James J. Hartman, Jr. v. St. Bernard Parish Fire Department & Fara (Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 7)

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #013
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 24th day of March, 2021 are as follows:
BY Weimer, C.J.:
2020-C-00693 JAMES J. HARTMAN, JR. VS. ST. BERNARD PARISH FIRE
DEPARTMENT & FARA (Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 7)
AFFIRMED. SEE OPINION.
Hughes, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Genovese, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
McCallum, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by Justice
Crichton.
Griffin, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

03/24/21
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2020-C-00693
JAMES J. HARTMAN, JR.
VERSUS
ST. BERNARD PARISH FIRE DEPARTMENT & FARA
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit,
Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 7
WEIMER, Chief Justice
In this case, we are called on to decide a question left unresolved in Arrant v.
Graphic Packing International, Inc., 13-2878, 13-2981 (La. 5/5/15), 169 So.3d
296–whether an employee who suffers from noise-induced hearing loss is entitled to
indemnity benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), which confers such benefits
to employees who sustain “a permanent hearing loss solely due to a single traumatic
accident.” Finding that cumulative hearing loss incurred as a result of repeated
exposure to high noise levels on the job does not constitute “a permanent hearing loss
solely due to a single traumatic accident” as required for the award of permanent
partial disability benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), we affirm the judgments
below.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The salient facts of this case are not in dispute. In fact, the facts were the
subject of stipulation at trial.

James J. Hartman, Jr. has been employed by the St. Bernard Parish Fire
Department since May 25, 1990, and (as of the date of the filing of his claim) remains
on the job, serving as a District Chief. He has never been disabled from performing
the duties of his position.
During the course of his employment with the Fire Department, Mr. Hartman
was exposed to injurious levels of noise, which resulted in permanent hearing loss.
The Department was informed of Mr. Hartman’s hearing loss on September 20, 2006.
He underwent audiograms on January 24, 2008, April 10, 2014, March 1, 2017, and
September 27, 2017. Each test showed a gradual increase in hearing loss. The last
audiogram, performed by Dr. Daniel Bode on September 27, 2017, shows a 42.2%
binaural hearing loss. Dr. Bode opined that repeated exposure to loud noises for
extended periods of time (specifically, from 1990-2017) was “likely a contributing
factor to [Mr. Hartman’s] bilateral sensorineural hearing loss.”
Mr. Hartman filed a disputed claim for compensation seeking permanent partial
disability benefits for hearing loss pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p). The Fire
Department opposed the claim asserting, among other things, that Mr. Hartman’s
claim for work-related hearing loss is not covered by La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), which
applies only where the permanent hearing loss is “solely due to a single traumatic
accident.” The case was fixed for trial and the parties stipulated to the facts recited
above. In addition, they stipulated that the Fire Department currently provides
medical benefits to Mr. Hartman for his hearing loss pursuant to La. R.S. 33:2581.1
and that, given Mr. Hartman’s employment dates, the current versions of La. R.S.
23:1021(1), 23:1221(4)(p), and 23:1031(B) and (E) are the statutes applicable to Mr.
Hartman’s claim. The case was submitted on the stipulations and the briefs of the
parties.
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On December 10, 2019, a judgment was rendered in favor of the Fire
Department, dismissing Mr. Hartman’s claim. In that judgment, the Office of
Workers’ Compensation judge determined that Mr. Hartman’s hearing loss is a
cumulative hearing loss that occurred over time as a result of his exposure to injurious
noise, and not the result of a single traumatic event such as would entitle him to
permanent partial disability benefits under La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p). In written reasons,
the judge explained:
Upon reviewing the medical evidence and medical testimony, the Court
concludes that Claimant’s hearing loss is a cumulative hearing loss not
covered under La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p) which provides benefits to an
employee who suffers a permanent hearing loss solely due to a single
traumatic accident (emphasis added). ... Unfortunately, as written, La.
R.S. 23:1221(4)(p) does not provide benefits for cumulative hearing
loss.
Mr. Hartman appealed and the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed.
Hartman v. St. Bernard Parish Fire Department & Fara, 20-0103 (La.App. 4 Cir.
5/20/20), 301 So.3d 562. Like the Office of Workers’ Compensation judge, the court
of appeal rejected the contention that Mr. Hartman is entitled to permanent partial
disability benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p). Id.
The court of appeal began its discussion by distinguishing this court’s opinion
in Arrant v. Graphic Packaging International, Inc., 13-2878, 13-2981 (La. 5/5/15),
169 So.3d 296, which held that an employee’s gradual noise-induced hearing loss
constituted both an injury by accident and an occupational disease under the
Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (“LWCA”) such that the employer was
entitled to immunity from suits in tort. The court of appeal noted that while Arrant
held that noise-induced hearing loss falls within the parameters of the LWCA, the
court made no affirmative finding that gradual hearing loss is compensable under La.
R.S. 23:1221(4)(p). Indeed, the court of appeal noted, “notwithstanding the potential
3

