State of Louisiana in the Interest of M.R. .

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN * NO. 2020-CA-0347
THE INTEREST OF M.R.
*
COURT OF APPEAL
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FOURTH CIRCUIT
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STATE OF LOUISIANA
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APPEAL FROM
JUVENILE COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2019-339-02-DQ-F, SECTION “F”
Honorable Mark Doherty, Judge
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Judge Tiffany G. Chase
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(Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge
Tiffany G. Chase)

Katherine M. Franks
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P.O. Box 220
Madisonville, LA 70447

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/M.R.

Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney
Donna R. Andrieu, Chief of Appeals
Adele Krieger, Assistant District Attorney
ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/STATE OF LOUISIANA

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED
OCTOBER 5, 2020

TGC
RLB
PAB
This is a juvenile delinquency case. The juvenile, M.R.,1 appeals her

judgment of disposition for her adjudication of carjacking. After consideration of

the record before this Court and the applicable law, we amend the judgment of

disposition and affirm as amended.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The pivotal issue in this appeal concerns the trial court’s imposition of a

sentence of juvenile life without allowing for modification for four years. Thus, a

detailed recitation of the underlying facts are necessary for our analysis.

On December 3, 2019, M.R., sixteen at the time, and her co-defendants

(collectively “the juveniles”) approached the victim in a French Quarter parking

lot. The juveniles claimed to be sisters, that their grandmother had just died, and

they needed a ride home. One of the juveniles, who was crying and limping,

claimed her leg was broken. The victim agreed to give the juveniles a ride and

they provided her with an address in the Seventh Ward.

Upon arrival at the address, the juvenile claiming to have a broken leg

requested assistance exiting the vehicle. As the victim went to assist, she saw one

1
Pursuant to Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-1 and 5-2, the initials of the
juveniles involved in this matter will be used instead of their names.

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of the juveniles run away. The victim quickly got back into her vehicle. The other

juveniles had also fled. Locking the doors, the victim noticed the juveniles had

taken the keys but left a cell phone inside the vehicle.

The juveniles returned to the vehicle and demanded the cell phone. The

victim said she would return the phone if the juveniles returned her keys. Ignoring

this request, the juveniles repeatedly unlocked the vehicle with the key fob while

the victim relocked the doors from inside. The juveniles eventually gained entry to

the vehicle and forcibly removed the victim by pushing her, punching her, pulling

out clumps of her hair, and dragging her to the ground. They entered the vehicle

and attempted to drive away. In an effort to stop the juveniles from leaving, the

victim climbed onto the hood of the vehicle. One of M.R.’s co-defendants started

the vehicle and drove for approximately ten blocks with the victim still on the

hood. During this time, one of the juveniles grabbed a metal water bottle in the

vehicle, threw it at the victim, and struck her in the head, injuring her. Eventually

the vehicle slowed down and the victim rolled off the hood.

The juveniles continued driving before ultimately crashing the vehicle, and

fled the scene. A witness to the incident called the police. The juveniles were

apprehended when found hiding under a nearby house. The victim positively

identified M.R. and her co-defendants as the perpetrators.

On December 5, 2019, the State filed a delinquency petition accusing the

juveniles of carjacking, a violation of La. R.S. 14:64.2. On January 16, 2020, the

case proceeded to an adjudication hearing. At the conclusion of the two-day

hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated M.R. and her co-defendants delinquent.

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On January 31, 2020, the juvenile court held the first part of a disposition

hearing.2 The victim testified that she sustained both physical injury and anxiety

resulting from the carjacking. She further testified she had difficulty going about

her daily life and would suffer panic attacks while driving. She explained she was

having difficulty putting the incident past her given its shocking circumstances that

made it the topic of news coverage.

On February 13, 2020, the juvenile court held the second part of the

disposition hearing allowing M.R. and her co-defendants to present their evidence.

Counsel for M.R. called Dr. Sarah Deland (hereinafter “Dr. Deland”), a forensic

psychologist, as a witness. Dr. Deland testified that M.R. had no significant

trouble until approximately a year ago when her father stopped visiting from out of

state. Dr. Deland noted one incident in March 2019 where M.R. was screaming

and pounding on the walls and another where she attempted self-harm. Dr. Deland

discussed two further incidents, one where M.R. was in an automobile accident and

lost consciousness, and another where M.R. was kidnapped at gunpoint in an

attempted sexual assault. Dr. Deland’s preliminary diagnosis was that M.R. had

depressive disorder and stressor/trauma related disorder. This, Dr. Deland opined,

leads to mood instability, impulsivity, and a lack of planning or foresight. Also

testifying was Daynia Dupass (hereinafter “Ms. Dupass”), a juvenile detention

counselor at the Juvenile Justice Intervention Center, who gave insight into the

juveniles behavior while in custodial care. As to M.R. specifically, Ms. Dupass

2
The juvenile court declined to order a pre-disposition investigation opining it did not find the
resulting reports helpful. Instead, the juvenile court bifurcated the disposition hearing allowing
the juveniles two weeks for their counsel to secure independent evaluations and prepare.

