Frederick N. Meiners, III v. St. Tammany Parish Fire

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #041
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 20th day of October, 2020 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2020-CC-00491 FREDERICK N. MEINERS, III VS. ST. TAMMANY PARISH FIRE
PROTECTION DISTRICT NO. 4, ET AL. (Parish of St. Tammany)
We find the district court erred in remanding the case to the Board to impose
discipline other than termination. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the district court and reinstate the decision of the Board.
DISTRICT COUR T REVERSED . DECISION OF CIVIL SERVICE
BOARD REINSTATED.
Retired Judge James Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice pro tempore, sitting for
the vacancy in Louisiana Supreme Court District 4.
Johnson, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.

10/20/20
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2020-CC-0491
FREDERICK N. MEINERS, III
VS.
ST. TAMMANY PARISH FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT NO. 4, ET AL.
On Supervisory Writ to the 22nd Judicial District
Court, Parish of St. Tammany
PER CURIAM*
In this case, we are called upon to determine whether the district court’s
judgment reversing a decision of a civil service board goes beyond the authority
granted to the district court under La. R.S. 33:2561(E). For the reasons that follow,
we conclude the district court’s judgment is contrary to La. R.S. 33:2561(E).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Frederick Meiners, III was employed as Assistant Fire Chief with the St.
Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 4 (“District”). On February 19, 2016,
Mr. Meiners agreed to retrieve a repaired ambulance unit from Hattiesburg, but
informed his supervisor, provisional fire chief Kenneth Moore, that he first had to
attend a speaking engagement with a ladies’ group that would last approximately
thirty minutes. At 1:08 p.m. that day, Jennifer Glorioso, the wife of Fire Equipment
Operator Glorioso (hereinafter referred to as “FEO Glorioso”), photographed Mr.
Meiners sitting at a table at the La Madeleine restaurant with his wife and his lawyer.
She later sent a text message containing this photograph to her husband.
* Retired Judge James Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice pro tempore, sitting for the vacancy in
Louisiana Supreme Court District 4.

At 2:30 p.m., District Fire Chief Brady Anderson advised Chief Moore that Mr.
Meiners was not yet back from his meeting and offered to pick up the ambulance
himself. Chief Moore declined Mr. Anderson’s offer.
At 2:37 p.m., Chief Moore called Mr. Meiners and inquired as to his
whereabouts. Mr. Meiners advised Chief Moore that he was en route back to the
station. Mr. Meiners reported to Chief Moore’s office at 3:00 p.m., at which time
Chief Moore gave Mr. Meiners the address to the ambulance repair shop in
Hattiesburg. Chief Moore also asked Mr. Meiners about his meeting with the ladies’
group. Mr. Meiners told Chief Moore that “they were just asking me about my career
and what we did here at Fire District 4 . . . I’m not ever going to do that again.”
At 3:07 p.m., Chief Moore received a text message from an unknown number
that contained a photograph of Mr. Meiners taken at the restaurant. When Mr.
Meiners returned, he confronted FEO Glorioso about the photograph by standing over
him and demanding that FEO Glorioso tell him who had taken the photograph.
Thereafter, on Monday, February 22, 2016, Chief Moore asked Mr. Anderson
to put together a timeline of events of that day. Chief Moore then provided a written
notice of investigation to Mr. Meiners, stating that he was “initiating an investigation
into an incident involving you in a matter which occurred on February 19, 2016,
specifically, conflicting details regarding a speaking engagement while on duty.” The
notice of investigation also stated the “persons conducting this investigation will be
Corianne Green and a PMI representative.” Chief Moore then placed Mr. Meiners
on administrative leave with pay.
Ms. Green issued a written notice of interrogation to Mr. Meiners via certified
mail on February 25, 2016,1 and issued an amended notice of interrogation to Mr.
Meiners dated February 29, 2016, setting an interrogation date and time of March 8,
1 Mr. Meiners did not retrieve the notice from his mailbox until March 16, 2016.
2

