Guste Homes Resident Management Corporation v. Renard Thomas

GUSTE HOMES RESIDENT * NO. 2020-CA-0110
MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION *
COURT OF APPEAL
VERSUS *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
RENARD THOMAS *
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
FIRST CITY COURT OF NEW ORLEANS
NO. 2019-07997, SECTION “D”
Honorable Ernestine L. Anderson-Trahan,
******
Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano
******
(Court composed of Judge Edwin A. Lombard, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge
Dale N. Atkins)

Kenneth E. Pickering
PICKERING & COTOGNO
1515 Poydras Street, Suite 1800
New Orleans, LA 70112-3776

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

Hannah Adams
Southeast Louisiana Legal Services
1340 Poydras Street, Suite 600
New Orleans, LA 70112

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED

JULY 29, 2020

This is an eviction case. Defendant/appellant, Renard Thomas (“Thomas”),
JCL
appeals the November 4, 2019 judgment of the First City Court for the Parish of
EAL
Orleans (“city court”) in favor of plaintiff/appellee, Guste Homes Resident
DNA
Management Corporation (“Guste”), ordering Thomas’ eviction. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

On October 3 and 14, 2019, Guste filed a rule for possession of premises,

seeking to evict Thomas from the unit he rented in the Guste Highrise, a public

housing complex on Simon Bolivar Avenue in New Orleans.1 The eviction request

was based on Guste’s allegations that Thomas violated the terms of his lease by

failing to complete an annual recertification of income and family composition and

by failing to pass an annual housekeeping inspection. According to the September

4, 2019 notice to vacate, annexed to the rule for possession, Guste stated that

Thomas violated the lease in that he: failed to attend four scheduled annual

1
The October 3, 2019 rule for possession incorrectly identifies the defendant-lessee as “Bernard
Thomas.” The October 14, 2019 amended rule for possession correctly names Renard Thomas as
the defendant-lessee. We refer to both pleadings collectively as the rule for possession, as they
involve the same allegations.

1

recertification meetings; failed to keep his unit in a safe and sanitary condition;

was “not [] living in the unit”; and failed to notify the site manager that he would

be absent from his unit for a period longer than one week.2 The notice directed

Thomas to vacate the unit within fifteen days.

2
The lease signed on December 8, 2008 states, in relevant part:

VII. Terms and Conditions
The following terms and conditions of occupancy are made a part of the Lease;
…
(c) Re-determination of Rent, Dwelling Size, and Eligibility…
(1) The family composition is to be recertified at least once a year. The Site
Manager shall recertify the income of the family at least once a year if Resident
chooses to pay income-based rent….
(2) Resident promises to supply the Site Manager, when requested, with accurate
information about: family composition, age of family members, income and
source of income of all family members, assets, and related information necessary
to determine eligibility, annual income, adjusted income, and rent. Failure to
supply such information when requested is a serious violation of the terms of the
Lease, and the Site Manager may terminate the Lease….
…
IX. Resident’s Obligations
Resident shall be obligated:
…
(e) To keep the dwelling unit and other such areas as may be assigned to Resident
for exclusive use in a clean and safe condition.
…
(p) To give prompt prior notice to the Site Manager, in accordance with Section
XIII hereof, of Resident’s leaving dwelling unit unoccupied for any period
exceeding one calendar week.
…
(y) To use reasonable care to keep the unit in such condition as to ensure proper
health and sanitation standards for Resident, household members and neighbors.
…
XI. Inspections
…
(b) Other Inspections - The Manger will inspect the unit at least one time annually
using HUD’s Uniform Physical Condition Standards (UPCS) as a guideline but
on a quarterly basis to check needed maintenance, Resident housekeeping, and
other Lease compliance matters….
…
XIV. Termination of the lease
In terminating the Lease, the following procedures shall be followed by the Site
Manager and Resident:
(a) This Lease may be terminated for serious or repeated violations of material
terms of the Lease, … or to fulfill Resident obligations set forth in Section IX
above, or for other good cause. Such serious or repeated violation of terms or
other causes shall include but not be limited to:
…

2

Trial was set on October 18, 2019. Guste appeared for trial, but Thomas did

not. The city court rendered a default judgment of eviction in Guste’s favor and

ordered Thomas to vacate the premises within twenty-four hours. On October 22,

2019, Guste requested a warrant of possession of the premises from the city court.