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testified she was quiet and reserved, sticking to her schoolwork, and that

“everything is good.”

On February 19, 2020, the juvenile court entered a judgment of disposition

committing M.R. to the custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice (hereinafter “the

OJJ”) for juvenile life.3 Additionally, all three juveniles received a particularized

modification of their dispositions that stated, “[a]fter four years in the custody of

the [OJJ], the youth’s attorney may file a motion to modify the disposition and

request a hearing to determine if the youth is eligible for a step-down to non-secure

care” provided the fulfillment of various conditions.4 This appeal followed.

ERROR PATENT REVIEW

We have reviewed the record for errors patent, and find one. Raised as part

of the assignment of error, we shall discuss it therein.5 See State in the Interest of

J.T., 2011-1646, p. 24 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/6/12), 94 So.3d 847, 862 (an illegal

disposition is an error patent in juvenile delinquency cases).

3
Juvenile life is the maximum sentence that can be imposed on a juvenile delinquent. If the
juvenile is under thirteen at the time of commitment to custody, the disposition terminates when
the juvenile reaches age eighteen. Otherwise, the disposition terminates when the juvenile
reaches the age of twenty-one. See La. Ch.C. art. 898.
4
The conditions are:

(1) The youth has been on good behavior while in the Department’s custody;
(2) The youth has earned a high school diploma or general equivalency degree;
(3) The youth has submitted to a psychological evaluation and the evaluation
report recommends that the youth should be stepped down to non-secure care;
and
(4) The Department recommends that the youth should be stepped down to non-
secure care.
5
The record does not reflect that the juvenile court advised M.R. of the time period to file post-
conviction relief under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, which requires the trial court to inform a defendant
of the delays for filing post-conviction relief; however, this language is merely precatory and
does not bestow an enforceable right upon an individual defendant. State v. Handy, 2001-0005,
p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/24/01), 779 So.2d 103, 105. Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial
economy, this Court hereby notifies M.R. that La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 generally requires that an
application for post-conviction relief be filed within two years of the finality of the adjudication
and disposition. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8.

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DISCUSSION

In her sole assignment of error, M.R. argues the “maximum disposition of

‘juvenile life’ without the possibility of modification or early release is excessive

and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” We first address the four-year

prohibition on modification of the disposition before turning to the broader

excessiveness challenge.

ILLEGAL DISPOSITION

M.R. argues the juvenile court’s four-year prohibition on modification is an

illegal disposition. The Louisiana Children’s Code enumerates specific felony-

grade delinquent acts whose associated dispositions prohibit modification for a

fixed period. See La. Ch.C. art. 897.1. The settled doctrine of Expressio Unius est

Exclusio Alterius dictates that when the legislature specifically enumerates a series

of items, the omission of other items is deemed intentional. See International

Paper Co., Inc. v. Hilton, 2007-0290, pp. 19-20 (La. 10/16/07), 966 So.2d 545,

558-59 (citations omitted); State in Interest of J.D., 2013-0964, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 4

Cir. 11/27/13), 129 So.3d 831, 836. Implicitly applying this interpretive maxim to

a juvenile proceeding, the Third Circuit observed that, outside of La. Ch.C. art.

897.1, no other limitations on modification exist within the Children’s Code. See

State in the Interest of D.B., 2014-0085, pp. 12-13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/17/14), 141

So.3d 296, 304 (citing State in the Interest of J.C., 2009-2000, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir.

7/15/10), 2010 WL 2802104 (unpub.) (finding juvenile court erred in ordering first

three years of custody to be served without benefit of parole based on

interpretation of La. Ch.C. art. 898 in pari materia with La. Ch.C. art. 897.1)).

