Conrad Comeaux, In His Official Capacity As Assessor

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #022
FR
OM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 20th day of May, 2021 are as follows:
BY Crichton, J.:
2020-CA-01037 CONRAD COMEAUX, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ASSESSOR
FOR LAFAYETTE PARISH VS. THE LOUISIANA TAX
COMMISSION & KRAIG THOMAS STRENGE & KELLY PARKS
STRENGE (Parish of East Baton Rouge)
REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART. SEE OPINION
Weimer, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Hughes, J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Griffin, J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.

1
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-CA-01037
CO
NRAD COMEAUX, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ASSESSOR FOR
LAFAYETTE PARISH
VS.
THE LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION & KRAIG THOMAS STRENGE &
KELLY PARKS STRENGE
O
N APPEAL FROM THE 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH
OF EAST BATON ROUGE
CRI
CHTON, J.
Pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 5(D),1 Kraig and Kelly Strenge (“Taxpayers”)
appealed directly to this Court from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court of East
Baton Rouge Parish upon a declaration by that court that La. R.S. 47:1990 is
unconstitutional, as applied. The district court’s ruling on partial summary judgment
also held that the Louisiana Tax Commission (the “Commission”) exceeded its
authority in promulgating Section 3103(Z) of Title 61, Part V of the Louisiana
Administrative Code (the “ Rules and Regulations”) and declared Section 3103(Z)
unconstitutional. For the reasons set forth herein, we find the district court erred in
ruling the Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating Section 3103(Z) and
declaring Section 3103(Z) unconstitutional but correctly declared La. R.S. 47:1990
unconstitutional, as applied. Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
1 La. Const. art. V, § D provides: “ Appellate Jurisdiction. In addition to other appeals provided
by this constitution, a case shall be appealable to the supreme court if (1) a law or ordinance has
been declared unconstitutional or (2) the defendant has been convicted of a capital offense and a
penalty of death actually has been imposed.”

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FACTS
Following the reappraisal of their residential property by Lafayette Parish
Assessor Conrad Comeaux (the “Assessor”), Taxpayers challenged the correctness
of their 2016 tax year assessment by appealing to the Lafayette City-Parish Council
(the “Board of Review”).2 After the Board of Review ruled in favor of the Assessor,
Taxpayers appealed to the Commission.3 Orally on August 23, 2017, and later in a
written judgment, the Commission ruled that the fair market value of the property
for tax year 2016 was $231,500, not $288,270 as determined by the A ssessor, and
ordered the Assessor to reduce Taxpayers’ 2016 assessment accordingly. Two days
after the Commission’s oral ruling, the Assessor assessed the fair market value of
Taxpayers’ property for the 2017 tax year again at $288,270.4
Despite the Assessor’s assertion in its “Notice of Assessment” to Taxpayers
that “[i]f you feel there is an error in your assessment, please bring this letter to the
Assessor’s Office . . . no later than August 30, 2017,” there is no evidence in the
record that Taxpayers advised the Assessor of the inconsistency with the fair market
value determined by the Commission. Nor did Taxpayers timely appeal the 2017
assessment to the Board of Review pursuant to the ordinary tax appeal process

2 The Assessor reappraised Taxpayers’ property in accordance with the quadrennial reappraisal
cycle established by the Louisiana Tax Commission. See La. Admin. Code 61:V.303(D).
3 When appealing their 2016 tax year assessment, Taxpayers followed the ordinary tax appeal
procedure for a correctness challenge. See La. R.S. 47:1989 (“The Louisiana Tax Commission
shall consider the appeal of any taxpayer, bona fide representative of an affected tax -recipient
body, or assessor dissatisfied with the determination of a local board of review.”).
4 While Taxpayers’ appeal was pend ing before the Commission, on July 1, 2017 the Assessor
listed on the assessment rolls the value of Taxpayers’ property for the 2017 tax year at $288,270
– i.e., the same value contested by Taxpayers in their then -pending 2016 correctness challenge.
See La. R.S. 47:1987(A) (“The preparation and listing on the assessment lists of all real and
personal property shall be completed by the assessor on or before the first day of July in each
year.”). At that time, the Board of Review had affirmed the Assessor’s 2016 valuation.
In its original brief to this Court, the Assessor claimed the 2017 assessment at $288,270 was in
error due to the short timespan (two days) available to correct the assessment on its rolls following
the Commission’s ruling on the 2016 assessment. The Assessor blamed the Commission for this
error, asserting that the Commission failed to timely consider Taxpayers’ 2016 appeal and thus
gave the Assessor little time to correct the 2017 assessment.

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provided by La. R.S. 47:1992 and La. R.S. 47:1989.5 The Commission approved and
certified the 2017 ad valorem tax assessment roll of Lafayette Parish on November
29, 2017.
Having thus failed to timely appeal to the Board of Review, Taxpayers
appealed their 2017 assessment directly to the Commission.6 Observing that
Taxpayers had bypassed the requirement of filing their appeal first with the Board
of Review, the Commission nonetheless docketed Taxpayers’ appeal on a newly -
created docket to distinguish Taxpayers’ appeal from ordinary tax appeal s.7 The
Commission likewise issued a rule to show cause to the Assessor, ordering that he
appear before the Commission and demonstrate why Taxpayers’ 2017 assessment
and valuation should not be corrected to reflect the Commission’s prior decision
overturning the Assessor’s 2016 appraisal value and assessment. The Commission
cited Section 3103(Z) of its Rules and Regulations, which then provided8 in pertinent
part:
A decision by the Tax Commission that determines the fair market
value of a property shall be applied to subsequent tax years until
reappraisal in a future mandated reappraisal year, unless there has been
a change in the condition of the property that would justify reappraisal
or a change in value.
The Assessor did not appear, and on December 20, 2017, the Commission
ordered the Assessor to correct the 2017 assessed value of Taxpayers’ property to

5 The phrase “ordinary tax appeal” is used herein to refer to appeals brought first to the local board
of review and then to the Commission pursuant to La. R.S. 47:1992 and La. R.S. 47:1989,
respectively, and in accordance with La. Const. art. VII, § 18(E).
6 By letter, Taxpayers requested the C ommission consider their “appeal” as they had failed to
timely file with the Board of Review.
7 To distinguish Taxpayers’ appeal from all other appeals, the Commission added a “P” to the
beginning of Taxpayers’ docket number. Public service appeals are designated with a “PS” in the
docket number, and ordinary tax appeals are given numbers only.
8 As will be discussed further herein, the Commission ultimately repealed Section 3103(Z)
following an adverse ruling in the underlying litigation.

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reflect the fair market value determination of the Commission in the 2016 appeal
(the “Correction Order”), therein stating:
THIS MATTER came for hearing on December 20, 2017, on the Tax
Commission’s Rule to Show Ca use issued to the Lafayette Parish
Assessor. After considering the evidence and oral argument, the Ta x
Commission determined that the Assessor failed to present sufficient
evidence that would justify reappraisal or a change in value of the
subject property in a non-reappraisal year. Accordingly, and for other
reasons orally assigned:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to L a. Admin. Code §
61:3101(Z) [sic] and La. R.S. § 47:1990, that the 2017 assessment of
138 Azalea Street, Lafayette, LA 70506 shall be corrected to reflect the
decision of the Louisiana Tax Commission determining the fair market
value of the subject property to be $231,500. Tax Commission staff is
hereby directed to process a change order to perfect this ruling.
Rather than appeal t he Correction Order , the Assessor filed a petition for
declaratory judgment.
9 The petition alleged that “[o]n information and belief, the
Tax Commission has never before issued a ‘Rule to Show Cause’ ordering and
commanding an assessor to appear before it and show cause why an assessment
should not be corrected by the Tax Commission.” The Assessor prayed for the
district court to declare, inter alia, (1) that Sections 121(A), 213(C), and 303(B) of
the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, all of which relate to the Commission’s
mandatory quadrennial reappraisal cycle, 10 are unconstituti onal; (2) that the
Commission exceeded its authority in correcting an assessment outside of an
ordinary tax appeal; (3) that La. R.S. 47:1990 is unconstitutional, as applied by the

9 See La. R.S. 47:1989(D) (“All decisions of the Tax Commission are final unless appealed to the
district court within thirty days.”). Taxpayers argue to this Court that the Commission’s order was
final due to the failure of the Assessor to appeal the ruling to the distr ict court. However,
Taxpayers’ argument presupposes that the Commission had the authority – or jurisdiction – to
enter into the ruling at all, which is at the heart of the Assessor’s petition.
10 In pertinent part, these rules provided: “Real property, as defined in La. R.S. 47:2322, shall be
reappraised once every four years ,” La. Admin. Code 61:V.121(A) (emphasis added); “All
property shall be reappraised and valued in accordance with the Constitution at intervals of not
more than once every four years . This quadrennial cycle reappraisal date shall be determined
solely by the Louisiana Tax Commission.” La. Admin. Code 61:V.213(C) (emphasis added); “The
assessor’s office may reappraise property during a non- reappraisal year if that prope rty in all or
part of the assessing district, or within a certain classification, was appraised inaccurately or was
not uniformly appraised during the current reappraisal cycle . . . all such property shall be valued
based upon the most current valuation date and established by the Louisiana Tax Commission and
on the same criterion as other similar property.” La. Admin. Code 61:V.303(B).

