Clerk of Court For the Court Robert Tassin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company And Raymond Hebert

The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
Clerk of Court
For the Court
ROBERT TASSIN
VS.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY AND RAYMOND
HEBERT
No.2020-C-00652
_ _ _ _ _ _
IN RE: Robert Tassin - Applicant Plaintiff; Applying For Writ Of Certiorari, Parish
of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Number(s) 645,411, 1st Circuit
Court of Appeal, Number(s) 2019 CA 1162;
_ _ _ _ _ _
October 14, 2020
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
BJJ
JLW
JDH
JTG
Crichton, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Boddie, J., dissents for reasons assigned by Justice Crain.
S
upreme Court of Louisiana
October 14, 2020
10/14/2020 "See News Release 039 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

10/14/20
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-C-00652
R
OBERT TASSIN
VS.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY AND
RAYMOND HEBERT
O
N WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 1ST CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEAL, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
PE
R CURIAM
Writ granted. Plaintiff, Robert Tassin, filed suit against State Farm
Automobile Insurance Company and Raymond Hebert (“Defendants”) seeking
personal injury damages resulting from a car accident allegedly caused by Hebert’s
failure to yield at a traffic signal. Tassin amended his original petition to add the
City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge, alleging fault for failure to
properly maintain the traffic signal. Nearly two months prior to trial, but after a joint
pre-trial order (“PTO”) had been submitted by the parties, the City/Parish was
dismissed from the lawsuit. On the eve of trial, Defendants attempted to add Brenda
Dawson as a witness, although she was only listed as a witness in the PTO by the
City/Parish and not by Defendants (Defendants allege that the language included in
their PTO says they may call any witness listed by any other party). Tassin filed a
motion to strike Dawson’s testimony, which was granted by the district court.
The case proceeded to a bench trial, where conflicting witness testimony was
presented concerning which party had the right of way. Defendants also proffered
Dawson’s testimony that she witnessed the accident and observed Tassin run the red
light. Following trial, the district court ruled in Tassin’s favor and awarded damages.
The district court found the preponderance of the evidence proved the accident was

2

caused solely by Hebert’s negligence. The court of appeal vacated the ruling of
the district court and remanded the case for new trial finding the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding Dawson’s testimony, and the exclusion interdicted
the fact-finding process. A trial judge has great discretion in conducting a trial,
which discretion includes the admissibility of witness testimony. See La. C.C.P. art.
1631; Palace Properties, L.L.C. v. Sizeler Hammond Square Ltd. P'ship, 2001-2812
(La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/02), 839 So. 2d 82, 91, writ denied, 2003-0306 (La. 4/4/03),
840 So. 2d 1219. In this case, the district court excluded Dawson’s testimony
because defendants failed to identify her “in their discovery responses, witness lists,
or on the pre-trial order.” Moreover, Dawson’s proffered testimony was identical to
that of other defense witnesses, and clearly cumulative . Considering the vast
discretion gi ven to district courts in conducting trial proceedings and ruling on
evidentiary issues, we find the district court did not abuse that discretion in this case.
Given the particular facts of this case, we find the court of appeal erred and
therefore reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstate the ruling of the
district court.
REVERSED.