After examining other relevant provisions of the Children’s Code and the Revised

Statutes, the Third Circuit concluded that it was error for a juvenile court to impose

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a disposition without benefit of modification for a circumstance not within the

scope of La. Ch.C. art. 897.1.6 In re D.B., 2014-0085, pp. 13-15, 141 So.3d at 305-

06. We agree.

A proscriptive bar on the modification of a juvenile disposition is

impermissible in the absence of a specific legislative provision enabling such. See

also State v. Small, 2011-2796, p. 19 (La. 10/16/12), 100 So.3d 797, 811 (the rule

of lenity requires any doubt as to the interpretation of a criminal statute must be

resolved in favor of the defendant); La. Ch.C. art. 102 (provisions of the Louisiana

Children’s Code shall be liberally construed such that each child shall be accorded

due process and receive care conducive to their welfare). The offense for which

M.R. was adjudicated delinquent, carjacking, is not one of the offenses enumerated

in La. Ch.C. art. 897.1. When an error in the disposition involves the imposition of

restrictions beyond what is authorized in the statutes, appellate courts are

instructed to correct the disposition. In addition, “[w]here the defect in

[disposition] does not involve the exercise of discretion, the [disposition] may be

corrected on appeal by amendment rather than remand.” State in Interest of H.L.F.,

1997-2651, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/20/98), 713 So.2d 810, 813 (citation omitted).

We therefore amend the judgment of disposition to remove the four-year

prohibition on modification.

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Specifically, La. Ch.C. arts. 897, 898, 901, and 909 contain language emphasizing the
dispositions for offenses enumerated in La. Ch.C. art. 897.1 are unique in their prohibition on
modification for a fixed period. The legislature makes this expressly clear in La. R.S. 15:906(C):

In cases governed by Children’s Code Article 897.1, it is hereby declared to be
the public policy of this state that commitment to the custody of the Department
of Public Safety and Corrections for confinement in secure placement without
benefit of parole, probation, suspension of imposition or execution of sentence, or
modification of sentence, is necessary and proper because for these very serious
offenses the protection of society is the primary objective. The goal of such
confinement is rehabilitative, as rehabilitation furthers public safety.

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EXCESSIVE DISPOSITION

M.R. further argues her disposition of juvenile life is excessive. This Court

has applied the following analytical framework for a juvenile’s claim that her

disposition is excessive:

In any review for excessiveness, the appellate court must first
ascertain whether the lower tribunal took cognizance of the general
guidelines provided for juvenile cases in Louisiana Children's Code
Article 901, and whether the record reflects an adequate factual basis
for the commitment imposed. State in Interest of T.L., 674 So.2d
1122. “Following that determination, the reviewing court need only
explore for constitutional excessiveness in light of the circumstances
of the case and the background of the juvenile.” Id. at 1124. “[A]bsent
a showing of manifest abuse of the wide discretion afforded in such
cases, a disposition will not be set aside as constitutionally excessive.”
Id.

State in the Interest of D.M., 2002-2528, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/2/03), 851 So.2d

1216, 1222. Thus, our appellate review of M.R.’s claim requires examining both

statutory excessiveness and constitutional excessiveness.

Statutory Excessiveness

M.R. contends that her commitment to OJJ custody – rather than placement

in a residential facility – renders her disposition excessive. When, as here, a

juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent for a felony-grade act, a juvenile court

“may commit the child to the custody of the Department of Public Safety and

Corrections, with or without a recommendation that the child be placed in

alternative care facilities.” La. Ch.C. art. 897(D). However, a juvenile court shall

not remove a child from the custody of her parents “unless [her] welfare or the

safety and protection of the public cannot, in the opinion of the court, be

adequately safeguarded without such removal.” La. Ch.C. art. 901(A). In making

this determination, a juvenile court must impose “the least restrictive disposition

authorized by Articles 897 through 900 of this Title which the court finds is

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consistent with the circumstances of the case, the needs of the child, and the best

interest of society.” La. Ch.C. art. 901(B). In extensive written reasons, the

juvenile court applied the proper statutory law and examined the relevant

circumstances of the case in reaching its decision.

Turning first to La. Ch.C. art. 901(D), the juvenile court weighed each

consideration and determined it should not suspend M.R.’s disposition or allow for

probation. Specifically, the juvenile court cited M.R.’s five prior delinquencies in

2019, the fact that the carjacking was pre-planned, the unforeseeability of whether

M.R. would commit a future delinquent act, and that nothing in the record

indicated M.R. would respond affirmatively to probationary treatment. To the

latter point, the juvenile court observed the opposite to be true as “each girl has

begun to do much better in the controlled, structured environment of a detention

facility which meets their individual daily need for safety, stability, medical and

mental health care, and education.”

A juvenile’s commitment to the Department of Public Safety and

Corrections may be appropriate if any of the following circumstances exist:7

(1) There is an undue risk that during the period of a suspended
commitment or probation the child will commit another crime.

(2) The child is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial
environment that can be provided most effectively by his
commitment.

(3) A lesser disposition will deprecate the seriousness of the child’s
delinquent act.