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Commission in issuing the rule to show cause and Correction Order; and (4) that
Section 3103(Z) of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations exceeds the
Commission’s rulemaking authority and is unconstitutional. The Louisiana
Assessors Association (the “LAA”) intervened.
In their answer to the petition, Taxpayers asserted certain affir mative
defenses, including that the Assessor’s interpretation and application of the
regulations and/or laws at issue constituted a taking of property without due process,
a denial of equal protection, and a denial of due process and/or an abuse of process.
For its part, the Commission asserted in its answer that it did not act outside of its
authority, which included the authority to supervise the parish assessors, and that
both La. R.S. 47:1990 and Section 3103(Z) did not conflict with the Louisiana
Constitution.
The Commission als o filed a reconventional demand, again asserting “[a] s
long as taxes have not been paid, the Tax Commission has the authority to change
or correct any and all assessments of property” and the Commission “is only required
to issue written instructions to the assessor to make the change, but in the instant
case, the Tax Commission went further than required and offered the assessor a
hearing.” The Commission prayed for judgment declaring that the Commission “has
the authority to supervise and exercise oversight over the parish assessors and
assessment procedure;” the Commission “has the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to ensure uniform assessment pra ctices and procedures ;” the parish
assessors are required to follow and comply with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission; and the Commission “has the authority to enforce
its rules and regulations if not followed by the parish assessors.”
On June 18, 2018, the Assessor and LAA filed a joint motion for partial
summary judgment, seeking, inter alia , to have Sections 121(A), 213(C) and

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303(B)(2) of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations declared unconstitutional as
contrary to and inconsistent with Article VII, Sections 18(D) and (F) of the Louisiana
Constitution and La. R.S. 47:2331. 11 Notably, the Commission amended these
regulations in 2017 to include mandatory language as to the quadrennial reappraisal
cycle – i.e. that property be reappraised no more than every four years – whereas
prior to the 2017 amendments the quadrennial reappraisal cycle established by the
Commission was not expressly mandatory.12
On November 13, 2018, the district court entered partial summary judgment
against the Commission, striking down Sections 121(A), 213(C) and 303(B)(2) of
the Commission’s Rules and Regulations on grounds that they “exceed the Tax
Commission’s authority and unconstitutionally infringe on powers gra nted to
Assessors in this State vis-à -vis Article VII, Section 18(D) of the Louisiana
Constitution.” Although the judgment was made final, neither the Commission nor
Taxpayers appealed.

11 La. Const. art. VII, § 18(D) (“[E]ach assessor shall determine the fair market value of all property
subject to taxatio n within his respective parish . . . Fair market value and use value of property
shall be determined in accordance with criteria which shall be established by law and which shall
apply uniformly throughout the state.”); La. Const. a rt. VII, § 18(F) (“A ll property subject to
taxation shall be reappraised and valued in accordance with this Section, at intervals of not more
than four years.”) (emphasis added); La. R.S. 47:2331 (“real property shall be reappraised at least
every four years.”) (emphasis added).
12 While real property is reassessed annually, it is only reappraised as of the “uniform lien date”
set by the Commission – i.e., the date by which real property must be reappraised for purposes of
ad valorem taxation. Reappraisal is currently set to occur every four years. La. Admin. Code
61:V.303(D). The 2017 amendments clarified that reappraisals are to occur only on the quadrennial
reappraisal cycle set by the uniform lien date absent exception for change in property value due to
a change in its condition, La. Admin. Code 61:V.3103(Z), or because the property was mistakenly
reappraised (or not reappraised at all), La. Admin. Code 61:V.303(B).
Assessor Comeaux and LAA representative Bobby Edminston testified by deposition that the
Commission establishes the uniform lien date on which they reappraise property . Assessor
Edminston explained that a change in assessed values in non-reappraisal years could occur if, for
example, the assessor’s office erroneously failed to reappraise a property or if an owner improves
the property.

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Following this adverse ruling and on its own motion, the Commission
rescinded its Correction Order by a second order date d December 4, 2018 (the
“Rescission Order”), therein stating:
In part in light of the Ruling by Honorable Judge Richard “Chip” Moore
on October 23, 2018, the Tax Commission hereby voluntarily rescinds
and vacates the November 15, 2017 Rule to Show Cause and December
20, 2017 Order concerning Lafayette Parish Assessor Conrad
Comeaux’s 2017 assessment and valuation for the property located in
Lafayette Parish at 138 Azalea Street, Lafayette, LA 70506. Upon
reconsideration, the Tax Commission also determines that this action
was not authorized outside the context of an appeal. As the Taxpayers
failed to timely appeal their 2017 assessment, the Tax Commission
determines that it was without jurisdiction to cor rect Assessor
Comeaux’s 2017 assessment for the subject property. The Commission
also determines that La. Admin. Cod e 61:V. 3103(Z) does not apply
outside the context of an appeal.
(Emphasis added.)
13
On the same day it issued the Rescission Order, the Commission filed an
exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction with the district court. The
Commission therein “conceded and acknowledge[d] that it lacked jurisdiction to
correct the 2017 assessment of the subject property outside the context of an appeal.”
Such concession, the Commission argued, rendered the Assessor’s petition for
declaration as to the authority and constitutionality of that action moot.
In opposition to the Commission’s exception, the Assessor and LAA argued
a justiciable controversy remains because the Commission maintained its
reconventional demand in which it asserted, inter alia, “[a]s long as taxes have not
been paid, the Tax Commission has the authority to change or correct any and all
assessments of property” and “[t]he Tax Commission was acting within its authority
to change the subject assessment to ‘conform to the true and correct valuation.’”
They additionally noted that none of the statutes or administrative regulations relied
upon by the Commission in issuing the Correction Order had then been repealed or

13 The Commission itself filed the motion for reconsideration.

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amended. Without judicial action, then, nothing prevents the Commission from
changing its position on its authority to engage in the disputed behavior again.
Finally, they argued “this case did not arise in a vacuum but instead is simply the
latest installment in the [Commission’s] ongoing efforts to assert control over
Assessors and their assessments.”
On January 10, 2019, the Assessor and LAA moved for partial summary
judgment as to whether the Commission exceeded its authority in reviewing and
correcting the 2017 assessment, as to the constitutionality of La. R.S. 47:1990, as
applied, and as to the validity and constitutionality of Section 3103(Z). In arguing
that the district court should render summary judgment that Section 3103(Z) is
unconstitutional, the Assessor and LAA relied in part on the district court’s
November 13 , 201 8 ruling wherein it declared unconstitutional certain of the
Commission’s Rules and Regulati ons related to the mandatory quadrennial
reappraisal cycle. Because Section 3103(Z) “clearly suffers from the same
constitutional defects,” the Assessor and LAA argued, the district court should
likewise declare it unconstitutional.
Following a hearing on the Commission’s exception and the Assessor and
LAA’s partial motion for summary judgment, on July 23, 2019 the district court
denied the Commission’s exception, ruling that the matter remained a justiciable
controversy. The court also granted the Assessor and LAA’s motion for summary
judgment, issuing the following declarations: that the Commission
unconstitutionally exceeded its authority under La. Const. a rt. VII, § 18(E) and
unconstitutionally infringed on powers exclusively granted to the par ish assessors
under La. Const. art. VII, § 18(D) when it ordered the Assessor to correct the 2017
assessment of Taxpayers’ property ; that Section 3101(Z) unconstitutionally
exceeded the Commission’s rulemaking authority and unconstitutionally infringed

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upon powers granted exclusively to the parish assessors under La. Const. art. VII, §
18(D); and that La. R.S. 47:1990, as applied by the Commission as a means by which
it could issue a rule to show cause to the Assessor and then issue an order changing
a proper ty assessment outside the context of an ordinary tax appeal,
unconstitutionally exceeded the Commission’s authority under La. Const. a rt. VII,
§18(E) and unconstitutionally infringed on the c onstitutional authority granted
solely to parish assessors under La. Const. art. VII, § 18(D).
Taxpayers filed a motion for new trial in which they raised their affirmative
defense that the actions by the Assessor and Commission amounted to an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection and/or due process and/or abuse of
process. Observing that Taxpayers effectively argued that their affirmative defenses
should be treated as a reconventional demand against the Assessor, the district court
denied Taxpayers’ motion for new trial on February 20, 2020. The court rea soned
that comment (f) of the 2008 comments to La. C.C.P. art. 1005 makes clear that an
affirmative defense cannot be used in the place of an incidental demand.
Taxpayers subsequently appealed the July 23, 2019 judgment directly to this
Court pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 5(D).
DISCUSSION
There are multiple significant issues presented in this matter . We will first
address whether the matter is moot. Finding that a justiciable controversy remains,
the Court will review the district court’s rulings on summary judgment. Specifically,
we will address the validity and constitutionality of Section 3103(Z) of the
Commission’s Rules and Regulations and the constitutionality of La. R.S. 47:1990,
as applied by the Commission as authority to issue a rule to show cause to the

10

Assessor and thereafter correct an assessment outside of the ordinary tax appeal
process.14
MOOTNESS
As a threshold matter, we must first determine whether the questions before
the Court present a justiciable controversy or are moot. See, Cat’s Meow, Inc. v.
City of New Orleans Through Dep’t of Fin. , 98-0601 (La. 10/20/98), 720 So. 2d
1186. Specifically, the Court must address whether the Commission’s Rescission
Order and its repeal of Section 3103(Z) render moot the Assessor’s constitutional
challenge of La. R.S. 47:1990, as applied, and challenge to the validity and
constitutionality of Section 3103(Z).
The positions of the Assessor and the Commission on this issue have been
inconsistent.15 The parties’ shifting positions on mootness is irrelevant, however, as
jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, nor can it be waived. La. C.C.P. art. 3;
see St. Charles Par. Sch. Bd. v. GAF Corp. , 512 So. 2d 1165, 1171 (La. 1987), on
reh'g (Aug. 7, 1987) (“In order to avoid deciding abstract, hypothetical or moot

14 In their briefs to this Court, Taxpayers also argued the district court erred in failing to rule on
their individual constitutional rights arguments. However, these claims were not before the district
court when it entered the judgment at issue. The judgment under review arose from the district
court’s ruling on a partial summary judgment motion filed by the Assessor and LAA, which
narrowly challenged the constitutionality of La. R.S. 47:1990, as applied, the validity and
constitutionality of Section 3103(Z), and the Commission’s authority to review the correctness of
an assessment outside of an ordinary tax appeal. Taxpayers’ individual constitutional rights
arguments were not raised in that motion. Taxpayers did not file a cross motion for summary
judgment raising those issues, nor did they file an opposition to the Assessor and LAA’s summary
judgment motion.
15 Since issuing its Rescission Order and up to and including oral argument, the Commission has
held the position that this Court was without subject matter jurisdiction to review the
constitutionality of La. R.S. 47:1990 and Section 3103(Z). In its post-argument brief, however, the
Commission switched its position entirely. The Commission now not only argues that review of
the district court’s summary judgment ruling is not moot but also that Section 3103(Z) and La.
R.S. 47:1990 are constitutional (even as applied) and that the Commission had authority thereunder
to issue a rule to show cause and the Correction Order to the Assessor. Further , after initially
contesting mootness, the Assessor now concedes that review of Section 3103(Z)’s constitutionality
is moot.

