In Re: Michael Peter Arata

Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: MICHAEL PETER ARATA
No.2020-B-01487
_ _ _ _ _ _
IN RE: Disciplinary C ounsel - Applicant Other ; Findings an d Recommendations
(Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
April 20, 2021
Disbarment imposed. See per curiam.
PDG
JLW
JDH
SJC
JTG
WJC
JBM
Crain, J., concurs.
Supreme Court of Louisiana
April 20, 2021
04/20/2021 "See News Release 016 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

04/20/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
020-B-1487
I
N RE: MICHAEL PETER ARATA
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
T his disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Michael Peter Arata, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension based upon
his conviction of a serious crime. In re: Arata , 16-0203 (La. 2/17/16), 184 So. 3d
671.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS
In May 2014, respondent and two co-defendants, Peter Hoffman and Susan
Hoffman, were indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Loui siana on multiple charges of defrauding a state tax credit program of
approximately $1.1 million in connection with the renovation of a historic New
Orleans mansion into a post- production film studio. In April 2015, a jury found
respondent guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, seven
counts of wire fraud, one count of mail fraud, and four counts of making false
statements to the FBI. The jury acquitted respondent of twelve additional counts of
wire fraud.
Following his conviction, respondent filed a motion for judgment of acquittal.
In December 2015, United State s District Court Judge Martin Feldman granted
respondent’s motion with respect to all counts except the conspiracy to commit mail

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and wire fraud count and one count of wire fraud. On January 27, 2016, Judge
Feldman sentenced respondent to four years of probation, including 300 hours of
community service, and fined him $15,000.
The United States government then sought a preliminary order of forfeiture
seeking a personal money judgment against respondent and his co-defendants in the
amount of $1,132,480.80. After finding that only $223,434.25 of the government’s
requested amount was subject to forfeiture, Judge Feldman issued a personal money
judgment in that amount against respondent and his co- defendants and held them
liable jointly and severally for the payment of said judgment.
Appeals were taken to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. After
considering the matter, the court of appeal reinstated respondent’s convictions with
respect to six counts of wire fraud, one count of mail fraud, and all but one count of
making false statements to the FBI, essentially reinstating the jury verdict as to all
but one count. The court of appeal also vacated respondent’s sentence and remanded
the matter to the district court for re-sentencing. Finally, the court of appeal affirmed
the forfeiture award. On May 20, 2019, the United States Suprem e Court denied a
petition for writ of certiorari, and respondent’s conviction became final.
On February 19, 2020, Judge Feldman sentenced respondent to five years of
probation, fined him $15,000, which respondent had already paid, and issued a
special assessment in the amount of $1,200. On March 19, 2020, respondent and the
United States government signed an agreement terminating all litigation in the
criminal case a gainst him. The government also agreed that it would not seek to
collect more than 40% ($89,373.70) of the forfeiture judgment from respondent.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In February 2016, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging
that his conduct as set forth above violated the following provisions of the Rules of

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Professional Conduct: Rules 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct),
8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Respondent answered the formal
charges, “steadfastly maintain[ing] his innocence,” and denied he violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct as alleged.1 Accordingly, the matter proceeded to a formal
hearing on the merits.

Formal Hearing
The hearing committee conducted the hearing on November 5, 2019, after the
finality of respondent’s criminal conviction. Both respondent and the ODC
introduced documentary evidence, including hundreds of letters attesting to
respondent’s good character. Respondent called several witnesses to testify before
the committee, including character witnesses. He also testified on his own behalf
and on cross-examination by the ODC. The most relevant testimony follows.

W
ILLIAM GIBBENS’ TESTIMONY
Mr. Gibbens, who represented respondent in his criminal case, testified that a
hearing on restitution and forfeiture took place in the case. Following the heari ng,
Judge Feldman found that the State of Louisiana suffered no loss; thus, no restitution
was ordered. Neither Louisiana nor the United States government appealed the
ruling regarding restitution. Therefore, in Mr. Gibbens’ opinion, respondent caused
no financial harm. Mr. Gibbens, however, acknowledged the forfeiture judgment
against respondent and his co-defendants. He also indicated that Peter Hoffman, one
of respondent’s co-defendants, signed an affidavit indicating he received the entire

1 It should be noted that respondent filed his answer to the formal charges on April 12, 2016, long
before he and the United States government reached their March 19, 2020 agreement.