On the same date, Thomas filed a motion for new trial, seeking to set aside

the city court’s judgment and admit new evidence. Thomas argued that he had

been hospitalized, had been recovering at the homes of family members, and was

not home to receive the notice to vacate or rule for possession; meanwhile, Thomas

returned to his unit for the first time on October 22, 2019 to find the unit had been

burglarized and “left [] a mess.” Thomas contended that he had advised Guste’s

manager, Mary Wilson (“Wilson”), in advance of his hospitalization and

temporary absence from his unit, and that Thomas had continued to pay rent to

Guste.

On October 30, 2019, Thomas filed an answer and exception of prematurity,

in which he argued that he was a person with disabilities under the Fair Housing

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (“FHA”). He stated that on October 28 and 29, 2019

he made requests for reasonable accommodation for disability to Guste’s attorney

and that Guste had failed to grant an accommodation. In particular, Thomas sought

more time to complete his annual recertification requirements and reinspection of

his unit. He argued that Guste’s lack of response to his accommodation request

(6) Failure to supply, in a timely fashion, any certification, release, information,
or documentation on family income or composition needed to process annual
reexaminations or interim re-determinations; …

3

was a defense to the eviction and/or rendered the eviction premature. Thomas

annexed to his answer and exception an October 23, 2019 letter addressed from Dr.

Anjali Niyogi, Associate Professor of Internal Medicine, Tulane University School

of Medicine, stating that Thomas “was recently hospitalized” and “was discharged

to his family’s care in order to expedite his recovery and for general assistance

with activities of daily living following his hospitalization.”

The city court granted a new trial, which was first scheduled on October 30,

2019 and then continued to November 4, 2019. At the start of trial, the city court

held a hearing on the exception of prematurity and denied the exception in open

court. Thereafter, Wilson and Thomas gave testimony at trial.

Guste called Wilson to testify as its employee and representative. According

to Wilson, the purpose of annual recertification is for Guste to review its tenants’

income and family composition to ensure that they continue to meet eligibility

requirements for Guste housing. Annual recertification is mandatory for all tenants,

and Guste must provide a recertification notice to the tenant 120 days in advance.

Four recertification notices were tacked to the door of Thomas’ unit on the

following dates: 120-day notice on May 20, 2019; 90-day notice on June 20, 2019;

60-day notice on June 25, 2019; and 30-day notice on July 9, 2019.

Guste’s annual housekeeping inspection of Thomas’ unit took place on

August 28, 2019. Wilson and her staff attended the inspection and took

photographs. Wilson identified photographs showing “disarray” in the unit and

testified that clothing and various items were strewn throughout the unit. Wilson

4

testified that the unit was not safe and sanitary when inspected, which was a

violation of the lease. Wilson issued Thomas a notice to vacate on September 4,

2019 based on the failed inspection and failure to comply with annual

recertification. Wilson also attended a follow up inspection of Thomas’ unit on

September 5, 2019 and noted that there had been no improvement.

Wilson denied that Thomas informed her that he was going to be

hospitalized. Wilson denied having received a reasonable accommodation request

from Thomas and speculated that Guste’s attorney may have provided the request

to her supervisor.