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questions, courts require that cases submitted for adjudication be justiciable, ripe for
decision, and not brought prematurely.”).
In the context of a declaratory judgment action, w e have defined “justiciable
controversy” as connoting “an existing and actual and substantial dispute, as
distinguished from one that is merely hypothetical or abstract.” Abbott v. Parker, 249 So. 2d 908, 918 (La. 1971). The party seeking the declaratory judgment should
have a “legally protectable and tangible interest at stake, and the dispute presented
should be of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of the
declaratory judgment.” Id. ; St. Charles Par. Sch. B d., 512 So. 2d at 1171 (“The
doctrine that courts will not hear moot cases serves two complementary purposes: it
prevents the useless expenditure of judicial resources and assures that the courts will
not intrude prematurely into policymaking in a manner that unnecessarily constrains
the other branches of government.”).
A case may become moot for several reasons, including because a defendant
has voluntarily ceased the challenged behavior. Cat’s Meow , 720 So. 2d at 1193
(“[A] case may become moot because the law has changed; because defendant has
paid moneys owed and no lo nger wishes to appeal . . . because allegedly wrongful
behavior has passed, been mooted, and could not reasonably be expected to recur;
because a party could no longer be affected by a challenged statute . . . or because a
party has died.”) (quoting ROTUND A & NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Vol. 1, § 2.13). O ne example of voluntary cessation
that may render a case moot is the repeal or amendment of a statute or ordinance that
effectively resolves the underlying controversy. E.g., Ulrich v. Robinson, 2018-534
(La. 3/26/19), 282 So. 3d 180.
It is well -settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged
practice, however, does not necessarily deprive a court of its jurisdiction because

12

“the defendant would then be free to return to his old ways.” See, e.g., Cat’s Meow,
720 S o. 2d at 1194 . In order to succeed on a mootness argument arising out of
voluntary cessation, the defendant must further “show with assurance that there is
no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur.” Id. The purpose of
the voluntary cessation doctrine is to prevent defendants from creating a “technical
mootness as a sham.” Id.
In City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 102 S. Ct. 1070,
71 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that the City of
Mesquite’s voluntary cessation of the challenged practice, including an amendment
to the relied-upon ordinance, did not deprive the Co urt of jurisdiction because it
would not preclude the City “from reenacting precisely the same provision if the
District Court's judgment was vacated.” Id. at 284. The Court reasoned that the City
had a prior practice of doing so and had expressed its intention of reenacting the
challenged ordinance following litigation. Similar facts are present here.
As in Aladdin’s Castle , the Commission’s sudden switch in its position is
more indicative of an attempt to create a “technical mootness as a sham” than a
genuine change of heart. Cat’s Meow, 720 So. 2d at 1194. The underlying facts of
this case do not present a hypothetical or abstract question of law but instead are
demonstrative of an ongoing jurisdictional conflict arising from the Commission’s
efforts to press its claim of authority to supervise and oversee the parish assessors
and assessment procedure. The underlying case is simply the latest installment of
the power struggle between the Assessor and Commission. See, e.g., D90 Energy,
LLC v. Jefferson Davis Par. Bd. of Review, 2020-00200, p. 4–5 (La. 10/1/20), __ So.
3d __ ; Williams v. Opportunity Homes Limited Partnership, 2017 -0955 (La.
3/13/18), 240 So. 3d 161.

13

While not dispositive, it is significant that La. R.S. 47:1990 has not been
repealed or amended. Unlike Ulrich and Cat’s Meow, there is no “solemn legislative
act” clarifying that the Commission did not have t he authority to correct an
assessment outside of the context of an ordinary tax appeal. Cf. Cat’s Meow, 720 So.
2d at 1195; Ulrich, supra. While the act of repealing or passing legislation to correct
a complained-of statute is not required to render a controversy moot, the fact that
La. R.S. 47:1990 has not been repealed is indicative that the Commission can and
might reengage in the complain ed-of behavior and increases the “reasonable
expectation” that the alleged violation will reoccur. Similarly, the Commission’s
act of repealing Section 3103(Z) during its annual update to its Rules and
Regulations can be more easily reversed than a legislative act, as echoed by the
Commission’s own description of the process as “simple, ” and does not carry the
same weight as a legislative amendment or repeal.
Also key to the mootness analysis is the Commission’s failure to relinquish
its prayer on reconventional demand, which included arguments such as: “[a]s long
as taxes have not been paid, the Tax Commission has the authority to change or
correct any and all assessments of property” under La. R.S. 47:1990, “that the Tax
Commission has the authority to enforce its rules and regulations if not followed by
the parish assessors,” and that “[t]he Tax Commission was acting within its authority
to change the subject assessment to ‘conform to the true and correct valuation. ’”
Even in its briefs to this Court, the Commission maintains the validity of Section
3103(Z) and its authority under La. R.S. 47:1990 to engage in the same or similar
conduct in the future.16

16 But see Cat’s Meow, 720 So. 2d at 1193 (“[I]t is not enough that the requirements of justiciability
are satisfied when the suit is initially filed: the requirements must remain throughout the course of
litigation up to the moment of final disposition.”).

14

In light of these facts, we find the district court did not err in finding the
Commission’s Rescission Order and change of position on its authority was a n
attempt to thwart a final and binding ruling on constitutionality of La. R.S. 47:1990
and Section 3103(Z). The Commission has failed to meet its burden of proving with
assurance that there is no “reasonable expectation” it would reengage in the same or
similar conduct to that out of which this litigation arose.17
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Taxpayers challenge the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment
in favor of the Assessor and LAA. The law is well-settled that appellate review from
the grant of summary judgment is de novo, with the reviewing court using the same
criteria that govern the district court's determination of whether summary judgment
is appropriate – i.e., whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Davis v. A Bar and
Grill with a Bite, Inc. , 2019-1928, p. 2 (La. 3/16/20), 294 So. 3d 1051, 1052; La.
C.C.P. art. 966(B). Moreover, this Court conducts a de novo review of a judgment
that declares a statute unconstitutional. Iberville Par. Sch. Bd. v. La. State Bd. of
Elementary and Secondary Educ. , 2017-0257, p. 8 (La. 3/13/18), 248 So. 3d 299,
305 (“The constitutionality of legislation is a legal question, which is reviewed by
this court de novo.”).
La. Admin. Code 61:V.3103(Z) – Statutory Authority

17 In support of its finding that the case was not moot, the district court recounted that the
Commission’s chairman said in open hearing that the district court’s first summary judgment
ruling finding the mandatory quadrennial reappraisal cycle unconstitutional “was just one District
Judge’s opinion” and that “District Courts don’t make law.” While this statement, if true, would
be further indication that the Commission’s Rescission Order is a technical sham to avoid litigation
and that the courts could not reasonably expect the Commission not to reengage in the challenged
behavior in this case, there is no evidence in the record to support the district court’s factual
account.

15

In the judgment under review, the district court declared Section 3103(Z) of
the Commission’s Rules and Regulations “null, void and without effect” on grounds
that it “exceeds the Tax Commission’s rulemaking authority and unconstitutionally
infringes upon powers granted t o Assessors in this State by Article VII, Section
18(D) of the Louisiana Constitution.” In accordance with the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance, we first address the question of statutory authority.
The Legislature is vested with the legislative power of the state. La. Const.
art. III, § 1. Unless the Constitution expressly provides otherwise, neither another
branch of government nor any person holding office in one of them, may exercise
legislative power. La. Const. art. I, § 2. Where the Legislature has delegated certain
administrative authority to an agency, the agency is of course bound not to
promulgate regulations exceeding the authorization. See, e.g., Jurisich v. Jenkins,
99-0075 (La. 10/19/99), 749 So. 2d 597, 605 (“[I]f the Constitution limits the
authority of the Legislature to delegate to administrative agencies, the corollary that
follows is that those agencies cannot exceed the authority that the Legislature has
granted them.”); see also La. Const. art. III, § 1.
18
Article VII, Section 18(D) of the Louisiana Constitution provides parish
assessors with the authority to determine the fair market value of property . Its
proviso that such determination must be made “in accordance with criteria which
shall be established by law and which shall apply uniformly throughout the state ,”

18 The district court erroneously addressed whether the enabling statutes pursuant to which the
Commission promulgated Section 3103(Z), see Discussion infra, are constitutional delegations of
authority under Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets v. McCrory. 112 So.2d 606, 613 (La.
1959). Neither the Assessor’s original petition for declaratory judgment nor the Assessor and
LAA’s motion for partial summary judgment challenged the constitutionality of the Legislature’s
delegation of authority to the Commission. Instead, the relevant question presented is whether the
Commission exceeded the authority delegated to it or unconstitutionally infringed on the powers
of the Assessor. See State v. Hatton, 2007-2377, p. 13 (La. 7/1/08), 985 So. 2d 709, 718–19 (“It is
well-settled that a constitutional challenge may not be considered by an appellate court unless it
was properly pleaded and raised in the trial court below. . . A corollary of these principles is that
courts are generally reluctant to address the constitutionality of legislation unless required by th e
particular case and issue before them.”).