2016 at 9:00 a.m. Mr. Meiners received the amended notice on March 1 via email
from Ms. Green.
Unbeknownst to the District, Mr. Meiners conducted a “factory reset” of his
employer-issued mobile phone at 11:58 p.m. on February 29, 2016. The factory reset
permanently erased certain data, including all text messages.
On Tuesday, March 8, 2016, Mr. Meiners attended the interrogation with his
counsel, Mr. Barnett. Ms. Green and the PMI representatives, Mark Waniewski and
Shannon Darder, were also present at the meeting. At the commencement of his
interrogation, Mr. Meiners was provided with a copy of the amended notice of
interrogation. During the interrogation, Mr. Meiners admitted he was at a restaurant
eating and attending a meeting with his wife and attorney at the time of the
photograph. Mr. Meiners claimed that immediately prior to going to the restaurant,
he met with a local ladies group at Pinkberry Yogurt, which is located next to the
restaurant. He could not remember how long the meeting at Pinkberry lasted nor
could he recall the identities of any of the persons at the meeting. Mr. Meiners’s
description of the meeting and involved persons was vague and general.
The date of the interrogation was also a “duty day” for Mr. Meiners.
According to the District, Mr. Meiners was required to have his District-issued phone
with him. Mr. Meiners did not bring the phone with him the day of the interrogation,
and Mr. Barnett, his counsel, stated he had advised Mr. Meiners to leave his phone
at home so its ringing would not interrupt the interrogation. Mr. Waniewski
requested that Mr. Meiners retrieve his phone and bring it to Ms. Green for
examination of messages, including text messages. Mr. Meiners agreed. Neither Mr.
Meiners nor Mr. Barnett disclosed the February 29, 2016 factory reset or that the reset
erased all text messages and other data more than a week before the interrogation.
3

That evening, Mr. Barnett emailed Ms. Green stating: “I would like to report
that I met again with Chief Meiners this afternoon and he has checked his cellphone
and that there are no phone calls or text registered on February 19.” Ms. Green
responded to Mr. Barnett and requested Mr. Meiners bring his cellphone to her as
requested at the interrogation. On Friday, March 11, 2016, Mr. Meiners brought his
cellphone to Ms. Green in a sealed envelope.
Ms. Green sent Mr. Meiners’s telephone to a third-party expert, Data Recovery,
to determine whether text messages from February 19, 2016 had been deleted. On
April 1, 2016, Data Recovery advised Ms. Green that Mr. Meiners had conducted a
factory reset on the phone on March 1, 2016.
On April 12, 2016, Ms. Green issued a written Notice of Pre-Disciplinary
Hearing to Mr. Meiners, which Mr. Meiners received on or about April 13, 2016.
The notice set a pre-disciplinary hearing for April 19, 2016 and listed items that could
potentially form the basis of disciplinary action against Mr. Meiners. These items
included Mr. Meiners’s untruthfulness regarding his alleged meeting with the ladies
group on February 19, 2019 and Mr. Meiners’s factory reset of his District-issued
cellphone.
The pre-disciplinary hearing occurred on April 19, 2016. On April 20, 2016,
Chief Moore issued a Letter for Final Decision to Mr. Meiners, which terminated Mr.
Meiners’s employment based on his “conduct, as described in the Notice of Pre-
Disciplinary Hearing.”2
Mr. Meiners appealed his termination to the St. Tammany Parish Fire
Protection District No. 4 Civil Service Board (“Board”), asserting procedural and
substantive violations of his rights in the District’s disciplinary action.
2 At the time of his termination, Mr. Meiners, who had been employed with the District for
32 years, was participating in DROP and approaching retirement.
4

The Board affirmed the termination. The Board found that Mr. Meiners’s
statements under oath about the Pinkberry meeting were untruthful; Mr. Meiners
improperly used his position to intimidate FEO Glorioso; and Mr. Meiners
intentionally destroyed evidence that would have been unfavorable to him:
23.
. . . .The Appointing Authority has presented evidence that,
at a minimum, casts serious doubt on Meiners’ claim that
he was at Pink Berry meeting with a ladies group before
going to La Madeleine. The question of whether Meiners
was actually at Pink Berry is a matter that is peculiarly
within his knowledge. Under these circumstances, the
burden shifted to Meiners to prove that he was at the Pink
Berry meeting. See, Artificial Lift. The Board closely
observed Meiners’ live testimony on this point and finds
that it was not credible. The Board, thus, finds that
Meiners’ February 19, 2016 statements to Chief Moore,
Meiners’ statements under oath at the March 8, 2016
interrogation, and the statements under oath that Meiners
made at his April 12, 2016 pre-disciplinary hearing were
untruthful.
24.

