Bayou Bridge Pipeline, Llc v. 38.00 Acres, More Or Less

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #020
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 13th day of May, 2021 are as follows:
BY Genovese, J.:
2020-C-01017 BAYOU BRIDGE PIPELINE, LLC VS. 38.00 ACRES, MORE OR LESS,
LOCATED IN ST. MARTIN PARISH, ET AL. (Parish of St. Martin)
AFFIRMED. SEE OPINION.
Weimer, C.J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Crain, J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.
McCallum, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by Weimer, C.J.

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05/13/21

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2020-C-01017

BAYOU BRIDGE PIPELINE, LLC

VS.

38.00 ACRES, MORE OR LESS, LOCATED IN ST. MARTIN PARISH,
ET AL.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of St. Martin

GENOVESE, J.
This case involves whether an award of attorney fees and other litigation costs
to defendant landowners in an expropriation proceeding m ay be upheld under
current law. For the following reasons, we concur and affirm the court of appeal’s
award to defendants; however, we find that the basis of the award is vested in the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974 rather than statutory law.
The facts in this case arise out of the construction of the Bayou Bridge
Pipeline, which carries crude oil from Lake Charles to St. James, Louisiana. As part
of the project, Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC (“BBP”) , sought to acquire servitudes
on the property of various land owners. The specific piece of property at the center
of this litigation is approximately 38 acres of land (“the property”) in St. Martin
Parish. Prior to reaching servitude agreements with all individuals with an ownership
interest in this particular parcel of land, BBP began pipeline construction.
Specifically, in July 2018, BBP entered the property, cleared trees, dug trenches, and
undertook other action in furtherance of the project.
Peter Aaslestad, one of the property owners, filed suit against BBP in order to
enjoin BBP from further construction. BBP later stipulated that it would remain off
the property as of September 10, 2018. However, the pipeline construction was more
than 90% complete at that time.

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Meanwhile, in late July 2018, after it had begun construction on the property,
BBP filed expropriation litigation against hundreds of property owners with whom
servitude agreements could not be reached, including Mr. Aaslestad, Katherine
Aaslestad, and Theda Larson Wright (hereinafter collectively referred to as
“defendants”). In response, defendants filed a reconventional demand against BBP,
alleging BPP trespassed on their property and violated due process by proceeding
with construction of the pipeline prior to a judgment of expropriation.1
The matter proceeded to a trial wherein the trial court granted BBP’s petition
for expropriation, finding the expropriation served a public and necessary purpose.
The trial court also granted defendants’ reconventional demand, finding that BBP
trespassed on defendants’ property prior to obtaining permission or legal authority.
The trial court ultimately awarded each defendant $75.00 for the expropriation and
another $75.00 in trespass damages. Finally, the trial court ordered that each party
bear its costs and attorney fees. Relying on La. R.S. 19:12, the trial court reasoned
as follows:
The Court al so notes and finds the provisions of La. R.S. 19:12 are
applicable in this case. It states “if the highest amount offered prior to
the filing of the expropriation suit is equal to or more than the final
award[,] the Court may[,] in its discretion[,] order the defendant to pay
all or a portion of the cost of the expropriation proceeding.” Id. The
Court in this case finds that the defendants were sent proper
documentation pursuant to La. R.S. 19:2 .1, and the final tender made
to the defendants was that of $75. Bayou Bridge has prevailed on its
expropriation case pursuant to La. R.S. 19:12. However, the
landowners have prevailed on their trespass claim. Therefore, this
Court orders that each party will bear its own costs.

Defendants appealed. Pertinent to the issues before this Court, defendants
specifically argued that the trial court failed to render judgment on parts of their
reconventional demand alleging violations of their property and due process rights.
A five-judge panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed

1 Defendants answered the suit, alleging the Louisiana expropriation statutes were unconstitutional
as applied to oil pipelines. Defendants also included an exception of prematurity, alleging BBP
failed to offer information to defendants as required by La. R.S. 19:2.1.