16

however, subjects parish assessors’ authority to conditions and limitations as
provided by the Legislature. La. Const. VII, § 18(D) (emphasis added) ; Dow
Chemical Co. v. Pitre, 468 So. 2d 747, 752–53 (La. 1985). In accordance with this
constitutional delegation, in La. R.S. 47:2323(A) the Legislature sets forth the
appraisal procedures by which the fair market value of real and perso nal property
shall be determined:
The criteria for determining fair market value shall apply uniformly
throughout the state . Uniform guidelines, procedures and rules and
regulations as are necessary to implement said criteria shall be adopted
by the Louisiana Tax Commission only after public hearings held
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.
(Emphasis added. ) Likewise, La. R.S. 47:1837 sets forth the duties and
responsibilities of the Commission, including the authority to ensure uniformity of
appraisals, providing in pertinent part:
In order to promote compliance with the requirements of the
constitution and laws of the state, the tax commission shall issue and,
from time to time, may amend or revise rules and regulations
containing minimum standards of assessment and appraisal
performance.

(Emphasis added.)
In D90 Energy, LLC v. Jefferson Davis Par. Bd. of Review , we recognized
that this statutory framework charges the Commission “with implementing ‘uniform
guidelines, procedures and rules and regulations’ for statewide application and
adoption of criteria to determine fair market value .” 2020-00200, p. 4 –5 (La.
10/1/20), __ So. 3d __. 19 It is thus established that the Commission acts within its
authority – and, indeed, within its statutory duty – when issuing and implementing
“criteria” ensuring the uniform application of appraisal procedures. See also Dow
Chemical, 468 So. 2d 747 (upholding the “valid expression of the legislature's will
encompassed in LSA R.S. 47:2331” because “all similarly situated taxpayers were

19 This case was pending when the parties filed their original briefs.

17

treated in a similar manner and no taxpayer suffered excess valuation from the
methods employed by the assessors” in the context of reappraisal); Williams v.
Opportunity Homes Limited Partnership, 2017-0955, p. 5, n.3 (La. 3/13/18), 240 So.
3d 161, 165 , n.3 (“The responsibility of the Commission as the supervisory state
agency over parish tax assessors is clear .”); La. R.S. 47:1957(A) (“The assessors
shall be responsible, under the supervision of the tax commission, for listing and
assessing all property wit hin their respective parishes, except such property as is
subject to direct assessment by the tax commission. . . .”) (emphasis added).
Per these legislative mandates and in order to ensure the uniformity required
by La. Const. art. VII, § 18(D), in 2017 the Commission revised its Rules and
Regulations to clarify the mandatory nature of its longstanding quadrennial
reappraisal cycle,20 including the addition of Section 3103(Z). At the time of the
events out of which this litigation arose, that section provided:
A decision by the Tax Commission that determines the fair market
value of a property shall be applied to subsequent tax years until
reappraisal in a future mandated reappraisal year, unless there has
been a change in the condition of the property that would justify
reappraisal. A change in value in subsequent tax years for a
property that the Tax Commission determined fair market value
of, prior to a reappraisal year, shall serve as prima facie evidence
of a prohibited reappraisal. The assessor must show that there has

20 The 2017 amendments related to the quadrennial reappraisal cycle did not change, and instead
clarified, the Commission’s Rules and Regulations. As noted herein, the district court in an earlier
ruling not appealed by any party also ruled that certain regul ations related to the mandatory
quadrennial appraisal process are unconstitutional. See Notes 10 and 12, supra. We acknowledge
the district court’s prior judgment on the constitutionality of these specific rules is not under review
in this case, but we rej ect the Assessor’s argument that we are bound, by the doctrine of res
judicata, to find Section 3103(Z) is unconstitutional for the reasons assigned in the district court’s
prior ruling as to these other sections of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations. See Burguieres
v. Pollingue , 2002- 1385 (La. 2/25/03), 843 So. 2d 1049, 1053 (“A reading of La. R.S.
13:4231 reveals that a second action is precluded when all of the following are satisfied: (1) the
judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes of
action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and
(5) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or
occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation.”). We address herein a question not
already addressed by the district court, but critical to evaluating the district court’s rulings below:
whether Section 3103(Z) is valid and constitutional. See also La. Admin. Code 61:V.303(D) (the
Commission’s rule, neither challenged by the Assessor and LAA nor found to be unconstitutional
in the district court’s ruling, setting the quadrennial reappraisal cycle by which assessors are to
reappraise properties).

18

been a change in the condition of the property that would justify
reappraisal or a change in value in a non-reappraised year.
(Emphasis added.)21
As in D90 Energy, the foregoing rule falls within the Commission’s authority
under La. R.S. 47:1837(D) and La. R.S. 47:2323 to establish uniform rules related
to appraisal of property for purposes of ad valorem taxation. 22 Inequity and a loss
of uniformity would result if a parish assessor reappraise d a single property in a
neighborhood while leaving the other values alone. Without the mandatory
quadrennial reappraisal cycle, a similar inequity and violation of uniformity would
occur if the assessor in one parish reappraised the properties in his or her parish at a
frequency greater than the assessor in the neighboring parish. Where property value
is increasing year to year, for example, the taxpayers in one parish would receive the
benefit of a slower reappraisal cycle as compared to the taxpayers in the other where
property values increase more frequently . Thus, the mandatory quadrennial
reappraisal cycle furthers the foregoing statutory and constitutional requirements of
uniformity by preventing any such inequity.
In connection with this uniform reappraisal cycle, Section 3103(Z) for its part
ensured that once an appraised value has been corrected, the appraised value would
apply for the entire period following a taxpayers’ appeal and before reappraisal
absent a change in condition of the property that would justify more frequent
reappraisal. For the same reasons that apply to the quadrennial reappraisal cycle, this
rule ensured that the reappraised value wa s uniformly applied throughout the state.
Accordingly, Section 3103(Z) was within the Commission’s authority to establish

21 The mandatory reappraisal year is determined by the Commission, which sets a “uniform lien
date” by which all reappraisals must be valued. See Notes 10 and 12, supra.
22 The Assessor argues that the mandatory quadrennial reappraisal cycle conflicted with La. R.S.
47:2331’s mandate that “real property shall be reappraised at least every four years.” Since the
plain language of La. R.S. 47:2331 requires reappraisal of real property at least every four years
and the mandatory quadrennial reappraisal cycle requires reappraisal of real property within that
timeframe, this argument is easily dismissed.

19

“criteria” to ensure the uniform reappraisal of property throughout the state, and the
district court erred in finding otherwise.
La. Admin. Code 61:V.3103(Z) – Constitutionality
In addition to finding Section 3103(Z) e xceeded the Commission’s statutory
authority, the district court ruled that Section 3103(Z) unconstitutionally infringed
upon the Assessor’s authority under La. Const. art VII, § 18(D) and
unconstitutionality conflicted with the mandates of La. Const. art. VII, § 18(D) that
property shall be reappraised “at intervals of not more than four years.” It is
axiomatic that the Constitution is the supreme law of this state to which all legislative
instruments must yield. Iberville Par. Sch. Bd., 248 So. 3d at 306 (citing La. Fed’n
of Teachers, 13-01230 at p. 22, 118 So. 3d at 1048 (citing World Trade Ctr. Taxing
Dist. v. All Taxpayers, Prop. Owners, 908 So. 2d 623, 632). When a legislative
instrument conflicts with a constitutional provision, the legislative instrument must
fall. See Caddo–Shreveport Sales and Use Tax Com’n v. Office of Motor Vehicles
Through Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections of the State , 97–2233, p. 6 (La.
4/14/98), 710 So. 2d 776, 780. Logically , we apply the same standards when
addressing whether an administrative regulation conflicts with the Constitution.
For the same reasons that Section 3103(Z) does not exceed the legislative
authority granted to the Commission within this Constitutional framework, Section
3103(Z) does not unconstit utionally infringe on the powers of the state assessors
provided in La. Const. VII, § 18(D). See also Dow Chemical, 468 So. 2d at 755
(finding La. Const. art. VII, § 18(D) does not limit the Legislature’s authority to set
appraisal cycles for different types of properties); see also D90 Energy, 2020-00200
at pp. 4–6.
Turning to Article VII, Section 18(F), the mandate that property be
reappraised at least every four years for purposes of ad valorem taxation clearly sets

20

a maximum amount of time that can lapse between assessments. T he mandatory
quadrennial reappraisal cycle established by the Commission’s challenged Rules and
Regulations – including Section 3103(Z) – required reappraisal of real property at
least every four years and thus did not exceed this maximum. Accordingly, Section
3103(Z) did not unconstitutionally conflict with the requir ements set forth in La.
Const. art. VII, § 18(F).
For the foregoing reasons, we find the district court erred in ruling Section
3103(Z) unconstitutional.
La. R.S. 47:1990 – Constitutionality, As Applied23
Having found Section 3103(Z) – the substantive basis for the Correction Order
– to be valid and constitutional , the final question is whether the Commission
appropriately invoked jurisdiction over Taxpayers’ appeal under La. R.S. 47:1990.
Specifically, we must address whether the Commission’s invocation of the broad
grant of authority under La. R.S. 47:199024 to docket Taxpayers’ appeal, issue a rule
to show cause, hold a hearing to review the correctness of the 2017 assessment, and
correct an assessment outside of an ordinary tax appeal unconstitutionally conflicts
with and thus violates La. Const. a rt. VII, § 18(D) and (E). 25 La. Const. art. VII,

23 While the Assessor argues La. R.S. 47:1990 is facially un constitutional, that constitutional
challenge is not properly before the Court. Rather, the narrow constitut ional challenge presented
in the Assessor’s petition sought a declaration that La. R.S. 47:1990 is unconstitutional as applied
in this case, and the district court determination of unconstitutionality was also “as applied” to the
Commission’s actions. State v. Hatton, 2007-2377, p. 13 (La. 7/1/08), 985 So. 2d 709, 718–19 (“It
is well-settled that a constitutional challenge may not be considered by an appellate court unless it
was properly pleaded and raised in the trial court below. . . A corollary of t hese principles is that
courts are generally reluctant to address the constitutionality of legislation unless required by the
particular case and issue before them.”). See also Segura v. Frank , 93-1271 (La. 1/14/94), 630
So.2d 714, 725 (“appellate courts w ill not consider issues raised for the first time” in appellate
court).
24 In pertinent part, La. R.S . 47:1990 provides: “The tax commission may change or correct any
and all assessments of property for the purpose of taxation . . . at any time before the taxes levied
have actually been paid.” (Emphasis added.)
25 Both the Commission and Taxpayers argue that the authority granted to the Commission by La.
R.S. 47:1990 is essential to the interpretation and application of various statutes in Title 47. These
arguments are immaterial here because when and how La. R.S. 47:1990 may be validly invoked
by the Commission is not before the Court.