compensability of any work-related accident and injury, the employer’s mandate to
pay workers’ compensation indemnity benefits is limited to those employees who
meet the statutory conditions imposed by the LWCA.” Hartman, 20-0103 at 4, 301
So.3d at 565.
Turning to the statutory conditions–the language of La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p)–the
court of appeal pointed out that the statute only authorizes payment of permanent
partial disability benefits to an employee who suffers hearing loss based “solely” on
a “single traumatic accident.” Id., 20-0103 at 6, 301 So.3d at 565. Finding the words
of the statute to be clear and unambiguous, the court of appeal rejected Mr. Hartman’s
suggestion that the statute should be read more expansively to include hearing losses
arising out of multiple single incidents. It likewise rejected Mr. Hartman’s assertion
that a contrary reading would unconstitutionally deprive him of a remedy. Id., 20-
0103 at 7, 301 So.3d at 566.
Applying the unequivocal language of La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p) to the medical
evidence, the court of appeal determined that Mr. Hartman’s permanent hearing loss
did not result solely from a single traumatic accident; thus, he did not meet his burden
of proving that he met the statutory conditions imposed for the award of indemnity
benefits. Id., 20-0103 at 7-8, 301 So.3d at 566. As a result, the court affirmed the
judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation denying Mr. Hartman permanent
partial disability benefits under La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p). Id.
Upon Mr. Hartman’s application, we granted certiorari to review the
correctness of the rulings below in light of our decision in Arrant and to dispel any
confusion that may have arisen from our opinion in that case. Hartman v. St.
Bernard Parish Fire Department & Fara, 20-00693 (La. 10/20/20), 303 So.3d 319.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
4

The facts in this case are undisputed. The issue presented is solely a question
of law, requiring the interpretation of a statute. Thus, our review is de novo.
Louisiana Municipal Association v. State, 04-0227 at p. 35 (La. 1/19/05), 893
So.2d 809, 836.
The statute at issue in this case is La. R.S. 23:1221(4), which sets forth the
conditions for an award of permanent partial disability benefits under the LWCA. It
provides, in pertinent part:
In the following cases, compensation shall be solely for
anatomical loss of use or amputation and shall be as follows:
. . . .
(p) In cases not falling within any of the provisions already made,
where the employee is seriously and permanently disfigured or suffers
a permanent hearing loss solely due to a single traumatic accident
..., compensation not to exceed sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages
not to exceed one hundred weeks may be awarded. ... [Emphasis
added.]
Mr. Hartman asserts that his hearing loss resulting from occupational exposure
to excessive noise is compensable under this statute because that hearing loss was
caused by a series of individual traumatic accidents, each one immediately causing
injury, although the damage only became perceptible over time. For this proposition,
he relies on this court’s decision in Arrant.
In Arrant, current and former employees of a manufacturing facility filed a tort
suit against their employer seeking damages arising from hearing loss sustained as a
result of repeated exposure to hazardous levels of industrial noise over the course of
their employment. The employer opposed the suit, seeking immunity in tort under the
LWCA. After proceeding through the lower courts, this court granted writs of
certiorari in the case to address the res nova issue “of whether gradual noise induced
hearing loss caused by occupational exposure to hazardous noise levels is a personal
injury by accident or an occupational disease, or both, under the Louisiana Workers’
5