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in part in a 4-1 decision. In its ruling, the majority declined to address the trespass
damage award, finding that it had not been properly raised as an assignment of error.2
On the merits, the court of appeal upheld the constitutionality of the expropriation
process set fort h in La. R.S. 19:2(8), La. R.S. 45:251, and La. Const. a rt. I, §
IV(B)(4).3 In addition, the court of appeal found the Louisiana expropriation statutes
do not violate property and due process rights guaranteed in the Louisiana
Constitution. The court of appeal also affirmed numerous evidentiary rulings made
by the trial court. Finally, t he court of appeal determined that BBP violated
defendants’ due process rights and awarded $10,000 .00 to each defendant for this
violation:
As co-owners, Defendants’ due process rights were individually viable
and as against BBP, a third- party, each were entitled to be recognized
regardless of their co-ownership interest or residence. In accord ,
Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government Law, 53 La.L.Rev. 823,
850 (1993) (footnotes omitted) (stating “the right to exclude others has
been recognized as an essential attribute of the ownership of immovable
property. When the government physically invades (or authorizes third
parties to invade) real estate, a taking occurs even if the financial impact
is minimal.”). Thus, regardless of BBP’s assertions of limitation, each
Defendant was entitled to assert their constitutionally guaranteed due
process rights against BB P’s expropriation action and contest BB P’s
right to such an expropriation. As such, the due process rights
established and specifically recognized in La.Const. art. 1, § 4 existed
to protect Defendants’ property ownership rights, and BBP willfully,
wantonly, and recklessly violated those rights.

In the present case, the trial court’s failure to award damages for BBP’s
violation of Defendants’ due process rights, a claim separate and apart
from their award for trespass damages, constituted legal error. When
the trial court errs as a matter of law in its assessment of damages rather
than abuses its “much discretion,” an appellate court, if it can, must
assess res nova the amount of damages appropriate under the
circumstances. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1128 (La.1987).

2 The court of appeal ultimately determined that the adequacy of the trespass damage award was
not properly raised by defendants. It noted that while defendants raised as error the trial court’s
failure to compensate them for BBP’ s violation of their due process rights, defendants did not
specifically address the adequacy of the $75.00 trespass damage award, and they failed to argue
that the $75.00 award should be increased.

3 These statutory and constitutional provisions permit common carriers —such as BB P—to
expropriate private property for public and necessary purposes . Specifically, the court of appeal
reasoned the expropriation statutes do not violate the nondelegation doctrine, as it affords
expropriation defendants a clear process for judicial review.

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Bayou Bridge Pipeline , LLC v. 38.00 Acres, 19-565, pp. 35 –36 (La. App. 3 Cir.
7/15/20), 304 So.3d 529, 550-51 (footnote omitted). Ultimately, the court of appeal
found that although defendants could not challenge the amount of the trespass award,
they were entitled to damages for due process violations:
After reviewing the record, we find the Defendants proved they are
entitled to damages for BBP ’s violation of the due process rights
particularized in this state ’s constitution. To decide otherwise would
give entities such as BBP the unrestrained ability to decide whether
another citizen’s property rights can be restricted and makes a mockery
of this state’s carefully crafted laws of expropriation. Therefore, we
award these Defendants each $10,0 00.00 for BBP’s violation of their
due process rights.

Id., at 39, 304 So.3d at 552. Finally, the court of appeal found defendants are entitled
to attorney fees and other litigation costs pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5111, but remanded
the matter for a hearing to determine the reasonable amounts of each:
In addition, the Defendants have prayed for an award of reasonable
attorney fees and expert witness fees. At the time BBP violated the
Defendants’ due process rights[,] it acted as a private entity qualified as
an agent of the government for purposes of La.R.S. 13:5111. See
Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., 249 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2001). As such, when
it commenced pipeline construction on Defendants’ property prior to
the initiation of expropriation proceedings, it became liable to
compensate Defendants for reasonable attorney fees and expert witness
costs pursuant to the provisions of La.R.S. 13:5111. Because the record
is incomplete with regard to these elements of costs, we remand this
matter to the trial court for a hearing to determine those elements of
cost.[
4]

Id., at 40, 304 So.3d at 552 –53. BBP thereafter so ught writs in this Court,
arguing that the court of appeal erred in awarding defendants attorney fees and expert
witness costs pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5111, because BBP is not “the State of
Louisiana, a parish, or municipality or other political subdivision or an agency of
any of them.” Alternatively, BBP averred that the present action does not involve a

4 Judge Ezell dissent ed in part and assigned reasons, stating that he would not have awarded
defendants damages for violation of due proc ess. Judge Ezell further stated: “I believe that the
damages suffered by Defendants for Bayou Bridge’s improper entry onto their property were for
trespass alone.”

