State of Louisiana in the Interest of C.B. .
State of Louisiana in the Interest of C.B. ., No. 2020-CA-0075 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Apr. 15, 2020).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- 281 So. 3d 657 not in our corpus
- State of Louisiana in the Interest of L.D. 149 So. 3d 763
- State v. Driever 347 So. 2d 1132
- Rubin v. Non-Flood Prot. Asset Mgmt. Auth. 259 So. 3d 1228
- Rubin v. Non-Flood Prot. Asset Mgmt. Auth. 265 So. 3d 774
Opinion text
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN * NO. 2020-CA-0075
THE INTEREST OF C.B.
* COURT OF APPEAL
* FOURTH CIRCUIT
* STATE OF LOUISIANA
*
*
*******
RBW
BARTHOLOMEW-WOODS, J., CONCURS, IN PART, AND DISSENTS, IN
PART
I respectfully concur, in part, and dissent, in part. With regard to the
sufficiency of the evidence, I concur with the majority’s opinion. However, with
regard to whether C.B. waived the mandatory time delays outlined by La. Ch. C.
art. 877(C), I respectfully disagree with the majority’s position.
The Louisiana Children’s Code explicitly provides mandatory time
limitations within which the adjudication hearing for juvenile delinquency matters
must commence. La. Ch. C. art. 877 provides, in pertinent part, the following:
B. If the child is not continued in custody, the
adjudication hearing shall commence within ninety (90)
days of the appearance to answer the petition.
C. If the hearing has not been commenced timely, upon
motion of the child, the court shall release a child
continued in custody and shall dismiss the petition.
D. For good cause, the court may extend such period.
1
Unlike the majority’s view, I find State In the Interest of C.G., 2019-01653
(La. 11/15/19), 281 So.3d 657 to be analogous to the present matter. Similar to In
the Interest of C.G., the record in the present matter reflects that the same trial
court re-set the adjudication hearing, twice, due to a lack of a court reporter.1 The
record further reflects that C.B.’s adjudication hearing was reset over the formal
written objection of C.B., once occurring after the mandatory time delays had
already run.
The majority, in distinguishing In the Interest of C.G. from the instant
matter, relies upon the fact that C.B. did not “formally” request a dismissal, but
only filed “Notice of Objections.” However, in reaching this conclusion, the
majority looks only to the “title” of the pleadings and not the substance.2 In
reviewing the substantive portions of the objections, C.B. clearly invokes La. Ch.
C. art. 877(C) when the following language was filed in the “Notice of Objection”
with the trial court, “Counsel for C.B. vehemently objects to this court’s setting
this matter outside of the La. Ch. C. art. 877 deadlines…”. A subsequent Notice of
Objection stated, “The Louisiana Children’s Code 877 dictates that C.B. needs to
be brought to trial within ninety days of entering a denial to the petitioned charge.
This matter has already been continued once beyond the statutory ninety (90) day
limitation. Counsel for C.B. vehemently objects to this court’s continuance.”
1
The Louisiana Supreme Court has already stated that “‘[t]he court system cannot excuse itself
from affording an accused a trial within the delay required by law, simply by relying upon
internal operating procedures which result in noncompliance with the statutory mandate.’” Id.
citing State in the Interest of L.D., 2014-1080 (La. 10/15/14), 149 So.3d 763, 765 (quoting State
v. Driever, 347 So.2d 1132, 1134 (La. 1977)).
2
This Court explained that “[t]he intent of a pleading is determined by its substance, not the
caption of the pleading.” Rubin v. Non-Flood Prot. Asset Mgmt. Auth., 2018-0500, p. 4 (La. App.
4 Cir. 11/14/18); 259 So.3d 1228, 1232, writ denied, 2018-2055 (La. 2/18/19); 265 So.3d 774
(internal citations omitted).
2
I find it sufficient that in C.B.’s Notices of Objection, C.B. cited La. Ch. C.
art. 877 and its provisions regarding the mandatory ninety (90) day time period to
substantiate a dismissal of C.B.’s adjudication petition. Furthermore, C.B.
objected in both Notices to the proceedings due to the untimeliness. Nowhere in
article 877 does it mandate that C.B. must take an immediate supervisory writ from
a denial of dismissal of the adjudication petition; I find that C.B.’s Notices of
Objection preserved C.B.’s rights to raise this issue on appeal. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion finding otherwise.
As to the remainder of the majority’s opinion, I concur.
3