21

§18 (E) (providing that an assessment shall be subject “to review” first by the board
of review and then by the Commission); La. Const. art. VII, § 18(D) (providing that
the parish assessors “shall determine the fair market value of property” for purposes
of ad valorem taxation).
The Louisiana Legislature may enact any legislation that the Constitution does
not prohibit. Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1132 (La. 1993). There is a
presumption that a legislative instrument is constitutional, and the party challenging
its validity bears the burden of proof. State v. Citizen , 04-1841, p. 11 (La. 4/1/05),
898 So. 2d 325, 324. “If a legislative instrument is susceptible to two constructions,
one of which would render it unconstitutional or raise grave constitutional questions,
the court will adopt the interpretation of the legislative instrument which, without
doing violence to its language, will maintain its constitutionality.” Iberville Par. Sch.
Bd., 248 So. 3d at 306. Yet, legislation must yield to the Constitution. Id.
The Louisiana Constitution grants the parish assessors the responsibility and
authority to determine the fair market value of real property (except public service
property) within their respective parishes. La. Const. a rt. VII, § 18(D). The
assessments by the parish tax assessors are subject to review under La. Const. art.
VII, § 18(E), which states “[t]he correctness of assessments by the assessor shall be
subject to review first by the parish governing authority, then by the Louisiana Tax
Commission or its successor, and finally by the courts, all in accordance w ith
procedures established by law.”
The “procedures established by law ” for a review proceeding provide for
protest first to the parish governing authority sitting as the board of review, followed
by appeal to the Commission, and then judicial review. See R.S. 47:1992(D) (“Any
taxpayer or assessor dissatisfied with the determination of the board of review may
appeal to the tax commission in accordance with rules and regulations established

22
by the tax commission.”); La. R.S. 47:1989(A) (“[T]he tax commission shall
conduct public hearings to hear real and personal property appeals of taxpayers, bona
fide representatives of an a ffected tax-recipient body, or assessors, from the a ction
of the board of review.”); La. R.S. 47:1998 (“Any taxpayer . . . dissatisfied with the
final determination of the [Commission] under the provisions of R.S. 47:1989 shall
have the right to institute suit within thirty days of the entry of any final decision of
the [Commission] in the district court . . . .”). This Court recently upheld this
ordinary tax appeal process for review of assessments in D90 Energy, supra, finding
“[t]his statutory scheme . . . guarantees the due process rights of the taxpayer by
affording a meaningful opportunity to challenge the assessor's valuations.” Id.,
2020-00200 at p. 8.
Significantly, the narrow facts present in this case do not involve an appeal
through the ordinary process set forth above and upheld by this Court in D90 Energy.
Instead, this case involves a docketed appeal in which the Commission ordered the
Assessor to show cause as to why Taxpayers’ 2017 assessment should not be
corrected even though Taxpayers had not first appealed to the Board of Review
pursuant to the ordinary tax appeal process. No one contests this was an appeal.
The Commission argues that while La. R.S. 47:1990 does not authorize it to
unilaterally review the correctness of an assessment outside the context of a properly
and timely filed correctness challenge, the Commission can nonetheless rely on
authority granted therein to “change or correct any and all assessments of property
for the purpose of taxation, in order to make the assessments conform to the true and
correct valuation.” Stated another way, the Commission argues it is authorized under
La. R.S. 47:1990 to change an assessment in this case because the value had already
been adjudicated in Taxpayers’ 2016 appeal.

23
This argument is not persuasive. Section 3103(Z) provides that, if changed
prior to the quadrennial reappraisal, a property’s change in value is prima facie
evidence of a prohibited reappraisal. However, a party may still contest any such
reappraisal and rebut the prima facie evidence. In order to have reached a
determination as to whether the Assessor had invalidly reappraised property in a
non-reappraisal year, Section 3103(Z) required the Commission to consider
evidence – or in this case, the lack thereof – that the Assessor might bring forward
as to the change in condition of the property justifying rea ppraisal. In sum, Section
3103(Z) never permitted the Commission to treat the prima facie evidence as
definitive.
Moreover, the Commission’s assertion that it did not “review” or adjudicate
the correctness of the 2017 assessment is not supported by the re cord. In fact, the
record shows that the Commission not only docketed this matter as an appeal but
also ordered the Assessor to “show cause” as to why the assessment should not be
corrected. The very act of issuing a rule to show cause designated that the
Commission would review the assessment of the Assessor after evaluating the
arguments and evidence of both parties. The Commissions’ subsequent hearing was
not merely an act of enforcement. Instead, the Commission’s hearing was
adjudicatory and thus inherently one of “review.”
Under th e plain language of La. Const. a rt. VII, § 18(E), Taxpayers were
obligated to seek “review” first by the Board of Review and only thereafter could
the Commission review and correct their assessment. The Commission acted outside
the scope of proper appellate proceedings by improperly using R.S. 47:1990 to
circumvent the constitutional requirements for reviewing assessments. Accordingly,
we find La. R.S. 47:1990, as applied by the Commission here, unconstitutionally

24
conflicts with the plain language of La. Const. a rt. VII, § 18(E), and uphold the
district court’s summary judgment finding in that respect.26
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we find the district court erred in finding the
Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating Section 3103(Z) and declaring
Section 3103(Z) unconstitutional. We further find the district court correctly
declared La. R.S. 47:1990 unconstitutional, as applied.
REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.
26 Having found La. R.S. 47:1990 is unconstitutional, as applied, due to its conflict with La. Const.
art. VII, § 18(E), we pretermit a determination as to whether the district court correctly found that
La. R.S. 47:1990 unconstitutionally conflicts with La. Const. art. VII, § 18(D).

05/20/21
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2020-CA-01037
CONRAD COMEAUX, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
ASSESSOR FOR LAFAYETTE PARISH
VS.
THE LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION &
KRAIG THOMAS STRENGE & KELLY PARKS STRENGE
ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
WEIMER, C.J., dissenting in part.
The majority opinion does an excellent job for sorting through the Gordian
procedural knot presented in this complicated case. However, I respectfully dissent
in part based on the district court’s prior declaration that former La. Admin. Code
61:V.121(A), 213(C), and 303(B)(2), “all of which relate to the Commission’s
mandatory quadrennial reappraisal cycle,”1 are unconstitutional.
Formerly, those administrative code provisions read:
Real property, as defined in La. R.S. 47:2322, shall be
reappraised once every four years. [La. Admin. Code 61:V.121(A)
(emphasis added).]
All property shall be reappraised and valued in accordance with
the Constitution at intervals of not more than once every four years.
This quadrennial cycle reappraisal date shall be determined solely by the
Tax Commission. [La. Admin. Code 61:V.213(C) (emphasis added).]
The assessor’s office may reappraise property during a
non-reappraisal year if that property in all or part of the assessing
district, or within a certain classification, was appraised inaccurately or
was not uniformly appraised during the current reappraisal cycle ...
all such property shall be valued based upon the most current valuation
date established by the Tax Commission and on the same criterion as
1 See Comeaux v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 20-1037, slip op. at 4 (La. 5/_/21).

other similar property.” [La. Admin. Code 61:V.303(B)(2) (emphasis
added).]
As the majority recognizes, those provisions were revised by the Commission “in
2017 to include mandatory language as to the quadrennial reappraisal cycle–i.e. that
property be reappraised no more than every four years–whereas prior to the 2017
amendments the quadrennial reappraisal cycle established by the Commission was
not expressly mandatory.”2 See La. Admin. Code 61:V.303(D) (which establishes
the quadrennial reappraisal cycle).3
In summary, those former regulations were revised in 2017 to make the
quadrennial reappraisal cycle established in La. Admin. Code 61:V.303(D)
mandatory.4 By judgment dated November 13, 2018, the district court deemed the
2 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
3 La. Admin. Code 61:V.303(D) provides:
The Louisiana Tax Commission has ordered all property to be
reappraised for the 2016 tax year in all parishes. All property is to be
valued as of January 1, 2015.
1. The Louisiana Tax Commission has ordered all property to
be reappraised for the 2020 tax year in all parishes. Beginning in tax
year 2020, all real property is to be valued as of January 1, 2019.
4 Despite the 2017 addition of language making those provisions mandatory, twice in the opinion,
the majority states that the 2017 amendments were for clarification purposes. See id. at 6 n.12
(“[t]he 2017 amendments clarified that reappraisals are to occur only on the quadrennial reappraisal
cycle set by the uniform lien date absent exception for change in property value due to a change in
its condition, La. Admin. Code 61:V.3103(Z), or because the property was mistakenly reappraised
(or not reappraised at all), La. Admin. Code 61:V.303(B).”).; id. at 17 n.20 (“The 2017 amendments
related to the quadrennial reappraisal cycle did not change, and instead clarified, the Commission’s
Rules and Regulations.”). Such a pronouncement is legally significant.
“When an existing law is not clear, a subsequent statute clarifying or explaining the law may be
regarded as interpretive, and the interpretive statute may be given retrospective effect because it does
not change, but merely clarifies, pre-existing law.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609
So.2d 809, 817 (La. 1992). However, “[i]nterpretive laws do not establish new rules. What they do
is to determine the meaning of existing laws.” Id. at 818 (quoting 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW
TREATISE, No. 251 (La.St.L.Inst.Transl. 1959)). There is “no bright line between substantive laws
which change existing standards and interpretive laws which change existing standards by redefining
and returning to their ostensible ‘original’ meaning.” Id. at 819 (quoting Pierce v. Hobart Corp.,
939 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir.1991)).
In light of the tenuous line between the lawmaker’s intent to “clarify” existing laws and the
2