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proceeding “for compensation for the taking of property by the defendant [in
reconvention], other than through an expropriation proceeding[.]”
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5111(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[a] court of Louisiana rendering judgment for the plaintiff, in a
proceeding brought against the state of Louisiana, a parish, or
municipality or other political subdivision or an agency of any of them,
for compensation for the taking of property by the defendant, other than
through an expropriation proceeding, shall determine and award to the
plaintiff, as part of the costs of court, such sum as will, in the opinion
of the court, compensate for reasonable attorney fees actually incurred
because of such proceeding.

By its plain language, La. R.S. 13:5111 does not allow for an award of attorney fees
in this case, as it involves expropriation by a private entity. Specifically, we find that
BBP is not an “agency” of the state.
5 Therefore, each party’s arguments regarding
whether or not this statute applies will not be addressed. Instead, we find that the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974 does provide the legal authority and basis to uphold
the award of attorney fees and litigation costs.
The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 requires that landowners be compensated
“to the full extent” of their loss, which “shall include, but not be limited to, the
appraised value of the property and all costs of relocation, inconvenience, and any
other damages actually incurred by the owner because of the expropriation.” La.
Const. Art. I, § IV(B)(5).This article applies to both public and private entities and
was amended in the Constitution of 1974 in order to encompass costs of litigation
and attorney fees. See Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. v. Gerson, 17-0229, 17-
0296, p. 28 (La. App. 4 Ci r. 11/14/18), 260 So.3d 634, 654, writ denied, 18-2054
(La. 2/25/19), 266 So.3d 292 (reviewing cases and legislative history from the 1973

5 We note that the legislature has previously amende d certain expropriation statutes in order to
allow for attorney fee awards. For example, La. R.S. 19:201 was amended to allow attorney fees
to be awarded against private expropriating entities in unsuccessful expropriation actions by
substituting the phrase “any expropriating authority referred to in R.S. 19:2” in place of the prior
listing of state governmental expropriating authorities. La. R.S. 19:201 (current version as
amended in 2012). However, the l egislature did not similarly amend La. R.S. 13:5111, which
retains the listing of state governmental expropriating authorities that was contained in the original
version of La. R.S. 19:201.

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Constitutional Convention, in holding “the payment of attorney fees in expropriation
actions that ‘makes a landowner truly whole’” and that “a landowner ‘is entitled to’
attorney’s fees as part of the compensation ‘to the full extent of his loss, ’ which is
mandated by the constitution”), quoting Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ. &
Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Villavaso, 14-1277, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/15), 183
So. 3d 757, 764, writ denied sub nom. Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ. & Agric.
& Mech. Coll. v. Villavaso, 16-0161 (La. 3/24/16), 190 So.3d 1193; Bd. of Comm’rs
of New Orleans Exhibition Hall Auth. v. Missouri Pac. RR Co., 93-0755, 625 So.2d
1070, 1082 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/22/93), as clarified on reh’g, 11/18/93, writ granted,
93-2499 (La. 9/27/93) , 627 So.3d 638, writ denied, 93-2518 (La. 10/15/93), 627
So.2d 638, writs denied, 93-3100, 93- 3088 (La. 1/28/94), 630 So.2d 802, cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1220, 114 S.Ct. 2707, 129 L.Ed.2d 835 (1994)). Additionally, this
Court has previously hel d that La. Const. Art. I, § IV allows landowners to seek
compensation for land already taken or damaged by a “governmental or private
entity” exercising the power of eminent domain. State through Dep’t of Transp. &
Dev. v. Chambers Inv. Co, Inc ., 595 So.2d 598, 602 (La. 1992) (emphasis added).
This constitutional provision has served as the basis for fee awards for “wrongful
taking[s] in violation of both the Louisiana and United States Constitutions. ” See
Gravolet v. Bd. of Comm ’rs for Grand Prairie Levee Dist. , 598 So.2d 12 31, 1233
(La. App. 4 Cir. 1992). Furthermore, regardless of the specific procedural posture of
the case, i.e., whether the proceeding is an expropriation matter (where the damage
to property is anticipated) or an inverse taking (where the damage to the property
occurred before suit was filed), “one thing that both actions [] have in common . . .
is our state constitution. Larkin Dev. N., L.L.C. v. City of Shreveport, 53,374 , p. 13
(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/4/20), 297 So.3d 980, 990, reh’g denied 7/16/20, writ denied, 20-
01026 (La. 12/22/20), 30 7 So.3d 1039. Moreover, “we note that the courts of this

