In Re: Joseph N. Mayer, III

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #037
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 30th day of September, 2021 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2020-B-01335 IN RE: JOSEPH N. MAYER, III
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.
Weimer, C.J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2020-B-1335
IN RE: JOSEPH N. MAYER, III
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
PER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Joseph N. Mayer, III, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
UNDERLYING FACTS
On the morning of October 1, 2018, respondent was driving to his New
Orleans law office when he stopped at a convenience store and purchased two half-
pints of vodka. He drove to a parking garage near his office and sat there for a period
of time consuming the alcohol until he became intoxicated. Respondent then left the
premises to return home. Wh ile driving on Veterans Boulevard in Metairie,
respondent rear-ended a car stopped at a traffic light.
Initially, respondent pulled off the road to inspect the damage to the vehicles
and exchange relevant information with the other driver. However, he qui ckly
realized he was going to be in trouble. Prior to the arrival of the police, respondent
fled the scene of the accident, striking another car in the process. Respondent then
drove to a bar several blocks away and drank more vodka. Later, an off-duty police
officer saw respondent staggering back to his vehicle and called 911 to report
respondent’s condition. Officers were able to identify respondent as having been
involved in the hit and run accident. A Breathalyzer test showed his blood alcohol
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level was .260 g%. Respondent was arrested on charges of DWI, hit and run, no
liability insurance, and driving under suspension.1
In November 2018, the ODC referred respondent to the Judges and Lawyers
Assistance Program (“JLAP”) for an independent evaluation. Respondent contacted
JLAP on December 7, 2018 and was referred for inpatient treatment at a JLAP -
approved facility. Respondent advised that he did not have the financial means to
pay for treatment, so JLAP recommended he utilize Bridge House in New Or leans
as an option for persons who cannot afford treatment. To date, respondent has not
complied with JLAP’s recommendations.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In August 2019, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging
that his conduct as set forth above violated the following provisions of the Rules of
Professional Conduct: Rules 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct)
and 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer). R espondent answered the formal
charges and stated that the events at issue represented “an isolated incident,” that no
injuries were involved, and that all property damage issues had been resolved.
Respondent further represented that he had successfully completed a pre -trial
diversion program to resolve the criminal charges.
Following the filing of respondent’s answer, the matter was set for a formal
hearing before the hearing committee. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that
respondent would testify in mitigation; however, he “does not contest the material
underlying facts surrounding his arrest for DWI, the fact that he was driving while
impaired, his level of impairment and that he was driving while under suspension

1 Respondent testified that his driver’s license had been suspended for non -payment of his state
income taxes.

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and while uninsured at the time. And as such, he stipulates that that conduct would
be a violation of Rule 8.4(b) and 8.4(a), as charged in the formal charges.”

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee found that respondent was heavily intoxicated when he caused
two vehicular accidents on October 1, 2018. Respondent does not have a sound
recollection of what occurred that morning, but he admits both accidents occurred
when he was on hi s way to work. He also admits that the second accident was
coincident with his unlawfully leaving the scene of the first accident. Based on these
facts, respondent stipulated that he violated Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(b) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct as charged.
Following the accidents, respondent was charged with DWI, hit and run
driving, driving with a suspended license, and driving without vehicle insurance.
Because he had no prior alcohol-related traffic violations or arrests, respondent was
permitted to enter a diversion program to resolve the criminal charges. After he
successfully completed all requirements of the diversion program, the criminal
charges were dropped.
In December 2018, respondent participated in a clinical interview with the
JLAP program, and it was recommended that he obtain inpatient substance abuse
treatment. Although respondent admitted he is an alcoholic, he did not undergo
inpatient or outpatient treatment, nor did he enroll in the free program at Bridge
House. Respondent has cited issues of cost as the primary reason for not undergoing
treatment, but also testified that he felt the diversion program was enough. During
the hearing, the JLAP director testified that a diversion program does not satisfy
JLAP requirements.

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The committee found that respondent violated duties owed to the public and
the legal profession. Respondent caused property damage to multiple vehicles, but
no personal injuries, though the potential for serious injury to himself and others was
high. The applicable baseline sanction is suspension.
In aggravation, the committee found a dishonest or selfish motive (as
evidenced by respondent’s unlawfully leaving the scene of an accident) and
substantial experience in th e practice of law (admitted 1979 ). In mitigation, the
committee found the absence of a prior disciplinary record, personal and financial
problems, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude
toward the proceedings, good character and reputation, and remorse.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee recognized that
this court has imposed an actual period of suspension in DWI cases involving
multiple offenses or in which the arrest stems from a substance use disorder that
remains una ddressed. See In re: Baer , 09 -1795 (La. 11/20/09), 21 So. 3d 941 .
Applying this jurisprudence, the committee reasoned that an actual period of
suspension is warranted in this case.
Accordingly, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year and one day. The committee also recommended that
respondent be assessed with all costs of this proceeding.
Respondent filed an objection to the hearing committee’s factual findings and
recommended sanction.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
The disciplinary board adopted the hearing committee’s findings of fact and
rule violations, as they are based on the stipulations of the parties and/or supported
by the record. The board also adopted the aggravating and mitigating factors cited
by the committee.