Commission’s mandatory quadrennial reappraisal cycle to be unconstitutional, based
on a finding that in promulgating those regulatory provisions, the Commission
exceeded its “authority and unconstitutionally infringe[d] on powers granted to
Assessors”5 by La. Const. art. VII, § 18(D), which provides:
Each assessor shall determine the fair market value of all property
subject to taxation within his respective parish ... . Fair market value
and use value of property shall be determined in accordance with criteria
which shall be established by law and which shall apply uniformly
throughout the state.
That 2018 judgment is now final since it was not appealed.
Subsequently, the Commission revised La. Admin. Code 61:V.121(A), 213(C),
and 303(B)(2) to remove the mandate imposed by the 2017 amendments, to wit:
Real property, as defined in R.S. 47:2322, shall be reappraised
and reassessed at least every 4 years. [La. Admin. Code 61:V.121(A)
(emphasis added).]
All property shall be reappraised and valued in accordance with
the Constitution at intervals of not more than four years. This
quadrennial cycle reappraisal date is determined by the Louisiana Tax
Commission. [La. Admin. Code 61:V.213(C) (emphasis added).]
The assessor may reappraise property based on property transfers
more often than every four years, if transfers indicate that property in
all or a part of the assessing district, or within a certain classification,
was appraised inaccurately or was not uniformly appraised during the
prior reappraisal. However, the reappraisal shall not be applied on a
parcel by parcel basis, but rather, across the board in a given
geographical area. Values determined from recent transfers would then
be indexed to the date of the last reappraisal. [La. Admin. Code
61:V.303((B)(2) (emphasis added).]
enactment of new substantive provisions, see id., it is improper for this court to make such a
determination when the issue has not be raised by the parties, especially since former La. Admin.
Code 61:V.121(A), 213(C), and 303(B)(2) are “not under review in this case. See Comeaux, slip
op. at 17 n.20.
5 Comeaux, slip op. at 6.
3

As revised, these provisions now conform with La. Const. art. VII, § 18(F)6 and La.
R.S. 47:2331.7
At issue here is former La. Admin. Code 61:V.3103(Z), which was in existence
when Taxpayers appealed their 2017 assessment directly to the Commission and
provided:8
A decision by the Tax Commission that determines the fair market
value of a property shall be applied to subsequent tax years until
reappraisal in a future mandated reappraisal year, unless there has
been a change in the condition of the property that would justify
reappraisal or a change in value. A change in value in subsequent tax
years for a property that the Tax Commission determined fair market
value of, prior to a reappraisal year, shall serve as prima facie evidence
of a prohibited reappraisal and shall create a rebuttable presumption
against the assessment. The assessor must show that there has been a
change in the condition of the property that would justify reappraisal or
a change in value in a non-reappraisal year. [Emphasis added.]
Former Section 3103(Z) referenced the “mandated reappraisal year” implemented by
former La. Admin. Code 61:V.121(A), 213(C), and 303(B)(2) in 2017. In urging the
unconstitutionality of Section 3103(Z):
[T]he Assessor and LAA relied in part on the district court’s November
13, 2018 ruling wherein it declared unconstitutional certain of the
Commission’s Rules and Regulations related to the mandatory
quadrennial reappraisal cycle. Because Section 3103(Z) “clearly suffers
from the same constitutional defects,” [as those Rules and Regulations
that made the quadrennial reappraisal cycle mandatory,] the Assessor
and LAA argued, the district court should likewise declare [Section
3103(Z)] unconstitutional.[9]
6 Article VII, § 18(F) provides that “[a]ll property subject to taxation shall be reappraised and valued
in accordance with this Section, at intervals of not more than four years.” Emphasis added.
7 La. R.S. 47:2331 provides that “real property shall be reappraised at least every four years.”
Emphasis added.
8 In its brief to this court, the Commission stated that La. Admin. Code 61:V.3103(Z) was deleted
“during its annual update of its Rules and Regulations in calendar 2019.”
9 Comeaux, slip op. at 8.
4

The district court agreed and found that, like former La. Admin. Code 61:V.121(A),
213(C), and 303(B)(2), La. Admin. Code 61:V.3101(Z) “unconstitutionally exceeded
the Commission’s rulemaking authority and unconstitutionally infringed upon powers
granted exclusively to the parish assessors under La. Const. art. VII, § 18(D).”10
While recognizing “the district court’s [November 13, 2018] judgment on the
constitutionality of [former La. Admin. Code 61:V.121(A), 213(C), and 303(B)(2)
(2017)] is not under review in this case,”11 the majority nonetheless proceeds to
revisit the constitutionality of the “mandatory quadrennial reappraisal process” for
purposes of determining the constitutionality of former La. Admin. Code
61:V.3103(Z).12 As urged by the Assessor and LAA, I believe this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction13 to determine the correctness of the district court’s November 13,
2018 judgment as that judgment, which was then appealable,14 became final due to
the lack of an appeal. See Tolis v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Louisiana State Univ., 95-1529,
pp. 2-3 (La. 10/16/95), 660 So.2d 1206, 1206-07:15
10 Id. at 8-9.
11 Id. at 17 n.20.
12 Id.
13 The issue of subject matter jurisdiction addresses the court’s authority to adjudicate this matter;
the issue may be considered at any time, even by an appellate court on its own motion, at any stage
of an action. Boudreaux v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Development, 01-1329, pp. 7-8 (La.
2/26/02), 815 So.2d 7, 13.
14 See La. C.C.P. art. 1915; La. C.C.P. art. 1841 (“A judgment that determines the merits in whole
or in part is a final judgment.”).
15 The Tolis court found that, under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment which had
dismissed the action in its entirely barred subsequent modification by any court except on direct
review. Id., 95-1529 at 3, 660 So.2d at 1207. The Tolis court noted that the appellate court
confused the doctrine of law of the case in cases involving interlocutory judgments with the doctrine
of res judicata involving final judgment. Id., 95-1529 at 2, 660 So.2d at 1206. Similarly, in First
National Bank, Bienville Parish v. Smith, 29,350, p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/2/97), 691 So.2d 355,
358, the court found that a prior summary judgment on the plaintiff’s principal demand on a
promissory note, which had become final due to the failure to appeal, was res judicata and, therefore,
barred certain issues defendants later raised in the same lawsuit in defense of plaintiffs’ exceptions
to defendants’ reconventional demand.
5

When a court renders a judgment that decides the merits of the
case in whole or in part, the judgment is a final judgment. La.Code
Civ.Proc. art. 1841. A final judgment may be rendered by either a trial
court or an appellate court. ...
A final judgment is conclusive between the parties except on
direct review. La.Rev.Stat. 13:4231. Moreover, a final judgment
acquires the authority of the thing adjudged if no further review is
sought within the time fixed by law or if the judgment is confirmed on
further review. ... Once a final judgment acquires the authority of the
thing adjudged, no court has jurisdiction, in the sense of power and
authority, to modify, revise or reverse the judgment, regardless of the
magnitude of the error in the final judgment.
Accordingly, this court does not currently have jurisdiction, in the sense of power and
authority, to modify, revise or reverse the November 13, 2018 judgment–directly or
indirectly, regardless of the magnitude of the error in the final judgment. See id.16
In summary, although this court has not yet opined on the constitutionality of
the mandatory quadrennial reappraisal cycle implemented by former La. Admin. Code
61:V.121(A), 213(C), and 303(B)(2) (2017), this court is not now jurisdictionally free
to do so in reviewing the constitutionality of former La. Admin. Code 61:V.3103(Z).
As urged by the Assessor and LAA, this court’s review of the constitutionality
of former La. Admin. Code 61:V.3103(Z) must be made based on the underlying
premise that the mandatory quadrennial reappraisal cycle is unconstitutional.
Because former La. Admin. Code 61:V.3103(Z) is based on the previously-declared
unconstitutional “mandated reappraisal” cycle, the district court properly found that
16 The majority rejects “the Assessor’s argument that [this court is] bound, by the doctrine of res
judicata, to find Section 3103(Z) is unconstitutional for the reasons assigned in the district court’s
prior ruling as to” former La. Admin. Code 61:V.121(A), 213(C), and 303(B)(2) (2017). Comeaux,
slip op. at 17 n.20. Its reliance on Burguieres v. Pollingue, 02-1385 (La. 2/25/03), 843 So.2d 1049,
for this rejection is misplaced as the conclusiveness of the November 13, 2018 judgment between
the parties herein is not dependent on the filing of a second action. Although the Burguieres court
discussed the application of res judicata in a second action, Burguieres is distinguishable from the
instant case in that the Burguieres court was not called on to address the conclusive effect of a prior
judgment that became final due to the passage of time without an appeal in the same action. Id.,
02-1385 at 7, 843 So.2d at 1053. The applicability of res judicata does not require the filing of a
separate lawsuit. See Gladney v. Anglo-Dutch Energy, L.L.C., 19-93, p. 14 (La.App. 3 Cir.
10/2/19), 280 So.3d 964, 973; see also Tolis and First National Bank, Bienville Parish, supra.
6