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state have held that both expropriation and inverse condemnation actions arise from
the same constitutional mandate of just compensation.” Id. p. 16, 297 So.3d at 991.
BBP argues alternatively that landowners in the present case failed to appeal
the amount of the trial court’ s compensation award, wh ich did not include an
attorney fee award. Thus, BBP argues that defendants have waived any challenge to
the amount of that award, including a challenge to the trial court’s failure to include
attorney fees as an element of just compensation, citing Mosing v. Domas, 02-0012,
pp. 12–14 (La. 10/15/02), 830 So.2d 967, 976-77.6
We disagree with BBP ’s contention that defendants waived their right to
challenge the award of costs and attorney fees. Indeed, defendants appealed the trial
court’s failure to rule on their reconventional demand, which directly relates to a
determination of the full extent of their loss caused by the taking. Thus, we find the
waiver rule in Mosing inapplicable because defendants raised the issue of whether
they had received compensation to the full extent of their loss in the lower court.

6 In Mosing, this Court described the waiver rule and its rationale as follows:
Having appealed, Travelers was required to raise all perceived errors in connection
with the exemplary damage award (especially errors of alleged constitutional
magnitude) before the Court of Appeal in order to preserve those errors for review.
See Boudreaux v. State, DOTD, 01-1329 (La. 2/26/02), 815 So.2d 7, 9 (“Except for
the declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the peremptory
exceptions, two of which, prescription and res judicata, must be specially pleaded,
we cannot consider contentions raised for the first time in this Court which were
not pleaded in the court below and which the district court has not addressed.” ).
Such a rule, while seemingly harsh, preserves the proper allocation of functions
between the lower appellate courts and the Supreme Court by consigning the first
appellate review t o the court of appeal and preserving to this court discretionary
review upon the litigant ’s petition for certiorari. See Buckbee v. United Gas Pipe
Line Co., 561 So. 2d 76, 86 (La. 1990). The purpose of the rule is thwarted when a
litigant, such as Travelers, raises some, but not all, of its arguments on appeal and
then, after a less than favorable result, urges the arguments it omitted on certiorari
to this court.

Accordingly, while Travelers was not a party to the case at trial, and thus was not
in a position to raise the constitutional challenge in the district court, it did appeal
and in doing so, failed to assign as error the federal due process excessiveness claim
it belatedly raises in this court. We cannot consider this claim, which was waived
by the failure of Travelers to assert it timely in the court below. Boudreaux v. State,
DOTD, supra; Geiger v. State ex rel Dept. of Health , 01-2206 (La. 4/12/02), 815
So. 2d 80, 86. .

Id.at pp. 13-14, 830 So.2d at 977 (footnote omitted).

