In Re: Donald R. Dobbins

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #020
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 13th day of May, 2021 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2020-B-01403 IN RE: DONALD R. DOBBINS
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.

05/13/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20
20-B-1403
I
N RE: DONALD R. DOBBINS
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
T his disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Donald R. Dobbins, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently suspended from practice.
PRI
OR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review
respondent’s prior disciplinary history. After being admitted to the practice of law
in Louisiana in 1991, respondent’s first encounter with the disciplinary system
occurred in April 1998, when he was admonished for failing to have a contingency
fee agreement in a client matter. Less than a year later, in February 1999, respondent
received a second admonition for failing to have contingency fee agreements in two
client matters and failing to provide a client with an accounting in a case he handled
in the early 1990’s. Respondent received a third admonition in 2001 for failing to
comply with a provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct while a candidate for
judicial office.
In January 2002, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for one
year, with all but six months deferred, followed by one year of proba tion with
conditions, for commingling and converting client funds. In re: Dobbins, 01 -2022
(La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 133.

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In June 2005, we accepted a joint petition for consent discipline and publicly
reprimanded respondent for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Additionally, we ordered respondent to attend the next session of Ethics
School offered by the Louisiana State Bar Association. In re: Dobbins , 05-1464
(La. 6/15/05), 903 So. 2d 1129.
Finally, in January 2020, we determined that respondent had failed to provide
competent representation to clients, neglected legal matters, failed to communicate
with clients, failed to refund unearned fees and unused costs, failed to properly
supervise his non-lawyer staff, resulting in false affidavits being filed in the court
record, failed to reduce a contingency fee agreement to writing, forged client
signatures on settlement checks, and failed to place disputed funds in his trust
account. For this misconduct, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for
one year and one day. In re: Dobbins, 19 -1346 (La. 1/29/20), __ So. 3d __.
Respondent has not yet been reinstated from this suspension; thus, he remains
suspended from the practice of law.
Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at
issue in the present proceeding.

UNDERLYING FACTS:
Count I
On September 18, 2016, respondent was arrested and charged with 1
st offense
driving while intoxicated (“DWI”), speeding, and reckless operation. Specifically,
a police officer observed respondent driving 75 mph in a 45 mph zone and pulled
him over. Another officer providing backup observed that respondent had g lassy
eyes, poor balance, slurred speech, and a very strong odor of alcohol about him.
Respondent refused to take a field sobriety test, refused to take a Breathalyzer test,
refused to submit to a blood test, and invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain

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silent. The criminal charges were dismissed on August 7, 2019 because one of the
officers could not appear in court when he was scheduled to testify.
Following his 2016 arrest, r espondent agreed to be evaluat ed through the
Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (“JLAP ”). The results of the evaluation
were inconclusive as to whether respondent could be diagnosed with a substance use
disorder, and he was referred for an inpatient multi-disciplinary evaluation at a
JLAP-approved facility. Respondent has refused to submit to the inpatient
evaluation.
During its investigation, the ODC also discovered that respondent was
arrested in November 2010 for DWI and reckless operation. Specifically ,
respondent entered a sobriety checkpoint, and the police officer observed him to
have blood-shot, red, glassy eyes, slurred speech, and a strong order of a lcohol.
Respondent refused to take a field sobriety test, refused to take a Breathalyzer test,
refused to submit to a blood test, and invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent. The prosecutor dismissed the criminal charges on August 28, 2014.
Upon further investigation, the ODC discovered that respondent has an
extensive arrest record. In May 1981, respondent was arrested for DWI and pleaded
guilty to the charge on July 24, 1981. In April 1992, he was arrested an d charged
with simple battery and criminal trespass. Respondent pleaded nolo contendre to
the charges in September 1992, and his conviction was set aside pursuant to Article
894 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in March 1993. In May 1992, respondent
was arrested for DWI and careless driving. In March 1993, respondent pleaded
guilty to the careless driving charge, and the prosecutor dismissed the DWI charge.
In April 2001, respondent was arrested for hit and run. The prosecutor dismissed
the charge against respondent in September 2001.

