Jerry R. Bagwell v. Union Carbide Corporation, Et Al.

Supreme Court of Louisiana
January 12, 2021
Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
JERRY R. BAGWELL
VS.
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, ET AL.
No.2020-C-01242
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I
N RE: Union Carbide Corporation - Applicant Defendant; Montello, Inc. -
Applicant Defendant; Applying For Writ Of Certiorari, Parish of Orleans Civil,
Orleans Civil District Court Number(s) 2015-10146, Court of Appeal, Fourth
Circuit, Number(s) 2019-CA-0414;
_ _ _ _ _ _
January 12, 2021
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., dissents and would grant and docket.
WJC
JDH
SJC
JTG
JBM
PDG
01/12/2021 “See News Release 001 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents.”

01/12/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-C-01242
J
ERRY R. BAGWELL
VS.
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, ET AL.
O
n Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans
Civil
PE
R CURIAM
I
n this mesothelioma case, the plaintiffs sued various defendants, alleging the
decedent was exposed to asbestos and such exposure caused his death. The jury
rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs against the decedent’s employer, RMC,
finding it 75 % at fault. CAPCO, a non-party defendant, was found 25% at fault.
The jury assigned no fault to Union Carbide Corporation (“UCC”) and Montello,
Inc., the manufacturer and the distributer of certain asbestos-containing products.
The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for judgment notwithstan ding the
verdict and new trial.
The court of appeal initially affirmed relative to liability but reversed on
rehearing and granted a new trial, finding the jury verdict internally inconsistent. In
response to Interrogatory 1 on the jury verdict form, the jury found the decedent
“contracted mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos from the
products/activities” of CAPCO and RMC, and “that such exposure was a substantial
contributing cause of his mesothelioma.” The jury specifically rejected liability on
the part of UCC and Montello in response to this inquiry . In later interrogatories,
RMC and CAPCO were the only companies found to have caused Bagwell’s injury
under a negligence theory, and only CAPCO was found liable under a strict products
liability theory. The plaintiffs argued the jury reached a logically impossible result

2

by finding RMC 75% at fault for the decedent’s exposure to asbestos without
assigning fault to the producers of the asbestos products. In finding these responses
inconsistent, the court of appeal stated, “the jury was clearly confused in determining
that RMC exposed [the decedent] to drilling mud additives, yet simultaneously
found no exposure to drilling mud additives used by RMC.”
We reverse the grant of a new trial and reinstate the jury’s verdict, finding the
jury’s answers to these interrogatories are not irreconcilable. The court of appeal
reasoned that Interrogatory 1 only contemplated the source of the decedent’s
exposure, not causation. In narrowly interpreting it as such, the court of appeal found
the jury could not have logically held RMC liable for exposing the decedent to the
asbestos-containing products without also assigning fau lt to UCC and Montello ,
whose products were allegedly the source of the exposure. This interpretation fails
to properly consider the se cond question posed in Interrogatory 1: whether the
exposure was a “substantial contributing cause” of the decedent’s disease. The jury
could have reasonably found that even if UCC and Montello’s products we re the
source of exposure, on which we express no opinion, 1 the products were not
unreasonably dangerous and did not cause the decedent’s mesothelioma. The jury
instructions even provided, “[n]ot every asbestos exposure is a substantial
contributing factor.” Evidence was presented at trial that the manufacturers’
packaging, labeling, and handling was compliant with federal standards. Thus, the
jury could have rationally concluded the decedent’s injury was caused only by
RMC’s mishandling of the products, not the products themselves.
Considering the verdict as a whole, it is evident the jury did not find UCC

1 The parties dispute the implications of several pre-trial directed verdicts relating to the source of the exposure. The
broad language of the directed verdicts leave s some room to conclude that RMC’s own products contained asbestos,
but, because we find an independent basi s for upholding the jury verdict, we assume arguendo that the jury found
UCC and Montello’s products were the source of the exposure. If this assumption is wrong, such error only acts as
additional support for the verdict.

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and Montello caused the decedent’s injuries or w ere otherwise legally at fault. 2 It
did not find their products or activities resulted in exposure to asbestos that was a
substantial contributing cause of the decedent’s mesothelioma. It did not elsewhere
check “negligent” or “strictly liable” for these two defendants. RMC was t he sole
named defendant the jury found negligent, which is consistent with answering “yes”
to Interrogatory 1 for RMC. The employer, whose products or activities were found
to be the sole substantial contributing cause of the decedent’s disease , is also the
only defendant assessed with liability and a percentage of fault. Thus, we find the
jury verdict is not internally inconsistent.
The court of appeal’s opinion issued on rehearing is reversed. The original
court of appeal judgment on the merits is reinstated, subject to the parties’ right to
seek supervisory review thereof within thirty days of this opinion.
REVERSED.

2 A verdict based on the interrogatories should not be set aside unless the form prevented the jury from reaching a
legally correct verdict. Palacios v. Louisiana & Delta R.R., Inc. , 2005-1168 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 5/3/06), 930 So. 2d
1086, 1091, writ denied, 2006-1909 (La. 11/3/06), 940 So. 2d 665 quoting Chatelain v. Rabalais, 2004-28 (La. App.
3rd Cir. 7/7/04), 877 So. 2d 324, 334). An inconsistent verdict, however, must be read as a whole, with the rule that
the judgment shall be just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal. La. C.C.P. art. 2164; Chambers v.
Graybiel, 25,840 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 6/22/94), 639 So. 2d 361, 368 writ denied, 94-1948 (La. 10/28/94), 644 So. 2d
377.