Section 3103(Z) (in the words of the Assessor and LAA) “clearly suffers from the
same constitutional defects” as former La. Admin. Code 61:V.121(A), 213(C), and
303(B)(2) (2017).
Furthermore, this court in City of New Orleans v. Louisiana Assessors’ Ret.
& Relief Fund, 05-2548, pp. 11-13 (La. 10/1/07), 986 So.2d 1, 12-13, set forth the
“Principles of Review for Constitutionality” as follows:
As a general rule, statutes are presumed to be constitutional; therefore,
the party challenging the validity of a statute has the burden of proving
its unconstitutionality. Because the provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution are not grants of power but instead are limitations on the
otherwise plenary power of the people, exercised through the legislature,
the legislature may enact any legislation that the constitution does not
prohibit. As a result, a party challenging the constitutionality of a
statute must point to a particular provision of the constitution that would
prohibit the enactment of the statute, and must demonstrate clearly and
convincingly that it was the constitutional aim of that provision to deny
the legislature the power to enact the statute in question. A
constitutional limitation on the legislative power may be either express
or implied.
Finally, because it is presumed that the legislature acts within its
constitutional authority in enacting legislation, this court must construe
a statute so as to preserve its constitutionality when it is reasonable to
do so. In other words, if a statute is susceptible of two constructions,
one of which would render it unconstitutional, or raise grave
constitutional questions, the court will adopt the interpretation of the
statute which, without doing violence to its language, will maintain its
constitutionality. Nevertheless, the constitution is the supreme law of
this state, to which all legislative acts must yield. When a statute
conflicts with a constitutional provision, the statute must fall. [Citations
omitted.]
Consequently, while La. Const. art. VII, § 18(D) requires that an assessor’s
determination of the fair market value of property “must be made ‘in accordance with
criteria which shall be established by law and which shall apply uniformly
throughout the state,’”17 any such “[u]niform guidelines, procedures and rules and
17 Comeaux, slip op. at 15.
7

regulations”18 implemented by the Commission, like statutes enacted by the
legislature, must not conflict with the constitution. See Caddo-Shreveport Sales &
Use Tax Comm’n v. Off. of Motor Vehicles, Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. of
State, 97-2233, p. 6 (La. 4/14/98), 710 So.2d 776, 780. As previously stated, La.
Const. art. VII, § 18(F) provides: “All property subject to taxation shall be
reappraised and valued in accordance with this Section, at intervals of not more than
four years,” and La. R.S. 47:2331 similarly provides that “real property shall be
reappraised at least every four years … .” (Emphasis added.) These constitutional
and statutory provisions require that reappraisal occurs at least once every four years,
but do not prohibit reappraisal more frequently. Although the “legislative”
implementation of a “mandatory quadrennial reappraisal cycle” by the Commission
does not violate the constitutional requirement that reappraisal occur at least every
four years, as found by the majority,19 rules and regulations making such a cycle
mandatory limit the assessor’s general authority to conduct a reappraisal to once
every four years. Even though done pursuant to the Commission’s supervisory
authority over parish assessors with the goal of ensuring uniformity, the “legislative”
implementation of a mandatory quadrennial reappraisal cycle by the Commission
impermissibly restricts the assessor’s implied constitutional right to reappraise the
property more often.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s discussion related
to both the Commission’s statutory authority to promulgate former La. Admin. Code
61:V.3103(Z) and the constitutionality of that provision.
18 La. R.S. 47:2323(A).
19 Comeaux, slip op. at 20.
8

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2020-CA-01037
CONRAD COMEAUX, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
ASSESSOR FOR LAFAYETTE PARISH
VERSUS
THE LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION & KRAIG THOMAS STRENGE
& KELLY PARKS STRENGE
HUGHES, J, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur, in part, with the majority decision to reverse the judgment of the
district court , ruling La. Admin. Code, Title 61, § 3103(Z) unconstitutional .
However, I dissent, in part, from the majority decision to affirm the judgment of the
district court, ruling La. R.S. 47:1990 unconstitutional as applied to the December
20, 2017 action of the Louisiana Tax Commission (“LTC”) (which ordered Conrad
Comeaux, in his official capacity as Assessor for Lafayette Parish (“Assessor”), to
correct his 2017 tax assessment valuation of the taxpayers’ property from $288,270
to $231,500, wh en the LTC had ruled on October 18, 2017 that the $288,270
valuation by the Assessor for the 2016 tax year should be reduced to the correct
valuation of $231,500), for the following reasons.
Firstly, La. R.S. 47:1998(C) does not provide the Plaintiff/Assessor with the
right to file a legality challenge1 in the district court unless it is “necessary to protect
1 Louisiana’s constitutional and statutory law formulates a two-track procedure that must be adhered to in
challenging property tax assessments; one track encompasses challenges to the correctness of assessments
by the assessor, while the other track covers challenges to the legality of the tax levied. Gisclair v.
Louisiana Tax Comm'n , 09 -0007 (La. 6/26/09), 16 So.3d 1132, 1135. Accordingly , under our
jurisprudence, challenges to ad valorem property tax assessments are categorized either as challenges to the
“correctness of assessments” or challenges to the “legality of assessments,” and the nature of the challenge
dictates the body in which our constitution grants jurisdiction to hear and resolve these disputes. Id. For
assessment correctness challenges, La. Const. art. VII, § 18(E) instructs that the “correctness of assessments
by the assessor shall be subject to review first by the parish governing authority, then by the Louisiana Tax
Commission or its successor, and finally by the courts, all in accordance with procedures established by
law.” Id., 16 So.3d at 1135. Claims challenging the constitutionality of tax provisions constitute legality
challenges over which the district courts exercise original jurisdiction. Id., 16 So.3d at 1138. Thus, the
LTC has original jurisdiction over correctness challenges, while the district court has original jurisdiction
over legality challenges, including the constitutional claims presented that arise out of correctness
challenges. See ANR Pipeline Co. v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n , 02-1479 (La. 7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1145,
1149-51.
05/20/21

2

the interest of the state ,” and there is no assertion by the Assessor that he filed the
instant district court suit to protect any state interest. Therefore, the Assessor’s suit
was subject to a peremptory exception plea ding the objection of no right of action ,
pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 927(B) (“The ... failure to disclose ... a right or interest in
the plaintiff to institute the suit ... may be noticed by either the trial or appellate court
on its own motion.).”
Secondly, even if this suit met the requirements of La. R.S. 47:1998(C), the
Assessor failed to bear his burden to show that La. R.S. 14:1990 was unconstitutional
as applied.
Unlike the provisions of the federal constitution, the constitutional provisions
in our state constitution are not grants of power but instead are limitations on the
otherwise plenary power of the people of a state exercised through its legislature.
State in Int. of J.M., 13-1717 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d 853, 859; Radiofone, Inc.
v. City of New Orleans, 93-0962 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 694, 697. The power to
tax is vested in the state as an attribute of its sovereignty and is not dependent upon
a grant of power in the constitution. Radiofone, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 630
So.2d at 697. Article VII, § 1 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution recognizes and
incorporates that principle: “Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the
power of taxation shall be vested in the legislature, shall never be surrendered,
suspended, or contracted away, and shall be exercised for public purposes only.” Id.
Therefore, the power of the state to tax is unlimited except as restricted by
constitutional provisions. Id. On the contrary, it is generally recognized that local
governments possess, with respect to taxation, only such power as has been granted
to them by the state constitution or the statutes. Id. Therefore, unless the state
constitution provides otherwise, the exercise of the power of taxation is vested
exclusively in the state legislature and is subject to legislative control. Id.

3

Accordingly, this state’s legislature has deemed it appropriate to give
extensive duties and powers to t he LT C, directing in Paragraph (A) of La. R.S.
47:1837 that the LTC “shall administer and enforce all laws related to the state
supervision of local property tax assessments and the assessment of public service
properties” “[i]n addition to any duties, powers, or responsibilities otherwise
conferred upon the tax commission .” (Emphasis added.) Importantly, La. R.S.
47:1957(A) states that “(t)he assessors shall be responsible, under the supervision
of the tax commission, for listing and assessing all property within their respective
parishes....” (Emphasis added.) Further, Paragraph (G) of La. R.S. 47:1957 provides
that “[t]he tax commission shall publicly reprimand any assessor if it shall appear
that he is wilfully negligent or unfair in the assessment of property, or in omitting it
from the rolls, and if the tax commission deems it necessary, shall institute removal
proceedings through the attorney general, for gross misconduct in office .”
(Emphasis added.) In addition, La. R.S. 47:1837(C)(4) provides: “Any person who
disobeys any order of the Louisiana Tax Commission or fails or refuses to comply
with any request of the Louisiana Tax Commission issued or made under the
authority of any Section of this Part or who disobeys any subpoena duces tecum, or
refuses to testify when requested to do so by the Louisiana Tax Commission, either
orally or by the Louisiana Tax Commission, shall for each offense be fined a sum
of not less than fifty dollars, nor more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned
for not more than thirty days, or both.” (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the Legislature
intended the LTC to have extensive supervisory power over local assessors, in order
to establish the aim of La. Const. Art. VII, § 18, that “[t]he percentage of fair market
value shall be uniform throughout the state upon the same class of property. ...”
(Emphasis added.)2

2 See also La. R.S. 47:1836 (authorizing the LTC to “examine carefully into all cases where
evasion or violation of the laws for assessment and taxation of property is alleged, complained of
or discovered, and ascertain wherein existing laws are defective or are imp roperly or negligently

4

The statute at issue herein, La. R.S. 47 :1990, contains an express grant of
enforcement power to the LTC, stating that the LTC “may change or correct any
and all assessments of property for the purpose of taxation, in order to make the
assessments conform to the true and correct valuation .... In order to correct or
change any such assessment, it shall only be necessary for the tax commission to
issue written instructions to the assessor to make the change upon the assessment
roll....” (Emphasis added.)
In his claim that La. R.S. 47:1990 is unconstitutional as applied, the Assessor
asserts, in essence, that the December 20, 2017 LTC order to the Assessor, correcting
the 2017 tax assessment valuation of the taxpayers’ property to the fair market value
determined by the LTC to be correct for the 2016 tax year, conflicts with La. Const.
Art. VII, § 18 (D) (“Each assessor shall determine the fair market value of all
property subject to taxa tion within his respective parish or district ....”) and that
because the taxpayers appealed the assessment value in 2016, not in 2017, the LTC’s
correction order impermissibly fell outside of an appeal proceeding contrary to La.
Const. Art. VII, § 18 (E) (“The correctness of assessments by the assessor shall be
subject to review first by the parish governing authority, then by the Louisiana Tax
Commission or its success or, and finally by the courts, all in accordance with
procedures established by law.”).
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional; accordingly, the party challenging
the validity of a statute generally has the burden of proving unconstitutionality.
Moore v. RLCC Techs., Inc., 95-2621 (La. 2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1135, 1140 . The
provisions of th e Louisiana Constitution are not grants of power but instead are

administered”); La. R.S. 47:1837(B) (authorizing the LTC to “measure the level of appraisals or
assessments and the degree of uniformity of assessments for each major class and type of property
in each parish throughout the state”); and La. R.S. 47:1837.1 (authorizing the LTC to formulate a
“program for the creation of a statewide ad valorem tax assessment database” to be “comprised of
information from assessment rolls of parishes participating in the program ... utilizing the
assessment rolls submitted to the tax commission”).