The Board also finds that: (a) Mr. Meiners improperly used
his position to intimidate FEO Glorioso on February 19,
2016; and (b) Meiners intentionally, and without credible
explanation, conducted a factory reset of his District 4
phone thereby intentionally destroying evidence that would
have been unfavorable to him. See Boh Bros. Const. Co. v.
Luber-Finer, Inc., 612 So.2d 270, 274 (La. Ct. 1992), writ
denied, 614 So.2d 1256 (La. 1993) (“Where a litigant fails
to produce evidence available to him and gives no
reasonable explanation, the presumption is that the
evidence would have been unfavorable to his cause.”).
Despite these findings, the Board is mindful of Chief
Moore’s live testimony that he did not use these facts as a
basis for disciplinary liability, but did consider them when
determining the degree of Meiners’ penalty.
5

In addition, the Board found Mr. Meiners’s conduct violated La. R.S. 33:25603
insofar as it involved untruthfulness to a supervisor and untruthfulness during an
investigation. In particular, the Board reasoned Mr. Meiners’s untruthfulness
“adversely affected the efficiency and operation of the department”:
Meiners was second in command at District 4. Only Chief
Moore was above him in the chain of command. Meiners
occupied a unique position of trust, i.e., he was in charge
of the entire fire department in Chief Moore’s absence. By
his untruthfulness, Meiners betrayed that trust. His
leadership position also required him to set a sterling
example for the lesser ranks. His untruthfulness to his
superior and his untruthfulness during the investigation fell
far short of this mark. His misconduct struck at the heart
of the structure and discipline necessary to a successful fire
department. It, therefore adversely affected the efficiency
and operation of the department. Meiners’ termination was
warranted.
3 La. R.S. 33:2560 provides in pertinent part:
A. The tenure of persons who have been regularly and permanently
inducted into positions of the classified service shall be during good
behavior. However, the appointing authority may remove any
employee from the service or take such disciplinary action as the
circumstances warrant in the manner provided below, for any one of
the following reasons:
1. Unwillingness or failure to perform the duties of his position in a
satisfactory manner.
2. The deliberate omission of any act that it was his duty to perform.
3. The commission or omission of any act to the prejudice of the
departmental service or contrary to the public interest or policy.
* * *
5. Conduct of a discourteous or wantonly offensive nature toward the
public or toward any municipal officer or employee, and any
dishonest, disgraceful or immoral conduct.
* * *
14. The willful violation of any provision of this Part or of any rule,
regulation or order adopted under its authority.
15. Any other act or failure to act which the board deems sufficient
to show the offender to be an unsuitable or unfit person to be
employed in the fire and police service. [emphasis added].
6

The Board also rejected Mr. Meiners’s claims that the District violated the
Fireman’s Bill Of Rights (“FBOR”).
Jason Kaufman, the Chairman of the Board, dissented and would have reversed
the District’s decision to terminate Mr. Meiners on the ground the notice of
investigation “did not state the names of the PMI representatives as it should have.”
In addition, Mr. Kaufman would have found the District failed to bear its burden of
proving Mr. Meiners was not at the Pinkberry meeting before he was photographed
at La Madeleine.
Thereafter, Mr. Meiners filed a petition for judicial review and appeal from the
Board’s decision to the 22nd Judicial District Court. The petition sought reversal of
the Board’s decision; reinstatement of back pay, benefits, emoluments, interest; and
attorney’s fees and costs on the ground the Board’s decision was without good faith
and just cause.
The district court reversed and remanded. In written reasons for judgment, the
district court found sufficient evidence existed to support the Board’s good faith and
just cause in its finding relative to the alleged procedural and due process violations.
In addition, the district court found sufficient evidence existed to support the Board’s
good faith findings that (1) Mr. Meiners was untruthful about his Pinkberry meeting
with a ladies’ group and (2) Mr. Meiners improperly used his position to intimidate
FEO Glorioso.
Nonetheless, the district court found no rational basis existed for the Board’s
finding that Mr. Meiners intentionally destroyed evidence by conducting a factory
reset of his District phone. The district court also determined the finding of
untruthfulness, standing alone, does not mandate termination, where the misconduct
did not result in a detrimental effect on the efficient and orderly operation of the fire
7