Compensation Act ..., thereby entitling the defendant employer to immunity from
suits in tort under the exclusivity provisions of the LWCA.” Arrant, 13-2878 at 2,
169 So.3d at 298.
In answering the question posed, the court first discussed the history of the
LWCA. The court noted that prior to 1990, La. R.S. 23:1021 defined the terms
“accident” and “personal injury” as follows:
(1) “Accident” means an unexpected or unforeseen event
happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault and
producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury ....
(7) “Injury” and “Personal Injuries” includes only injuries by
violence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or
infections as naturally result therefrom. These terms shall in no case be
construed to include any other form of disease or derangement,
howsoever caused or contracted.
Id., 13-2878 at 9, 169 So.3d at 302 (quoting La. R.S. 23:1201).
The court then noted that in response to legislative action defining occupational
diseases under the LWCA more expansively to include repetitive injuries that result
in a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration, such as carpal tunnel
syndrome, the legislature revised the definition of “accident” in 1990 to provide:
(1) “Accident” means an unexpected or unforeseen actual,
identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or
without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective
findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual
deterioration of progressive degeneration. [Emphasis added.]
Id., 13-2878 at 12, 169 So.3d at 304.
After reviewing this legislative history, the court turned to the question before
it: whether noise-induced hearing loss qualifies as a “personal injury by accident”
under the pre-1990 definition of “accident.” Id., 13-2878 at 14, 169 So.3d at 305.
In determining that the Arrant plaintiffs suffered “an unexpected or unforeseen event
happening suddenly or violently,” within the meaning of the pre-1990 definition of
6

“accident,” the court relied on the opinion of the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Ross Roeser,
who opined that excessive noise causes immediate injury to the inner ear, even
though the effect of the damage thereto only gradually becomes perceptible over time
and only with repeated or continuous exposures to the hazardous levels of noise:
[Dr. Roeser] testified that the snail-shaped structure [in the ear]
is the auditory portion of the inner-ear called the cochlea. He explained
the cochlea has two and a half turns, which, if unrolled longitudinally,
could be said to be “tonotopically”organized. He explained that
“tonotopically” means each distinct anatomical part is responsible for a
different frequency, and high frequencies of sound are heard close to
where the mechanical force enters the cochlea. This is consistent with
Dr. Roeser’s testimony in a previous [noise-induced hearing loss] case,
in which he explained that, when a high level of energy enters the
cochlea “it literally destroys, it damages and destroys that row of hair
cells in that particular part of the ear.” Thus, there is an immediate
injury to the inner ear, even though the effect of the damage thereto
only gradually becomes perceptible over time and only with
repeated or continuous exposures to the hazardous levels of noise.
In this regard, the excessive noise is a traumatic injury to the ear.
This is not a long-latency occupational disease case. The damage to
the inner ear is immediate, though imperceptible until the damage
cumulates into a measurable hearing shift or loss.
Such traumatic damage to the inner ear certainly qualifies as an
“injury” within the meaning of the LWCA, because the high levels of
energy noise entering the ear cause damage to the inner ear “by violence
to the physical structure of the body,” i.e., the hairs and cells in the inner
ear. Furthermore, the exposure to hazardous levels of industrial
noise, as alleged by the plaintiffs, qualifies as an accident because
the hazardous level of industrial noise, a large quantity of energy
that did violence and damage to the inner ear, was an “unexpected
or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently, with or
without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms
of an injury.” [Citations omitted; emphasis added.]
Id., 13-2878 at 18-19, 169 So.3d at 307-308.
Mr. Hartman relies on this language to argue that the science behind hearing
loss, as explained by the court in Arrant, establishes that occupational exposure to
hazardous levels of noise is a “single traumatic accident” and that the permanent
hearing loss for which he seeks benefits is the result of multiple single traumatic
7

accidents, each of which caused immediate injury. Unfortunately, Mr. Hartman reads
this court’s language in Arrant too expansively.
In Arrant, we limited our holding that noise-induced hearing loss qualifies as
a “personal injury by accident” to the pre-1990 definition of “accident” contained in
La. R.S. 23:1021(1), specifically noting that “[w]e need not decide whether [noise-
induced hearing loss] falls within the definition of ‘accident’ since the 1990 revision
of La. Rev.Stat. 23:1021(1), because ... we also find that, since 1975 at least, [noise-
induced hearing loss] is a covered ‘occupational disease.’” Id., 13-2878 at 14 n.3, 169
So.3d at 305 n.3. Indeed, as we noted, the Arrant plaintiffs did not argue that noise-
induced hearing loss falls within the post-1990 revision of the definition of
“accident.” Id., 13-2878 at 12, 169 So.3d at 304. Nor does Mr. Hartman make that
specific argument here, having brought his claim as one for occupational disease.
Moreover, the issue the court addressed in Arrant was limited to whether the
plaintiffs in that case had a remedy for noise-induced hearing loss under the LWCA
that prevented them from bringing suit against their employer in tort. Significantly,
the court did not address whether the plaintiffs were entitled to any specific benefits
under the LWCA, noting instead that entitlement to benefits “is a matter of proof at
trial.” Id., 13-2878 at 23, 169 So.3d at 310.
In this case, therefore, we are presented with the issue left unresolved in
Arrant: whether Mr. Hartman’s work-related noise-induced hearing loss entitles him
to benefits under La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p). To answer this question, we rely on well-
settled rules of statutory interpretation.
The fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative
intent. Moss v. State, 05-1963 at p. 15 (La. 4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1185, 1196.
Ascertainment of that intent is accomplished through the rules of statutory
8