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Count II
In September 2017, Byron Norris hired respondent to institute an action to
prove paternity after the death of his alleged biological father , paying re spondent
$2,500. According to Mr. Norris, the $2,500 was a flat fee. Respondent claimed the
$2,500 was a retainer to be billed at $300 per hour. Although respondent produced
a fee contract to this effect, Mr. Norris never signed the contract, and Mr. Norris
claimed respondent never asked him to sign such a contract.
Mr. Norris informed respondent that the decedent would be buried on October
7, 2017, and his immediate action was necessary in order to preserve DNA evidence.
Thereafter, respondent informed Mr. Norris that he had filed the necessary pleadings
on September 28, 2017. Mr. Norris contacted the court on October 10, 2017 to
check the status of the matter and discovered that respondent had actually fax-filed
the pleadings on October 1, 2017. He further learned that the filing was incomplete
because respondent failed to pay $25 still due for the court costs and failed to deliver
the original pleadings to the court within the time delay allowed. Additionally, the
fax-filed pleadings submitted by respondent contained false information that was
material to Mr. Norris’ cause of action to establish paternity.
Upon learning about the deficiencies in the filing, Mr. Norris contacted
respondent. According to Mr. Norris, respondent was dismissive and defensive, but
he agreed to check on the matter. Mr. Norris also requested that respondent amend
the pleading to correct the inaccurate information. Respondent initially told Mr.
Norris the information did not matter but eventually agreed to amend the substantive
errors along with correcting the multiple misspellings of Mr. Norris’ first name.
After not hearing from r espondent, Mr. Norris contacted the c ourt again to
determine if the deficiencies in the filing had been cured. Mr. Norris discovered that
the status of the matter had not changed. Therefore, on October 12, 2017, Mr. Norris
sent respondent a letter of termination, demanding the return of the $2,500. On

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November 2, 2017, respondent sent Mr. Norris an invoice charging him $300 per
hour and indicating that Mr. Norris owed him an additional $343.32. The invoice
also indicated that respondent worked on Mr. Norris’ legal matter on three separate
days after Mr. Norris notified him of his termination.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In May 2019, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that
his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct:
Rules 1.1(a) (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (failure to
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure
to communicate with a client), 1.5 (fee arrangements), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c)
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
Respondent filed an answer to the formal charges, denying any misconduct. The
matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee made the following factual findings:
Count I – Based on the documentary evidence, respondent has been arrested
sporadically since 1981 through 2016 for DWI. However, all criminal charges that
were brought against respondent after his admission to the Louisiana Bar in 1991
have been disposed of by way of him either pleading to lesser charges or having the
charges dismissed. Nevertheless, respondent, by way of his arrests for DWI, has
engaged in activity of a criminal nature that reflects on his fitness to practice law.

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Even though respondent’s arrests have not resulted in convictions, the
committee noted that a link between respondent’s criminal charges and his
consumption of alcohol appears to exist. Yet, according to Mr. Stockwell,
respondent has refused further evaluations or further assistance f rom JLAP.
Respondent himself made several statements during the hearing indicating his
unwillingness to participate in additional JLAP evaluations. Despite respondent’s
reluctance, the committee opined that he should be assessed further to determine his
fitness to practice law.
Count II – Mr. Norris testified that he issued a $2,500 check to respondent via
overnight mail, with the expectation that respondent would file a petition to establish
paternity with the Orleans Parish Civil District Court on September 28, 2017. Mr.
Norris testified, however, that the petition was not filed until October 1, 2017 and
that the clerk’s office informed him respondent had failed to submit the original copy
of the petition and failed to pay $25 in filing fees with the fa x-filed submission of
the petition. Respondent proffered into evidence a copy of a check dated October 4,
2017 in the amount of $25 made payable to the Orleans Parish Clerk of Court to
establish his payment of the filing fee. After becoming aware of the complications
surrounding the filing of the petition, Mr. Norris terminated respondent’s services
via email sent on October 12, 2017. Mr. Norris testified that, after he terminated
respondent, he received an invoice from respondent for services rendered.
Respondent’s act of issuing the invoice post- termination is the nucleus of Mr.
Norris’ complaint. Based upon Mr. Norris’ testimony, he understood that the cost
of respondent’s representation would be a total of $2,500 as opposed to the $2,500
serving as a retainer fee for services provided.
According to the ODC, r espondent failed to handle Mr. Norris ’ matter in a
diligent manner by not correcting the pleadings that were fax -filed with the court
and by not providing any original copies of the pleadings to the court. Secondly, the