department. Finally, the district court found insufficient evidence existed to establish
a real and substantial relationship between Mr. Meiners’s improper use of his position
to intimidate FEO Glorioso and the efficient operation of the District.
The District sought supervisory review from this ruling. A five-judge panel of
the court of appeal denied the writ, with two judges dissenting. Meiners v. St.
Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 4, 19-1005 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/13/20)
(unpublished).
Upon the District’s application, we granted certiorari to consider the
correctness of the district court’s judgment. Meiners v. St. Tammany Parish Fire
Protection District No. 4, 20-00491 (La. 7/2/20), 297 So.3d 766.
DISCUSSION
In Moore v. Ware, 01-3341, p. 7-8 (La. 2/25/03), 839 So.2d 940, 945–46, we
discussed the standards of judicial review applicable to decisions of civil service
boards:
If made in good faith and statutory cause, a decision of
the civil service board cannot be disturbed on judicial
review. Smith v. Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service
Bd., 94-625 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/02/94), 649 So.2d 566;
McDonald v. City of Shreveport, 655 So.2d 588 (La.App.
2 Cir.1995). Good faith does not occur if the appointing
authority acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or as the result
of prejudice or political expediency. Martin v. City of St.
Marieville, 321 So.2d 532 (La.App. 3 Cir.1975), writ
denied, 325 So.2d 273 (La.1976). Arbitrary or capricious
means the lack of a rational basis for the action taken.
Shields v. City of Shreveport, 579 So.2d 961, 964
(La.1991); Bucknell v. United States, 422 F.2d 1055 (5
Cir.1970). The district court should accord deference to
a civil service board's factual conclusions and must not
overturn them unless they are manifestly erroneous.
Shields v. City of Shreveport, 565 So.2d 473, 480 (La.App.
2 Cir.), aff’d, 579 So.2d 961 (La.1991). Likewise, the
intermediate appellate court and our review of a civil
service board's findings of fact are limited. Shields, 579
8

So.2d at 964. Those findings are entitled to the same
weight as findings of fact made by a trial court and are not
to be overturned in the absence of manifest error. Id.; City
of Kenner v. Wool, 433 So.2d 785, 788 (La.App. 5
Cir.1983). [emphasis added].
In the instant case, the Board made three primary factual findings regarding Mr.
Meiners’s actions, which may be broadly summarized as follows:
(1) Mr. Meiners’s statements under oath regarding his
purported appearance at the Pinkberry lunch were
untruthful.
(2) Mr. Meiners improperly used his position to
intimidate FEO Glorioso on February 19, 2016.
(3) Mr. Meiners intentionally, and without credible
explanation, conducted a factory reset of his District
issued phone thereby intentionally destroying
evidence that would have been unfavorable to him.
Notably, the district court found “sufficient evidence” existed to support the
Board's good faith findings that (1) Mr. Meiners was untruthful about his Pinkberry
meeting with a ladies' group, and (2) Mr. Meiners improperly used his position to
intimidate FEO Glorioso. However, the court determined there was insufficient
evidence to support the Board’s good faith in its finding that Mr. Meiners
intentionally destroyed evidence that was unfavorable to him. In reaching this
conclusion, the court explained the reset of the phone occurred eight days prior to the
date of interrogation.
The district court went on to determine the finding of untruthfulness
concerning the Pinkberry incident did not mandate termination, “where the
misconduct did not result in a detrimental effect on the efficient and orderly operation
of the fire department.” The court pointed out there was no evidence that Mr.
Meiners left the boundaries of the District during the disputed period, and there was
no evidence he missed any calls during the entire time. The court noted there is no
9

policy prohibiting Mr. Meiners from having lunch with his wife or his attorney while
on duty. Further, the court found insufficient evidence existed to establish a real and
substantial relationship between Mr. Meiners’s improper use of his position to
intimidate FEO Glorioso and the efficient operation of the District.
Thus, although the district court found sufficient evidence to support two of the
Board’s three findings, it determined termination was “excessive and not
commensurate with the misconduct found.” As a result, the court concluded “the
Board’s decision to affirm the District’s termination was arbitrary and capricious and
without just cause.”
The District contends this court rejected similar reasoning in Marchiafava v.
Baton Rouge Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 233 La. 17, 96 So.2d 26 (1957). In that
case, the Baton Rouge Police Department terminated an officer for engaging in
prohibited political activity. The civil service board affirmed the dismissal on a
finding that there had been a participation in political activities as charged. The
officer filed a petition for judicial review. The district court stated, “I agree that
appellant was guilty of political activity, but I do not agree that what he did was just
cause for his dismissal from the service.” Therefore, the district court reversed the
termination, restored the officer to duty, and remanded the case to the civil service
board for other disciplinary action such as a suspension. This court granted writs and
reversed, explaining:
But even assuming that the charge against plaintiff might
be considered in the light of the above quoted general
provisions of paragraph 30 (which authorize either
dismissal or suspension of the employee) unquestionably
the district court was without authority to substitute, as
it did, its judgment for that of the Board (changing the
punishment meted out from dismissal to suspension).
Paragraph 31 of the Civil Service Law provides: ‘Any
Employee under classified service and any appointing
authority may appeal from any decision of the board, or
10