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$223,434.25. Therefore, Mr. Gibbens is trying to get Judge Feldman to rule that
there is no forfeiture against respondent.

RESPONDENT’S TESTIMONY
Respondent testified that he is guilty and does not contest his conviction. He
testified, however, that there are m itigating factors present. Respondent indicated
that he terminated his relationship with Peter Hoffman in 2009 after discovering Mr.
Hoffman was engaging in fraud. In 2011, the government contacted respondent, and
he volunteered to participate in the inv estigation of Mr. Hoffman not knowing that
he himself was a focus of the investigation. Respondent also indicated that the
mansion renovation project received $1.1 million in tax credits but actually earned
between $4.1 and $4.5 million in tax credits. Therefore, Louisiana suffered no loss.
According to respondent, other mitigating factors present include the absence of a
prior disciplinary record, a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, character or
reputation, and the imposition of other penalties or sanctions.
At the time of the hearing, respondent had completed four years of probation
and more than 300 hours of community service, and he had paid the fees and fines.
He also pointed out that his misconduct was not related to the practice of law.
Finally, he indicated that he has an enormous amount of remorse over the damage
that this has caused and that he recognizes the wrongful nature of his conduct.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee found that, in 2015, respondent was convicted by a jury in federal
court of eight felony counts involving conspiracy and wire fraud arising from
fraudulent claims and submissions to obtain tax credits under a Louisiana progra m
that provides tax credits for expenditures made in Louisiana relative to the film

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industry. Respondent and his two co- defendants claimed the tax credits in
connection with the renovation of an old building into a studio for post- production
film work at 807 Esplanade Avenue in New Orleans. The committee further found
it is undisputed and the parties agree that respondent was convicted of multiple
felonies. The gist of the convictions was that respondent submitted paperwork
falsely claiming costs and expenses had been incurred for the studio when they had
not. Following the criminal conviction, the federal court ordered no restitution.
However, a forfeiture order was entered against respondent in the amount of
$1,132,480.80 to be paid by respondent and his two co-defendants. The committee
accepted as fact the testimony of respondent’s criminal defense attorney William
Gibbens that respondent would owe one -third of this amount. The forfeiture order
was entered to compel the three co- defendants to return the tax credits of
$1,132,480.80 awarded by Louisiana for the project at 807 Esplanade Avenue.
Based on these factual findings, the committee determined respondent violated
Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b) and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.
The committee did not address aggravating and mitigating factors, except to
note that the issue of respondent’s good moral character is “neutral” as a mitigating
factor.
After considering respondent’s misconduct in light of the permanent
disbarment guide lines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix D, the
committee determined there does not appear to be grounds to recommend he be
permanently disbarred. Instead, the committee recommended the imposition of
ordinary disbarment.
Both respondent and the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s report.
While respondent did not object to the recommended sanction, he did object to the
committee’s finding that a forfeiture order in the amount of $1,132,480.80 was
entered against him because the actual forfeiture judgment amount was $223,434.25.

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Respondent also objected to the committee’s failure to find any mitigating factors,
arguing that the following are present: the absence of a prior disciplinary record,
timely good faith effort to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, a cooperative
attitude toward the proceedings, character or reputation, and the imposition of other
penalties or sanctions. The ODC objected to the recommended sanction as too
lenient and argued that respondent should be permanently disbarred.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board determined that, with two exceptions, the
hearing committee’s factual findings are not manifestly erroneous and are supported
by the record. Regarding the exceptions, first the board noted that the committee
incorrectly found respondent was convicted of eight felony counts of criminal
conduct when, in fact, he was ultimately convicted of twelve felony counts. Second,
the board noted that the committee incorrectly found the forfeiture judgment was in
the amount of $1,132,480.80 when, in fact, the judgment amount was only
$223,434.25, for which respondent and his two co-defendants were held jointly and
severally liable. Elaborating on the second finding, the board also p ointed out that
respondent introduced exhibits after the hearing committee filed its report, showing
an agreement between respondent and the United States government wherein the
government agreed to seek no more than 40% of the forfeiture judgment from him.
Based on these findings, the board agreed with the committee that respondent
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.
The board then determined respondent intentionally violated duties owed to
the public and the lega l profession. While the federal court found no actual
pecuniary loss to Louisiana, the board found respondent’s conduct had the potential
to harm Louisiana and its taxpayers. Respondent’s convictions and associated
criminal conduct also tarnished the legal profession’s reputation. Relying on the