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The board determined respondent knowingly violated duties owed to the
public and the legal profession. He operated a vehicle while impaired, causing actual
harm in the way of property damage to two other vehicles. Respondent’s conduct
also created the potential for serious bodily harm. By engaging in criminal conduct,
including leaving the scene of an accident, respondent damaged the reputation of all
members of the profession. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions , the board determined that the applicable baseline sanction is
suspension.
In its discussion on sanctions , th e board acknowledged respondent’s
successful completion of the diversion program to resolve his criminal charges, and
his testimony that he has refrained from alcohol use since November 2018.
However, the board pointed out that the misconduct at issue in this case “arose out
of a substance abuse issue that appears to remain unresolved by the standards that
the Court has applied over and over again.” Respondent has not sought or obtained
a proper JLAP -approved evaluation and treatment, if so indicated. Th erefore, the
board concluded that deferral of the suspension is not warranted.
Based on this reasoning, the board recommended respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year and one day. The board further recommended
respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.
Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.
Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Suprem e Court
Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).

Interim Order of the Court
Following oral argument, we issued an interim order on May 11, 2021
directing respondent to obtain an evaluation through JLAP within thirty days. The
order provided:

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IT IS ORDERED that within thirty days of the date of this
order, respondent shall submit to an evaluation, not to
exceed one day, by a facility approved by the Judges and
Lawyers Assistance Program. Following the evaluation,
the parties shall cause a copy of the report thereof to be
filed in this court as soon as practicable.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the record of this matter
shall be held open pending the filing of the report of the
evaluation. The parties may file supplemental briefs
addressing the report within ten days of the filing thereof.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event respondent
fails to attend or complete the evaluation, the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel shall immediately advise the court of
this fact, at which time the court shall proceed with
consideration and disposition of the case. Failure to attend
or complete the evaluation may be considered by the court
in the imposition of discipline. [Internal footnote omitted.]

On June 14, 2021 , the ODC notified the court that respondent had not
contacted JLAP since the issuance of the interim order. Shortly thereafter, counsel
for respondent filed a motion to reset the deadline provided in the order, stating that
he had not received a copy of the interim order, but if he had received it, respondent
would have promptly complied. Accordingly, on June 2 4, 2021, we granted
respondent an additional thirty days to submit to a JLAP evaluation.
On July 26, 2021, respondent informed the court that he had scheduled an
evaluation at Palmetto Addiction Recovery Center on August 4, 2021, the earliest
date available. However, on August 3, 2021, respondent cancelled the evaluation,
advising JLAP that he could not af ford the cost of the evaluation and did not have
transportation to Palmetto.
On August 5, 2021, the ODC notified the court of the foregoing facts . On
August 9, 2021, respondent filed a reply again urging that he could not afford to
attend the evaluation. Accordingly, we now proceed with consideration and
disposition of this matter.

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DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
The record supports a finding that respondent committed criminal misconduct
by driving while intoxicated. This misconduct amounts to a violation of Rules 8.4(a)
and 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In d etermining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis , 513 So. 2 d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent violated duties owed to the public and the legal profession,
causing the potential for serious harm. Fortunately, no personal injury occurred, but
actual harm resulted in the form of property damage to multiple vehicles .
Respondent’s misconduct was at least knowing. The baseline sanction for this type
of misconduct is suspension.

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In aggravation, the record supports the following factors: a dishonest or selfish
motive, substantial experience in the practice of law, and illegal conduct. In
mitigation, the record su pports the following factors: the absence of a prior
disciplinary record, personal problems, good character and reputation, imposition of
other penalties or sanctions, and remorse.
Following respondent’s DWI arrest, he contacted JLAP and admitted that he
is an alcoholic; however, he refused to comply with JLAP’s recommendation for a
substance abuse evaluation and treatment . During oral argument in this court,
respondent contended that he no longer ha s an unresolved substance use disorder.
Consequently, we ordered an evaluation to assess respondent’s condition, but once
again, he has declined to cooperate, even after assuring us that he intended to do so
promptly. Indeed, it is disappointing that we have made every effort to allow
respondent time to obtain an evaluation and treatment, and respondent has
consistently delayed and frustrated the process.
Under these circumstances, we must conclude that respondent has a substance
abuse problem that appears to remain unresolved , and an actual suspension is
therefore warranted under In re: Baer, 09-1795 (La. 11/20/09), 21 So. 3d 941. The
sanction of a one year and one day suspension means respondent will have to file a
formal application for reinstatement if he wishes to return to the practice of law. We
specifically caution respondent that in the event he applies for reinstatement, he will
be required to show compliance with the criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule
XIX, § 24(E) , including obtaining a JLAP evaluation and participating in any
recommended treatment and/or monitoring.
Based on this reasoning, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and
suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day.

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DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the record , briefs, and oral argument , it is
ordered that Joseph N. Mayer, III , Louisiana Bar Roll number 9124, be and he
hereby is suspended from the practice o f law for one year and one day. All costs
and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from
the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

09/30/21
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2020-B-1335
IN RE: JOSEPH N. MAYER, III
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
WEIMER, C.J., additionally concurring.
I write separately to express my disappointment that action by this court has
become necessary. Every effort has been made to encourage and accommodate
respondent, who has rebuffed all offers of assistance. I wish to make clear that
respondent is not being sanctioned because he has a substance abuse problem; rather,
he is being sanctioned because, while intoxicated, he caused a series of automobile
accidents and fled the scene, engaging in conduct that violates the law. The practice
of law is a privilege, not a right.1 While we are concerned with the well-being of each
attorney, we have an obligation to protect the public. Those whose actions under the
influence of a substance abuse problem demonstrably cause harm to a client or to the
public must establish that the problem is in the past. We have been willing to work
with respondent to accomplish this goal, and continue to hope he can, in the future,
demonstrate competency and return to the practice of law.
1 See Moity v. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n, 239 La. 1081, 1090, 121 So.2d 87, 90 (1960).