from any action taken by the board under the provisions of
the Section which is prejudicial to the employee or
appointing authority. * * * This hearing shall be confined
to the determination of whether the decision made by
the board was made in good faith for cause under the
provisions of this Section. No appeal to the court shall be
taken except upon these grounds.’
In this instance the Board had the right to affirm the
governing authority's dismissal of plaintiff; and clearly,
in so ruling, it acted ‘in good faith for cause’ (just as the
district judge found). Whether such cause was
sufficient to justify the dismissal was a question
determinable by the Board— not, according to the
provisions of paragraph 31, by the court.
Since we have concluded that the district court exceeded its
authority in setting aside the dismissal ruling of the Board
a consideration of the latter's exception to the jurisdiction
ratione materiae is unnecessary. [emphasis added].
Marchiafava, 233 La. at 24-25, 96 So.2d at 28-29.
The provisions of Paragraph 31, as cited by Marchiafava, are largely identical
to the current version of La. R.S. 33:2561(E), which governs the authority granted to
the district court, as reviewing court of the Board’s decision. That statute provides:
E. Any employee under classified service and any
appointing authority may appeal from any decision of the
board or from any action taken by the board under the
provisions of this Part which is prejudicial to the employee
or appointing authority. This appeal shall lie direct to the
court of original and unlimited jurisdiction in civil suits of
the parish wherein the board is domiciled. This appeal shall
be taken by serving the board, within thirty days after entry
of its decision, a written notice of appeal stating the
grounds thereof and demanding that a certified transcript
of the record or written findings of fact and all papers on
file in the office of the board affecting or relating to such
decisions be filed with the designated court. The board
shall, within ten days after the filing of the notice of
appeal, make, certify, and file the complete transcript with
the designated court, and that court thereupon shall
proceed to hear and determine the appeal in a summary
manner. This hearing shall be confined to the
determination of whether the decision made by the
board was made in good faith for cause under the
provisions of this Part or to whether a board member
11

should have or failed to recuse himself in accordance with
Subsection D of this Section. No appeal to the court shall
be taken except upon these grounds. [emphasis added].
Mr. Meiners seeks to distinguish Marchiafava on the ground the district court
in the instant case, unlike the court in Marchiafava, did not impose a different
sanction in place of the Board’s sanction. We acknowledge the district court did not
specifically impose a new sanction; rather, the district court’s judgment simply states
“remanded to the St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 4 Civil Service
Board for further proceedings in accordance with this Judgment and the written
reasons issued by the Court on November 14, 2018.” Nonetheless, the clear
implication of the court’s judgment is that termination is excessive, and the Board
must therefore revise its decision to impose a lesser sanction. Thus, although the
district court did not explicitly dictate the sanction, it defined the parameters of the
sanction as being something other than termination. This action clearly goes beyond
the authority granted to the district court under La. R.S. 33:2561(E).
This conclusion is further supported by City of Bossier City v. Vernon, 12-0078
(La. 10/16/12), 100 So.3d 301, in which the court addressed the power of a civil
service board to impose a different penalty from the appointing authority. Relying
on our opinion in Marchiafava, we stated:
This court held the district court exceeded its authority,
finding the Board, and not a reviewing court, had the
authority under Art. 14, Section 15.1(31) to decide not only
that discipline was warranted, but also that the discipline
was commensurate with the violation. Marchiafava, 233
La. at 25, 96 So.2d at 29 (“ . . . the Board had the right to
affirm the governing authority's dismissal of plaintiff; and
clearly, in so ruling, it acted ‘in good faith for cause’ (just
as the district judge found). Whether such cause was
sufficient to justify the dismissal was a question
determinable by the Board— not, according to the
provisions of paragraph 31, by the court.”). Thus, we have
previously held, in reviewing an earlier, substantially
similar version of the statute, that the Board has the
12

