Succession Of Peggy Blackwell Bruce

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FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #005
FR
OM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 27th day of January, 2021 are as follows:
BY Hughes, J.:
2020-C-00239 SUCCESSION OF PEGGY BLACKWELL BRUCE (Parish of Calcasieu)
REVERSED AND REMANDED. SEE OPINION.
Retired Chief Justice Johnson participated in this decision, which was
argued prior to her retirement.
Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., heard this case as Justice pr o tempore,
sitting in the vacant seat for District 4 of the Supreme Court. He is now
appearing as an ad hoc for Justice Jay B. McCallum.
Weimer, C.J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons.
Crichton, J., concurs and assign s reasons.
Crain, J., concurs in the result for the reasons assigned by Chief Justice
Weimer.

*Retired Chief Justice Johnson participated in this decision, which was argued prior to her
retirement. Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., heard this case as Justice pro tempore, sitting in
the vacant seat for District 4 of the Supreme Court. He is now appearing as an ad hoc for Justi ce
Jay B. McCallum.

01/27/2021
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2020-C-00239

SUCCESSION OF PEGGY BLACKWELL BRUCE

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal,
Third Circuit, Parish of Calcasieu

HUGHES, J.*
The primary issue in this case is whether the language of an attestation clause
in a notarial testament , which failed to expressly state t hat the testator declared or
signified that she signed the testament “at the end,” even though it was stat ed that
the testator signed “on each page,” violates the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577
and renders the testament absolutely null under La. C.C. art. 1573 (“The formalities
prescribed for the execution of a testament must be observed or the testament is
absolutely null.”).
The testator herein executed a notarial testament in 2016, naming her niece as
her sole legatee. After the testator’s death in 2018, her widower challenged the
testament, contending inter alia that it was rendered invalid by the failure to state in
the attestation clause that the testator declared she had signed “at the end ” of the
testament. The 2016 testament reads, in pertinent part:
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, in the presence of the undersigned
Notary Public and competent witnesses, I have declared this to be my
Last Will and Testament and have signed each page hereof on this 21st
. . . day of November, 2016, in Lake Charles, Calcasieu Parish ,
Louisiana.
[signature of testator]

* * *

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Signed on each page and declared by Testator, PEGGY B.
BRUCE, above named, in our presence, to be her Last Will and
Testament, and in the presence of the Testatrix and each other, we
hereunto subscribed our names on this the 21st day of November 2016.
[signature of witnesses, notary,
and testator]
* * *
(Emphasis added.)

Despite the fact that the testator actually signed on each separate page and at
the end of the testament, 1 the testament stated only that it was “[s]igned on each
page.” However, La. C.C. art. 1577(2) provides as follows:
In the presence of the testator and each other, the notary and the
witnesses shall sign the following declaration, or one substantially
similar: “In our presence the testator has declared or signified that this
instrument is his testament and has signed it
at the end and on each
other separate page, and in the presence of the testator and each other
we have hereunto subscribed our names this ____ day of _____, __.”

(Emphasis added.)

The district court invalidated the testament and, as described by the appellate
court, the district court “found the only deviation from La.Civ.Code art. 1577(2) was
the absence of the words ‘at the end’ in the attestation clause.” Succession of Bruce,
19-0208, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/8/20), 289 So.3d 121, 123. 2 T he appellate court
affirmed. Succession of Bruce, 19 -0208 at p. 6 , 289 So.3d at 125. This court
granted the subsequent writ application to r eview these rulings. Succession of
Bruce, 20-00239 (La. 6/22/20), 297 So.3d 773.

1 In her two-page testament the testator, Peggy Blackwell Bruce, signed: at the bottom of the first
page; at the end of her testamentary recitations on the second page; and at the bottom of the second
page, after the attestation clause. We note that 1997 Revision Comment (b) to La. C.C. art. 1577,
infra, states that, even though the testator is not required to sign after the attestation, rather only at
the end of the dispositive or appointive provisions of th e testament, “the validity of the document
is not affected by such a ‘double’ signature.”

2 While the testator’s widower raises several other minor defects in the testament, in brief to this
court, he does not appear to contest the appellate court find ing that the district court ruled solely
on the absence of the words “at the end” in the attestation clause; therefore, we deem these
additional assertions of minor defects to be in support of his contention that the testament was
hastily drafted and there fore defective in failing to state in the attestation clause that the testator
signed at the end of the testament.