Thomas next testified. He stated that he had been a Guste resident for over

20 years and had never previously failed a housekeeping inspection. He testified

that he received the 120-day recertification notice, which contained a time and a

date for a meeting. He testified that he met Wilson in her office and signed the

logbook on the counter. He did not recall the date of the meeting, but believed it

was in July 2019 or sometime “after May.” According to Thomas, Wilson stated

that she had access to his social security income statement but that he needed to

“get [his] bank statements and come back.” Thomas testified that, at this meeting,

he advised Wilson of his upcoming procedure and did not return for a follow up

meeting because he was hospitalized the first week of August.

Thomas gave no testimony about the reason for his hospitalization. His

attorney objected to questioning about his medical condition, and the city court

sustained the objection. Thomas testified that he was admitted to Tulane Hospital

5

in the first week of August, and his room was first on the seventh floor, then the

fourth floor. He could not recall how many days he was in the hospital or the

particular dates. Thomas testified that Dr. Anjali advised him that his medication

would make him “woozy” or “dizzy” and that he would need to stay somewhere

such that he was not alone. Thomas stated that he underwent the same procedure

two years ago and that the medicine was “so strong.”

When Thomas was released from the hospital, he stayed with his aunt, then

his cousin. Thomas testified that he is married, his wife lives in Hammond,

Louisiana, and they do not live together. Before getting married, he provided the

marriage license to the Housing Authority of New Orleans and Guste and informed

them that he would maintain a separate residence from his wife. Thomas did not

see his wife after he was released from the hospital and had not seen her since his

procedure. When questioned why Thomas did not go to his wife’s house following

the hospitalization, he stated that it was “personal.”

Thomas testified that, during his absence, no one checked on his unit, and if

something was tacked to his door, his neighbors would call him. Thomas believed

that he and his belongings were safe in the building and that it takes an “act of

congress” to get inside. Thomas testified that he returned to his unit in October

2019 and saw the eviction notice and other notices, which were inside the unit, not

tacked to the door. He described the state of his unit as having been “ransacked.”

Clothes that were previously in his closet were left hanging on the sprinkler system

6

and thrown on the floor, and stacks of paper he left on tables had been thrown on

the floor.

Thomas testified that he called the police and his attorney. A police officer

came to Thomas’ unit, took a report, asked what was missing, and Thomas was

unable to identify any missing items at that time. The officer told him that the unit

looked “staged.” A detective also contacted him three or four days later. Thomas

noted later that binders of documents were missing. Thomas testified that he has

since cleaned the unit, that it would now pass inspection, and that if given an

opportunity he would be able to complete his recertification.

Guste recalled Wilson as a witness. Wilson denied meeting with Thomas

and denied that he informed her about an upcoming hospitalization. According to

Wilson, Thomas did not submit anything to her in connection with 120-day

recertification request. Guste introduced and Wilson identified pages of the visitor

logbook from Wilson’s office, dated between May 2019 and July 2019. Wilson

testified that Thomas’ name did not appear on those logs. Wilson stated, however,

that she does not sit at the front desk or watch visitors sign the logbook.

On November 4, 2019, at the conclusion of the new trial, the city court

rendered judgment granting the eviction and ordering Thomas to vacate the

premises within 20 days. Thomas brought a suspensive appeal.

On appeal, Thomas raises two assignments of error:

1. First City Court erred in granting the Rule for Possession over Mr.
Thomas’s affirmative defense of failure to accommodate his
disability in violation of federal civil rights law.

7

2. First City Court erred in denying Mr. Thomas’ exception of
prematurity for failure to consider his reasonable accommodation
request, because Guste failed to engage in the required interactive
process before eviction.

In reviewing a judgment of eviction, an appellate court reviews the lower

court’s findings of fact under the manifest error standard of review. Mazzini v.

Strathman, 13-0555, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/16/14), 140 So.3d 253, 256.

“Applying that standard, we must first find from the record that there is a

reasonable factual basis for the lower court’s findings of fact; second, the record

must establish that the lower court’s findings are not manifestly erroneous or

clearly wrong.” Id. (citing Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La. 1987)). “Factual

findings should not be reversed on appeal absent manifest error.” Id. (citing Rosell

v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989)).