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BBP also argues that La. Const. art. I, § IV’s “just compensation” clause does
not provide for an award of attorney fees in expropriation and/or taking actions. In
support, it cites Rivet v. State Dep ’t of Transp . and Dev., 01-0961, p. 6 (La.
11/28/01), 800 So.2d 777, 782 (per curiam), wherein this Court stated in dicta that
“[a]ttorney’s fees have traditionally been regarded as being distinct from the
compensation due to the landowner . See, e.g., La. R.S. 13:5111(A), La. R.S. 19:8,
and La. R.S. 48:453(A).”7 BPP notes that, in Rivet, the landowners brought an
inverse condemnation action after the s tate appropriated their property without
bringing an expropriation action . The trial court awarded the landowners
approximately $3 million in just compensation, plus a 25% attorney fee and expert
witness fees. Id. at 1, 800 So.2d at 779. After a remand from this Court on the amount
of attorney fees originally awarded, the trial court awarded $237,500.00 in attorney
fees, but thereafter granted a new trial on the attorney fee issue on the ground that
Mr. Rivet would have to pay the difference between the initial amount awarded
herein by the Court and the amoun t of attorney fees due per his contract. Thus, he
would not be in the same position that he was in prior to the condemnation, and he
would therefore not have been compensated to the full extent of his loss. Since he
would not have been compensated to the full extent of his loss, he would have been
denied his rights as guaranteed by the Louisiana Constitution. Id. at pp. 3 –4, 800
So.2d at 780. This Court found that the trial court’ s granting of a new trial was
erroneous because the court’s original attorney fee award of $237,500 .00 was not
“contrary to the law and evidence.” Id . at p. 7, 800 So.2d at 783. Specifically, the
Court found that the trial court “fell into error” with respect to its concern that an
attorney fee award in an amount that did not compensate the plaintiffs for the full
amount they owed their attorney (in this case, 25% of the total award) would violate

7 The cited statutes provide for attorney fees in expropriation and appropriation proceedings.

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the “just compensation” clause. Id. at p. 6, 800 So.2d at 782. This Court reasoned
that: (1) as stated above, attorney fees “have traditionally been regarded as being
distinct from the compensation due to the landowner”; and, (2) “it is well settled that
courts m ay inquire as to the reasonableness of attorney fees as part of their
prevailing, inherent authority to regulate the practice of law.” Id (citations omitted).
BBP argues that Rivet demonstrates that this Court rejected the argument that the
“just compensa tion” clause of the Louisiana Constitution governs the issue of
attorney fees in the expropriation/takings context.
In addressing Rivet , defendants note that the ruling does not explicitly state
whether or to what extent La. Const. art. I, § IV(B)(5) is intended to include attorney
fees and legal costs in the compensation awarded for a taking. They argue instead
that this Court simply held that the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to
compensate a landowner for the full extent of their loss is within the discretion of
the trial court. Defendants aver Rivet’s reliance on statutory provisions as the sole
authority for its reasoning that “[a]ttorney’s fees have traditionally been regarded as
being distinct from the compensation due to the lan downer” reinforces the premise
that the statutes regulating attorney fees in takings cases give effect to, and should
be applied to be consistent with, the constitutional compensation requirement. Id.
While this Court has generally acknowledged that attor ney fee awards are
governed by statute or contract, we have also noted that there are exceptions to this
rule. See e.g., Hernandez v. Harson, 237 La. 389, 409, 111 So.2d 320, 327 (1958)
(discussing exceptions to the juri sprudential rule that attorney fees are not allowed
except where authorized by statute or contract). Additionally, we note that “the
constitution is the supreme law of this state, to which all legislative acts must yield.”
M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07 -2371, p. 22 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16,
32(citations omitted). We agree with defendants that Rivet is inapplicable because it
does not address the fundamental question presented herein: whether the Louisiana

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Constitution permits any award of attorney fees and litigation costs separ ate from
any statutory authority explicitly authorizing an award of attorney fees and costs.
We find that it does. Thus, u nder the specific facts of this case, we find sufficient
support in the Louisiana Constitution to uphold the awards of attorney fees and costs.
DECREE
We affirm the ruling of the court of appeal and remand this matter to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED.

05/13/21
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2020-C-1017
BAYOU BRIDGE PIPELINE, LLC
VS.
38.00 ACRES, MORE OR LESS, LOCATED IN ST. MARTIN PARISH;
BARRY SCOTT CARLINE, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT,
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN
WEIMER, C.J., additionally concurring.
I agree that the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides a basis for upholding
the award of attorney fees and litigation costs. I write separately only to highlight the
history surrounding La. Const. art. I, § 4, which fully supports the majority’s decision.
Relative to the “Right to Property,” Article I, § 4(B)(5) provides:
In every expropriation or action to take property pursuant to the
provisions of this Section, a party has the right to trial by jury to
determine whether the compensation is just, and the owner shall be
compensated to the full extent of his loss. Except as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the full extent of loss shall include, but not
be limited to, the appraised value of the property and all costs of
relocation, inconvenience, and any other damages actually incurred by
the owner because of the expropriation. [Emphasis added.]
The language “the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss” was
included as part of the 1974 revision to the Louisiana Constitution. Previously, the
1921 constitution gave the landowner the right to “just and adequate compensation.”
La. Const. art. I, § 2 (1921).
It has long been recognized, including by this court, that the 1974 constitution
significantly expanded the concept of compensation by adding to the expropriation
provision the requirement that the owner be compensated to the “full extent of his