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A disposition mortis causa may be made only in the form of a testament
authorized by law. La. C.C. art. 1570. The formalities prescribed for the execution
of a testament must be observed or the testament is absolutely null. L a. C.C. art.
1573. A notarial testament is one that is executed in accordance with the formalities
of Articles 1577 through 1580.1. La. C.C. art. 1576.
The codal provisions governing an attestation clause within a notarial
testament state that the mandated attestation clause need only be “substantially
similar” to the model declaration provided therein. See Successions of Toney, 16-
1534, p. 5 (La. 5/3/17), 226 So.3d 397, 401. See also In re Succession of Holbrook,
13-1181, p. 9 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d 845, 851 (“There must be an attestation
clause, or clause of declaration. However, its form is not sacrosanct: It may follow
the form suggested in the statute or use a form substantially similar thereto .”)
(quoting Succession of Morgan , 257 La. 380, 385, 242 So.2d 551, 552 (1970) ).
“The attestation clause is designed to evince that the facts and circumstances of the
confection and execution of the instrument conform to the statutory requirements.”
In re Succession of Holbrook, 13-1181 at p. 9, 144 So.3d at 851 (citing Succession
of Morgan, 257 La. at 385, 242 So.2d at 552). “The witnesses and the notary are
attesting to the observance of the formalities .” La. C.C. art. 1577, 1997 Revision
Comment (b).
Our jurisprudence requires that the validity of a testament should be
maintained through the liberal construction and application of the codal articles,
rather than a strict interpretation, as long as there is substantial compliance with the
codal provisions. See In re Succession of Holbrook, 13-1181 at pp. 8-9, 144 So.3d
at 851; Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So.2d 366, 368 (La. 1987). This court held
in Successions of Toney that “[t]here is a presumption in favor of the validity of
testaments in general, and proof of the nonobservance of formalities must be

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exceptionally compelling to rebut that presumption. ” Successions of Toney , 16 -
1534 at p. 5, 226 So.3d at 401.
Thus, the issue presented herein is whether an attestation clause verifying that
the testator declared that the testament was “[s]igned on each page” is substantially
similar to the Article 157 7 requirement that an attestation clause verify that the
testator declared that the testament was signed “at the end ” and “on each other
separate page.”
With respect to the La. C.C. art. 1577 language at issue herein, a review of the
history of th is article as well as i ts precursor, La. R.S. 9:2442, shows that when
former Section 2442 was enacted in 1952, it required only that the testator “sign each
separate sheet of the instrument” and that the witnesses and notary public attest that
the testator had “[s]igned (on each page) .” See 1952 La. Acts, No. 66, § 1 .
Thereafter, former Section 2442 was amended in 1964 to slightly modify the
pertinent language, requiring the testator to “sign his name on each separate sheet of
the instrument” and requiring the witnesses and notary to attest that the testator had
“[s]igned on each page.” See 1964 La. Acts, No. 123, § 1. In 1974, the first of these
former Section 2442 phrases was amended to read: “sign his name at the end of the
will and on each separate sheet of the instrument ”; however, there was no similar
change to the requisite attestation that the testator had “[s]igned on each page.” See
1974, No. 246, § 1 (emphasis added). In 1980, both of these former Section 2442
phrases underwent a minor re-wording, with the former changed to require that the
testator sign his name “at the end of the will and on each other separate page” and
the latter phrase modified so that the witnesses and notary attested that the testator
had signed “at the end and on each other separate page.” See 1980 La. Acts, No.
744, § 1 (emphasis added).
In the April 28, 1980 minutes of the House Committee on Civil Law and
Procedure, Professor H. Alston Johnson, III, Reporter for the Louisiana State Law

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Institute, stated that House Bill 439 (subsequently passed as 1980 Act No. 744)
“would permit people who cannot read to execute a statutory will,” and that the bill
“makes mostly technical corrections to help harmonize R.S. 9:2442 and 2443 .”
(Emphasis added.) Professor Johnson further stated that “the only substantive
change is that a statutory will cannot be executed in braille or other similar mode of
expression.” At the June 3, 1980 minutes of the Committee on Judiciary A, Terry
Ryder, Research Coordinator for the Louisiana State Law Institute , indicated that
House Bill 439 was one of four bills presented by the Law Institute , and it was “a
revision bill of statutory will provisions and the bill only proposed organization and
semantical revisions,” with the only substantive change to provide that a braille will
could not be used under these provisions. (Emphasis added.) House Bill 439 was
reported favorably.
From this history, we can see that , prior to the 1980 amendment, former
Section 2442 re quired the testator to “ sign his name at the end of the will and on
each separate sheet of the instrument,” but the witnesses and notary were required
to attest only that the testator had “[s]igned on each page”; however, t he 1980
amendment changed both of these phrases to state that the testator had signed “at the
end” and “on each other separate page. ” In addition, the comments by Professor
Johnson and Mr. Ryder, representing the author (the Louisiana Law Institute) of the
bill that became 1980 Act No. 744, make it apparent that th ese 1980 changes were
part of the technical or semantic revisions that the 1980 amendment was intended to
effect.
Thus, when former La. R.S. 9:2442 was repealed and its substance re-enacted
as La. C.C. art. 1577 (by 1997 La. Act No. 1421, §§ 1 & 8, eff. July 1, 1999), both
of the requirements ‒ directing where the testator was required to sign and what the
witnesses and notary were required to attest about where the testator had signed ‒
employed the language “at the end” and “on each other separate page.” The relevant