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ODC alleged respondent failed to effectively communicate with Mr. Norris in that
(1) the fees and costs for representation were never placed in writing and (2) there
was never any indication by respondent that the $2,500 payment was to be regarded
as a partial payment f or any legal services rendered. In light of the above, the
committee determined r espondent shoulders the responsibility for the lack of
communication and lack of diligence in this matter.
Based on these facts, the committee determined respondent violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges. The committee then
determined respondent’s conduct in Count I has the potential to continue to harm the
public and the legal profession if responde nt continues to refuse help from JLAP.
Respondent’s conduct in Count II also resulted in harm. After considering the
ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined the
baseline sanction is suspension. The committee found no mitigating factors present
but noted respondent’s prior disciplinary record as an aggravating factor.
In light of the above, the committee recommended respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year and one day. The committee further
recommended that respondent’s reinstatement to the practice of law should be
contingent upon his participation in the recommended JLAP inpatient evaluation.
Finally, the committee recommended respondent be ordered to make restitution to
Mr. Norris for any unearned fees.
Respondent filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report. Specifically,
he argued that he has not been convicted of any crimes and does not owe Mr. Norris
any money. He also argued that the recommended sanction is too severe and that
the charges should be dismissed or, at most, a public reprimand imposed.

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Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After reviewing this matter, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing
committee’s factual findings are not manifestly erroneous and adopted same.
Additionally, the board found that respondent’s $25 check, which he claimed to have
sent to the clerk of court to pay the outstanding fee in Mr. Norris’ case, does not
prove the fee was paid because it does not show that the clerk’s office negotiated the
check. Based on these facts, the board determined that respondent violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.
The board then determined respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his
client, the public, and the legal profession. With respect to harm, respondent’s
conduct in Count I tarnished the legal profession’s reputation and had the potential
to injure himself and others. As to Count II, respondent harmed Mr. Norris and has
yet to provide Mr. Norris with an accounting or a refund of any unearned fees. The
board agreed with the committee that the baseline sanction is suspension.
In a ggravation, the board found a prior disciplinary record, a dishonest or
selfish motive, refusal to acknowledge the wro ngful nature of the misconduct,
vulnerability of the victim (Mr. Norris resided in California and was attempting to
obtain legal relief in the short time between his father’s death and burial), substantial
experience in the practice of law (admitted 1991), and ille gal conduct. The board
found no mitigating factors present.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct and noting the numerous aggravating factors present, the board
recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and
one day, to run consecutively to respondent’s current one year and one day
suspension imposed by the court on January 29, 2020. The board further
recommended respondent be ordered to provide Mr. Norris with an accounting and
a refund of any unearned fees.

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One board member dissented and would recommend the imposition of a
longer period of suspension and the requirement that respondent participate in a full
assessment and evaluation through JLAP prior to being allowed to return to the
practice of law.
Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.
Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
The record in this matter supports a finding that respondent has been arrested
for DWI on multiple occasions, failed to provide competent representation to a
client, neglected a legal matter, failed to adequately communicate with a client,
including failing to adequately explain the fee arrangement, and failed to account for
and/or refund an unearned fee.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to mainta in
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,

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and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Considering the facts of this case, we find a three -year suspension from the
practice of law to be an appropriate sanction. Because respondent remains
suspended by operation of our 2020 order, we will make the instant suspension
retroactive to the date of that order. We further order respondent to make full
restitution of all unearned fee s. Before any application for reinstatement will be
considered, respondent shall be required to show full compliance with all
requirements of Supreme Court Rule XIX, §24, including a showing under
subsection E(3) that any alcohol abuse issues have been addressed.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it
is ordered that Donald R. Dobbins , Louisiana Bar Roll number 20537, be and he
hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, retroactive
to the effective date of the suspension imposed by this court in In re: Dobbins, 19-
1346 (La. 1/29/20), __ So. 3d __. Respondent is further ordered to make full
restitution of all unearned fees. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed
against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal
interest to commence thirty days from the dat e of finality of this court’s judgment
until paid.