5

limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people, exercised through the
Legislature, the Legislature may enact any legislation that the constitution does not
prohibit. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d
16, 31. As a result, a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must point
to a particular provision of the constitution that would prohibit the enactment of the
statute, and must clearly and convincingly demonstrate it was the constitutional aim
of that provision to deny the Legislature the power to enact the statute in question.
Id.
Because it is presumed that the legislature acts within its constitutional
authority in prom ulgating a legislative instrument, this court must construe a
legislative instrument so as to preserve its constitutionality when it is reasonable to
do so. Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State, 13-0120 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d
1033, 1048 . In other w ords, if a legislative instrument is susceptible to two
constructions, one of which would render it unconstitutional or raise grave
constitutional questions, the court will adopt the interpretation of the legislative
instrument which, without doing violenc e to its language, will maintain its
constitutionality. Id. Even so, the constitution is the supreme law of this state to
which all legislative instruments must yield; therefore, when a legislative instrument
conflicts with a constitutional provision, the legislative instrument must fall. Id.
In this case, the Constitutional article pointed to by the Assessor, La. Const.
Art. VII, § 18, in Paragraphs (D) - (E), gives local governmental assessors the power
to determine the fair market value of property for ad valorem taxation, but Paragraph
(D) provides that fair market value must be determined “in accordance with criteria
which shall be established by law and which shall apply uniformly throughout the
state.” The Legislature specified criteria in La. R.S. 47:2323 and further directed
that “[u]niform guidelines, procedures and rules and regulations as are necessary to
implement said criteria shall be adopted by the Louisiana Tax Commissio n....”

6

Further, Paragraph (E) of Art. VII, § 18 subjects the local assessors’ fair market
value assessments to a “correctness” review, first by the parish governing authority,
then by the LTC and , finally by the courts “all in accordance with procedures
established by law.”
Although the jurisprudence discussed herein requires a court : to place the
burden of proof on the party pleading unconstitutionality, to presume that legislative
acts are constitutional, and to construe a legislative provision so as to preserve its
constitutionality when it is reasonable to do so, the district court in this case ruled
La. R.S. 47:1990 unconstitutional, as applied, based on supposition. Since La. R.S.
47:1990 was first enacted in 1934, prior to the 1974 Constitution (which removed
the power of assessing the fair market value of residential property from the LTC
and placed that duty with local assessors) , the district court assumed that La. R.S.
47:1990 conflicts with the updated provisions of the 1974 Constitution. The district
court further reasoned that the “Commission simply had no basis under the law to
believe that La. R.S. 47:1900 [sic] somehow made it a ‘Super Commission’ with the
power now to bypass Louisiana’s Constitution. As applied by the Commission, it’s
[sic] action utilizing La. R.S. 47:1900 [sic] was an unconstitutional infringement of
powers granted solely to Assessors.” Notwithstanding, the Legislature has, since the
1974 Constitution, vested the LTC with extensive administrative and supervisory
duties and powers over assessments by local assessors, and in the more than forty
years since the enactment of the 1974 Constitution , had the Legislature intended to
revoke the authority granted to the LTC by La. R.S. 47:1990, it could have repealed
the statute. Under the circumstances, it would appear the Assessor failed to bear its
burden to prove that La. R.S. 47:1990 is invalid and w ithout effect. No conflict
between La. R.S. 47: 1990 and La. Const. Art. VII, § 18 was demonstrated by the
Assessor.

7

Further, the conclusion by the majority opinion that, in issuing the December
20, 2017 order, the LTC was conducting a “review” of the Assessor’s 2017 tax
assessment valuation of the taxpayers’ property, is belied by the language of the rule
to show cause issued by the LTC to institute the December 20, 2017 hearing,
following which the December 20, 2017 order was issued. The November 15, 2017
rule to show cause by the LTC stated that the LTC had determin ed in connection
with its review of the 2016 assessment that the correct fair market value of the tax
property at issue was $231,500 and that La. Admin. Code, Title 61, § 3103(Z)
requires an LTC corrected fair market value to “be applied to subsequent tax years
until reappraisal in a future mandated reappraisal year, unless there has been a
change in the condition of the property that would justify reappraisal or a change in
value”; therefore, pursuant to its authority under La. R.S. 47:1990, it “commanded”
the Assessor to appear and show cause on December 20, 2017 why the 2017 tax
assessment should not be corrected to reflect the LTC’s correct fair market valuation
for the property of $231,500. The subsequent LTC’s December 20, 2017 order
stated that, at the hearing on the rule to show cause, “the Assessor failed to present
sufficient evidence that would justify reappraisal or a change in value of the subject
property in a reappraisal year, ” and the LTC ordered the 2017 assessme nt to be
corrected to reflect the fair market value of the subject property as $231,500. Clearly
such action was within the scope of the authority granted to the LTC by the
Legislature in La. R.S. 47:1990, since the Assessor’s actions, in continuing to record
a fair market value of $ 288,270 even though the Assessor was aware that the LTC
had determined the correct fair market value to be $231,500, was in violation of La.
Admin. Code, Title 61, §3103(Z), supra. The deposition testimony of the Assessor,
filed in the district court record , reflected his opinion that he was not legally
obligated to comply with La. Admin. Code, Title 61, §3103(Z) (which was enacted
by the LTC in conjunction with the authority to enact rules and regulations granted

8

to it by the Legislature in La. R.S. 47:1837(G), and in compliance with Louisiana’s
Administrative Procedure Act, La. R.S. 49:950 et seq., as required therein ).3
Therefore, the LTC’s rule to show cause issued to the Assessor pursuant to La. R.S.
47:1990, and resulting in the December 20, 2017 correction order , was an action
instituted by the LTC to enforce the rules and regulation it had lawfully established
and which the Assessor was violating.

3 The district court judgment herein was issued following a motion for summary judgment and, in
connection with that motion , excerpts of the June 7, 2018 deposition of the Assessor were filed
into the record. In his deposition, the Assessor explained that his 2017 assessment of the taxpayers’
property was entered on the parish tax rolls in July of 2017, when no ruling by the LTC had been
issued at that time and the parish board of review had affirmed hi s fair market value for the
property, so the Assessor said that he “carried forward” his 2016 valuation of $288,270 for the
property into the 2017 tax assessment. When the Assessor learned that the LTC had decided to
correct the fair market value for the property for the 2016 tax year to $231,500, the Assessor stated
in his deposition that he "decided to accept the value the Tax Commission was going to put on that
property for 2016 but not 2017. Twenty -seventeen [sic] my numbers were still good, 288,270."
One of the taxpayers, Thomas Strenge , who is also an attorney and who was questioning the
Assessor during the deposition, then asked the Assessor whether the Assessor was telling him that
he would have to go through the whole appeal process two years in a row, and the Assessor
answered, "That is correct."

05/20/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-CA-01037
CO
NRAD COMEAUX, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ASSESSOR FOR
LAFAYETTE PARISH
VS.
THE LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION & KRAIG THOMAS STRENGE &
KELLY PARKS STRENGE
O
n Appeal from the 19th Judicial District Court,
Parish of East Baton Rouge
G
RIFFIN, J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.
I
agree with the majority opinion that this case is not moot and that La. Admin.
Code § 3103(Z) is constitutional. However, I disagree with the holding that La. R.S.
47:1990 is unconstitutional as applied.
“The correctness of assessments by the assessor shall be subject to review first
by the parish governing authority, then by the Louisiana Tax Commission or its
successor, and finally by the courts, all in accordance with procedures established
by law.” La. Const. art. 7 § 18 (E). In my view, the language of the last clause gives
the legislature the power to grant the Tax Commission the authority to enforce its
prior rulings, even if that enforcement does not technically comply with strict
procedures set forth in subpart (E). Thus, the power to review includes the power to
enforce. This view is supported by the original understanding of the framers of the
1974 Louisiana Constitution. They expressly intended the legislature to have the
power to upset the procedures set forth in Subsection (E) and to grant the Tax
Commission the type of police action exercised in this case.
1 T he legislature
1 Mr. Lanier: Well, suppose somebody doesn’t use fair market value, is it
your opinion that, even without authority in the constitution,
and with no statutory authority, that the Tax Commission
could require an assessor to asses at fair market value?

2

exercised that power in enacting La. R.S. 47:1990 (“The tax commission may
change or correct any and all assessments of property for the purpose of taxation, in
order to make the assessments conform to the true and correct valuation.”).

Mr. Mire: Well, I don’t follow your question that this proposal does not
provide for fair market value assessment.
Mr. Lanier: I know it does, but I’m getting at…suppose somebody
doesn’t?
Mr. Mire: Well, the legislature will have to provide for a police action
of a sort that will make it positively that the local governing
authority and/or the Tax Commission, both jointly or
individually, can, in fact, come in and check and make the
assessor do it under certain penalties.
Mr. Lanier: Is there any provision in here that says that the legislature
shall do this?
Mr. Mire: Well, of course, it says that they will establish the law, and I
assume that they will because there will be many, many local
taxing authorities looking at them to do so. This was
discussed at length, and we certainly would like to be
positive about that that it will have to be done. We feel that
the court order will mandate it, you see. You know, even so.
Mr. Lanier: What is the present law with reference to the authority or
ability of a parish governing authority to review an
assessment?
Mr. Mire: Well, presently he can review the tax roll and recommend to
the Louisiana Tax Commission, changes. This is done on an
annual basis.
Mr. Lanier: Can the local government itself, make changes or does it
only recommend?
Mr. Mire: It can only recommend to the Louisiana Tax Commission.
Mr. Lanier: Under the present constitution, does the Tax C ommission
have that authority to mandate the assessor make changes?
Mr. Mire: Yes, sir.
Mr. Lanier: But that authority is not specifically granted in this proposal is that
correct?
Mr. Mire: No. We would like that to be statutory.

Records o f the Louisiana Constitutional C onvention of 1973: Convention Transcripts,
Volume VII, page 1729-1730.