“When the factual findings are based on the credibility of witness’s

testimony, the appellate court must give great deference to the fact finder’s

decision to credit a witness’s testimony.” River Garden Apartments v. Robinson,

12-0938, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/23/13), 108 So.3d 352, 356 (quotations omitted).

“Even if an appellate court feels its own evaluations and inferences are more

reasonable than the factfinder’s, reasonable evaluations of credibility and

reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict

exists in the testimony.” Id., 12-0938, pp. 4-5, 108 So.3d at 356 (quotations

omitted). “Therefore, ‘[i]f a review of the entire record demonstrates that the trial

court’s factual findings were reasonable, the appellate court must affirm.’” Id., 12-

0938, p. 5, 108 So.3d at 356 (quotations omitted). “Where legal errors of the trial

8

court have tainted the fact finding process, the verdict below is not reviewed under

the manifest error standard and, if the record is complete, the appellate court may

make a de novo review of the record and determine the preponderance of the

evidence.” Hous. Auth. of New Orleans v. King, 12-1372, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir.

6/12/13), 119 So.3d 839, 842.

“The dilatory exception of prematurity provided in La. Code Civ. Proc. art.

926 questions whether the cause of action has matured to the point where it is ripe

for judicial determination.” Williamson v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson,

04-0451, p. 4 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So.2d 782, 785. Appellate courts generally review

a lower court’s decision concerning an exception of prematurity for manifest error.

Landis Const. Co., LLC v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 15-0854, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir.

5/25/16), 195 So.3d 598, 602. “However, when resolution of an exception of

prematurity involves a question of law, the appellate court undertakes a de novo

review.” Id.

On appeal, Thomas does not challenge the validity of the lease or its terms.

He does not dispute that his failure to complete the annual recertification process

or pass an annual housekeeping inspection was a violation of the lease. Rather, he

argues that his eviction must be overturned because Guste failed to respond to his

request for reasonable accommodation for his disability. This Court explained the

elements of a reasonable accommodation claim under the FHA as follows:

The FHA prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling,
because of a handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). A landlord engages in

9

unlawful discrimination under if FHA if he or she refuses “to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services,
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. §
3604(F)(3)(B).

In order to establish a prima facie case against [the landlord] for
failure to accommodate [his] disability under the Section
3604(F)(3)(B) of the FHA, [the tenant] must have been able to show,
at minimum, the following:

(1) That [he] suffers from a disability within the meaning
of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h);
(2) That the owner knew of [his] disability or reasonably
should be expected to know of it;
(3) That an accommodation may be necessary to give the
resident an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the
dwelling;
(4) That the requested accommodation is reasonable; and
(5) The owner refused to make the accommodation.

Overlook Mut. Homes, Inc. v. Spencer, 666 F.Supp.2d 850, 855 (S.D.
Ohio 2009), aff’d, 415 Fed.Appx. 617 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
DuBois v. Assoc. of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d
1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006)).

Mazzini, 13-0555, pp. 6-7, 140 So.3d at 257 (footnote omitted).

Thomas raises his reasonable accommodation argument through two

different procedural vehicles, an exception of prematurity and an affirmative

defense.

We first address Thomas’ second assignment of error: the city court’s denial

of Thomas’ exception of prematurity. Thomas’ exception is based on Guste’s

alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Thomas argues that his eviction

was premature because Guste failed to open a dialogue with him to resolve his

reasonable accommodation request prior to proceeding with the eviction.

