported “collusion” allegations against them. These individuals suffered stress,
anxiety, and damage to their reputations. They also had to spend time and, in Ms.
Treadaway’s circumstances, money to defend against the federal lawsuit.
Respondent also harmed Latasha, who had to pay Ms. Treadaway to respond to
respondent’s duplicative and unnecessary pleadings. Mark could have been harmed
as well if he had to pay legal and filing fees for these pleadings. Citing the ABA’s
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the board determined the baseline
sanction is in the range of a public reprimand to suspension.
The board agreed with the aggravating factors found by the committee. In
additional aggravation, the board found a refusal to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of the conduct. The board also agreed with the mitigating factors found by
the committee. In additional mitigation, the board found that respondent has a good
character or reputation.
After considering respondent’s conduct in light of this court’s prior
jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the board recommended respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day.
Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board’ s recommendation.
Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).

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DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
The record of this matter supports a finding that respondent failed to provide
competent representation to a client and made false statements about the integrity of
a judge. The record is replete with examples, as listed by the hearing committee, of
the improper pleadings filed by respondent and her failure to understand and follow
court procedures. The record also contains a copy of the collusion letter, in which
respondent attacked Judge Murphy’s integrity with reckless disregard for the truth
or falsity of her statements. Her explanation as to why she focused her allegations
of collusion on Judge Murphy makes little sense in light of the fact that Judge
Windhorst and Judge Liljeberg also signed the 2
nd Fifth Circuit ruling. Respondent
then filed a federal lawsuit against Judge Murphy, later adding Judge Burmaster as
a defendant, alleging the same collusion. Respondent has provided absolutely no
evidentiary support for these allegations of collusion by members of the judiciary,
yet she continues to make them, even in her brief and oral argument presented to this
court. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct as found by the committee and adopted by the disciplinary board.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining

13

a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to her client,
the legal system, and the le gal profession. Her conduct caused significant actual
harm. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is suspension.
Aggravating factors include a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses,
refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, and substantial
experience in the practice of law. Mitigating factors include the absence of a prior
disciplinary record, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, and character or
reputation.
The heartland of respondent’s misconduct is her violation of Rule 8.2, which
prohibits a lawyer from making a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity conc erning the integrity of a judge . It is
clear respondent was frustrated that her client did not obtain the relief to which she
believed he was legally entitled. It is an unfortunate fact that in many instances,
litigation leaves one of the parties and its counsel disappointed by the outcome.
However, this does not give an attorney license to make unsupported and reckless
allegations of collusion and conspiracy on the part of the judges who participated in
the matter . Rather, l awyers are expected to be professionals and to honor their
obligations to the legal system and to the profession. Respondent failed to do so,
and for this misconduct, she must be sanctioned.

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Based on this reasoning, and considering respondent’s complete lack of
remorse, we find the board’s recommended sanction is appropriate. Accordingly,
we will suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is
ordered that Cecilia F. Abadie, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19874, be and she hereby
is suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day . All costs and
expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme
Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date
of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

05/13/21
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2020-B-1276
IN RE: CECILIA F. ABADIE
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
WEIMER, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
I concur in the opinion, but dissent as to the sanction.
Zealous advocacy must be tempered with the obligation of an attorney to serve
as an officer of the court.
I note the hearing committee listed as mitigating factors no prior disciplinary
record and the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. The Disciplinary Board
agreed with the mitigating facts described by the hearing committee and additionally
found the Respondent has a good character or reputation. I believe the sanction of
a one-year suspension recommended by the hearing committee would serve the ends
of justice.

05/13/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-B-1276
I
N RE: CECILIA F. ABADIE
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
CRI
CHTON, J. additionally concurs and assigns reasons:
A
fter receiving an unsuccessful result for her client, and without a scintilla
of evidence but her own incompetent representation, respondent launched a public
and defamatory tirade against several individuals, including members of the
judiciary, alleging that they “maneuvered… colluded…and conspired” to commit
nefarious acts against her and her client. By filing a lawsuit in U.S. District Court,
then seeking review in the U.S. Court of Appeal s for the Fifth Circuit and later the
Supreme Court of the United States, again with zero evidence, she exacerbated the
actual damage to the named individuals, co sting them resources and stress, and
impugning both the legal profession and judiciary.
Compounding her misconduct, respondent has refused to acknowledge the
wrongfulness of her actions and has displayed no remorse. Even during oral
arguments before this Court , she was obtuse at best in her response to repeated
inquiries regarding what, if any, evidence of this alleged collusion was in the
record. Quite simply, there is none. At a minimum, and extending respondent the
benefit of the doubt, she made these statements with reckless disregard. From an
objective standpoint, however, the statements asserted in the Federal courts are
patently false. Either way, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel has proven a
violation of Rule 8.2(a) by clear and convincing evidence.

2

This Court in Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v Karst , 428 So.2d 406 (La. 1983)
addressed Disciplinary Rule 1- 102 and 8-102(B), the latter of which is the
predecessor for Rule 8.2(a) of the Rules of Professional C onduct. In Karst , the
Court adopted an objective standard, rather than an objective one, in determining
whether a statement is knowingly or recklessly false for purposes of violation of
the then-titled Disciplinary Rule 8 -102(B). The Karst court concluded that when
an attorney intentionally causes accusations to be publis hed which he knows to be
false or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should know to be false, he is in violation
of the rule. The Court explained that t he rationale for DR 8- 102(B) appeared in
Ethical Consideration 8-6, the pertinent part of which provided at the time:
Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly freed to defend themselves,
are entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism.
While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize such officials
publicly, he should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use
appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and
intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal
system. Criticisms motivated by reasons other than a desire to
improve the legal system are not justified.

Karst, 428 So.2d at 409, citing Ethical Consideration 8-6.
1

In this matter, u nhappy with her results in the underlying litigation,
respondent had the absolute right to seek appellate review, which is favored in the
law. La. C.C.P. art. 2082. See also Fraternal Order of Police v. New Orleans, 02-
1801, p. 2 (La. 11/8/02), 831 So.2d 897, 899, citing General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Deep South Pest Control Inc., 247 La. 625, 173 So.2d 190, 191 (1965) (“It
is well settled that appeals are favored in the law .”). Instead, she chose to ignore
the most basic procedural vehicles provided to seek relief for her aggrieved client.
Furthermore, if respondent believed that the two targeted judges violated the

1 See also, In re Simon , 04- 2947 (La. 6/29/05), 913 So.2d 816 (the C ourt finding
respondent violated Rule DR8-102(B) by filing motions to recuse judges, alleging various
misrepresentations of truth and improper attorney/client relationships between a judge and
respondent’s opposing counsel).

3

Code of Judicial Conduct, the appropriate course of action would have been to file
a complaint with the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana . See Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon 2(a) (“[a] judge shall respect and comply with the law and sha ll
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary”) and Rule 8.3(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
(“[a] lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of the applicable
rules of judicial conduct that raises a question as to the judge’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness for office shall inform the Judiciary Commission. ”)
However, respondent failed to do so, and her consistent pattern of dishonest,
harmful, and outrageous beha vior in judicial forums and the legal profession as a
whole warrants the sanction imposed today. Accordingly, I wholeheartedly concur
in the Court’s imposition of a full suspension from the practice of law for one year
and one day, necessitating her reapp lication to this Court, should she choose to do
so. See La. S. Ct. Rule XIX, §24(A) (“A disbarred lawyer or a suspended lawyer
who has served an active suspension of more than one year shall be reinstated or
readmitted only upon order of the court.”)