Ryan Delatte and George Lander v. Strickland Properties, LLC, James C. Strickland, III, Ghx Industrial, LLC, Ghx Holdings, LLC, Hose Specialty & Supply, LLC, Scott Elwood and Jim Riley

RYAN DELATTE AND * NO. 2020-C-0055
GEORGE LANDER
*
VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL
*
STRICKLAND PROPERTIES, FOURTH CIRCUIT
LLC, JAMES C. STRICKLAND, *
III, GHX INDUSTRIAL, LLC, STATE OF LOUISIANA
GHX HOLDINGS, LLC, HOSE *******
SPECIALTY & SUPPLY, LLC,
SCOTT ELWOOD AND JIM
RILEY

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2017-00748, DIVISION “I”
Honorable Ronald J. Sholes (Pro Tempore),
******
Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods
******
(Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome,
Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods, Judge Dale N. Atkins)

Aaron P. Mollere
Travis J. Beslin
MÖLLERE BESLIN, APLC
3500 N. Hullen Street,
Metairie, LA 70002

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS-RELATORS

Andrew D. Weinstock
Linda A. Hewlett
Autumn M. Coe
DUPLASS, ZWAIN, BOURGEOIS, PFISTER, WEINSTOCK & BOGART, LLC
3838 North Causeway Boulevard, Suite 2900
Metairie, LA 70002
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS

WRIT GRANTED
APRIL 8, 2020

RBW

RLB

DNA

Plaintiffs-Relators, Ryan Delatte and George Lander (“Relators”), seek

supervisory review of the trial court’s denial of its motion for revision of a prior

judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B). Relators sought a revision of the trial

court’s April 26, 2019 ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-

Respondents, Strickland Properties, LLC, James Strickland, III, GHX Industrial,

LLC, GHX Holdings, LLC, Hose Specialty & Supply, LLC, Scott Elwood, and

Jim Riley (“Respondents”), as to the issue of negligence only. For the following

reasons, the writ is granted.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 5, 2017, Relators filed their petition for damages and alleged

exposure to toxic mold due to Respondents’ failure to properly maintain the work

environment. On April 30, 2018, Respondents filed a motion for summary

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judgment and sought dismissal from Relators’ lawsuit arguing that Relators’

claims for intentional tort were without merit and that any negligence claims must

be resolved pursuant to the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act exclusively.

Counsel for Relators conceded that the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act was

the exclusive remedy for any negligence claims. Accordingly, on April 29, 2019,

the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents as to the issue of

negligence only. Thereafter, Relators retained new counsel and on November 14,

2019, filed a motion for revision of prior judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. art.

1915(B). The motion proceeded to a hearing on December 20, 2019. At the

hearing, while the trial court expressed consternation that the motion should be

granted and the underlying motion granting summary judgment reversed, the trial

court denied Relators’ motion. It was from this motion that Relators now seek

supervisory review.

DISCUSION

Assignments of Error

Relators argue that the trial court erred in denying its motion for revision of

its prior judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B). Relators further argue that

because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Relators’

negligence claims have remedy in tort or in the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation

Act, summary judgment in favor of Respondents as to the issue of negligence

should be reversed.

Standard of Review

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This Court applies “a de novo standard of review in examining a trial court’s

ruling on summary judgment. Accordingly, we use the same criteria that govern a

trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate.” Carrero

v. Mandina’s, Inc., 2019-0158, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/7/19), writ denied, 2019-

01554 (La. 11/25/19); 283 So.3d 497 (internal citations omitted). Pursuant to La.

C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3), “a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the

motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine

issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.”

Analysis

Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B), in pertinent part, “[w]hen a [trial]

renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment . . . as to one or more but

less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party . . . the

judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final

judgment . . .” and therefore “may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the

judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties”

Relators argue that because the trial court’s April 26, 2019 ruling granting

summary judgment in favor of Respondents as to the issue of negligence was not a

final judgment and in error, the ruling should be revised pursuant to La. C.C.P. art.

1915(B). Further, this Court explained that

“‘an interlocutory judgment is not subject to a motion for new trial.’ Johno v. Doe,

16-0200, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/17/16), 198 So.3d 1216, 1218. ‘The proper

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procedural vehicle to seek review of an interlocutory judgment that is not

immediately appealable is an application for supervisory writ.’ Id.”

Schwarzenberger v. Louisiana State Univ. Health Scis. Ctr.-New Orleans, 2018-

0480, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/3/18), writ denied, 2018-1966 (La. 1/28/19); 263

So.3d 428.

Motion for Summary Judgment

This Court has explained that “[i]n order to determine whether the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment was proper, this court must look to the

applicable substantive law.” Alexander v. Hancock Bank, 2016-0662, p. 4 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 2/8/17); 212 So.3d 713, 716. Here, Relators argue that the Louisiana

Workers’ Compensation Act is generally the exclusive remedy for an employee’s

work-related injuries precluding civil liability except for injuries resulting from

intentional acts, and rely on jurisprudence in which employees proceeded with a

tort claim pursuant to La. R. S. 23:1032 against their employers for injuries

associated with mold exposure. See Ruffin v. Poland Enterprises, L.L.C., 2006-

0244 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/13/06), 946 So.2d 695 and Watters v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 2008-0977 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/17/09), 15 So.3d 1128. Accordingly, Relators

argue that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Relators may

proceed in tort against Respondents, thus making the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment improper.

This Court, in Ruffin, held that the plaintiffs were not subject to the

exclusive remedy pursuant to the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act because

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the type of injury they experienced, exposure to mold and other contaminants, was

not a “precipitous event happening suddenly or violently” and such injuries arising

from prolonged exposure to mold did not constitute an occupational disease. 2006-

0244, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/13/06); 946 So.2d 695, 699.

Relators also rely on Watters v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., in which this Court

reasoned that while “[g]enerally, an employee’s claim based on La. R.S. 23:13

would be under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act and not in tort. . . .

[T]this court recognized an exception to this general rule in a case virtually

identical to this one, Ruffin v. Poland Enterprises, L.L.C., [20]06–0244 (La. App. 4

Cir. 12/13/06), 946 So.2d 695.” 2008-0977, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/17/09); 15

So.3d 1128, 114. Further, “exposure to mold in the workplace fell outside the

scope of the [Louisiana] Workers’ Compensation Act because such exposures were

not an accident, not an occupational disease, and not peculiar to or characteristic of

clerical employment. Accordingly, this [C]ourt held that workplace mold exposure

could form the basis for a tort action against an employer.” Similar to Ruffins and

Watters, Relators’ claims regarding exposure to mold in the workplace could form

the basis of tort claims against Respondents; thus, making the granting of summary

judgment inappropriate at this juncture.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the trial court erred in denying Relators’

motion to revise a prior judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B).

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Accordingly, Relators’ writ is GRANTED and the matter remanded for further

proceedings.

WRIT GRANTED

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