No reported Louisiana case has held that an exception of prematurity must

be granted where a lessor has not responded to a lessee’s request for

10

accommodation. Thomas relies on Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109,

1121 (D.C. 2005) to contend that his accommodation request was timely and could

be made any time before the eviction judgment was rendered. Citing to cases

decided in other jurisdictions, Thomas argues that where an eviction proceeding is

pending, and final judgment has not yet been rendered, the landlord must halt the

eviction proceedings in order to engage in an interactive process to respond to the

accommodation request.3

A timely raised exception of prematurity is typically the appropriate means,

under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, to address whether a plaintiff has

complied with an appropriate administrative remedy prior to filing suit. See Landis,

15-0854, p. 6, 195 So.3d at 602. This exception is raised to argue that “a cause of

action does not yet exist because of an unmet prerequisite condition.” Id. A

prematurity exception “is usually utilized in cases in which the applicable law or

contract provides an administrative procedure as a precondition for judicial

action.” Id. “It is determined by the facts existing at the time suit is filed.” Id.

We find no dispute in the record that Thomas, through counsel, made the

accommodation request after Guste filed its rule for possession. It is also

undisputed that, after the rule for possession was filed, Guste did not permit

Thomas additional time either to attempt to pass a housekeeping inspection or to

3
See id. at 1127; Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003); Armant v.
Chat-Ro Co., LLC, No. 00-1402, 2000 WL 1092838, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2000); Jankowski
Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1996), as amended (Aug. 26, 1996); Hous.
Auth. of City of Bangor v. Maheux, 748 A.2d 474, 476 (Me. 2000); Anast v. Commonwealth
Apartments, 956 F. Supp. 792, 801 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 1997); Cobble Hill Apartments Co. v.
McLaughlin, 1999 Mass. App. Div. 166, 1999 WL 788517, at *4 (1999); City Wide Assocs. v.
Penfield, 409 Mass. 140, 143, 564 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (1991).

11

provide any missing documentation required for his annual recertification. As these

particular facts are not in dispute, Thomas’ argument presents a legal question, and

we must review whether the city court legally erred by failing to apply the

administrative exhaustion doctrine in this case.

In pleading the exception of prematurity, the defendant bears burden of

showing that “an administrative remedy is available, by reason of which the

judicial action is premature.” Members of Grand Lodge of State v. Elected Bd. of

Directors of Grand Lodge of State, 18-0443, p. 4 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/6/19), 265

So.3d 976, 979 (citing Steeg v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 329 So.2d 719, 720 (La.

1976)). An exception of prematurity based on the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust

administrative remedies may not be granted, however, where the applicable law or

contract does not specify a precondition for judicial action. See Landis, 15-0854, p.

9, 195 So.3d at 604 (holding that Louisiana Public Bid Law does not provide for

any administrative proceeding as a precondition to judicial action based on a

violation of Public Bid Law).

We find no support in the Fair Housing Act, or in any of the cases Thomas

cites,4 for the argument that Guste must exhaust an interactive administrative

procedure before a suit for eviction is filed or adjudicated. Thomas also makes no

showing that the lease or any other contract between Thomas and Guste required

Guste to exhaust an administrative remedy prior to eviction. Thus, we find no legal

error in the city court’s denial of Thomas’ exception of prematurity.

4
See n. 3, infra.

12

We next address Thomas’ first assignment of error: his accommodation

request as an affirmative defense. Thomas argues on appeal that, because he made

a prima facie case that he was entitled to reasonable accommodation for his

disability, the city court erred in granting the eviction. We disagree, as we find that

Thomas did not meet his burden to show, on the evidence at trial, that the

requested accommodation was “necessary” as required under the FHA.5

Very few Louisiana cases have analyzed reasonable accommodations under

the FHA with respect to evictions. See, e.g., Mazzini, 13-0555, p. 7, 140 So.3d at

258 (affirming eviction judgment and rejecting a lessee’s accommodation

argument where lessee failed to prove a qualifying disability under the FHA);

Renewal Homes v. Laneheart, 17-0199, p. 11, 2017 WL 4700825, at *6 (La. App.

4 Cir. 10/18/17), --- So.3d ---, --- (affirming judgment denying eviction of mentally

disabled lessee and finding lessor failed to comply with accommodations pursuant

to participation in federally assisted program). Thomas cites to this Court’s

decision in Laneheart, supra, to argue that a lessor’s failure to make a reasonable

accommodation for a lessee’s disability is an affirmative defense to an eviction.