loss.” See, e.g., State Through Dep’t of Highways v. Constant, 369 So.2d 699,
701-02 (La. 1979); State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Dietrich, 555 So.2d 1355,
1358-59 (La. 1990); State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Chambers Inv. Co., 595
So.2d 598, 602 (La. 1992).
While this court has not previously addressed whether “full extent of his loss”
encompasses attorney fees, scholarly commentary from Professor Lee Hargrave and
commentary from Louis ‘”Woody’” Jenkins, a member of the House of
Representatives and a delegate at the constitutional convention, undoubtedly support
the holding in this case that attorney fees can be awarded under La. Const. art. I, § 4.
Professor Hargrave explained:
The history of Section 4 reveals a desire to increase the level of
compensation beyond that provided by existing state law. The change
from the 1921 Constitution’s language (“just and adequate
compensation”) to the new phrase (“compensated to the full extent of his
loss”) was deliberate, prompted by a belief on the part of the sponsors
that inadequate awards have been provided under existing law. The new
formula comes from the 1972 Montana Constitution, and was stated by
the committee in comments as “intended to permit the owner whose
property has been taken to remain in equivalent financial circumstances
after the taking.” This level of compensation applies “in every
expropriation,” whether by public agencies or private persons.
The change is far reaching. Explaining his proposal, Delegate
Louis Jenkins indicated it would even extend to costs of litigation
and attorney fees: “[A]nd even if you win, you are going to lose,
because of the cost of going to court, hiring an attorney, which
you’ll have to pay. So this would attempt to take into account that
fact.” [Emphasis added.]
Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
La. L. Rev. 1, 15. Mr. Jenkins also related the purpose and intent of changing the
constitutional language:
The amount of compensation to be paid when property is taken is
not merely “just compensation” as that term has been understood under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Federal Constitution and the
1921 State Constitution. Instead, the owner must be compensated “to
2

the full extent of his loss.” This is intended to include things “which,
perhaps, in the past may have been considered damnum absque injuria,
such as cost of removal”, attorney fees, inconvenience, loss of aesthetic
value or business profits and so forth. [Emphasis added.]
Louis “Woody’” Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 9, 23 (1975).
In referencing attorney fees, Mr. Jenkins quoted comments from the constitutional
convention:
In other words, when someone’s property is taken, he has a certain loss,
and this section says that loss shall be the measure of just compensation.
Sometimes, unfortunately, it has been much less. For example, suppose
a highway comes across the corner of your property. You are offered
five hundred dollars for it. It’s worth a thousand. At present, there is no
way you can get what it’s worth because if you go to court and challenge
that offer and try to get your thousand dollars, ... even if you win, you
are going to lose, because of the cost of going to court, hiring an
attorney, which you’ll have to pay. So this would attempt to take into
account that fact.
Id. at n.68 (citing Proceedings, Aug. 30, 1973, at 8).
Importantly, this court has historically relied on the above-cited articles by
Professor Hargrave and Mr. Jenkins when considering and opining on other issues
relative to the meaning of “full compensation” under this constitutional provision.
See Constant, Dietrich, and Chambers Inv. Co., supra. Following the same
guidance in this case supports a holding that La. Const. art. I, § 4 was intended to
encompass an award of attorney fees.1
1 I recognize there are some situations where the award of attorney fees may be limited in
expropriation suits. For example, La. R.S. 19:8(A)(3) provides in relevant part:
Immediately after compensation has been determined, the plaintiff shall,
upon motion of the defendant, present evidence as to the highest amount it offered
the defendant for the property and severance damages, if any, prior to the trial on the
merits. After hearing evidence on the issue, the court shall determine the highest
amount offered. If the highest amount offered is less than the compensation
awarded for the property and severance damages, if any, the court may award
reasonable attorney fees to the defendant. [Emphasis added.]
According to Louisiana’s expropriation laws, the expropriating authority shall engage in negotiations
of a compensation agreement with property owners prior to taking possession of the land. In fact,
expropriation laws require an expropriating authority to comply with very specific requirements in
its dealings with the owners of the property to be expropriated and attempt to reach a compensation
3