interpretation. Id. Pursuant to those rules, the starting point in the interpretation of
any statute is the language of the statute itself. Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d
885, 888 (La. 1983). When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does
not lead to absurd consequences, the law must be applied as written, and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the legislative intent. La. C.C. art. 9; La. R.S.
1:4. Unequivocal provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be
applied by giving the words their generally prevailing meaning, with words of art and
technical terms accorded their technical meaning. La. C.C. art. 11; La. R.S. 1:3.
Further, it is presumed that every word, sentence, or provision in a statute was
intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such
provision, and that no unnecessary words or provision were employed. Moss, 05-
1963 at 15, 925 So.2d at 1196. As a result, courts are bound, if possible, to give
effect to all parts of a statute and to construe no sentence, clause, or word as
meaningless and surplusage if a construction giving force to, and preserving, all
words can legitimately be found. Id. Finally, laws on the same subject matter are to
be interpreted in reference to each other. La. C.C. art. 13.
In addition to the above principles which guide courts in determining
legislative intent, the legislature has enacted specific rules for the interpretation of the
provisions of the LWCA. Pertinent to our consideration are La. R.S.
23:1020.1(D)(2), which directs that “the laws pertaining to workers’ compensation
shall be construed in accordance with the basic principles of statutory construction
and not in favor of either employer or employee,” and La. R.S. 23:1021.1(D)(3)
which instructs that “[i]f the workers’ compensation statutes are to be liberalized,
broadened, or narrowed, such actions shall be the exclusive purview of the
legislature.”
9

With these principles in mind, we note that the language to be construed in this
case is La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p)’s directive that permanent partial disability benefits not
to exceed sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages for a period not to exceed one
hundred weeks may be awarded “where the employee ... suffers a permanent hearing
loss solely due to a single traumatic accident.” (Emphasis added.) We find, as did
the lower courts, that these words are clear and unambiguous. According the words
the generally prevailing meaning, as we must, we also find that the clear legislative
intent expressed in the statute is to provide permanent partial disability benefits to an
employee who suffers a permanent hearing loss solely (i.e., to the exclusion of all
else1) due to a single (i.e., consisting of only one in number2) traumatic accident.
Here, the expert medical evidence presented through the report of Dr. Daniel
Bode concludes that “Mr. Hartman’s repeated exposures to loud noises for extended
periods of time (1990-2017) is likely a contributing factor in his bilateral
sensorineural hearing loss.” (Emphasis added.) Obviously, “repeated” exposure is
not synonymous with a “single” exposure; neither is a “contributing factor”
synonymous with a “sole” one. The expert evidence in this case clearly disqualifies
Mr. Hartman from indemnity benefits under La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p).
Despite the plain words of the statute, relying on Arrant’s description of the
injury process (each single burst of sound is a trauma that causes immediate injury
qualifying as an accident), Mr. Hartman argues that his hearing loss is the result of
a series of single traumatic accidents, entitling him to benefits under the statute. In
short, Mr. Hartman would require the court re-write the language of La. R.S.
23:1221(4)(p) so as to provide disability benefits for permanent hearing loss “solely
1 WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1106 (1973).
2 WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1083 (1973).
10