The following principles apply to the parties’ claims herein. The lessor has

the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a valid lease and that

5
Thomas argues that at least one other court has found a request for more time for recertification
is a reasonable accommodation request. He argues that, under similar facts, a federal district
court denied in part a motion to dismiss a reasonable accommodation claim under Fed. R. Civ.
Proc. 12(b)(6). In Pinckney v. Carroll, No. 18-12198, 2019 WL 6619484 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4,
2019), the court found that a tenant adequately stated a claim that her co-tenant mother suffered a
stroke, was hospitalized, failed to timely submit required documents for recertification, and that
thereafter her landlord denied her request for a hearing and refused to reinstate her Section 8
housing voucher. Pinckney provides us with no guidance in Thomas’ appeal, however, because
the federal court considered only the sufficiency of the tenant’s allegations, not any evidence
adduced at trial.

13

the violation of the lease provides sufficient grounds for an eviction. Guste Homes

Resident Mgmt. Corp. v. Thomas, 12-0386, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/29/13), 116

So.3d 987, 991. The party pleading an affirmative defense bears the burden of

proof on that defense, which must be established by a preponderance of the

evidence. Jeanmarie v. Peoples, 09-1059, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/16/10), 34 So.3d

945, 950; Touro Infirmary v. Marine Med. Unit, Inc., 96-2506, p. 7, n. 3 (La. App.

4 Cir. 5/21/97), 699 So.2d 90, 93. The lessee bringing a reasonable accommodation

claim under the FHA bears the burden of proving that he had a disability for which

the lessor failed to accommodate. See Mazzini, 13-0555, p. 8, 140 So.3d at 258; see

also Riser v. H.Y. Bell Mem’l Apartments, 28,077, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/96),

669 So.2d 689, 692. The party claiming failure to accommodate under the FHA

also bears the burden of showing that the requested accommodation is necessary.

See Harmony Haus Westlake, LLC v. Parkstone Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., No. 19-

1034, 2020 WL 1241724, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2020)(citing Elderhaven, Inc.

v. City of Lubbock, Tex., 98 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1996)); Varrecchio v. Friends

All. Hous. II, Inc., No. 18-8915, 2018 WL 6510740, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 11,

2018).

Thomas argues that, at the new trial, Guste judicially confessed to the first

two factors of the reasonable accommodation claim: Thomas’ disability and

Guste’s awareness of his disability. Thomas points to argument of counsel and the

city court’s statements from the bench acknowledging that Guste’s residents are

elderly or disabled, and that Thomas’ disability was the reason for his housing at

14

Guste. Even so, we find that Thomas failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of

the third factor: whether the requested accommodation was “necessary to afford

such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” See 42 U.S.C. §

3604(f)(3)(B).

Federal courts have compared the “necessity” factor to a causation

requirement6 and explained as follows:

This requirement is divided into two considerations: is the
accommodation necessary and will the accommodation afford equal
opportunity to the disabled? In order for a requested accommodation
to be necessary, the [aggrieved tenant] must show “a direct linkage
between the proposed accommodation and the ‘equal opportunity’ to
be provided to the handicapped person.” Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v.
Howard County, Md., 124 F.3d 597, 604 (4th Cir. 1997). If the
requested accommodation “provides no direct amelioration of a
disability’s effect,” it is not necessary. Id. With respect to the “equal
opportunity” requirement, the FHA “does not require
accommodations that increase a benefit to a handicapped person
above that provided to a nonhandicapped person with respect to
matters unrelated to the handicap.” Id.

Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, La., 932 F. Supp. 2d 683, 693 (M.D.

La. Mar. 19, 2013). See also Riser, 28,077, p. 6, 669 So.2d at 692 (“Even should

we assume arguendo that [an aggrieved tenant] was handicapped, the record must

further show that she was discriminated against because of her handicap in order to

recover under the Fair Housing Act.”)(Emphasis added).