agreement with the owners—all before an expropriation suit is filed. La. R.S. 19:2; La. R.S. 19:2.2.
In this case, Bayou Bridge Pipeline (“BBP”) entered the property, cleared the property, and began
construction of the pipeline, all prior to initiating expropriation litigation. In such a situation, La.
R.S. 19:8(A)(3) should not be applied to limit an award of attorney fees. Additionally, although the
district court found the highest tender from BBP was $75, equal to the amount awarded for
compensation for the property, the landowners were subsequently awarded an additional $10,000
for their due process claims. These damages are not “compensation awarded for the property” as
referenced in the statute. Because the attorney fees were awarded relative to these claims and not
as compensation for the appropriated property, and because the total damages awarded to the
landowners exceed the $75 tender from BBP, this statutory provision should not be applied to limit
or eliminate the attorney fee award.
4

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2020-C-01017
BAYOU BRIDGE PIPELINE, LLC
VS.
38.00 ACRES, MORE OR LESS, LOCATED IN ST. MARTIN PARISH,
ET AL.
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of St. Martin
CRAIN, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Louisiana Revised Statute 13:5111
does not apply to a private party exercising expropriation authority granted by
Louisiana Revised Statute 19:2 . I also agree that just compensat ion “to the full
extent of his loss,” as used in Article I, § 4B(5) of the Louisiana Constitution, can
include attorney fees incurred by the property owner in defending an expropriation
suit. I do not, however, believe such an award is appropriate in this case.
The property owner’s a ttorney fees, like all other recoverable expropriation
damages, must be “incurred by the owner because of the expropriation.” See La.
Const. art. I, § 4B(5). Before filing an expropriation suit, an expropriating authority
must make an offer of compensation to the property owner. See La. R.S. 19:2.2A(2).
If the owner declines the offer, proceeds to trial, and recovers more than was offered,
the constitution’s causation requirement for recovery of attorney fees is satisfied.
The property owner necessarily incurred attorney fees “because of the
expropriation,” specifically due to the expropriating authority’s failure to
compensate the owner to the full extent of his loss. However, the same cannot be
said when the property owner recovers a sum equal to or less than the pre-suit offer.
In that instance, the owner voluntarily incurred attorney fees because of his refusal
to accept an offer equal to or greater than the constitutionally required compensation.
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His attorney fees were not incurred because of the expropriation; they were incurred
because he demanded more than he was due. A n award of attorney fees to the
property owner under those circumstances is contrary to the c onstitution, not
supported by the convention history , and in consistent with the ancillary statutory
scheme enacted for expropriation proceedings. See La. R.S. 19:8A(3) and 19:12.
Here, at the outset of the expropriation proceeding, plaintiff offered e ach
defendant $75 as compensation f or the full extent of the loss caused by the
expropriation. Defendants refused the offer , proceeded to trial , and were awarded
$75 for expropriation damages. Because they failed to recover more than plaintiff’s
offer, defendants’ attorney fees were not caused by the expropriation. An award of
attorney fees is thus not permitted by Article I, § 4B(5). See also La. R.S. 19:8A(3).
I respectfully dissent from the majority decision to the extent it remands to the trial
court for an award of attorney fees in this case.1

1 I recognize the trial court also awarded damages for plaintiff’s pre-expropriation trespass;
however, attorney fees are not authorized for an action in trespass. See Booth v. Madison River
Communications, 02-0288 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/27/03), 851 So. 2d 1185, 1190, writ denied, 03-2661
(La. 12/12/03), 860 So. 2d 1161. Defendants’ recovery of attorney fees is only authorized in
defense of the expropriation proceeding. See La. Const. art. I, §4(B)(5). For this same reason, the
court of appeal’s award of damages for the violation of defendants’ due process rig hts, which is
not before this court, does not support an award of attorney fees.

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