La. Ch.C. art. 901(C). As to the first circumstance, the juvenile court noted the

actions of M.R. and her co-defendants demonstrated they are capable of engaging

7
Consideration of La. Ch.C. art. 901(C)(4) is not relevant as a firearm was not involved.

8

in behavior that ignores the threat it poses to human life. As to the second

circumstance, the juvenile court specifically considered Dr. Deland’s opinion that

M.R.’s attention deficit and hyperactivity disorders required treatment and

medication in the form of wraparound services. However, it determined the

evidence reflects the delivery of those services in a controlled and structured

environment was crucial in yielding positive results. Finally, as to the third

circumstance, the juvenile court determined that a lesser disposition would

deprecate the seriousness of M.R.’s delinquent act. The court emphasized that the

juveniles’ behavior and the egregious circumstances of the carjacking increased the

potential for a fatality. The juvenile court concluded “the three youths recklessly

endangered the victim’s life, their own lives, and the lives of innocent people on

the street, and that they each pose an undue risk to the public that each will commit

another offense.”

M.R. contends that the juvenile court erred in requiring her placement in a

secured facility because residential placement would better serve her treatment

needs. Dr. Deland’s testimony that the wraparound services required for M.R.’s

treatment are available at the OJJ undercuts this contention. Further, Dr. Deland

acknowledged that there would be no impediment to the OJJ developing a long-

term treatment plan in the best interest of M.R. Ms. Dupass testified that, in her

present custody with OJJ, M.R. is adapting well, beginning to trust the staff, and

keeping to her schoolwork. Thus, we find M.R.’s argument that residential

placement would better serve her treatment needs unpersuasive.

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M.R. also argues her disposition is inconsistent with prior dispositions

handed down by the juvenile court. In support of this argument, M.R. relies on

State ex rel. A.M., 2007-1228 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/9/08), 983 So.2d 176, wherein the

juvenile received a three-year disposition for a carjacking when he punched the

victim, knocking out a tooth. The relative factual similarities to the matter sub

judice end there. Not only did M.R. and her co-defendants punch the victim, they

also evinced an indifference to human life with their continued actions of

attempting to shake the victim off the hood of her moving vehicle. The victim

testified the carjacking resulted in both physical injury and anxiety effecting the

routine activities of her daily life.

M.R. was sixteen years old at the time of her arrest and detention. She will

serve less than four and a half years in the custody of the OJJ prior to the

expiration of her disposition of juvenile life. See La. Ch.C. art. 898. Thus, relative

to the disposition in In re A.M., M.R. will only serve a potential maximum of an

additional one and a half years in custody. We further note the maximum sentence

permissible for an adult found in violation of the underlying crime of carjacking is

twenty years at hard labor without the benefit of parole. La. R.S. 14:64.2(B).

Given M.R.’s multiple 2019 delinquencies, the aforementioned egregious

circumstances involved in the carjacking, and the positive response M.R. has

shown to a secure and structured environment, we find the juvenile court’s

decision to commit M.R. to the custody of OJJ for juvenile life is not statutorily

excessive.

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Constitutional Excessiveness

“A juvenile has the same constitutional rights against excessive punishment

as an adult.” State in the Interest of R.C., 2016-0966, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir.

12/28/16), 208 So.3d 962, 964. A sentencing court has “wide discretion in the

imposition of [a] sentence within statutory limits” and a sentence imposed “should

not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of [its] discretion.”

State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). M.R.’s disposition of juvenile

life is within the statutory limit for carjacking. See La. Ch.C. art. 898; La. R.S.

14:64.2(B)(2). However, “the imposition of a sentence, although within the

statutory limit, may violate a defendant’s constitutional right against excessive

punishment.” Sepulvado, supra. A sentence is excessive and unconstitutional “if

it is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime or if it is nothing more

than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.” State v.

Bonanno, 384 So.2d 355, 357 (La. 1980).

The disposition imposed in this case is not grossly out of proportion to the

egregious nature of M.R.’s delinquent act: a calculated and violent carjacking that

injured and terrorized the victim, the reckless nature of which could have led to

further, and direr, consequences. Nor do we find the disposition is a purposeless

and needless imposition of pain and suffering. As discussed earlier in this opinion,

the trial court properly weighed the statutory considerations and we find no error in

the numerous factors it articulated militating in favor of a custodial sentence.

Having removed the four-year prohibition on modification, the remaining goals

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enumerated by the juvenile court – good behavior, high school diploma/G.E.D.,

and a psychological evaluation with accompanying recommendation that M.R. be

stepped down to non-secure care – reflect a disposition focused on rehabilitation

rather than punishment, with appropriate considerations for the welfare of society.

Thus, we find the disposition, as amended, is not constitutionally excessive.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we amend the judgment of disposition to remove

the four-year prohibition on modification, and affirm as amended.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED

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