authority to review, and modify if appropriate, the
discipline imposed by the appointing authority, even when
the appointing authority imposed discipline in good faith
with cause. [emphasis added].
Vernon, 12-0078 at p. 9-10; 100 So.3d at 307–08.
Vernon makes it clear that while the Board has authority to modify the
discipline, the district court does not. Any attempt by the district court to usurp the
Board’s discretion and dictate the discipline to be imposed through the guise of a
remand would frustrate the legislative intent behind La. R.S. 33:2561(E) and
eviscerate our holding in Marchiafava.
Moreover, the district court’s finding that Mr. Meiners’s actions did not
interfere in any significant way with his job performance is irrelevant to the issue on
review. La. R.S. 33:2561(E) makes it clear the district court’s determination “shall
be confined to the determination of whether the decision made by the board was made
in good faith for cause under the provisions of this Part.” In reasons for judgment,
the district court clearly explained there was “sufficient evidence to support the
Board’s good faith” in finding the Pinkberry violation and the intimidation violation.
Having found the Board acted in good faith, the district court was not entitled to
weigh the relative merits of these violations in order to determine an appropriate
sanction.4
In summary, we find the district court’s action remanding this case to the
Board to impose discipline other than termination violates the clear provisions of La.
R.S. 33:2561(E). Accordingly, that judgment must be reversed.
4 We acknowledge the district court found the Board did not have a “rational basis” for
finding Mr. Meiners intentionally reset his phone to destroy evidence. However, the allegations that
Mr. Meiners reset his phone was simply part of the overall charge that Mr. Meiners was untruthful
in connection with the Pinkberry incident. The district court determined the Board acted in good
faith in finding Mr. Meiners was untruthful in this regard. Therefore, the district court obviously
concluded the Board’s finding of untruthfulness in the Pinkberry incident was supported by other
facts and did not rest solely on the allegation that he reset his phone.
13

DECREE
For the reasons assigned, we find the district court erred in remanding the case
to the Board to impose discipline other than termination. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the district court and reinstate the decision of the Board.
14

1
10/20/20
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-CC-00491
FRE
DERICK N. MEINERS, III
VS.
ST. TAMMANY PARISH FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT NO. 4, ET AL.
O
N SUPERVISORY WRIT TO THE 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY
JO
HNSON, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
B
ased on the facts of this case, I find the district court correctly reversed the
decision of the civil service board terminating Chief Meiners.
While the court should not modify the Board’s order unless it is arbitrary
capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion, appellate review of civil service
disciplinary cases is multifaceted. In part, the court must evaluate the Board’s
imposition of a particular disciplinary action to determine if it is both based on legal
cause and is commensurate with the in fraction. See Walters v. Dep't of Police of
City of New Orleans, 454 So. 2d 106, 113 (La. 1984) . Because I find the discipline
imposed was not commensurate with the infractions committed, I respectfully
dissent.
Even accepting there was sufficient evident to support the Board’s findings
relative to Chief Meiner’s actions, termination was clearly disproportionate to any
infractions committed by Chief Meiner. Chief Meiner, a 32-year veteran of the fire
department who was nearing retirement, was essentially fired for not being forthright
regarding having lunch during a work day with his wife and attorney. These actions,
even if they involved untruthfulness, should not mandate termination. Thi s is
especially true here, where there is no evidence the misconduct had a detrimental
effect on the efficient and orderly operation of the fire department. There was no

2

evidence Chief Meiners left the boundaries of the District during the relevant time
period; the evidence established he had his radio with him and operational at all
times and did not miss any calls ; and Chief Meiners complied with Chief Moore’s
order to pick up the repaired ambulance timely. Moreover, there is apparently no
policy which prohibited Chief Meiners from going to lunch within the district while
on duty; there is no specific time limit within which one is to take a lunch break; and
there is no prohibition for an employee to have lunch with a spouse or attorney.
Given these facts, it is my opinion the punishment imposed by the Board (i.e.,
termination) was not commensurate with the infractions proven. Accordingly, I
would affirm the ruling of the district court.