due to a series of single traumatic accidents,” or to “multiple single traumatic
accidents.” This the court is not free to do.
Had the legislature intended to extend disability benefits for a “series” of
traumatic accidents or “multiple” traumatic accidents, it could easily have done so by
using those exact words. It did not. That the legislature deliberately chose to restrict
the scope of partial permanent disability benefits by limiting compensability to
permanent hearing loss caused by a single traumatic accident–and not a series of
accidents–is confirmed by the 1986 amendment of La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p). Prior to
its amendment, La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p) provided, in pertinent part, that “[i]n cases not
falling within any of the provisions already made, ... where the usefulness of a
physical function is seriously impaired, the court may allow such compensation as is
reasonable ... .” Through 1985 La. Acts 926 § 1and 945 § 1, the legislature inserted
the current language expressly limiting benefits to “permanent hearing loss solely due
to a single traumatic accident.” Thus, while Mr. Hartman’s noise-induced hearing
loss might arguably have entitled him to benefits under the pre-amendment version
of La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), with the passage of the 1986 amendment, the legislature
made clear its intent to restrict benefits to a certain type of hearing loss, drawing a
distinction between cases in which a single exposure–such as a violent
explosion–produces immediately apparent trauma in employees exposed to it, and
those in which the loss is gradual and cumulative, produced by repeated exposure to
hazardous levels of noise.
The legislature’s deliberate choice in this regard is also confirmed by the
definition of the word “accident” that applies in this case–the post-1990 definition
which the parties stipulated as the applicable law. As explained above, the definition
11

of “accident” (a term of art in the context of the LWCA3) was amended by the
legislature in 1990 to exclude from its ambit injury that is “simply a gradual
deterioration or progressive degeneration.” La. R.S. 23:1021.1. That noise-induced
hearing loss is just such an injury is evidenced by the very explanation of the disease
process Mr. Hartman draws on in Arrant. As we explained therein: “[T]here is an
immediate injury to the inner ear, ... though the effect of the damage thereto only
gradually becomes perceptible over time and only with repeated or continuous
exposure to the hazardous levels of noise.” (Emphasis added.) Arrant, 13-2878 at
18-19, 169 So.3d at 307-308. Clearly, Mr. Hartman’s noise-induced hearing loss no
longer qualifies as an “accident” as that term is defined by statute and as it appears
in La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p).
Mr. Hartman contends nevertheless that unless La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p) is
interpreted to provide indemnity benefits for his hearing loss, the quid pro quo which
is at the core of the LWCA will be abrogated and he will be unconstitutionally
deprived of a remedy at law, in violation of La. Const. art. I, § 22.
Unquestionably, the quid pro quo between employers and employees to which
Mr. Hartman refers is essential to the LWCA. As we explained in O’Regan v.
Preferred Enterprises, Inc., 98-1602 (La. 3/17/00), 758 So.2d 124:
The Workers’ Compensation Act provides basic coverage for
injuries sustained in the course of employment. The Act was a
compromise between labor and industry pursuant to which laborers
received guaranteed no-fault recovery and industry was relieved of the
possibility of large damage awards in the tort system. That is, the
employer agreed to pay on some claims for which there might have been
no liability in exchange for the limited liability, and the employee agreed
to give up available tort actions and remedies in exchange for sure and
certain relief under the Act. This quid pro quo between employers and
employees is central to the Act. Thus, it is a fundamental principle that
the employee must have the possibility of recovery under the Act for this
3 O’Regan v. Preferred Enterprises, Inc., 98-1602 at pp. 9-10 (La. 3/17/00), 758 So.2d 124, 131.
12