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ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the baseline
sanction is disbarment.
In aggravation, the board found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of
misconduct, multiple offenses, substantial experience in the practice of law
(admitted 1992), and illegal conduct. In mitigation, the board found the absence of
a prior disciplinary record, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or a
cooperative attitude toward the proceed ings, character or reputation, imposition of
other penalties or sanctions, and remorse.
In determining an appropriate sanction to recommend, the board noted that
respondent’s final sentence imposed in his criminal case was well below the sentence
recommended under the federal sentencing advisory guidelines. The board also
placed great weight on the federal district court judge’s comments when he
sentenced respondent. After finding that greed played no part in respondent’s
actions, the judge further stated, “Nor did Mr. Arata receive any proceeds from the
film infrastructure expenditures associated with the project; Peter Hoffman alone,
and by his own candid admission, profited from the tax credit scheme.”
After further considering this court’s prior jur isprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the board recommended respondent be disbarred, retroactive to the date
of his interim suspension.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s
recommendation.

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court.
La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). When the disciplinary proceedings involve an attorney
who has been convicted of a crime, the conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt
and the sole issue presented is whether respondent’s crimes warrant discipline, and

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if so, the extent thereof. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19(E); In re: Boudreau, 02-
0007 (La. 4/12/02), 815 So. 2d 76; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Wilkinson, 562 So.
2d 902 (La. 1990). The discipline to be imposed in a given case depends upon the
seriousness of the offense, the circumstances of the offense, and the extent of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Perez, 550
So. 2d 188 (La. 1989).
The record of this matter indicates that respondent was convicted in federal
court of multiple counts of conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, and lying to the FBI.
Therefore, he has violated Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct as charged.
The record also supports a finding that respondent knowingly and
intentionally violated duties owed to the public and the legal profession. While the
criminal case against respondent found no actual harm, the potent ial for significant
harm existed. The applicable baseline sanction is disbarment. The record supports
the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the disciplinary board.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we agree with the hearing
committee and the board that respondent’s conduct does not warrant permanent
disbarment. Instead, disbarment is the most reasonable sanction under the facts of
this matter. In support, we take guidance from In re: Gilmore , 16 -0967 (La.
10/19/16), 218 So. 3d 100, and In re: Tillman-Fleet, 20-1040 (La. 3/2/21), ___ So.
3d ___. In Gilmore , an attorney was convicted in federal court of racketeering by
accepting bribes in exchange for taking favorable actions on behalf of individuals
and organizations having busin ess before the Monroe City Council, of which the
attorney was an elected member. We declined to impose permanent disbarment in
light of the testimony of character witnesses and other mitigating factors as well as
the reasons given by the federal district court judge for imposing a more lenient
sentence than called for by the sentencing guidelines. Instead, we imposed ordinary

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disbarment. In Tillman-Fleet, an attorney received approximately $53,000 in federal
grant funds through fraudulent means. The attorney’s criminal matter was resolved
through a pre -trial diversion program, and she paid $3,500 in restitution. For this
misconduct, we imposed ordinary disbarment.
In light of this case law and the numerous mitigating factors present, we will
adopt the board’s recommendation and disbar respondent.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the record , it is ordered that Michael Peter
Arata, Louisiana Bar Roll number 21448, be and he hereby is disbarred, retroactive
to February 17, 2016, the date of his interim suspension. His name shall be stricken
from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana
shall be revoked. All costs and expense s in the matter are assessed against
respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest
to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.