Thomas contends that he satisfied the necessity factor because, although he

waited until the final month of the 120-day period to complete his recertification,

he found himself unexpectedly unable to complete the process because of his

6
See, e.g., Valencia v. City of Springfield, Illinois, 883 F.3d 959, 968 (7th Cir. 2018); Lapid-
Laurel, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 460 (3d Cir.
2002)(quoting Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard Cty., Md., 124 F.3d 597, 604 (4th Cir. 1997)).

15

hospitalization, and thereafter, needed more time. Nowhere in the record was any

showing made as to the nature of Thomas’ disability, medical condition or

treatment requiring hospitalization, dates of hospitalization, or length or extent of

recovery from said condition or treatment. Further, the record contains no facts as

to whether the hospitalization at issue had any link to a disability. Moreover, no

hospital or other medical records were admitted into evidence, and no medical

expert witnesses were called to testify. At the new trial, the city court read into the

record a physician’s letter, but Thomas did not introduce the letter into evidence,

Guste objected to the letter, the lower court did not rule on the objection, and

Thomas did not proffer the letter.

Thomas testified that he had been in the hospital the first week of August,

that a doctor told him that he should not be alone while on medication, and that he

had recovered at the homes of his cousin and aunt until he returned to his unit in

late October 2019. No other evidence was introduced to corroborate this testimony.

The city court heard conflicting testimony from Thomas and Wilson about

Thomas’ actions regarding the annual recertification. Thomas testified that he met

with Wilson in approximately July 2019, signed a logbook at Wilson’s office, and

was told that the only remaining documentation he needed to produce to Guste

were bank statements. He testified that, at this meeting, he told Wilson about his

upcoming hospitalization and expected absence from his unit. Wilson denied in her

testimony that the July 2019 meeting ever took place and that Thomas provided her

with any documentation needed for his recertification. Guste also introduced the

16

logbook from Wilson’s office into evidence, and Wilson was unable to locate

Thomas’ name in the logbook.

Thomas relies on Laneheart, supra, for his argument that Guste failed to do

“all that is required of it to assist the [tenant] prior to instituting a petition to evict.”

We find such reliance misplaced. The Laneheart tenant introduced evidence

through social worker and counselor testimony about the nature of her mental

disability, her disability’s effect on her ability to comply with certain terms of her

lease, and how specific accommodations (scheduling appointments and sending

notices through a caseworker) would be expected to alleviate lease violations. This

Court found no evidence within the trial record of a breach of the lease. Laneheart

provides very little discussion of the necessity factor, however, and we find the

case distinguishable on its facts.

Here, the city court heard and weighed the credibility of witnesses’

testimony, examined the documentation in evidence, and could have reasonably

concluded that Thomas violated the lease and that there was insufficient evidence

at trial that the accommodation was necessary to ameliorate the effects of a

disability.7 Consequently, under the circumstances presented in Thomas’ appeal,

we cannot find any manifest error in the city court’s judgment granting the

eviction.

7
As we find Thomas has not met his burden on the necessity factor, he has not satisfied the
requirements for a reasonable accommodation claim, and we find it unnecessary to reach the
remaining factors.

17

We also reject Thomas’ argument that the city court committed legal error in

its oral reasons for judgment, stating that Guste had a duty to help the tenant and

did so through recertification notices in advance of the applicable deadline.

According to Thomas, Guste provided these notices prior to the accommodation

request, and such notices cannot legally be a response or accommodation for

disability. It is well-settled that appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for

judgment; “on appeal, this Court examines the result of that judgment, not the

reason why the trial court reached that result.” Johnson v. Henderson, 04-1723, p.

4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/16/05), 899 So.2d 626, 628. The in-court statements form no

part of the judgment of eviction. We find no legal error.

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgment of the

city court.

AFFIRMED

18