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language of former La. R.S. 9:2442, as re -enacted in La. C.C. art. 1577, currently
states that the testator must sign his name “at the end” of the testament and “on each
other separate page” and that the witnesses and notary must attest that the testator
signed his name “at the end” of the testament and “on each other separate page.”
In contrast, we observe that the attestation clause employed in the notar ial
testament at issue herein made use of the exact language set forth in the sample
attestation clause in the pre -1980 version of former La. R.S. 9:2442; i.e., that the
will was “[s]igned on each page ” (as noted, when changed in 1980 to its current
wording, the difference was denominated by its authors as a technical and/or
semantic change). The question before this court, therefore, is whether such a
semantic departure from Article 1577’s current language can be considered
substantially similar to the requisite attestation ‒ that the testator “signed at the end
and on each other separate page.”
We recognize that these two phrases have slightly different connotations, as
once the testator signs “at the end” of the testamentary recitations he is not required
to sign after the attestation clause even if it concludes on a subsequent page; the
testator is only required to sign on each of the other separate pages that precede his
signature at the end of the testamentary recitations. See La. C.C. art. 1577, 1997
Revision Comment (b) ,3 and Succession of Guezuraga , 512 So.2d at 368-69
(holding that a testator is not required to sign on a page that contains only the
concluding portion of the attestation claus e, which contains no testamentary
recitations). However, since a statement that the testator signed “on each page” is a

3 Revision Comment (b) states:

The testator need not sign after both the dispositive or appointive provisions of
this testament and the dec laration, although the validity of the document is not
affected by such a “double” signature . The testator is disposing of property,
appointing an executor or making other directions in the body of the testament
itself. He need only sign at the end of the dispositive, appointive or directive
provisions. The witnesses and the notary are attesting to the observance of the
formalities; they need only sign the declaration. [Emphasis added.]

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more extensive statement (inevitably including the page on which the “end” of the
testament appears an d encompassing even those pages beyond the testamentary
recitations) than that currently required by La. C.C. art. 1577 (2) ‒ that the testator
signed “at the end and on each other separate page” ‒ we cannot say that stating that
the testator has “signed on each page” impermissibly deviates from Article 1577’s
model language.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the statement contained in t he
attestation clause at issue ‒ that the testator “[s]igned on each page” ‒ accomplished
the intended purpose of ensuring that the notarial testament complied with the
signature requirements and was substantially similar to the model language of La.
C.C. art. 1577 , requiring an attestation that the testator signed “at the end and on
each other separate page.”
We distinguish the cases of Succession of Hanna, 19-01449 (La. 11/25/19),
283 So.3d 493 (per curiam), and Succession of Liner, 19-02011 (La. 1/27/21), ___
So.3d ___ ( rendered contemporaneously with the instant case), in which the
attestation clauses in the notar ial testaments at issu e stated only that the will had
been “signed” by the testator; such language was not found to be substantially
similar to the language required by the codal articles (La. C.C. art. 1577 in Hanna,
and La. C.C. art. 1579 in Liner), requiring an attestation that the testator had signed
“at the end” and “on each other separate page.” As we held in Liner, the statement
that the testator had “signed” the testament establishes only that the will was signed
once and does not establish tha t the testament was signed at the end and on each
other separate page, particularly for multiple-page testaments such as those at issue
in both Hanna and Liner. See Succession of Liner, 19-02011 at pp. 5-8, ___ So.3d
at ___. In contrast, we conclude herein that a declaration that a testator has signed
“on each page” of a testament necessarily establishes that the testament has been
signed on every page, including the page containing the end of the testament.

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DECREE
Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court and the district court decisions,
and we remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the
foregoing.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

01/27/2021
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2020-C-00239
SUCCESSION OF PEGGY BLACKWELL BRUCE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT,
PARISH OF CALCASIEU
WEIMER, C.J., concurring in the result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case. I write separately
only to note my disagreement with the majority’s citation to Succession of Hanna,
19-1449 (La. 11/25/19), 283 So.3d 493, and Succession of Liner, 19-2011 (La.
1/__/21), ___ So.3d ___, cases in which I dissented due to concerns over whether, in
applying the “substantially similar” requirement of La. C.C. arts. 1577(2) and
1579(2), the court unduly elevated form over the substance of the testator’s intent.1
For further explanation and analysis, see my dissenting opinion in Succession of
Liner, 19-2011 at __, ___ So.3d at ___ (Weimer, C.J., dissenting.).
1 Succession of Hanna, 19-1449 at 1, 283 So.3d at 493 (Weimer, J., dissenting); Succession of
Liner, 19-2011 at ___, ___ So.3d at ___ (Weimer, C.J., dissenting).

01/27/2021

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2020-C-00239

SUCCESSION OF PEGGY BLACKWELL BRUCE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD
CIRCUIT, PARISH OF CALCASIEU

Crichton, J., concurs and assigns reasons:

I concur in the result of the majority opinion. For the reasons assigned in my
dissent to Succession of Liner , 19-2011 (1/27/21), -- So. 3d --, I find that the 2018
testament is valid even though the attestation clause states that the testator “signed
each page” before the witness and notary and does not include the exact language of
the form attestation clause provided by C.C. art. 1577(2), i.e. that the will was signed
“at the end ” and “on each other separate page. ” Succession of Liner , 19 -2011
(1/27/21), -- So. 3d -- (Crichton, J., dissenting).