compromise to hold and for the scope of immunity from tort liability
granted by the exclusivity provisions to hold.
Id., 98-1602 at 18, 758 So.2d at 136. Thus, we agree with Mr. Hartman that if the
LWCA, and our interpretation of the provisions of La R.S. 23:1221(4)(p) in
particular, leave him without a remedy under the Act, then the quid pro quo that
forms the basis of the Act would be abrogated and he would be entitled to pursue a
remedy in tort. However, this is not the case.
In this case, in addition to the permanent partial disability benefits Mr. Hartman
sought, the LWCA provides three other categories of indemnity benefits: temporary
total, permanent total, and supplemental earnings benefits. La. R.S. 23:1221(1)(2)
and (3). Because Mr. Hartman stipulated that he has continued to work with his
hearing loss and has not suffered a wage loss, he is not eligible for, and did not seek,
indemnity benefits under these provisions. Furthermore, as explained above, the
medical evidence in this case disqualifies him from permanent partial disability
benefits under La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p) because his hearing loss is cumulative, the
result of repeated exposure to loud noises for extended periods of time, which is
likely a “contributing factor” in his hearing loss and not “solely due to a single
traumatic accident.” However, this does not leave him without a remedy.
As the court of appeal in the Arrant case correctly recognized, upon proof of
impairment of function, employees suffering from occupational noise-induced
hearing loss are entitled to compensation under the LWCA, even if only under La.
R.S. 23:1203,4 which obligates the employer to furnish medical and vocational
4 La. R.S. 23:1203 provides, in relevant part:
A. In every case coming under this Chapter, the employer shall furnish all
necessary drugs, supplies, hospital care and services, medical and surgical treatment,
and any nonmedical treatment recognized by the laws of this state as legal, and shall
utilize such state, federal, public, or private facilities as will provide the injured
employee with such necessary services. ....
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rehabilitation expenses, prosthetic devices and other expenses. Arrant v. Graphic
Packaging Intern., Inc., 48,197 at 16 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/25/13), 127 So.3d 924, 933,
aff’d., 13-2878 (La. 5/5/15), 169 So.3d 296. Indeed, Mr. Hartman stipulated that his
employer, the Fire Department, currently provides him with such medical benefits for
his hearing loss pursuant to La. R.S. 33:2581.1, which provides, in pertinent part:
Any loss of hearing which is ten percent greater than that of the
affected employee’s comparable age group in the general population and
which develops during employment in the classified fire service in the
state of Louisiana shall, for purposes of this Section only, be classified
as a disease or infirmity connected with employment. The employee
affected shall be entitled to medical benefits including hearing
prosthesis as granted by the laws of the state of Louisiana to which
one suffering an occupational disease is entitled, regardless of
whether the fireman is on duty at the time he is stricken with the loss of
hearing. .... [Emphasis added.]
La. R.S. 33:2581.1(A). This statute, which is among a group of statutes that address
service-related occupational diseases suffered by firefighters, clearly adverts to the
provisions of La. R.S. 23:1203 when it refers to “medical benefits including hearing
prosthesis as granted by the laws of the state of Louisiana to which one suffering an
occupational disease is entitled.” The statute is, in effect, a legislative
acknowledgment that, at a minimum, medical benefits under the LWCA are available
as compensation to any employee who sustains occupational noise-induced hearing
loss. Whether indemnity benefits are additionally available hinges on proof of a
particular level of disability, a proof that is absent under the facts of this case.
As the foregoing discussion reveals, Mr. Hartman’s claim that unless La. R.S.
23:1221(4)(p) is interpreted to provide indemnity benefits for his cumulative hearing
loss, the quid pro quo that is at the core of the LWCA will be abrogated, and he will
be unconstitutionally deprived of a remedy at law, is without merit. As we
recognized in Arrant, the initial core compromise that is the quid pro quo has
14

evolved over the years and has been modified by the legislature, which has the
prerogative to define the conditions and limitations under which workers can recover
compensation benefits. Arrant, 13-2878 at 9, 169 So.3d at 302. While the
employer’s mandate to pay compensation is firm, it is not absolute, but limited to the
employee’s ability to meet the conditions imposed by the legislature for the receipt
of benefits.
In the case of indemnity benefits for occupational hearing loss, through the
enactment of La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p), the legislature has drawn a distinction between
cases in which a single exposure to noise (such as an explosion) causes immediate
trauma in employees exposed to it, and those in which the hearing loss is gradual and
cumulative, caused by repeated exposures. This distinction is not arbitrary; nor does
it deprive an employee suffering from noise-induced hearing loss of due process or
equal protection of the law. Rather, it reflects a policy decision that is uniquely the
province of the legislature to make.
Heeding the legislature’s directive that workers’ compensation statutes be
interpreted in accordance with the basic rules of statutory construction, and that it is
the responsibility of the legislature–and not this court–to liberalize, broaden or
narrow these statutes,5 we decline the invitation to expand the scope of La. R.S.
23:1221(4)(p) to apply to permanent hearing loss due to a series of single traumatic
accidents; i.e., to cumulative hearing loss sustained over years of exposure to
hazardous levels of noise. Applying instead the clear and unambiguous words of the
statute, we find that the medical evidence in this case establishes that Mr. Hartman’s
hearing loss did not result solely from a single traumatic accident and, thus, he is not
entitled to permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p).
5 La. R.S. 23:1020.1(D)(2) and (3).
15

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeal is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
16

03/24/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-C-0693
J
AMES J. HARTMAN, JR.
VE
RSUS
S
T. BERNARD PARISH FIRE DEPARTMENT & FARA
O
n Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit,
Office of Worker’s Compensation, District 7
H
ughes, J., additionally concurring.
Because Mr. Hartman did not miss any work or pay and has received medical
benefits, I concur in the result reached in this case.
However, further erosion of workers compensation claimants’ remedies may
well upset the quid pro quo of workers compensation, unconstitutionally deprive the
injured worker a remedy at law, and lead to tort liability on the part of the employer.

03/24/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-C-00693
J
AMES J. HARTMAN, JR.
VS.
ST. BERNARD PARISH FIRE DEPARTMENT & FARA
O
N WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH
CIRCUIT, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 7
C
richton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Th
e Legislature has the prerogative to define the conditions and limitations
under which workers can receive benefits. Arrant v. Graphic Packaging, Intern. Inc.,
13-2878, p.9 (La. 5/5/15), 169 So. 3d 296, 302. It is not for this Court to expand
those conditions. Notably, this claimant is not left without any financial assistance.
As the majority opinion points out, and as claimant himself stipulated at trial, the
Fire Department currently provides him with medical benefits for his hearing loss.
It is simply that the legislature has barred him from recovering under R.S.
23:1221(4)(p)—a decision that is within the legislature’s domain. As I have
previously observed, though the result may be unfortunate for this claimant, we must
follow the legislature’s plain directive in this matter, and I agree with the majority
opinion. See, e.g., Griggs v. Bounce N’Around Inflatables, LLC, 18 -0726 (La.
1/30/19), 281 So. 3d 628 (Crichton, J., additionally concurring) (“[O]ur result today
is necessary in light of the plain language of the statute. . .”).

03/24/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-C-00693
J
AMES J. HARTMAN, JR.
VS.
ST. BERNARD PARISH FIRE DEPARTMENT & FARA
O
n Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Office of Workers'
Compensation, District 7
G
enovese, J., additionally concurs and assigns the following reasons.
I fully concur with the reasons assigned by Justice Crichton. Additionally, I
write not only to acknowledge the unfortunate correctness of this decision, but also
to emphasize that the law is the law, and it is neither our prerogative nor our role to
change that law or otherwise legislate from the bench. However, worker s’
compensation indemnity benefits in this case should not be restricted to a single
traumatic event.
I fail to follow the rationale, nor do I find it justified, that in today’s workplace,
workers’ compensation indemnity benefits for hearing loss may only be awarded to
a worker exposed to a single traumatic accident and not for injuries that occur over
time. In this case, the worker’s proven cumula tive hearing loss was attributed to
required, on-the-job exposure to excessive levels of noise over an extended period
of work time. In my view, on-the-job hearing loss is hearing loss, whether caused by
a single traumatic event or over an extended period of time; and it should not be
restricted to a single traumatic event. Hopefully, the legislature will address and
correct this inequity.

03/24/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-C-00693
J
AMES J. HARTMAN, JR.
VS.
ST. BERNARD PARISH FIRE DEPARTMENT & FARA
O
n Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Office of Workers'
Compensation, District 7
G
RIFFIN, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
I write separately to note that our decision today does not overrule that portion
of Arrant v. Graphic Packaging Intern., Inc., which held noise induced hearing loss
to be an occupational illness. 13-2878, pp. 21-22 (La. 5/5/15), 169 So.3d 296, 309-
10. Despite Mr. Hartman’s ability to recover medical expenses under La. R.S.
23:1203, the potential lack of a remedy in tort tests the limits of the quid pro quo
bargain at the heart of the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. See O’Regan v.
Preferred Enterprises, Inc. , 98 -1602, p. 18 (La. 3/17/00), 758 So.2d 124, 136.
Nonetheless, it remains the prerogative of the legislature to correct any gap in the
law as to Mr. Hartman’s available remedies absent constitutional infi rmity. See
Kelly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 14-1921, p. 20 (La. 5/5/15), 169 So.3d 328,
340; Krielow v. Louisiana Dept. of Agriculture and Forestry , 13-1106, p. 4 (La.
10/15/13), 125 So.3d 384, 388.